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ABSTRACT 
Dissertation Adviser: Dr. Michael Reich                                                                                      Heather Lanthorn 
Achieving Access to Antimalarials: Views from Ghana on the Political-Economy of Adopting and 
Implmentig the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) 
 
Abstract 
My research examines the adoption and implementation processes involved in transferring a 
global health policy into national-level practice. More specifically, I consider how high-level stakeholders 
adopted and street-level, private-sector retailers implemented the Phase I pilot of the Affordable 
Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm) between mid-2009 and end-2011. The AMFm — a large-scale program 
housed at the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria — sought to improve access to high-quality 
malaria treatment through financing and delivery strategies using the public and private sectors. To date, 
the median implementation outcomes have been considered in the Independent Evaluation 
commissioned by the Global Fund but country-level processes and nuanced considerations of outcomes 
have gone unexplored. To better understand the AMFm pilot in Ghana, I collected both quantitative and 
qualitative data between August and December 2011.  
 
To consider adoption, I first use a grounded, qualitative approach to address: What explains the 
stands taken by national stakeholders towards and against participating in the AMFm’s Phase I? I generate 
explanatory categories about the different views — stands — key stakeholders in Ghana took about 
joining Phase I. Public health goals; indirect policy goals; and concerns about personal, organization, and 
national reputation help to explain the views of different high-level stakeholders. Second, I consider the 
actions taken by different stakeholders: To what extent can a multiple-streams approach to policy 
iii 
 
adoption help clarify Ghana’s decision to join in the AMFm’s pilot? I find the Multiple-Streams Approach 
cannot be used to explain adoption of the AMFm pilot in Ghana. However, a modified version accounting 
for the global and national levels simultaneously can explain this case. 
 
To consider implementation, I ask: Do retailers in Northern Region comply with Ghana’s the 
advertised AMFm Recommended Retail Price among for-profit, private-sector retailers? And, does non-
compliance vary systematically with features of retailer structure or conduct? I find high compliance based 
on reported retail prices. I also find that neither measures of spatial competition nor having seen 
regulation enforced in the past explain the pattern of non-compliance. Rather, variation in the terminal 
supply price is highly associated with a retailer’s decision to charge at or above the RRP.  
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PREFACE, POSITIONALITY, AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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described in (Raifman et al. 2014)). During the initial conversations this study, the diversity of views 
underlying Ghana’s decision to pilot the AMFm became apparent (to me). At that point in time (see Figure 
3), Ghana had applied to join the pilot (in June 2009); subsidized, quality-assured ACTs (s-QA.ACTs) had 
been flowing into the country for four months (since August 2010); and the formal launch lay one month 
in the future (February 2011). Yet, stakeholders expressed continued uncertainty about having adopted 
the AMFm and the implementation process that lay ahead.  
 
This struck me as an intriguing story, important to understanding access to antimalarial medication in 
Ghana as well as broader issues of global health policy processes in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs). It was a story I was physically and temporally positioned to collect and evaluate and, moreover, 
one which people seemed willing to tell me.  
 
Throughout, the reader should remain aware that I am a white, female researcher that was, for this work, 
attached to both Harvard and Innovations for Poverty Action in Ghana. This has implications for which 
data I could collect myself and that which I decided, along with my survey team, not to. It may have 
implications for the data I received. (For one recent examination of the effects of a specific positionality 
— “the white-man effect” in sub-Saharan Africa — on the answers received in Sierra Leone, see (Cilliers, 
Dube, and Siddiqi 2015).) 
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PART 1:  INTRODUCTION AND METHODS 
 
Figure 1: Central Mosque in Tamale, Ghana (with street market foreground) 
[image courtesy of Rachel Strohm] 
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CHAPTER I:  BACKGROUND,  GOALS,  AND STRUCTURE  
Of all continents, SSA suffers the heaviest burden of malaria, with over 77% of global malaria cases and 
90% of all global malaria deaths (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2014).* Reducing the burden of malaria 
requires, in part, increasing access to effective antimalarial treatment (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 
2014). Starting in 2010, global health leaders trialed a new approach to improving access to malaria 
treatment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This was Phase I of the Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria 
(AMFm). From mid-2010 to early-2012, this initiative enabled the financing and delivery of high-quality 
antimalarial treatment in seven selected pilot countries.† In this dissertation, I describe and analyze the 
processes of adopting and implementing the AMFm’s Phase I pilot in Ghana, with particular attention to 
the experiences of national stakeholders.  
 
This thesis constitutes a case study of adopting and implementing the AMFm in a country, bounded 
geographically by its focus on Ghana and temporally between end-2008 and end-2011. The processes of 
‘doing’ the AMFm form the thread running throughout this thesis. But why unfurl a thesis-worth of ink 
and sweat (including malarial) on a single program? Because not only did the Phase I pilot of the AMFm 
address an important and costly problem (malaria), it did so with success relative to its own goals 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012). The analyses in this thesis support this conclusion.  
 
Moreover, the AMFm represented an “innovative” and controversial approach to financing and delivering 
malaria treatment (Global Fund 2008a; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Given this, global health 
leaders took an explicitly experimental approach to testing the new mechanism, intended to be a proof-
of-concept learning experience to inform subsequent decision-making (Adeyi and Atun 2010). To this end, 
donors mobilized US$ 470 million to support national stakeholders to implement the initiative at scale in 
                                                          
* These figures represent the reported cases and deaths attributed to two specific malaria parasites, P. falciparum 
and P. vivax, as per the numbers provided in the most recent World Malaria Report (Global Malaria Programme, 
WHO 2014). 
 
† This includes eight national-scale pilots in seven countries: Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania 
(mainland and the semi-autonomous Zanzibar are considered as separate pilots), and Uganda. 
 
3 
seven countries, entering the public and private sector supply chains in each (Kamal-Yanni 2012). This 
scale and stated commitment to learning warrant careful analysis. The AMFm should continue to be 
analyzed, understood, and mined for lessons. 
 
This thesis is motivated by the idea that learning from the AMFm is sharpened by taking a particular tack 
to analysis, accounting for national stakeholder perspectives and actions and taking seriously big-P and 
small-p politics, economic pressures, and social relations. The AMFm was defined and designed at the 
global-level and subsequent decisions about its continuation — theoretically based on evidence produced 
through the pilot process — took place at the global level. But in the crucial interim of theory meeting the 
turf, it was national stakeholders at both the high-level and street-level that did the hard work of adoption 
and implementation during the Phase I pilot. Their work unfolded in a compelling narrative, of a contested 
but ultimately clinched high-level adoption, followed by smooth high-level implementation, and street-
level implementation that imposed some burden on implementers but ultimately met expectations.  
 
What, then, is the AMFm? In brief, the AMFm’s approached achieving access by making high-quality, 
globally recommended — but more expensive — antimalarial treatment accessible compared to the 
availability and retail cost of older and more familiar — but flaggingly effective — antimalarial 
medications. A key feature of the AMFm approach is the use of both public and private sector supply 
chains for the delivery of these treatments, thereby requiring cooperation between global and national 
public and private sectors. The AMFm’s designers predicted that increased access to the recommended 
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) through the action and interaction of both of these 
sectors would, in turn, increase use and, ultimately, reduce mortality from malaria while also delaying the 
development of parasite resistance to artemisinin.‡ 
 
                                                          
‡ ACTs include cocktails of artemisinin with a partner antimalarial (active pharmaceutical ingredient), such as 
amodiaquine (AA formulation) or lumefantrine (AL formulation). 
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This thesis is rooted in the specifics of Ghana’s efforts to make antimalarial treatment accessible through 
the AMFm mechanism — and as argued above, the AMFm is important to study deeply in its own right. 
Nevertheless, and while urging caution in generalizing from a specific case study to broad global health 
practice, I aim to generate lessons applicable beyond this country, disease, or program. The political, 
economic, and social history of a single project can shed light on how global health and development are 
approached and achieved (Keshavjee 2014).  
 
Here, this light falls on the political and technical processes, challenges, and opportunities of facilitating 
access to health commodities (here, pharmaceutical treatment) using a program designed at the global 
level but adopted nationally and implemented as locally as the (idealized) corner drug store. More 
specifically, the experience of the AMFm (re-)highlights that the views of national stakeholders matter — 
and may be divided — on global health policies that they ultimately will be the ones to adopt and 
implement at the country level, no matter where they were designed. This motivates my attention to 
national stakeholder perspectives throughout this thesis. National stakeholders face individual, 
organizational, and national risks in aligning with and carrying out global health policy, which are not 
acknowledged when viewing these processes as strictly technocratic. However, in this thesis I also show 
that a conflicted adoption phase can be followed by successful implementation — defined as meeting the 
goals set by the intervention itself — when incentives to implement as-planned are in place at the 
national-level and street-level (Matland 1995). 
 
In this introduction, I provide an overview of why the AMFm matters and what it is, contextualizing the 
initiative in a brief of global health efforts to reduce malaria from the 1940s to the 1990s. I close with the 
goals and structure of the thesis. 
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SECTION I.1:  OVERVIEW OF THE AMFM AND THESIS  
WHY FOC U S O N THE  AMFM? 
The AMFm is important to study for several reasons, including the focus of the intervention on malaria, 
the AMFm’s unprecedented approach to expanded access to treatment, the scale at which the AMFm was 
piloted, and the intention of the pilot evidence to inform decision-making. 
 
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE AMFM 
The malaria parasite remains costly to the people of Ghana in terms of lives, well-being, and resources. 
Malaria is endemic throughout Ghana and is the leading cause of under-5 child mortality, a top cause of 
all-age morbidity, and the top cause for out-patient visits in public facilities (Global Malaria Programme, 
WHO 2013; Ghana News Agency 2014).  
 
High quality treatment is necessary to reduce severe morbidity and mortality. But in SSA, access to high-
quality treatment is hindered both by the availability and affordability of the recommended 
pharmaceuticals. Ghana is not an exception. Despite this, there was uncertainty and resistance among 
some high-level stakeholders in Ghana to adopting the AMFm at the moment when this decision was 
necessary. Ghana did adopt the AMFm; not all national Ghanaian stakeholders wanted or had control over 
the AMFm. But, ultimately, Ghana implemented the initiative well at both the high-level and street-level, 
as documented by the Independent Evaluation (IndE) commissioned for the program (Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012). This previews the narrative in this thesis. Following the end of the Phase I pilot in 
2012, Ghana pursued an AMFm-like option under the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GF or 
the Global Fund) as the Private Sector Co-Payment Mechanism for ACTs (Global Fund 2013).  
 
The specific goals of the AMFm mirror the broader global-health aims of increasing access to effective 
health commodities (Conteh and Hanson 2003; Frost and Reich 2008). The AMFm was designed to 
facilitate patient access to effective antimalarial treatment. Essential public health commodities or 
technologies — health products — include easy-to-use preventatives, treatments, and diagnostics that 
meet central public health goals. Following Frost and Reich, I use access to refer to whether people are 
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aware of these products and whether the products are available, affordable, and acceptable to potential 
users (Frost and Reich 2008). This definition is in line with other multi-faceted concepts of access in the 
literature, including the one used to measure medicines access under the Millennium Development Goals 
(United Nations Development Group 2003). Facilitating access includes technical, logistical, operational, 
and financial challenges of supply chains but also has important political and social dimensions, which 
stem from, inter alia, national-level goals, street-level implementer practices, and consumer demand. 
 
THE AMFM APPROACH  
I elaborate on the design of the AMFm in Chapter IV to provide context on its adoption and 
implementation in Ghana. To follow the analyses of the responses of various national actors to the AMFm, 
it is important to understand the details of the program, how it was conceived and perceived by global 
players, and the underlying conception of how it would achieve its intended outcomes (that is, its theory 
of change (Weiss 1995)).  
 
To pursue improved ACT access, the AMFm’s operational designers relied on a suite of market 
interventions. Supply-side interventions consisted of global-level price negotiations with manufacturers 
and global-level subsidization for the high-quality antimalarial medication they produced, as well as 
national-level strengthening of monitoring on data collection efforts. The demand-side activities included, 
at the global level, a program-specific green-leaf logo applied across pilot countries to identify the high-
quality ACTs included under the AMFm as well as, nationally, in-country communication efforts to create 
awareness and preference for ACTs to treat malaria.  
 
Those components deemed “innovative” (Adeyi and Atun 2010) — even “radical” (Maxmen 2012) — 
include the global-level subsidization and logo-ing of approved antimalarial treatments, the explicit 
national-level use of the public and private sector delivery mechanisms, and the relatively “hands-off” 
(Fink et al. 2014) approach to regulating the distribution of the s-QA.ACTs (subsidized, quality-assured 
ACTs under the AMFm); importers (First-Line Buyers or FLBs) were the only supply chain actors required 
to formally commit to pass the subsidies down the supply chain to consumers (Adeyi and Atun 2010; 
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Maxmen 2012; Fink et al. 2014). Further, donor-funded approaches toward facilitating access to malaria 
treatment have historically focused on the public sector; the AMFm represents one of “the first large-
scale medical aid initiatives to partner directly with the unregulated commercial sector in [SSA]” (Maxmen 
2012). The other side of innovative, radical approaches, however, is that they are often untested, 
particularly at scale (see, among others (Frost et al. 2009)).  
 
SCALE AND INTENTION OF THE AMFM PHASE I PILOT 
This explains, in part, why the AMFm was launched first as a large-scale pilot (Phase I): to see if the theory 
could be translated into practice. To this end, in 2008, through the action of a various global stakeholders, 
the AMFm was established as a program housed at the Global Fund (Global Fund 2008a). Over the course 
of the Phase I pilot from early-2009 to late-2012, donors spent US$ 470m to pursue this effort (the AMFm) 
to improve ACT access in the seven SSA pilot countries (Kamal-Yanni 2012). As discussed further in this 
chapter as well as Chapter IV, the explicit intention of the Phase I pilot of the AMFm and the large-scale 
Independent Evaluation of this effort was to inform whether and how to pursue similar efforts in the 
future. It was, therefore, an explicit attempt to set-up for evidence-informed decision-making.  
 
OVERVIEW  OF THE  THES IS  
In this dissertation, I describe and analyze the process and outcomes of these efforts in Ghana. Using a 
variety of data sources and analytic techniques, I trace the political, economic, and social processes 
underlying the national-level adoption (Chapters IV, V and VI) and street-level§ implementation (Chapters 
VII and VIII) of the AMFm in Ghana, focusing between early 2009 to the end of 2011. More specifically, I 
consider why there was both national level support and resistance for the pilot initiative; how the initiative 
was adopted; and ACT pricing outcomes among retailers once the AMFm was adopted. I consider how 
relevant high-level stakeholders as well as street-level implementers in Ghana viewed the AMFm. 
Throughout, readers should note the tension between an initiative that involved global-level planning and 
                                                          
§ Throughout this thesis, following Pressman and Wildavsky’s study on implementation, I use the phrase “street-
level” implementers to refer to what may also be called front-line or field-level workers (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984). 
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negotiation – a central strength of the AMFm approach – and any claim to national-level ownership and 
decision-making power in the program. This is a point I return to explicitly in Chapter X.  
 
The AMFm relied on both public (government) and private distribution channels to achieve its access 
goals. Before moving forward, a note on terminology is required. In discussing the history of access to 
public health products, the private sector is an umbrella term covering a range of facilities of varying 
formality: from registered pharmacies and clinics, to shops licensed to sell over-the-counter medicines, to 
general convenience stores, informal drug shops, and mobile drug peddlers. Depending on the definition 
of private, this sector also includes NGO and mission clinics and pharmacies. Such facilities may penetrate 
farther into remote or otherwise underserved areas than a government’s health care network. In addition 
to geographic convenience, and compared to the public sector, private facilities may attract patients with 
their shorter waiting times, longer operating hours, more courteous and amenable staff, and less frequent 
stock-outs (for select examples, see (Goodman, Brieger, et al. 2007; J. M. Cohen et al. 2010; Patouillard, 
Hanson, and Goodman 2010)).  
 
To set the stage for my examination and analysis of the AMFm pilot, in the next sub-section I outline the 
history of global attention to, and efforts at, malaria control in SSA from the end of World War II through 
the late 1990s. This is to show the rise and fall of malaria on the global agenda and, therefore, why it may 
have seemed urgent to address malaria treatment access in the mid-2000s. Further, the background I 
provide on changing first-line malaria treatments should elucidate why access to high-quality and effective 
treatment remained a problem in the early 2000s.  
 
The close of World War II is not the standard point for beginning a consideration of the AMFm; such 
considerations usually jump back to ancient China and the first record of using Artemisia against malaria 
or begin recently, with the widespread deployment of ACTs as the recommended first-line treatment for 
malaria. I have two reasons for not following this norm. 
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First, rather than simply starting with the idea that antimalarial treatment is widely available in the private 
sector across SSA, I try to provide some background as to why this is so (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 
2004; Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010). Second, in the opening pages of his history of “the 
struggle against” malaria in SSA, James Webb notes that it is “a long history of well-intentioned malaria 
interventions that have been allowed to lapse” (J. L. A. Webb 2014a).  
 
In this dissertation, I examine the adoption and implementation of one malaria intervention; it is not yet 
(in December 2015) clear whether the principles and mechanisms underlying the AMFm will ultimately 
lapse and what the implications will be if it does or does not. But the reader may wish to keep this 
background — of trends in malaria control and treatment in SSA, the distribution of antimalarial treatment 
in the private sector, and the wave of started and stalled control and treatment initiatives in SSA — in 
mind will considering the AMFm as a new, innovative approach to treatment delivery and financing 
throughout this dissertation.  
 
 
SECTION I.2:  MALARIA ,  TREATMENT,  AND THE GLOBAL HEALTH AGEND A:  
1940S TO 1990S  
In the decades following WWII (as well as during the inter-war years), malaria was a priority public health 
concern around the globe. In the 1940s through the 1970s, the United States, Australia, and several 
European countries (such as Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) eliminated malaria as a 
serious health threat through large, publicly funded eradication campaigns and the application of new 
chemical weapons like dichloro- diphenyl- trichloroethane (DDT).  
 
During this period, malaria was also a global (or international) health concern. To address such cross-
border concerns, two parallel approaches were taken: (1) the large-scale application of DDT, largely under 
the auspices of the Global Malaria Eradication Program and (2) the less-organized but widespread 
distribution of antimalarial treatments. 
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From 1955 to 1969, the World Health Organization (WHO) ran its massive Global Malaria Eradication 
Program (GMEP), focused on chemically wiping out the disease in 48 selected countries that seemed ready 
to undertake and benefit socially and economically from such efforts. Many of these were newly 
independent countries, including participants in South and Southeast Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and some African islands (Packard 1997). GMEP 
envisaged a four-phase approach for each country: planning, attack (spray with DDT to disrupt 
transmission and eliminate the parasite), consolidation (find cases and treat with chloroquine (CQ), an 
“important tool in eradication” (Payne 1987)), and maintenance (Payne 1987; Packard 1997; Nájera, 
González-Silva, and Alonso 2011).** However, DDT remained the focus. 
 
The urgency around the World Health Assembly’s 1955 launch of GMEP from Mexico City was spurred 
both by excitement about the potential benefits for the newly developed DDT — given successes in Crete, 
Italy, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela — as well as the startling realization that some parasites had 
already developed resistance to this powerful chemical weapon (Packard 2010). Packard notes that “the 
governments of malarious countries were not universally enthusiastic about eradication” but found 
compelling financial and political reasons to sign on (Packard 2010). Scientists who favored eradication 
believed political resistance to be as much of an impediment to eradication efforts as parasite resistance 
to DDT (Soper 1955). Parallels with the AMFm’s beginning should be clear or become so in Chapter IV. 
 
As a result of the GMEP efforts, the national provenance of the disease became “tropical,” generally poor, 
often newly independent, and increasingly African (Packard 2010). In 1969/1970, WHO advisory panels 
recommended rolling malarial control into regular primary health care processes (Packard 2010).†† Given 
                                                          
** Given this, it is not quite accurate to say that continental SSA was excluded from GMEP but African countries 
remained in the early, planning stages of activity rather than moving to the more visible attack portion of the four-
step plan (Dalrymple 2013). 
†† At this time, 18 GMEP countries had declared malaria eradicated. These were a special subset, however, and 
should not be taken as signifying success of the program overall. Those that declared eradication at this point were 
usually rich and/or islands and/or socialist. These are: Brunei, Bulgaria, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Hungary, Jamaica, 
Mauritius, Poland, Puerto Rico, Réunion, Romania, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, the Virgin 
Islands, and Yugoslavia (Packard 2010). 
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GMEP’s phased approach, many participating countries (both those that succeeded and those that did 
not) had focused more heavily on DDT and less on systems for surveillance, case-finding and case-
management, and integrating with national primary health care. It is thus not clear what they were 
supposed to roll into their regular processes. Moreover, those policies and systems established at the end 
of the 1960s often lapsed in the 1970s and 1980s (Nájera, González-Silva, and Alonso 2011). 
 
In a largely parallel trend of malaria control that started before and continued past the large-scale 
eradication plans of GMEP, companies mass-produced CQ following WWII – first in Switzerland, then 
Czechoslovakia, then China (J. L. A. Webb 2014a). SSA manufacturers also began adding to the supply of 
CQ tablets, syrups, and injections in the late 1970s (Dodoo 2014). A “chloroquine era” stretched from the 
drug’s wide availability in the 1940s — and particularly starting in the 1960s in SSA — through the 1990s 
(Knol 2012; R-13, n.d.). During this period, CQ became “universally affordable and popular” (Knol 2012) in 
low-income countries, facilitated by inexpensive manufacturing and uncomplicated transport and storage 
(Payne 1987; Shah 2010; Knol 2012; Warhurst 2014).‡‡  
 
“CQ overtook aspirin as the drug of choice for fevers, and even aches and pains” (McGregor 1982) and “a 
village health worker with a jar of CQ” (Arrow et al. 2004) became, for better or worse, the ubiquitous 
mainstay of malaria control (McGregor 1982; Payne 1987; World Health Organization 1993; Arrow, 
Panosian, and Gelband 2004; Shah 2010). Researchers and development organizations ran trials of 
chloroquinated table salt in the late 1950s and early 1960s (in Angola, Ghana, and Tanzania) and mass 
administration of tablets from the late 1950s through the 1970s (in what is now Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) (Payne 1988; von Seidlein and Greenwood 2003; J. L. A. Webb 2014a).  
 
Some of these trials were pre-eradication pilots under the GMEP umbrella (in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda), efforts to “clean-up the human reservoir of parasites” in hopes 
                                                          
‡‡ CQ, a synthetic form of quinine, was discovered in 1934 by Johann Andersag and colleagues at Bayer Laboratories 
(Krafts, Hempelmann, and Skórska-Stania 2012). 
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that mainland SSA would one day be ready to follow GMEP’s phases towards eradication (J. L. A. Webb 
2014a). Though there is limited information about the distribution of CQ at this time, GMEP pilots closed 
in the early 1960s and CQ’s distribution thereafter “was largely uncontrolled by national or international 
interventions,” absent “a new rural health delivery system or any intervention by malaria experts” (J. L. 
A. Webb 2014a). As such, much of the action happened in the private sector, as defined above. 
 
In part, the heavy activity in the private sector followed from many newly independent governments not 
taking up the GMEP pre-eradication agenda, preferring to focus more broadly on economic development 
or on specific health efforts on their urban constituencies (J. L. A. Webb 2014a). Global malaria experts 
encouraged the on-going treatment of fevers as malaria — that is, presumptive treatment§§ — but did not 
organize broad treatment interventions (Brinkmann and Brinkmann 1991; McCombie 1996; N. J. White 
2004; Shah 2010). While governments focused on urban areas, private traders continued to distribute CQ 
to even remote rural areas through small firms and peddlers,*** fueled by an “astonishingly” (Webb 2014a) 
low price and word-of-mouth reports of its efficacy (Packard 2014; J. L. A. Webb 2014a; J. L. A. Webb 
2014b). Current debates on public versus private distribution of antimalarials should keep this historical 
reality in mind. 
 
Although researchers confirmed parasite resistance to CQ in Southeast Asia and Latin America in the 
1960s, and then in the 1970s in East Africa, SSA relied extensively on the drug from the late 1950s to the 
1990s. The chloroquine era in malaria control thus had two key features: (1) widespread use for fever 
                                                          
§§ From the 1970s, through the March 2010 release of the 2nd Edition of WHO’s Malaria Treatment Guidelines, global 
policy for malaria was presumptive treatment across the public and private sectors-- that is, to treat all malaria-like 
symptoms as malaria (World Health Organization 2010; “WHO Guidelines for the Treatment of Malaria, Second 
Edition | MMV” 2010). As the underlying epidemiology of fevers has changed over time, the likelihood of an 
antimalarial being the right answer to a fever has also changed, generally with any given fever being less likely to be 
caused by malaria than previously. 
 
*** In Ghana, one (Akan) term for such peddlers, apam pam literally translates to “store on head” (Amofah 2014). 
 
13 
prophylaxis and presumptive treatment in the public and private sectors, and (2) limited or laxly enforced 
regulation in how the drug was used (Packard 2010).††† In 1988, David Payne lamented that the: 
“as yet incalculable effects of the loss of CQ as the universal drug for malaria prophylaxis and treatment 
should alert everyone to the dangers of the uncontrolled use of drugs and should limit future 
experimentation and utilization to regimes that ensure a drug is always used to its maximum potential 
and is not compromised for financial reasons or operational expediency” (Payne 1988). 
 
In general, experts view the 1970s and 1980s as a time of limited donor funding for malaria control (World 
Health Organization 1993). Then, in the early 1990s, WHO and others made arguments for increased 
attention to and a “renewed attack on” (WHO 1993) malaria, given deteriorating control measures, rising 
mortality reports, failures of CQ, and promising advances in treating bednets with insecticides (World 
Health Organization 1993; Knol 2012).  
 
Arguments for increased attention came first through a variety of consultative and ministerial meetings, 
a World Declaration on the Control of Malaria, and the publication of a new Global Strategy on Malaria 
Control, which promoted, amongst its components, early diagnosis and prompt treatment (Kidson 1992; 
World Health Organization 1993). More broadly, the 1990s witnessed rising global attention to Africa, 
including a focus on health as a driver of economic development (World Bank 1993). This occurred for 
many reasons but recall that in the 1990s, the end of the Cold War reshaped international collaboration. 
A global public audience paid attention as the Apartheid regime fell in South Africa and a US Black Hawk 
helicopter fell in the First Battle of Mogadishu; genocides in Rwanda and Burundi captured media 
attention as a hell on earth; and AIDS raged and enraged across SSA.  
 
As the decade closed, African governments committed to fighting malaria as part of an overall 
development strategy in the Harare Declaration of 1997 and the Abuja Declaration in 2000 (Organisation 
of African Unity 1997; Organisation of African Unity 2000). Organizational and funding commitments 
followed these national political commitments, cemented by the 1998 joint launch of the Roll Back Malaria 
                                                          
††† Researchers using statistical models suggest it seems plausible that the patterns of use in SSA may have 
contributed to the appearance of resistance there (Payne 1987; Warhurst 2014). 
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(RBM) Partnership by WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) to “provide a global coordinated response to the disease” (de Savigny and Tanner 2008; Roll Back 
Malaria Partnership 2014). 
 
Following this, malaria was named as a priority disease within the Millennium Development Goals (Goal 
6) and researchers worked to demonstrate causality in a suspected reality: that malaria was caused by 
but also perpetuated poverty, implying that controlling malaria would allow economic growth (Shepard 
1990; Packard 1997; Gallup and Sachs 2001). The formation of the Global Fund and the Gates Foundation 
catalyzed a surge of dedicated funding for malaria (Global Fund 2014; “History - Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation” 2014). 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s also marked a new era in treating malaria, with ACTs as the new first-line 
treatment. This decision followed on the development of resistance to not only CQ but also sulfadoxine-
pyrimethamine (SP) and mefloquine in rapid succession after their introduction (Bloland and Ettling 1999; 
Williams, Durrheim, and Shretta 2004). This created an uncertain but hopeful environment when ACTs 
were introduced as the first-line treatment, pulled from ancient Chinese medical texts and refined through 
scientific research under Mao Zedong in the 1960s. In October 2015, Youyou Tu received the Nobel Prize 
in Medicine for her (re-)discovery of Artemisinin (NobelPrize.org 2015). 
 
WHO added Coartem© to its Model List of Essential Medicines in 2002 and pre-qualified it as the first safe, 
efficacious ACT for treating malaria in 2004 (Premji 2009). ACTs offered hope for global researchers and 
policymakers worried that malaria cases are rarely treated promptly or effectively – and when they are, 
with increasingly ineffective drugs (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004; Dalrymple 2013; Wilson 2014). 
Accordingly, endemic countries began to revise their treatment policies, often skipping over SP‡‡‡ as a 
                                                          
‡‡‡ Please refer back to page ix as a reference for acronyms and abbreviations throughout the thesis. 
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first-line treatment option and moving to directly to the effective but expensive combination of 
treatments offered in ACTs (Williams, Durrheim, and Shretta 2004; Amin et al. 2007). 
 
This dissertation is set against the background painted in broad strokes above: increasing attention and 
funding§§§ for malaria in the 1990s and 2000s, falling**** malaria burden over the same period (see Figure 
2, below, for evidence of a possible downward trend as well as the discrepancy in numbers between 
different estimations), changing national policies that mandate the use of ACTs in place of CQ despite 
constrained national budgets, high expectations for ACTs and fears about parasites developing resistance 
to it, and intensifying controversy about how to and who should prioritize and use these new funds for 
preventing, diagnosing and treating malaria (Snow et al. 2008; Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2012).  
                                                          
§§§ In Ghana, funding for malaria rose steadily over the 2000s to a peak in 2011, after which it plateaued and tapered 
slightly (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2014). 
 
**** Though the downward trend is somewhat accepted, the precise numbers are not. For 2013, WHO 
reports ~480,000 admitted cases (and 1,639,451 confirmed cases) against IHME’s estimate of 2,405,896 cases 
(Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2014; Murray et al. 2014). Reported cases were actually rising in Ghana in 
the period just before the AMFm, given increased access to testing in light of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(see, as one example, (Blanchet, Fink, and Osei-Akoto 2012)).  
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Figure 2: Estimates of malaria mortality in Ghana 2000 - 2013, from the World Health Organization and 
the Global Burden of Disease (Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation) 
 
SECTION I.3:  GOALS OF THE DISSERTATION  
In this thesis, I examine ACT access achieved through a specific globally designed mechanism (the AMFm) 
introduced for adoption and implementation in a specific country context (Ghana). To do so, I first 
consider policy transfer of the AMFm approach to access, from a global health nerve center (Geneva) to 
Ghana’s capital (Accra), its mixed reception, and its subsequent adoption by Accra-based decision-makers 
and high-level stakeholders (including, but not limited to, politicians). I then shift attention to northern 
Ghana (Tamale, in Northern Region) and the private-sector drug retailers who stocked and priced the 
AMFm-subsidized, quality-assured ACTs (s-QA.ACTs). Ghana adopted and implemented the AMFm with 
success, as validated in the IndE (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). In the rest of this thesis, I tease out 
the nuances behind the adoption and implementation processes of the AMFm pilot in Ghana. 
 
In examining the processes of transfer, adoption, and implementation, I have four principal goals, which 
fit with key lacunae in the literature. The first is straightforward: documentation. The details of the 
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AMFM’s unfolding in Ghana have been only cursorily recorded to date, in the IndE and in a piece on the 
high-level implementation work partially orchestrated by Ghana’s National Malaria Control Program 
(NMCP) (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; K. L. Malm et al. 2013). Some of the processes and 
viewpoints considered in this dissertation are not the sort that always become public or become the 
subject of academic analysis. Yet they are essential to learning how to plan feasible programs and policies.  
 
Laying out the details is a critical task taken up in this thesis and so, therefore, is finding theory that fits 
the case rather than settling for extant theories that only account for a portion of the case material. But 
this is not an admission that practical and theoretical lessons from this case do not generalize. Rather, as 
per Lincoln and Guba, thickness of description is necessary for readers to judge whether part or all of the 
case lessons may be applicable elsewhere (Lincoln and Guba 1986).  
 
Relatedly, second, I assess and emphasize the importance of national stakeholders in global health 
programming by capturing processes and perspectives on the AMFm in Ghana. National and sub-national 
stakeholders enact programs and policies, even if designed at the global level. This implementation must 
be preceded by adoption, with national stakeholders agreeing to (or attempting to block) the program’s 
responsibilities and workload. However, the views and actions of national stakeholders (whether 
considered as high-level figures or as all citizens) are under-represented in the literature and, perhaps, 
the more general discourse around the AMFm.††††  
Views about the AMFm are distinct from reported awareness of the AMFm or a recounting of the steps 
involved in implementing the AMFm (the latter is done in detail in the IndE as well as a paper authored 
                                                          
†††† Of the approximately fifteen empirical articles published between January 2012 and July 2015 (located via a 
Google Scholar search for the keyword “affordable medicines facility” and “AMFm”) on aspects of the AMFm, only 
one (Rusk et al. 2012) documented and reported the subjective views of those involved in adoption and 
implementation about the AMFm and ACTs during Phase I (Rusk et al. 2012; Tougher et al. 2012; Ajayi, Soyannwo, 
and Akpa 2013; J. L. Cohen et al. 2013; Efunshile et al. 2013; O’Meara et al. 2013; Larson et al. 2013; M. A. Briggs et 
al. 2014; Ezenduka et al. 2014; Fink et al. 2014; Morris et al. 2014; Thomson et al. 2014; Tougher et al. 2014; Willey 
et al. 2014; Joda et al. 2015). 
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by members of Ghana’s NMCP (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; L. Malm et al. 2013)).‡‡‡‡ In this 
dissertation, by drawing on Ghanaian stakeholder perspectives from direct interviews and other data 
sources and analyzing them in more depth, I offer small counterweight to the under-representation of 
national stakeholder experiences with the AMFm, linking these with AMFm process and outcome findings. 
This includes a description, at least, of some of the risks borne by different national stakeholders in 
adopting and in implementing the AMFm. 
 
Third, I add to the evidence base on the AMFm and the extent to which its access goals were met in Ghana. 
As of July 2015, of the empirical analyses published on the AMFm, none of the single-country studies have 
focused on Ghana, though John Amuasi has on-going work using the IndE data for Ghana (Amuasi et al. 
2012). Here, I examine adoption and implementation processes in more detail, incorporating the 
perspectives of stakeholders involved in these processes as well as retail-level outcomes. I analyze the 
patterns of pricing of s-QA.ACTs, reinforcing and clarifying the findings of the IndE for Ghana.  
 
Fourth, I bring in theoretical frameworks to what has so far been a heavily empirical investigation of 
whether the AMFm achieved its goals in each of the pilot countries. I draw on theories that help shed light 
on how these goals were achieved. 
 
From the outset, I emphasize that my goal is not to critique the AMFm as an approach to antimalarial 
financing, delivery, and access. That is, this thesis is not a critique of the AMFm’s theory of change, nor of 
a pooled approach to financing and procurement, nor the use of the private sector to aid in the delivery 
of an essential health commodity. Rather, the insight and critiques I generate are on the approach taken 
to introducing and implementing the AMFm in pilot countries – and the experimental pilot approach itself.  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡ The IndE, and the stakeholder report that fed into it, report high-level views but do not analyze them; the African-
authored argument for the continuation of the AMFm beyond Phase I expresses some high-level viewpoints about 
the AMFm (Matowe and K’omolo 2011; Talisuna, Adibaku, et al. 2012; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
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SECTION I.4:  STRUCTURE OF  THE DISSERTATION  
To address these goals, I trace the AMFm through time and geographic space, down hierarchies of power 
and through the heuristic stages in the process of designing and implementing a policy. A stylized version 
of this policy process starts with the prioritization of a problem, and then the identification and selection 
of a policy solution to that problem. These solutions may be home-grown or transferred in from other 
settings. Once identified and refined, this solution can be endorsed — adopted — and then implemented 
with varying degrees of success relative to the ex-ante goals.  
 
Each stage has distinct stakeholders, decision-makers, and requisite activities which offers a useful and 
intuitive way of dividing the policy process — and a dissertation. Though different researchers present 
slightly different terms, the essence of the policy stages include: (1) priority-setting among problems and 
selection of a solution from alternative proposals; (2) adoption and decision-making; (3) implementation 
and institutional change. Ideally, this includes monitoring and then cycles around to evaluation and 
problem (re-) identification (deLeon 1999; González-Rossetti and Bossert 2000; M. J. Roberts et al. 2008).  
 
This division into policy stages — priority-setting, transfer and adoption, and implementation — provides 
a structure for this thesis. I acknowledge that some researchers question whether this model has a role 
beyond categorization – that is, whether a policy-stages model has any causal explanatory power or is 
overly linear and rigid (Sabatier 2007).§§§§ Nevertheless, the stages are heuristically useful for structure 
and analytically useful as dependent variables (González-Rossetti and Bossert 2000). It is not my intent to 
improve the heuristic, only to employ it as far as it is useful. I utilize qualitative methods to explore 
adoption and both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze implementation. 
 
                                                          
§§§§ A key issue with a stages model is where the policy itself fits in the temporal process. Policy proposals may result 
from the prioritization of a problem but a full-fledged proposal may also beget or frame the problem and fuel its 
prioritization (Wildavsky 1979). A policy proposal that launches an adoption process may be significantly re-worked 
during that time to add critical detail or those details may be left intentionally vague to gain agreement on the 
general idea, leaving the operational nuts-and-bolts to be sorted only during implementation (Matland 1995). 
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In Figure 3, I provide a timeline of the period covered in this dissertation, including the division by policy 
stage. I also show the timing of the primary data collection that contributed to this thesis. In this figure, I 
visualize how this dissertation’s chapters map onto relevant timelines: events related to malaria control 
at both the global and national level as well political-economic events in Ghana. These events are the 
topics of the narratives in Chapters IV and VII and the analysis in V, VI, and VIII. As such, not all of the 
events shown in Figure 3 will be familiar to the reader at this point in the dissertation.  
 
The vertical columns show both (1) chronological time (in the black row) as well as what is covered by (2) 
different policy stages at the global and Ghanaian levels. The rows indicate categories of information 
relevant to this thesis. Above the black timeline row, these include the chapters of the dissertation as well 
as the periods of time during which I collected the primary data that informs this thesis. Below the black 
timeline, I highlight events relating to malaria in Ghana, to Ghana’s political economy, and to global 
decision-making about malaria.  
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Figure 3: Timeline of dissertation data collection and coverage, the AMFm adoption and implementation events 
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Along with this opening in Chapter I, in Chapters II and III, I provide the context and methods of this thesis. 
In Chapter II, I discuss and justify the selection of Ghana as a case for studying the AMFm adoption and 
implementation — as well as outline its limits for the reader to bear in mind throughout. In Chapter III, I 
describe the data sources and methods of collection and organization. Though in each analysis – in 
Chapters V, VI, and VIII – I employ different theoretical frames and empirical approaches, I draw on all 
these data sources throughout and hence introduce the methods early and separate from the individual 
analyses.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into three parts, guided by the policy stages and my perception of 
the critical events in these phases (as highlighted in Figure 3 and described in more detail in Chapters IV 
and VII). The second part addresses the transfer and adoption of the AMFm, focusing on mid-2009 to mid-
2010. The third part addresses implementation, focusing on late-2010 to late-2011. The fourth and final 
part winds up, concludes, and looks forward. Both the second and third parts include what I term case 
narrative chapters that are purely descriptive and case analysis chapters, in which I attempt to make sense 
of the narrative. Chapters IV and VII are narrative; Chapters V, VI, and VIII are analytic.  
 
In the narrative chapters, I use primary data and quotations whenever possible, to allow the reader to 
follow the analyses and consider the interpretations I offer in the subsequent chapters. As possible, I try 
to use the case narratives to introduce all relevant data, such that no new data are introduced in the 
analytic chapters. Where it does not result in long tangents that distract from the narrative, I draw links 
to the broader literature. If the tendency is towards too much detail, recall how little ink has been spilled 
on local processed and Ghanaian perspectives so far in considerations of the AMFm. I have curated the 
material in Chapters IV and VII, so the reader can be assured that what I provide — I feel — serves a 
purpose in the analysis and interpretation that follows. 
 
Chapter IV begins in 2001. When I asked key informants to tell the AMFm story, they often started in 2001. 
In Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, the King of Hearts advises the White Rabbit: “when you have 
something to say, begin at the beginning and go on till you reach the end” (Carroll 1920). I take this advice 
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and the cue from the respondents to set my starting point. This lays a technical, economic, political, and 
social foundation for the analyses of Ghana’s adoption of the AMFm. In Chapter IV I describe what 
happened. In Chapters V and VI, I analyze how and why Ghana achieved certain policy outcomes under 
the AMFm and why certain obstacles arose, using an appropriate theoretical frame for each analysis.  
 
In Chapter V, I employ a grounded qualitative approach to examine initial, high-level stakeholder reactions 
to the AMFm in Accra when Geneva handed down the idea. By grounded, I mean that the categories of 
answers to research questions comes from considering the range of data itself, rather than from a pre-
defined theoretical framework (Strauss and Corbin 1997). The nature of the data is itself qualitative: 
interview transcripts, meeting minutes, and newspaper reports. The central research question I address 
is: What explains the stands taken by national stakeholders towards and against participating in the 
AMFm’s Phase I? In brief, I find that the public health goals of the AMFm as well as indirect policy goals 
and concerns about reputation help to explain the views of different high-level stakeholders. 
 
In Chapter VI, I use a theory-based qualitative approach of backwards process-tracing to examine the 
adoption of the AMFm in Ghana. By backwards process-tracing, I mean testing hypotheses from 
qualitative data — again the primary data used in this chapter — within a single case, working from the 
outcome back to the causes (Bennett and George 1997; Collier 2011). The central research question of 
this chapter is: To what extent can a multiple-streams approach to policy adoption help clarify Ghana’s 
decision to join in the AMFm’s pilot? The multiple-streams approach (MSA) draws on the work of John 
Kingdon and others to propose that policy change happens only when the right people pay attention to 
the right problem at the right political moment – and a viable, acceptable policy solution is available 
(Kingdon 1995). I also follow other researchers who suggest that MSA can be applied to adoption as well 
as agenda-setting (Lemieux 2002; Zahariadis 2007; Ridde 2009). In brief, I find that MSA only successfully 
fits the case at hand if modified to account for the global and national levels simultaneously. 
 
The pattern of case description followed by case analysis repeats in Chapters VII and VIII, where I focus 
on implementation of the AMFm in Ghana from mid-2010 through mid-2011. In Chapter VII, I describe 
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implementation at both the policy-level, in Accra, and the street-level, in and around the city of Tamale, 
the capital of Ghana’s Northern Region (for the regions of Ghana, see Figure 4) (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984). This provides a narrative bridge between adoption and implementation – as well as between Accra 
and Tamale — and also introduces Ghana’s decision to use a Recommended Retail Price (RRP) as part of 
its national-level AMFm strategy to facilitate affordability. I also introduce some relevant literature in this 
chapter. In Chapter VIII, the last analytic chapter, I use primarily quantitative data and logistic regression 
analysis to examine retailer compliance with Ghana’s chosen RRP in Tamale. The key research questions 
in these chapters are: Do retailers in Northern Region comply with Ghana’s the AMFm RRP? And, does 
non-compliance vary systematically with features of retailer structure or conduct? This aligns with and 
expands on the pricing outcomes examined in the IndE. In brief, I echo the IndE finding of high compliance 
and target median prices with the RRP, with no clear patterning to non-compliance. 
 
The final part of this thesis, Chapters IX and X, provides denouement, conclusions, and reflections. In 
Chapter IX, I provide a brief closure to the overarching case narrative, covering events from late-2011 to 
mid-2014, as the Global Fund and Ghana decided to move forward after the Phase I experimental pilot 
closed. I then conclude, in Chapter X, with a summary of the findings, the contributions of each analysis, 
and the implications of the collective findings for future practice and research.  
 
Again, the AMFm was simultaneously innovative and part of a cycle of enthusiastic global efforts to treat 
malaria in SSA; efforts that are not always sustained. In the next section, I further justify the AMFm as an 
important program to study and consider why Ghana provides a suitable case for so doing. 
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CHAPTER II:  JUSTIFYING THE AMFM ADOPTION &  
IMPLEMENTATION IN GHANA AS A CASE  
 
In this chapter, I first justify the importance of studying the AMFm at the national level and discuss some 
potential constraints on the generalizability of findings from this analysis. The reader may bear these limits 
in mind throughout. Second, I consider the aptness of Ghana as a case for studying malaria programming, 
in general, and the AMFm, in particular. 
 
SECTION II.1:  AMFM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL  
The AMFm provides an important and informative case for studying global health policy as it translates at 
the national level. I introduce it briefly here; details of the program are the subject of Chapter IV. The 
AMFm combined financing mechanisms for reducing the price of ACTs imported into selected countries 
with use of their existing public and private supply chains and regulations to deliver these imported ACTs. 
At the global level, Phase I of the AMFm mobilized a large volume of funding as well as strong opinions 
among global stakeholders on whether and how to run such a program (for one review of global 
stakeholders and processes, see (Frost et al. 2009)).  
 
In response to these opinions, GF set up Phase I of the AMFm as an explicit experiment, meant to be 
studied and analyzed to provide lessons on a critical global health question (achieving access to ACTs) 
about a critical global health problem (malaria). The global community was meaningfully uncertain about 
whether the mechanism would improve availability and affordability of ACTs and, ultimately, outcomes 
related to morbidity, mortality, and parasite resistance (Freedman 1987; Frost et al. 2009; Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012; McKenzie 2013). 
 
Relative to its scale, novelty, and import, the AMFm has received insufficient academic treatment. As a 
global health financing and delivery program, it has innovative features and may be a harbinger of future 
approaches to achieving access utilizing private markets (UNITAID 2014). To date, researchers have 
focused on a few outcomes: availability, affordability, market share, and, to a lesser extent, use. The IndE 
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of the AMFm, commissioned by GF, examines these Phase I outcomes — based on before-and-after 
comparisons with documentation of possible confounders — in detail across each SSA pilot country 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012). These findings are supplemented by additional studies, particularly 
in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda (Rusk et al. 2012; Yadav et al. 2012; J. L. Cohen et al. 2013; 
Efunshile et al. 2013; Larson et al. 2013; Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. 2013; O’Meara et al. 2013; M. A. Briggs et 
al. 2014; Fink et al. 2014; Morris et al. 2014; Thomson et al. 2014; Tougher et al. 2014; Tougher et al. 2014; 
Willey et al. 2014; Yavuz 2014; Palafox et al. 2015). However, the AMFm process, including stakeholder 
experiences of adopting and implementing the AMFm at the national level, have received scant attention 
to date, with the key exceptions noted in Chapter I (Wilson 2014). This is a serious lacuna: national-level 
stakeholders, from the high-level to the street-level, were instrumental in adopting and implementing the 
AMFm. In sum, whether or not AMFm works has been evaluated but the process of getting AMFm adopted 
and implemented has not. This thesis fits in this gap. 
 
CONSIDER ATIO NS  FOR GE NER AL IZ ABIL ITY  
Aspects of the AMFm require some caution in generalizing the lessons from this thesis to all cases of global 
health policy transfer, adoption, and implementation. I discuss these in more detail in Chapter IV. GF 
introduces a unique decision-making body into each country which receives its funds, called a Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), which makes many of the national-level decisions about all GF programs, 
relating to HIV/AIDS and TB as well as malaria. This differs from how decisions are made in some other 
global health programs.  
 
In addition, the AMFm brought together a novel array of stakeholders, involving the private sector at 
global and national levels, in order to function. This means that the tasks and implementation effort 
required of CCM under the AMFm differed from its regular processes (Woolcock 2013). Ghana provides 
an apt case to study the AMFm because of its: (1) burden from malaria and programmatic efforts to 
alleviate it, (2) potential to implement malaria programming well, and, given the array of stakeholders 
affected by a nationwide initiative involving both the public and private sectors, (3) political-economy. I 
cover the first two points in this section and the third point in the last section, considering political and 
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economic aspects in Ghana made relevant by the fact that the AMFm required both public and private 
sector actors for implementation.  
 
 
SECTION II.2:  MALARIA POLICY AND  THE AMFM IN GHANA  
 
MALARI A AND  EFFORT S  T O  LESSEN  IT S  B URDE N I N GHANA  
Malaria is a key health concern in Ghana and the national government actively engages in malaria control 
efforts. Malaria is endemic across Ghana (100% of the population is at risk), exacting heavy human and 
economic costs on households and the state (Adegoke et al. 2008; International Monetary Fund 2009; 
Gething et al. 2011). Ghanaians suffer 3.4 million confirmed cases per year,***** making malaria the top 
cause for out-patient visits, with 11.3 million visits to in public facilities reported in 2013 (Global Malaria 
Programme, WHO 2013; Ghana News Agency 2014).†††††  
 
Across Ghana over the past decade, many malaria indicators have fallen in absolute numbers but flat-
lined in terms of their relative contribution to the national disease burden (see Figure 2 for the absolute 
numbers). Through the 1990s and 2000s, malaria accounted for a similar percentage of all recorded 
outpatient visits – averaging between 35 and 40% – even though the total number of outpatient visits 
grew in the later 2000s with the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme (Adams, Darko, 
and Accorsi 2004; Blanchet, Fink, and Osei-Akoto 2012; USAID, President’s Malaria Initiative 2012). 
Similarly, while the absolute numbers of child mortality from malaria were on a downward trend across 
the first decade of the 2000s, it consistently remained the top contributor (18%) to Ghana’s under-5 
mortality rate (Apoya and Marriott 2011; Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2012). 
 
                                                          
***** This number, from WHO, broadly accords with the incidence estimates for Ghana from the Institute of Health 
Metrics and Evaluation: 2.41m (with a range from 1,293,177 to 4,322,408) (Murray et al. 2014). 
 
††††† The Government of Ghana spent about 0.5% of its Total Health Expenditure in 2009 directly on malaria (WHO 
2012; Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2012). 
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To pursue preventative and curative measures Ghana has relied heavily on outside funding, including on 
grants from GF. In 2007, GF provided about 40% of total reported funding for malaria (while the 
Government of Ghana contributed 0%) (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2008). GF’s contribution to 
fighting malaria rose to almost 50% in 2008 (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2009). Ghana has 
performed well on these grants, reflecting the administrative and implementation competence that fuels 
Ghana’s status as a donor darling (Schmitt 2008). This implied that Ghana had a reasonable chance of 
being able to implement the AMFm, making it a good case for studying the AMFm processes. 
 
Ghana had the potential to implement the new initiative well because its legal and organizational 
approach to malaria medicine aligned with the AMFm’s mechanism. In 2004, Ghana changed their 
treatment policy to make ACTs the official first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria. Further, Ghana 
declassified ACTs in 2006, allowing for legal, over-the-counter (OTC) sale in the private sector, which 
includes registered pharmacies and Licensed Chemical Shops (LCSs) (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009; 
Independent Evaluation Team 2012). LCSs are a class of retailers allowed to sell OTC medicines, 
established by the Pharmacy Act in 1994 (Pharmacy Council 1994).‡‡‡‡‡ As in much of SSA, many people in 
Ghana commonly seek malaria treatment in the private sector (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010); 
in 2009, Ghana’s NMCP estimated that 60% of Ghanaians first seek malaria treatment in the private sector 
(“Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009; Patouillard, Hanson, 
and Goodman 2010).  
 
SECTION II.3:  POLITICS AND  ECONOMICS AND DEMOG RAPHICS IN GHANA  
Ghana also presents an interesting site for studying the AMFm adoption and implementation processes 
because of its political and economic context: a democratic nation with a growing economy (during the 
focal period of this dissertation) on a continent where many countries cannot make these claims. Ghana’s 
increasingly robust democracy makes it apt for studying policy decision-making, particularly those that 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡ These are similar to the other level II facilities, particularly private Proprietary and Patent Medicine Retailers 
(PPMVs) in Nigeria; they are somewhat similar to the Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs) in Tanzania 
(Wafula, Miriti, and Goodman 2012).  
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affect the public and private sector, as such decisions can have electoral consequences. Those decisions 
also involve various interest groups, including a growing private sector as well as citizen expectations for 
growth-oriented and social-protection policies.  
 
Within SSA, Ghana is often portrayed as a success story and aspirational for much of East and West Africa 
(for examples, see (Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Crook 2011)), themselves aspiring to firm middle-income status. 
Ghana has one of the highest life expectancies in SSA (64 years), ranks 7th in SSA for good governance, and 
performs above the SSA average for adult literacy (World Bank 2013; “2013 Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG)” 2014).  
 
In terms of political context, Ghana’s Fourth Republic was established in 1992, re-instituting multi-party 
democracy that has since grown increasingly free and fair (Freedom House 2014).§§§§§ The new 
constitution established a constitutional democracy with a president and unicameral parliament, with 
power heavily concentrated in the executive, at the expense of a “tame” (Hyden 2010) and even “weak” 
(Hyden 2010) parliament, with MPs more attuned to answering their constituents than checking the 
executive (Hyden 2010; Abotsi 2013; Strohm 2015). 
 
In their work on developmental patrimonialism, Kelsall and Booth suggest that from 1981 to 1992, Ghana 
could be considered as having centralized power (and a centralized means for seeking, creating, and 
distributing rents) and a long-term view of how to invest those rents: what could be considered 
developmental patrimonialism****** (Kelsall and Booth 2010). With the creation of the Fourth Republic 
and re-introduction of elections – and therefore election cycles – Kelsall and Booth suggest that Ghana 
                                                          
§§§§§ Free and Fair is, incidentally, also the name of a Licensed Chemical Shop (LCS) in Tamale. 
 
****** The authors, taking a cue from Weber, describe patrimonialism as “markedly personalistic and clientelistic, 
governments of men, not laws” (Kelsall and Booth 2010). Developmental patrimonialism, then, is characterized by 
these features but when rent-seeking is both centralized and distributed in ways that account for the long-term, 
combined with “broadly pro-capitalist policies” – a foundation the authors suggest is destroyed by “vigorous multi-
party competition in African contexts” and the short-term views this engenders among leaders (Kelsall and Booth 
2010). 
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moved to a more federal system, with more decentralized mechanisms of extracting rents and a more 
“limited view of the rent process, as [leaders] focus their energies on short-term regime survival” (Kelsall 
and Booth 2010). The authors suggest that in this dimension, Ghana is similar to contemporary Côte 
d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Uganda, among other countries (Kelsall and Booth 2010); Tanzania and Uganda 
were part of the AMFm pilot. 
 
As in many strengthening economies and multi-party democracies, Ghana faces internal and external 
expectations on the role of the state and social contract. Over the past decade, the government has 
pushed for immediately tangible social protection policies, including strides towards universal health 
insurance coverage through its nascent National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) (Weyland 2005; Apoya 
and Marriott 2011; Abiiro and McIntyre 2012).†††††† These measures remain high among Ghana’s political 
priorities and presented challenges and opportunities for the AMFm (Whitfield 2011). Finally, as I 
elaborate in Chapter IV, this study is set in a unique moment, amidst a global economic downturn and just 
following the 2008 presidential election in Ghana, which resulted in a change in ruling power.  
 
In terms of economic context, in 2012, the World Bank re-categorized Ghana up to a lower-middle income 
country, for statistical as well as economic reasons (Moss and Majerowicz 2012). Agriculture and primary 
product exports (cocoa, gold, petroleum) have constituted the bulk of Ghana’s GDP up to 2009. However, 
economists and economic theory suggest that continued growth into firm middle-income status requires 
strengthened service and manufacturing sectors (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2012). This raises the economic and political importance of these sectors, introducing 
interest groups with claims to be heard in the discussion around adopting and implementing the AMFm.  
 
Unlike many other countries in SSA, Ghana has planned and worked to implement — though has not yet 
fully achieved — a national health insurance program coverage, demonstrating organizational and 
                                                          
†††††† NHIS coverage was incomplete in 2010, at the time of the IndE baseline for the AMFm. As such, the median 
price paid for a quality-assured ACT in the public sector at that time was non-zero, which made Ghana distinct from 
the other AMFm pilot countries, which offered free malaria care through the public sector (Tougher et al. 2012). 
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bureaucratic capabilities. Also, pressures from democratic elections, tight party competition, and the 
growing needs of the manufacturing and service sectors may not (yet) apply across the African continent.  
 
SECTION II.4:  GEOGRAPHY,  DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCI OECONOMIC STATUS IN 
GHANA  
In addition to these political and economic considerations, basic welfare variables can help place Ghana 
within the larger SSA context and, therefore, provide insight into the extent to which lessons from this 
study may apply elsewhere. To generalize lessons from this case study – of the AMFm adoption and 
implementation in Ghana – requires two geographic levels of comparison and considerations of 
representativeness. First is the extent to which the experience in Ghana reflects and can offer lessons to 
SSA – particularly for adoption. Second is the extent to which Ghana’s Northern Region represents the 
country as a whole – particularly for implementation.  
 
The welfare indicators provided below do not fully answer this question but provide an initial way of 
considering the similarities and differences between the smaller units of study and the larger units to 
which one might generalize lessons. These indicators also did not guide the selection of Tamale or Ghana 
for this study. They are simply standard ways of getting a broad-brush sense of a given context. More 
thoughtful considerations of whether the adoption and implementation processes that unfolded in Ghana 
require a detailed consideration of the infrastructural and institutional support structures available in 
Ghana and elsewhere (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Iversen and Lanthorn 2015). These institutions and 
processes are highlighted throughout this thesis. 
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In Table 1, I present key welfare indicators — such as consumption, education, and access to water and 
sanitation — for Northern Region, Ghana, and SSA, to allow for a rough demographic and socio-economic 
comparison between the three geographic levels.  
 
Figure 4: Map of Ghana and its regions, including Northern Region and its capital, Tamale 
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Table 1: Comparing Ghana and Northern Region on demographic, economic, malaria indicators 
 
In Ghana, welfare and living standards are, in general, lower in Ghana’s three northern-most regions 
(including Northern Region, see Figure 4 for a map) as compared to the Ghanaian average. For example, 
as shown in Table 1, both consumption and literacy in Northern Region are about half the Ghanaian 
average (56% and 51%, respectively).  
 
Tamale (pronounced ˈtamalɛ) was chosen for the PACT study – and therefore the site of much of the data 
included in this thesis — specifically because it was not Accra, represented a best case implementation 
scenario and thus may not yield convincing evidence that the intervention under evaluation could be 
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scaled throughout Ghana (Raifman et al. 2014). Beyond useful for this randomized evaluation, Northern 
Region more broadly provides a useful proof-of-concept site for the AMFm.  
 
Of Ghana’s three eco-epidemiological zones — northern savannah; tropical rainforest; and coastal 
savannah/mangrove swamps — Northern Region falls in the first. In the implementation chapters of this 
thesis (VII and VIII), I focus on Northern Region. Its capital, Tamale, sits at an altitude of 180 meters above 
sea level. Despite being savanna-land, noted only for being “hot, flat and dusty” in Lonely Planet, Tamale 
has moderate urban transmission of malaria, with higher transmission in its rural surrounds (P. Briggs 
2007; Gething et al. 2011). Northern Region has one rainy season per year, from roughly May to 
September (McSweeny, New, and Lizcano 2008).  
 
Tamale Metropolis is one of the twenty-six districts in Northern Region and one of six Metropolitan 
Assemblies in Ghana. Sixteen percent of Northern Region’s population lives in Tamale, making the Tamale 
Metropolitan District the third largest city in Ghana, though only a quarter the size of each of the two 
largest cities, Accra and Kumasi. The main ethnic groups represented in Tamale include Dagombas, 
Gonjas, Mamprusis, Akan, and Dagaabas (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). Tamale lies about 375 miles – a 
10- to 15-hour bus-ride – north of Accra.‡‡‡‡‡‡ A spreading and merging amalgamation of villages with a 
central market and mosque, Tamale is purportedly the fastest-growing West African city (Ziem 2013). The 
city’s growth fuels and is fueled by infrastructure improvements, upgrading its airport to international 
status, building a new stadium for the 2008 Africa Cup, and becoming an outpost for Accra-based NGOs.  
 
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡ As noted in Chapter III, the specific part of the Tamale Metropolitan District and surround examined in this 
thesis is defined by an approximately 1-hour motorbike ride from the center of Tamale – roughly, 45 miles (70 
kilometers). Most captured retailers were within 30 miles (~50km) of the center of town, marked by a main market 
and mosque. The entire study area falls within what the AMFm IndE team, using the Accessibility-Remoteness Index 
of Australia, consider “highly accessible” or “accessible” (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
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Tamale is a useful location to consider the implementation of the AMFm — and the potential challenges 
faced — given its distance from Accra and the main sea ports of Ghana. This distance from where imported 
pharmaceuticals flow in, combined with the more limited infrastructure and lower population density 
found in the northern three regions of Ghana as compared to the south, make it more likely that supply 
chain problems will emerge and communication and monitoring efforts will not reach Tamale. The Tamale 
metro area covers both urban and rural areas, providing variation in infrastructure and population density 
within the study site. In some of its characteristics, such as population density, Northern Region is more 
similar to the SSA average than to the Ghanaian average. This is an important consideration when 
considering translating implementation lessons from Tamale to other settings. 
 
With this context in place, I turn to a description of the data collection, organization, and verification 
processes that generate the substance of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER III:  DATA SOURCES,  METHODS OF COLLECTIO N &  
ORGANIZATION  
SECTION III.1:  DATA SOURCES AND METH ODS OF COLLECTION  AND 
COMPILATION  
The data I use in this dissertation come from two main sources: a series of in-depth qualitative interviews 
with key informants in Accra and a series of in-depth quantitative and qualitative interviews with drug 
retailers in Tamale. I also draw on four auxiliary sources: technical documents and meeting minutes 
related to the AMFm; content analysis of news articles; household interviews; and an additional set of 
drug retailer follow-up interviews.  
 
Each chapter utilizes different combinations of these data. Chapters V, VI, and VIII rely on their own 
theoretical frameworks and analytic strategies, which I describe and justify in each respective chapter. 
Across these chapters, I rely both on key informants and the interview team to review, validate, and refine 
my interpretations. As this approach of member-checking is common across the analytic chapters, I 
include it here, in the final sub-section (Lincoln and Guba 1986).  
 
Funding for the PACT household data collection and entry, and the larger study around it, came from 
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI, formerly Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative) as part of the AMFm 
operational research. I funded all other data collection and entry. Innovations for Poverty Action, Ghana 
provided workspace in both Tamale and Accra. 
 
The interview guides both for high-level key-informant interviews and the retailers interviewers were 
reviewed as part of the overall Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval process under the PACT research 
project, which included review by Ghana Health Services (Raifman et al. 2014). These two interview guides 
generated the majority of the primary data included in this thesis. 
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IN -DEPTH  KEY  I NFORM ANT  INTERVIEW S AND  TEXT -B ASED  D ATA  
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 15 key informants (see Figure 5 for more details on 
informants). Individual interviews rather than group interviews were suitable for this work, given the 
contested nature of the adoption process under study as well as the goal of capturing and analyzing 
differing perspectives. I identified initial informants through technical documents noting them as very 
involved in the AMFm adoption process. I then identified key, active informants through snowball 
sampling, relying on prior interviews and technical documents, as is common in qualitative research 
(Bernard 2006). The total sample size reflects the total number of national stakeholders identified who 
were also willing to speak with me. 
 
Initial, in-person interviews took place between September and December 2011; identification and 
recruitment of these respondents took place throughout 2011. Most initial interviews lasted one hour 
and took place in the respondent’s office or another convenient location; as needed and as possible, I 
followed-up with these informants for further clarification and corroboration of findings, again, as is 
standard in qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba 1994). Often, the conversations that took place in late 
2011 continued over email and telephone through mid-2015, a continued dialogue that has enriched this 
dissertation and for which I am grateful. Some of these conversations also led to new contacts and 
additional, useful email exchanges. 
 
At the beginning of each interview, I established my role as a doctoral student and received verbal consent 
to conduct the interview and later use the information in an academic manuscript, which informants had 
an opportunity to review.  
 
To guide the interviews, I used a semi-structured interview schedule, focused on stakeholder views and 
actions. I took detailed notes during each interview. Between interviewing days, I adjusted the guide to 
accommodate new insights and to encourage richer discussions, following the qualitative tradition of 
initiating and using data analysis in parallel with data collection (Strauss and Corbin 1997).  
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Each key informant received a respondent code, in the form R-n.§§§§§§ I use these throughout the analysis 
to maintain the anonymity of quoted respondents. In Figure 5 below, I show the affiliation(s) of each 
respondent. CCM is the central Ghanaian decision-making body with regards to the AMFm adoption, as I 
describe in more detail in the following chapter. The “pharmacy and pharmaceutical sector” includes 
representatives from the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana (PSGH), the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of Ghana (PMAG), and private pharmacists. “Multilaterals and international NGOs” includes 
representatives of GF headquarters, the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). “Ghanaian government” includes representatives from the 
Ministry of Health (MoH), Ghana Health Service (GHS), and the National Malaria Control Program (NMCP). 
All of these are introduced in more detail in Chapter IV (Table 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Affiliations of key interview respondents (n=15) 
 
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE AMFM  
I draw on a variety of technical reports, meeting minutes, and Ghana’s application for the AMFm. Meeting 
minutes from Ghana’s CCM as well as Ghana’s AMFm application proved particularly useful. 
 
                                                          
§§§§§§ n signifies the chronological order of the first interview with a given respondent. 
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DATA ORGANIZATION 
I combined data from the in-depth interviews and the AMFm technical documents into a single narrative 
for analysis. For organization, I entered typed interview and document notes into a single spreadsheet 
column, with one sentence or complete thought per row. The text followed the chronology of the AMFm 
events, with each informant’s contribution noted in a different font-color (Grbich 1999). This generated a 
history of Ghanaian ACT policy and the AMFm deliberations that retained both facts on and stakeholders’ 
subjective views of the same events, allowing for triangulation. These are presented in Appendix A. In 
analyzing and presenting these data, I maintained the originally noted words used by interviewees or in 
documents. 
 
The period in which the interviews took place is reported in the present tense; at the time of the 
interviews, the decision to pilot had been taken and implementation was underway but GF’s decision on 
the AMFm was still a year away. In Figure 3, I present a timeline for reference.  
 
NEWS  D ATABASE  
Political and public sentiments regarding public health and malaria may influence how and why the AMFm 
was adopted in Ghana. Understanding this provides context to the AMFm adoption process.  
 
To obtain data on relevant political statements and public sentiment during the period leading to 
adoption, I compiled a database of news items from 1 November 2008 to 30 June 2009, 242 days that 
included the presidential election (28 December 2009) and President Mills’ first 100 days in office, as well 
as touchstones such as World Malaria Day. I relied on ghanaweb.com, one of Ghana’s major online news 
aggregators, which pulls from the Ghana News Agency (GNA). This is the most comprehensive source I 
found and does not have a clear political bias.******* I found n=197 unique news items with “malaria” (35 
                                                          
******* In 2014, Freedom House rated Ghana as 14/16 on “freedom of expression and belief” (Freedom House 2014). 
In its 2009 report, closer to the time period of interest for the adoption of the AMFm, Freedom House reported that 
“freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected. Numerous private radio stations 
operate, and many independent newspapers and magazines are published in Accra. However, Ghana has yet to pass 
legislation protecting freedom of information… Both the NPP and the NDC were also accused of using inflammatory 
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in 2008, 162 in 2009) and n=262 unique articles for “national health insurance” (105 in 2008, 157 in 2009). 
A search for the exact phrase “affordable medicines facility” yielded no results in 2008 or 2009; similarly, 
“AMFm” yielded no hits. 
 
This context is intrinsically helpful but also allows insight into the priorities and actions of some 
stakeholders unwilling or unable to be interviewed: President Atta-Mills, Vice President Mahama, Minister 
of Health Sipa-Yankey, and President Bill Clinton. 
 
DATA ORGANIZATION 
For coding, I transferred details of the news articles to a spreadsheet. Through an iterative process of 
open coding, I developed a series of labels to describe the use of “malaria” or “national health insurance” 
in the articles. I applied up to four labels to each news item; these are provided in detail in Appendix B, 
including example articles for each code. Because this content analysis is a peripheral dataset and analysis 
within the overall project of this thesis, I did not employ a second reviewer for this work. The full dataset 
is available on request for checks on reliability and validity of the coding.  
 
For “malaria,” I identified 11 main themes and 49 sub themes (for example, “call for prevention” may be 
a theme and “call for prevention using a bednet” and “call for prevention by keeping the environment 
clean” are sub-themes under it). I allowed each news item up to four codes, for a total of n=327 coded 
mentions. The 11 codes are: (1) a call for malaria prevention; (2) a call for malaria eradication; (3) a report 
on distribution or donation related to malaria; (4) a report on malaria’s prevalence, its incidence in out-
patient facilities, and Ghana’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals; (5) a comment on 
malaria treatment and treatment-seeking; (6) a statement linking malaria and Ghana’s economic 
development; (7) a call for domestic innovation and production related to malaria; (8) a call for additional 
resources or supplies to address malaria; (9) a report on an environmental clean-up activity related to 
                                                          
language and inciting violence in the final months of the campaign, though no significant violence resulted during 
the election itself” (Freedom House 2009). 
41 
malaria; (10) use of “malaria” as a metaphor for the common man or of common humanity†††††††; and (11) 
miscellaneous references to malaria. 
 
For “national health insurance,” I identified 19 main themes. I gave each news item up to three codes — 
the most that any article seemed to require once the codes were consolidated — for a total of n=337 
coded mentions. These are: (1) claims, appeal for prompt reimbursement; (2) claims, promise of prompt 
reimbursement; (3) coverage, report on conditions covered as well as free care to pregnant women; (4) 
coverage, call to expand the conditions or treatments covered, including considering the needs of women 
and persons living with HIV/AIDs; (5) enrollment, call to enroll or renew (including reports of enrollment 
events); (6) enrollment, reports of increased enrollment; (7) enrollment, reports that enrollment had 
increased attendance at facility; (8) enrollment, reports of increased revenue to facility through 
enrollment; (9) NHIS is an National Patriotic Part (NPP) success; (10) NPP promises to improve NHIS; (11) 
NHIS was not NPP’s idea or in line with their traditions; (12) NPP poorly implemented NHIS (not 
nationwide, not sustainable, too corrupt); (13) National Democratic Congress (NDC) promises to sustain 
and expand NHIS, including improving health infrastructure and issuing one-time premium; (14) NPP 
critiques NDC implementation; (15) NHIS is not political; (16) NHIS requires human resources; (17) 
premiums are too expensive; (18) report of someone sponsoring premiums for those who could not 
afford; and (19) miscellaneous references to NHIS. 
 
RETAILER  I NTERVIEW S A N D SPAT IAL  D ATA  
In July 2011, a team of surveyors from Innovations for Poverty Action – Ghana conducted an initial retail 
census amongst the variety of stationary drug retailers in and around Tamale: pharmacies, LCSs, and 
public and private clinics. This census was separate from any work carried out for the AMFm IndE and 
covered retailers regardless of their legal registration status.  
 
                                                          
††††††† I explain this further with examples in Appendix B. In brief, malaria can be used to represent a disease 
specifically of non-elites or, more broadly, a disease common to everyone, as mosquitoes are not particular about 
wealth, religion, or political affiliation. 
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This census covered a circular area bounded by a radius representing approximately 1-hour motorbike 
rides from the center of Tamale. All covered retailers were within 30 miles (~26 km) of the center of town, 
marked by a main market and mosque. The total sample size the distance radius and the willingness of 
respondents to participate in the interview. 
 
The entire study area falls within what the AMFm IndE team, using the Accessibility-Remoteness Index of 
Australia, considers “highly accessible” or “accessible” (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). This 
geographic location and informed consent were the only exclusion criteria used. As noted in Chapter III, 
in the initial census, we found 14 public facilities (including hospitals, clinics, and Community-based Health 
Planning zones), 9 private clinics (including hospitals, clinics, and maternity homes), 16 private, for-profit 
pharmacies, 174 LCSs, and 2 provision stores selling antimalarials. During the initial July 2011 census, the 
study team obtained a verbal expression of willingness to participate in future research and, if consent 
was granted, recorded the GPS coordinates.  
 
Of these, 14 LCSs and 153 pharmacies (88% of identified retail locations) were open, available and, 
consented to an in-depth interview. In addition, 66 retailers were added to the list over the course of the 
study period, from August to December 2011, based both on snowball sampling and new openings. With 
consent, GPS coordinates and interviews were also taken with these retailers if the shops were open; we 
interviewed all but two of these retailers (Institutional Review Board and Ethics Review Committee 
approvals are provided in Appendix C). Overall, 23 retailers could not be interviewed because the shops 
were never open during the study period or they refused interview. An additional 14 did not have s-
QA.ACT stock at the time of the interview. Of those with stock, 5 shops did not provide s-QA.ACT retail 
prices (so the number of shop observations with s-QA.ACT retail prices is n=232). Of those shop 
observations that yielded retail prices, 96% also provided supply prices.  
 
The team interviewed sixteen retailers twice in full at different points in time — usually by different 
interviewers — and one thrice during the study due to a record-keeping mix-up. To account for this, 
standard errors in the analyses in Chapter VIII are clustered at the level of the firm/shop, with n=214.  
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Judging from respondents’ information on other retailers in the area, we may have missed nine retailers 
or else could not properly match the formal name of the shop with the way the respondent described it. 
Nevertheless, as this represents a best-effort census of private-sector retailers in the catchment area, 
sampling weights are not used in the analyses of these data. 
 
I developed the semi-structured interview guide with two key aims. First, to explore specific hypotheses 
related to compliance with the RRP, drawing both on economic ideas of market competition and social 
ideas related to reputation and retailer integration into the community. Second, to align, as much as 
possible, with the larger scale IndE work, so that the IndE work provides a check on the validity and 
representativeness of the data I collected. To this end, the interview guide contained closed- and open-
ended items on the following domains: (1) Retailer characteristics and history; (2) Other retailers, 
competition and pricing decisions; (3) Expenses; (4) Sales practices and customer relations; (5) Monitoring 
and regulation; (6) Consumer preference and malaria medication; (7) Stock audit of antimalarials, 
including volume and wholesale and retail prices; (8) Stocking decisions; (9) Suppliers; (10) the AMFm 
awareness and perceptions; and (11) the AMFm stocking and pricing. The questionnaire was first modeled 
after the monitoring questionnaire developed for use by the Pharmacy Council in tracking the AMFm in 
Ghana. The domains largely overlap with the questionnaire used in the AMFm IndE, which was in turn 
based on the ACTWatch© questionnaire (Shewchuk et al. 2011; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
A team of four surveyors carried out these semi-structured interviews on the premises of each of the drug 
retailers. Because of concerns about whether retailers would trust a white researcher, I was not present 
during any of these interviews. Before each interview, the surveyor informed the respondent of the 
organizations involved in the study, the main aims of the projects and that s/he could terminate the 
interview at any time. Thus informed, the respondent provided verbal consent if s/he was willing to 
proceed with the interview. Interviews ranged from one to four hours and, as needed, were broken into 
several sessions, to fit with the retailer’s workload. Surveyors took detailed notes during these interviews. 
In addition, surveyors noted observations about the retailer and sales during the interview. Surveyors 
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were instructed to follow the flow of the conversation rather than strictly adhering to the ordering of the 
interview guide, allowing trust and rapport to be built as suited each interview. 
 
Once every three work days, I reviewed completed questionnaires and provided written suggestions of 
new and follow-up questions to add and consider, in order to obtain richer and more complete data. Such 
revision during data collection is common in qualitative work (Bernard 2006). I revised and printed 
questionnaires accordingly; as needed, surveyors re-visited or phoned retailers for clarifications. To 
review these changes and discuss other research challenges and opportunities, I met with the survey team 
once a week.  
 
Through these meetings, for example, we dropped difficult and sensitive questions from the interview 
guide, such as about monthly expenses and licensing fees, in an effort to avoid biasing the overall results 
due to respondent discomfort. Additionally, a full worksheet on monthly expenses was dropped in favor 
of a dichotomous question asking whether revenues exceeded costs in the previous month (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Refusal to provide costing information 
 
We also added questions based on topics that came up in other interviews. These included asking about 
specific shortages of Artesunate + Amodiaquine ((AA) one ACT variant) formulations of s-QA.ACTS (the 
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subsidized, quality-assured package of ACTs available under the AMFm). In addition, we added specificity 
about what happens if a main supplier is out of s-QA.ACTs and including questions about retailers on 
motorcycles. We also added a few questions part way through reflecting the interests of organizations 
working on the AMFm in Ghana, including a question about how retailers would feel if the RRP was 
lowered from US$ 0.90 to US$ 0.60 (that is, from 1.50 Ghana to 1.00 Ghana). Note that the iterative 
process of adding and removing questions means not all of these questions were asked of all respondents. 
This mostly affected the open-ended questions about the AMFm. The final questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix D.  
 
Due to the length of the questionnaire and the small size of the interview team, collection of these data 
took place over five months, as shown in Figure 7; this period included a change from rainy to dry season 
as well as a change in the AMFm approval policy for s-QA.ACTs, as described in Chapter VIII and shown in 
the timeline in Figure 3. Due to time and human resources constraints, most retailers were only 
interviewed once over this period (we intended to interview each only once); the number of interviews 
conducted each month was subject to the same constraints. In total, we interviewed 234 different 
retailers in 251 interviews, with a total of 346 s-QA.ACT observations across these retailers (retailers 
stocked an average of 1.25 brands of s-QA.ACTs). The number of interviews and s-QA.ACT observation (an 
interview could yield no observations, depending on retailer stock and willingness to discuss stock, but 
also up to six observations, given that six brands of s-QA.ACT were available in Tamale) over the study 
period are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Number of retailer interviews and s-QA.ACT price observations completed each month in 
Tamale, Ghana 
 
 
Although 98% interviewees reported having ever stocked s-QA.ACTs, 94% stocked s-QA.ACTs at the time 
of the interview (95% in pharmacies 94.3% in LCSs). For all of Ghana, the IndE reports 90.1% of pharmacies 
and 78.4% of LCSs stocking s-QA.ACTs (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Of the respondents of the in-
depth work in Tamale, 94% provided price information about their stocked s-QA.ACTs (n=8 of these were 
only for pediatric dosages and are therefore not included in the main analysis). This compares favorably 
to the ~70% reporting the information to calculate price mark-ups reported in other work on antimalarial 
prices and mark-ups in West SSA (Benin and Nigeria) drawing on ACTWatch© data, though is less than the 
100% rate reported in the IndE (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; Palafox et al. 2015). The overall 
provision of information by respondents allowing me to calculate mark-ups on the full set of antimalarial 
stock are more similar to the findings of Palafox et al, with 72% reporting both buy and sell prices. 
 
DATA ORGANIZATION 
I entered all data into Excel©; this entry was checked against the paper questionnaires by one independent 
data entry analyst. Discrepancies were resolved between me and the analyst, with reference to the paper 
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questionnaire. Quantitative data were exported to STATA for statistical analysis and ArcGIS for spatial 
analysis (STATA (version 11.0), n.d.). I kept qualitative data in Excel© for analysis.  
 
Open-ended questions that lent themselves to becoming categorical variables were coded first by me and 
then, using a codebook, two independent coders. Where there were discrepancies in coding, which were 
rare, we discussed and came to a consensus about the coding scheme. The raw data (corrected for spelling 
and shorthand) of answers with coding are provided in Appendix E. 
 
PACT  FAC IL ITY -  AND HOU SEHOL D -BASE D I NTERVIEW  D ATA  
Household interview data were collected within a larger randomized trial assessing ACT completion (PACT, 
clinical trial NCT01722734; (Raifman et al. 2014)). To recruit participants, surveyors stationed at health 
facilities (hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and LCSs) recruited people buying malaria medication. We 
conducted follow-up home visits between 58 and 72 hours post-sale with those purchasing an ACT, as 
well as meeting other inclusion criteria and providing consent. We recruited participants from 73 of the 
facilities we had included in the July 2011 census; 85% of the sample was drawn from 14 core facilities: 5 
public hospitals and health centers, 3 private hospitals or clinics, 2 private pharmacies and 4 private LCSs.  
 
Facility-level PACT data in this dissertation focuses on the n=XXX patients recruited from private 
pharmacies and LCSs and the n=1543 that we followed-up in person. Household-level data used in this 
dissertation draws on these n=1543 interviews, conducted between 30 July 2011 and 11 October 2011. 
During these, participants answered questions about choice of malaria treatment, perceptions about 
those treatments, and awareness of the AMFm. See Appendix G for the relevant questionnaire modules. 
 
There is no meaningful correlation between a retailer hosting a PACT recruiter and pricing outcomes 
reported in the retailer interviews. 
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DATA ORGANIZATION 
These data were double-entered from paper questionnaires by a data entry team with Innovations for 
Poverty Action - Ghana. Mismatched entries were compared between data entry operators and the 
original document to resolve discrepancies. These data were stored as a Stata file (STATA (version 11.0), 
n.d.); I transferred qualitative components to Excel© for coding. 
 
PACT  FOLLOW -UP RET AIL ER  INTERV IEW S  
At the end of the PACT trial, in mid-October 2011, the field manager went to each participating retailer to 
thank them and interview them about the process of working with PACT and their thoughts on the 
intervention. These are, then, a subset of retailers included in the retailer questionnaire. Sixty-five (89%) 
of these retailers consented to an interview. These follow-up interviews included Likert-scale items with 
options for open-ended elaboration. These questions covered the process of engaging with the research 
project, observations and suggestions about PACT, and observations and suggestions about ACTs more 
generally. The field manager took detailed notes of retailer responses. These questions related to the 
contents and approach of the experimental program, their implementation, and to the AMFm in general. 
In part, we based these questions on comments and concerns raised by retailers and patients throughout 
the trial. These qualitative responses are provided in full in Appendix F. 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to reiterate that the on-going AMFm research in Tamale – that is, the 
PACT project – may have made the site slightly more conducive to overall implementation of the AMFm. 
Among those retailers who did participate in PACT and consented to a follow-up, just under two-thirds 
mentioned that, following PACT, they are more diligent about keeping ACT stock and promoting ACTs to 
customers. They reported — unprompted, when reflecting on PACT — that it was hosting the PACT 
surveyors that educated them about ACTs, gave them more trust in ACTs, and encouraged them to 
maintain a stock of ACTs. Some noted that their customers, having received text messages in addition to 
a dose of ACT, came back to “testify as to the effectiveness” of the drug, which they said, in turn, further 
encouraged stocking (e.g. “people who testified on the good aspects of the drugs as a result of completing 
the dosage made us to keep more ACTs in stock” and “to be honest, it was the start of your study and the 
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subsequent positioning of a surveyor at your shop that made me to purchase ACTs, and now I have many 
varieties of green leaf drugs”) (V-52 2011; V-79 2011; V-146 2011). 
 
DATA ORGANIZATION 
Retailer responses were entered in a spreadsheet. I averaged Likert-scale type items across respondents. 
For open-ended answers, I used a process of iterative open coding to label responses with themes. Given 
that these results are not central to the analysis, I did not engage an independent coder. However, the 
reader can use the raw data provided in Appendix F to assess my coding. 
 
SECTION III.2:  REVIEWING  THE WHOLE THESIS:  MEMBER CHECKING  
Member-checking, or validation, is a means of allowing key informants and research participants to reflect 
on the researchers’ analytic interpretations (Lincoln and Guba 1994). Ensuing dialogue can allow 
researchers to refine their interpretations, expand conclusions, and inform future hypotheses for testing. 
It thus serves as a loose counterpart to specification checks in econometric analysis and can enhance the 
trustworthiness of results (Lincoln and Guba 1986). 
 
In Chapters V and VI, I draw on in-depth interviews and technical documents related to adoption as data 
sources. I shared manuscripts of these two chapters with all the key informants I could reach — all but 
two — to allow comment and flagging of factual errors relating to the independent variables in the 
analysis and/or errors in interpretation. The analyses in Chapters V and VI reflect key-informant feedback; 
I flag where discrepancies remain between my description and respondent input. 
 
In Chapter VII, I draw heavily on the retailer interviews and geo-coded data. The original survey team 
reviewed the methods and results section of this manuscript as a check against serious misinterpretations 
I may have made of the data (Lincoln and Guba 1994). As relevant, I incorporated their insights into the 
results and conclusion.  
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PART 2:  TRANSFER AND ADOPTION 
 
Figure 8: Stamp of arrival on the AMFm invitation to Ghana's Country Coordinating Mechanism 
[image courtesy of Daniel Norgbedzie] 
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CHAPTER IV:  CASE NARRATIVE -  PROGRAM TRANSFER &  
ADOPTION  
 
In this chapter, I review the descriptive case from 2001 through Ghana’s 2009 decision on joining the 
AMFm’s pilot Phase I. As noted in Chapter II, 2001 marked a global turning point in antimalarial treatments 
and a national turning point in Ghana’s democracy. With these pivots, 2001 provides a reasonable starting 
point for this narrative. The narrative is divided into two main time segments: 2001 through 2007 (Section 
IV.1) and 2008 through mid-2009 (Section IV.2). 
 
I do not intend to introduce analysis in this chapter; in fact, I strictly avoid analytic or interpretive 
statements. Throughout this chapter, I present original, descriptive data; in particular, in Section IV.2, I 
use direct quotes from key informants and from meeting minutes to capture national perspectives on the 
unfolding events of adopting the AMFm in Ghana. Appendix A provides complete details on informant 
responses and meeting minutes. Overall, I try to incorporate most of the responses during interviews to 
provide a complete picture. When a quote is not used in the narrative of this chapter, it is because a 
similar, indicative quote is already included. 
 
My goal is to weave together ample background and narrative data here, then pull the threads apart for 
analysis in Chapters V and VI. I use the several storylines and empirical sources presented in this chapter 
for the subsequent analyses, with the intent that no new data are added in the analytic chapters. 
Therefore, the reader is invited to read the story presented here knowing that I have curated the material 
as much as possible — but no further — in order to set up the analysis in Chapters V and VI and to allow 
the reader to assess whether her interpretations align with mine.  
 
A few points are particularly relevant for the analyses in Chapters V and VI. At the global level, this includes 
GF’s decision to pilot, then evaluate, the AMFm before committing beyond Phase I. It further includes the 
implementation responsibilities implied for Ghanaian stakeholders by the AMFm’s global design. At the 
national level, the 2008 presidential election immediately precedes GF’s invitation letter to Ghana for the 
52 
AMFm. Events in the 2008 election, shaped by events in the 2000 and 2004 elections, provide a backdrop 
of campaign commitments, issues around health care and insurance planning, and malaria programming. 
 
Throughout Part 2 of this dissertation — Transfer and Adoption — I identify key stakeholders in the AMFm 
adoption in Ghana positively (who was at the table) rather than normatively (who ought to have been at 
the table) (Gilson et al. 2012). That is, I analyzed people and organizations identified as key either (1) based 
on in-depth interviews during which respondents reflected on the process of adopting the AMFm in 
Ghana, or (2) as participants or speakers recorded in meetings relating to adopting the AMFm in Ghana, 
or (3) through the review of relevant newspaper articles in the period leading to adoption, as described 
in Chapter III. This is not based on frequency of mention but rather on the import given by an informant 
or data source to a stakeholder. In Table 5, presented later in the text, I detail the identified key 
stakeholders. 
 
As a consequence of identifying stakeholders in this way, some voices, such as the citizens of Ghana, are 
left out of the analysis of adoption – as they were, seemingly, left out of the adoption decision itself. In 
addition, and perhaps surprisingly, bilateral agencies, international NGOs, the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA), MoH, and individual pharmacies and LCSs all have a curtailed role (or lack one entirely) 
in the description and analysis that follow (Acheampong 2014; Nfor 2014). This is because they were not 
present or vocal in key meetings and therefore do not appear in meeting minutes or in stakeholder 
recounting of the meetings and decision-making process. In the case of one loudly quiet stakeholder — 
the US’s President’s Malaria Initiative, under the US Agency of International Development (USAID) — the 
USAID-PMI advisor from the time notes that much of PMI’s opposition to the AMFm happened at the 
global level, whereas at country level, advisors felt their job was largely to let national stakeholders lead 
(Psychas 2015).  
 
Throughout Part 2, I focus on what the identified active stakeholders did, rather than analyzing why others 
remained outside the debate. I remain agnostic to whether a stakeholder or her claims are “legitimate,” 
instead describing those who came forward with self-identified stake (Friedman and Miles 2006).  
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In the description that follows, I trace three main strands of history. First, the global and Ghanaian 
approaches to lessening the burden of malaria. Second, the political and economic changes, priorities, 
and commitments in Ghana leading to the period immediately relevant to adopting the AMFm’s Phase I. 
Third, the development of the idea of the AMFm itself, first at the global level and then transferred to 
countries invited to pilot the initiative, including Ghana. 
 
SECTION IV.1:  2001  –  2007,  DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDE A &  A DEMOCRACY  
GLOBAL  
MALARIA AND THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,  TB & MALARIA 
The Global Fund was launched in 2002 and immediately became a major stakeholder in global health. This 
was a key element in the increasing focus on — and funding for — malaria over the 2000s. Since its launch 
through 2010, GF held ten funding calls for countries and partner organizations, such as United Nations 
agencies, to submit programming ideas for financial consideration. These were standard requests for 
applications, prioritizing certain topics and requiring certain criteria (such as strengthening health 
systems). But specific approaches were left to the applying country. There was no assurance of funding.  
 
To enhance country ownership and harmonize with national health agendas, GF has required from the 
outset for grant-receiving countries to establish a Country Coordinating Mechanism, populated by 
different individuals and organizations in each country. In these multi-sectoral bodies, stakeholders come 
together to make project decisions and oversee implementation for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria 
programming (Global Fund, n.d.). Across countries, CCMs include varied compositions of government 
agencies, NGOs and businesses, and civil society groups. In some CCMs, there is notable skew towards 
representation from government or from the HIV/AIDS community (Global Fund 2008b).  
 
A CCM’s oversight and planning processes are, by design, separate from national legislative processes. 
They are meant to be independent of government. But, as one respondent described for the case of 
Ghana, this creates a tension because, “at many times, [CCM] needs the government [bureaucracy] in 
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order to move” (R-8, n.d.). That is, when those stakeholders who will be involved in implementing a 
program are not present in the decisions to adopt the program, adopted programs may not move forward 
or may do so fitfully. 
 
Malaria treatment and the origins of the AMFm: bringing global attention to a new problem 
Effective treatment is a critical element in strategies to lower malaria mortality. As noted in Chapter I, by 
the early 2000s, standard treatments were failing across Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) responded by declaring, in 2001, ACTs as the recommended first-line 
treatment for uncomplicated (non-severe, non-cerebral) malaria (World Health Organization 2010; 
Boseley 2006). Since then, 79 of the 88 countries in which P. falciparum malaria is endemic — including 
Ghana — have adopted ACTs formulations as first-line treatment. 
 
ACTs replaced less-expensive, more-stocked, more-familiar, and more user-friendly antimalarial drugs as 
the first-line treatment (Williams, Durrheim, and Shretta 2004; Buabeng et al. 2008). WHO’s policy change 
presented large implementation challenges and two key stumbling points for appropriate use of malaria 
treatment. First, the under-use of ACTs for malaria cases leads to needless mortality (Hanson et al. 2004; 
Tougher et al. 2012).  
 
Second, the mis-use of ACTs – through treating non-malarial fevers with ACTs as well as dispensers failing 
to administer and patients failing to complete the correct dosage — provides parasites an opportunity to 
develop resistance (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004; Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2010; Global 
Malaria Programme, WHO 2012). ACTs have a retail price between 10- and 20-fold more expensive‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
than older antimalarials, such as CQ and SP. In response, patients may opt for a different antimalarial or 
only buy or complete a partial ACT dose (such as a cut-apart foil blister pack).  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ ACT cost is driven by the costs of the active pharmaceutical ingredients constituting an ACT and of combining 
them into a single drug (Bosman and Mendis 2007; Amin and Snow 2005). 
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Even as the world tried to increase access to ACTs, unconfirmed reports of parasite resistance to 
artemisinin flowed out of Southeast Asia, followed by confirmatory laboratory analysis (Duffy and Sibley 
2005; Vijaykadga et al. 2006; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). But, the pharmaceutical pipeline for 
malaria treatment was not flowing with new ideas (Shah 2010). For those interested in tackling malaria 
through treatment, protecting the effectiveness of artemisinin was a high priority. 
 
Malaria treatment and the origins of the AMFm: bringing global attention to a new proposed solut ion 
The switch in first-line treatment made access to ACTs -- and appropriate use thereof -- a key concern for 
treating and beating global malaria. In response to these changes and challenges, in 2001, USAID 
requested the US Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a team to examine the economic challenges of 
global ACT access (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004; Frost and Reich 2009; Global Fund 2009b). Nobel 
Laureate in Economics Dr. Kenneth Arrow chaired this team of economists and epidemiologists (Frost and 
Reich 2009). Two linked goals drove their work: lowering malaria mortality by expanding access to ACTs 
but also reducing opportunities for the development of parasitic resistance to ACTs. 
 
In 2004, the IOM team published their recommendations as Saving Lives, Buying Time: the Economics of 
Malaria Drugs in an Age of Resistance (SLBT) (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004). The treatment-seeking 
patterns in malaria-burdened, low-income countries struck the authors as they analyzed the available 
evidence. In low- and middle-income countries, the public sector may fail to provide access to health 
products, hindered by weak supply chain organization, ineffective regulation, inadequate infrastructure, 
and insufficient retailer or consumer demand (Rockefeller Foundation, Results for Development Institute 
2008). The private sector can and does fill gaps in availability and acceptability with health products, 
although of variable quality (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010; Littrell et al. 2011). In SSA, half of 
fevers among under-5s are first treated in the private sector, suggesting that the private sector had the 
reach and operational capacity to make malaria drugs broadly available (Littrell et al. 2011).  
 
However, just because a health product is manufactured and can be made available on the market does 
not mean that individual retailers will stock it, as private providers, in general, respond more to consumer 
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demands and profit incentives than population-level health data and welfare goals. Even when private 
suppliers make health products available, profit-maximizing firms still might charge prices unaffordable 
for segments of the population. Given that health product consumers face difficulties in assessing quality 
prior to purchase and use, health products are subject to a variety of market failures, including supplier-
induced demand, supplier misinformation about quality, and price discrimination (Folland, Goodman, and 
Stano 2007; Roberts and Reich 2011).  
 
The SLBT authors considered a number of alternative solutions to the access problem. But the private 
distribution of antimalarial treatment — far-reaching though inconsistently regulated — led the team to 
conclude that two primary goals needed to be addressed: making ACTs available using all existing national 
delivery chains and making them affordable (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004). To lower prices, they 
proposed a global subsidy on quality-assured ACTs (QA.ACTs), applied high in the supply chain (a buyer 
subsidy, applied at global ACT manufacturers’ “factory gates”) (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004).  
 
This subsidy would, they hypothesized, lower retail prices to be competitive, on cost, with more-familiar 
but less-effective antimalarials In turn, the authors expected lower retail prices to improve availability 
(stocking, given less up-front costs to retailers) and affordability (price, given a lower price to the 
consumer), leading to more frequent — as well as more appropriate — use, ultimately “saving 
lives”(Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004). Cost-competitive prices might expand market-share for 
quality-assured ACTs (QA.ACTs) relative to other antimalarial treatments (especially monotherapies of 
Artesunate and partner drugs used in combination therapies§§§§§§§), delaying the development of parasite 
resistance — “buying time” for the effectiveness of artemisinin, while also allowing for the development 
of synthetic versions or alternative drugs (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004).******** Agencies could also 
                                                          
§§§§§§§ As per the IndE, “the objective of crowding out oral AMT was generally of limited importance, as the oral AMT 
market share was less than 5% at baseline except in Nigeria and Zanzibar.” In Ghana, 49% of surveyed outlets stocked 
an AMT at baseline and 41% did at endline; most of this was accounted for by private, for-profit outlets. Total AMT 
market share in Ghana was 3.6% at baseline and 2.5% at endline (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
******** Reducing the chance for resistance to developed involved gaining market-share for ACTs relative to 
artemisinin monotherapies. While this formulation poses a significant threat in Southeast Asia, it turned out not to 
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buy time for effective ACTs if lowered prices lead to more appropriate use of ACTs, following a hypothesis 
that high prices are a primary reasons that patients purchase or complete partial doses of ACTs — saving, 
sharing, or selling the remainder (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004).  
 
In SLBT, the authors used the idea of global public goods to frame access to and preservation of ACTs as 
an issue requiring global action (Kaul and Faust 2001; Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004). This grabbed 
the attention of global health and development communities, including the World Bank. For some, the 
proposal represented an attractive and “elegant” (Frost and Reich 2009) intervention to improve access 
to quality-assured ACTs while seeking to reduce the probability of parasites developing resistance to 
artemisinin (Laxminarayan, Over, and Smith 2006; Frost and Reich 2009; Laxminarayan and Gelband 
2009).†††††††† Not everyone agreed, as discussed below (Bate and Hess 2009; Frost and Reich 2009; Kamal-
Yanni 2010). Through this mechanism, both the public and private sectors could potentially benefit from 
an increased volume of less-expensive ACTs. These global disagreements anticipated later disagreements 
that played out in Ghana during adoption, though they are not the focus of my analytic work here.  
 
Global disagreement centered on whether treatment access was central for lowering malaria mortality 
and, if so, how to achieve it. The technical design for the AMFm was completed amidst this “heated” 
global debate (Frost and Reich 2009). Skeptics and critics of the SLBT proposal questioned the mechanism 
and its ability to realize targeted outcomes (Frost and Reich 2009; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
Critiques of the mechanism included: whether the global malaria community should focus on treatment 
rather than prevention; whether it was appropriate or necessary to involve the private sector in delivering 
public health; whether it was ethical to handle malaria treatment as a commodity rather than distributing 
                                                          
be as widespread in the AMFm pilot countries in SSA, with Nigeria, Ghana, and Zanzibar having oral AMTs that had 
5% or more of the market share of antimalarials (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
†††††††† As the AMFm and this dissertation largely focus on sub-Saharan Africa, I reference ‘malaria parasite’ as casual 
shorthand for the Plasmodium falciparum parasite carried by the female Anopheles mosquito, which is the dominant 
cause of SSA’s malaria and the only cause in Ghana (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2013). 
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ACTs for free; whether it was wise to make ACTs more accessible absent widespread availability of point-
of-care diagnostic testing; and whether the AMFm effectively subsidized pharmaceutical companies, 
giving them extra profits and lowering their incentive to develop new antimalarials (Laxminarayan, Over, 
and Smith 2006; Laxminarayan and Gelband 2009; Moon et al. 2009; Kamal-Yanni 2010).  
 
For the access outcomes, global actors questioned whether distributors would capture the subsidy rather 
than passing it on to patients. If the subsidy was captured in the supply chain, patients would not see 
lowered retail prices. It was further unclear if even the target retail prices (in either the public or private 
sector) were even low enough to be affordable to the poor and therefore truly improve access.  
 
For the longer-term intended outcomes, it was not clear that the assumptions linking the AMFm, access, 
and appropriate use would hold on-the-ground and lower malaria mortality. Threats to these assumptions 
included the ability of private sector retailers to appropriately dispense ACTs; the possible treatment of 
non-malarial fevers – absent point-of-care diagnostics – with ACTs; and patient willingness and ability to 
adhere to ACT regimens (Kamal-Yanni 2010; Moon et al. 2009; Laxminarayan and Gelband 2009; 
Laxminarayan, Over, and Smith 2006).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡,§§§§§§§§ Others expressed concerns that the AMFm would 
crowd-out supplies to a public sector that already experienced frequent stock-outs of antimalarial 
medication or that patients would opt for private facilities over public ones if ACTs were available.*********  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ More detailed descriptions of the early agenda-setting and policy-specification processes and debates can be 
found in works by Frost and Reich and are recapitulated in the AMFm’s IndE (Frost and Reich 2009; Frost et al. 2009; 
Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Here, I concentrate on aspects of the global debate that mirror or inform the 
debate and Ghana and provide details on the policy content that aid understanding of adoption and implementation 
in Ghana. 
 
§§§§§§§§ Key adverse effects of taking an ACT when not infected with malaria relate primarily to (1) putting off or 
foregoing the correct treatment, (2) wasted malaria resources, and (3) threats to the continued effectiveness of 
ACTs.  
 
********* For evidence on stock-outs in SSA, see e.g., (Zurovac et al. 2008; Kangwana et al. 2009; O’Connell et al. 2011; 
Sudoi et al. 2012; Githinji et al. 2013; Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. 2014). 
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THE AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FACILITY–MALARIA (AMFM): SPECIFYING ITS DESIGN 
The technical plan produced by RBM’s AMFm Task Force maintained the “spirit” (Frost and Reich 2009) of 
SLBT but packaged both supply- and demand-side interventions into three components or prongs (Figure 
9) (AMFm Task Force of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership 2007; Frost and Reich 2009; Adeyi and Atun 
2010). Prong I includes negotiations with global manufacturers to sell ACTs at public-sector prices to the 
private sector (representing reductions of 29% – 78%), as per a 2001 Memorandum of Understanding 
between WHO and Novartis to “available at cost price for distribution in the public sector of malaria-
endemic developing countries" (World Health Organization 2011; Tougher et al. 2012). Prong II includes 
both the subsidy††††††††† and the green-leaf logo applied to the AMFm ACTs as they leave the factory 
gates.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Prong III includes interventions to shape (but not control) the s-QA.ACT market, supporting 
implementation of the AMFm and the appropriate use of antimalarials (Adeyi and Atun 2010). As shown 
in Figure 9, all three prongs involved a supply-side component. However, the national-level work under 
Prong III had both demand- and supply-side activities. 
 
 
                                                          
††††††††† Most AMFm documents use the phrase ‘buyer co-payment’ in place of ‘subsidy’ as part of a rebranding effort 
to win over global actors uncertain of the AMFm’s concept and with knee-jerk reactions to the term ‘subsidy’ (Frost 
and Reich 2009). In this dissertation, I use the more familiar ‘subsidy’ for the sake of clarity, though ‘co-payment’ is 
used in the IndE and related publications. 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Given this pairing of subsidy and logo, I refer to s-QA.ACTs interchangeably as “subsidized” and “AMFm-
branded” in this dissertation. The use of a logo was promoted by the early operational research projects, such as the 
consortium for ACT private sector subsidy (CAPSS) work in Uganda and the Tibamal pilot in Tanzania (Talisuna, 
Daumerie, et al. 2012; Kedenge et al. 2013). 
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Figure 9: Design of the AMFm, including prongs and contents 
 
I present AMFm’s theory of change in Figure 10. This figure, adapted from the IndE, illustrates the 
underlying logic of how the AMFm’s designers expected the program would achieve its goals.  
 
 
61 
 
Figure 10: Theory of change for the AMFm, lightly adapted from the authors of the AMFm Independent 
Evaluation (IndE) 
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At the top of the figure are inputs. s-QA.ACTs enter national supply channels — public and private — at 
wholesale prices similar to other antimalarial medications. This was made possible through manufacturer 
price negotiations and the application of the subsidy from the AMFm fund housed at GF. Then, market 
forces (shown in the blue rectangles) drive key features of access — availability, market share, and retail 
prices of s-QA.ACTs — towards those of the other antimalarial medications (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 
2004). The pressure of competitive, local market forces is a key assumption of the AMFm’s theory of 
change; I explore this further in Chapter VIII. QA.ACT availability, relative market share, and relative price, 
also constitute the major benchmark indicators for the GF-commissioned IndE of the AMFm (Schäferhoff 
and Yamey 2011; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
To complement these market forces, countries designed Supporting Interventions of oversight 
(monitoring) and demand-generation (education and persuasion for retailers and consumers) 
mechanisms.§§§§§§§§§ These are shown in green ovals in Figure 10 and accounted for about 9% of the overall 
donor spending on the AMFm (Kamal-Yanni 2012; Willey et al. 2014). These include initiatives like:  
 advertising the AMFm green-leaf logo,  
 issuing behavior change communication about the importance of opting for ACTs over other 
antimalarial treatments,  
 developing and enforcing regulations related to the national treatment guidelines for malaria,  
 training public and private street-level workers, and,  
 as I analyze in Chapter VIII, setting and advertising an RRP.  
 
The hypothesized action channels of these measures are shown in green arrows in Figure 10. Overall, 
these Supporting Interventions constitute many of national-level implementation responsibilities for a 
country in the AMFm’s Phase I pilot.  
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§ An underlying assumption of the AMFm, especially without the demand-generating interventions, is that 
patients see all antimalarials as differentiated mainly by price and quality and that availability and affordability are 
the binding constraints on pursuing the higher-prices, high-quality option. That is, designers assumed that given a 
choice between equally priced courses of SP, a non-quality assured ACT, and an s-QA.ACT, a patient would choose 
the latter. Absent data, it is not clear this was the case. Briggs et al provide suggestive evidence from Tanzania (2012 
data) that even when SP and s-QA.ACTs were equivalently priced, a minority of patients chose ACTs (Briggs et al. 
2014). Higher patient-perceived efficacy of and satisfaction with CQ and SP were also noted in Nigeria during Phase 
I of the AMFm (Efunshile et al. 2013). 
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The elements of the AMFm are implemented against the local contextual backdrop, shown in the red 
rounded rectangles in Figure 10. These could enhance or impede — that is, they could moderate — 
progress towards reducing the malaria burden at various points. Moderating effects are indicated by 
dashed red arrows and include the influence of the health financing systems in place in different countries 
(such as the NHIS in Ghana) and other on-going programs related to malaria. Figure 10 also includes the 
broader political and economic environment and more specific issues around importation rules and tariffs. 
 
Besides seeing the expected flow of the AMFm’s influence in the theory of change diagram, it is worth 
noting that the key outcomes measured in the AMFm IndE – availability, price, and market-share, shown 
in blue rectangles – fall only midway down the expected causal chain. The precise underpinnings of this 
decision are unclear but the intended timeline for Phase I seems a likely key component (Schäferhoff and 
Yamey 2011). The main reasons for not including the household survey in the IndE to generate data on 
ACT use are cost considerations of data collection, the AMFm Phase I implementation timeline, and the 
ability of the evaluation to yield conclusive results********** (Global Fund 2010a; Global Fund 2010b). 
 
 
GHANA  
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
The date of 7 January 2001 marks an important step in the consolidation of Ghana’s democracy: Jonathan 
Kufour was inaugurated as president, enacting the first turnover of party power since the founding of the 
Fourth Republic in 1992.  
 
After gaining independence from the British in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana fell 
into a period of successive coups and government turnovers. In 1981, Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings had 
overthrown the 1979-elected government. He set up a dictatorial regime described as “quasi-military” 
                                                          
********** The meeting minutes note that “the TERG [Technical Evaluation Reference Group] advised the AMFm Ad 
Hoc Committee to be aware that the IndE alone will not yield unambiguous findings to guide decision making” 
(Global Fund 2010a). This could potentially be interpreted, in part, as risk aversion. 
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and “authoritarian–bureaucratic” (Whitfield 2009). During this time, health care and health status in 
Ghana declined, though life expectancy at birth remains steady or increasing over this period; the nation 
became one of the case study examples of the negative health effects of macroeconomic policies of the 
1980s in UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1988; Anyinam 1989; World 
Bank 2013). 
  
In 1992, Rawlings relinquished his dictatorship, resigned from the military, and ushered in Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic. He also called for free national elections – in which he ran.  
 
Rawlings represented the new NDC party, with Atta-Mills as his running mate (Kopecký 2011). Rawlings 
won both the 1992 and 1996 elections. In 2000, Kufour of the NPP, defeated NDC’s Atta-Mills and NPP 
gained a Parliamentary majority as well; NPP and Kufour bested Atta-Mills again in 2004.†††††††††† This set 
the tone for the 2008 elections, contemporary with the AMFm adoption decision. 
 
Returning to the early days of independence, in the 1960s, Ghana pursued import-substitution policies 
and indigenization / Economic Ghanaization, leading to “nascent but inefficient industry” (Whitfield 2010) 
(Boafo-Arthur 1999; Whitfield 2010; Aryeetey and Owoo 2015). Much of this eroded as trade liberalized 
and trust between the local business community and the state broke down during Rawlings’ tenure as 
dictator in the 1980s (Aryeetey and Owoo 2015). At the end of the Third Republic, as Rawlings took the 
presidency, Ghana discussed intentions to revive (better-planned) import-substitution industrialization. 
More broadly during this period, Ghana declared the national goal of attaining middle-income status by 
the year 2020 (Ghana - Vision 2020: the First Step; Moss and Majerowicz 2012). 
                                                          
†††††††††† Although Ghana is a competitive, multi-party democracy, elections so far in the Fourth Republic resemble 
a de facto two-party system, with tight races between NDC and NPP (Kopecký 2011). While both parties ultimately 
pursue similar policies, each has a distinct founding mythology dating to the colonial and immediate post-
independence period, self-described ideological image, and traditional constituencies, all of which they use to 
mobilize votes (Whitfield 2009; Ayee 2011). NDC was established in the tradition of Kwame Nkrumah, with center-
left and “populist interventionist” ideologies, and traditionally responding to “the plight of the masses,” representing 
the urban working-class, the unemployed, and the rural poor. NPP traces its foundation to J.B. Danquah and Kofi 
Busia, espouses center-right and (ethnically) elitist ideologies, and represents the urban middle- and upper-class, 
including intellectual, professional, and business elites (Lindberg and Morrison 2005; Kopecký 2011). 
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But industrial intentions faced serious barriers in the 1990s: growing aid dependency, return to short-
term, election-cycle economic planning, and general distrust between business and the state. The 
combination of in/actions during Rawlings’s military and civilian leadership meant that, by the 2000 
election, NPP (Kufour himself was a businessman) could portray NDC as anti-business and unsupportive 
of the domestic private sector (Whitfield 2010; Aryeetey and Owoo 2015).  
 
Also during the 2000 election, NPP fomented support in part by promising to “abolish” the “inhumane” 
system of health-care user-fees (NPP 2000). In place of this scheme, dubbed cash-and-carry, they would 
establish a national health insurance program (NPP 2000). User fees in Ghana had become more 
burdensome to citizens over time – acutely so in the mid-1990s, when the government shifted towards 
full cost-recovery (that is, less subsidization) for health services and medicines.  
 
In the heady days of independence, the public sector provided free health care. But economic troubles in 
the 1960s necessitated the government to introduce some fees. In the mid-1980s and again in the early 
1990s, under economic pressure as well as external pressure to pursue structural adjustment, the 
government (NDC) introduced hospital user fees (1985) and then cash-and-carry (1992). The latter 
required patients to pay a portion of all service costs and the total cost of all medicines (Boafo-Arthur 
1999; Nyonator and Kutzin 1999; Rajkotia 2007; Whitfield 2010). With these changes, public health care 
use dropped and health outcomes stagnated or worsened (Anyinam 1989; Lavy et al. 1996). 
 
While the NDC began experimenting with community-based health insurance schemes in the late 1990s, 
by the 2000 election, the costs of health care constituted a public problem and a political priority (Kingdon 
1995; Rajkotia 2007; Kusi-Ampofo et al. 2015). Once in office, NPP drafted a technical design for the NHIS 
that could pass through Parliament before the 2004 election and could be rapidly implemented nation-
wide. Party elites demanded the design embody NPP ideals and allow NPP to brand the new scheme as 
their own (Rajkotia 2007; Agyepong and Adjei 2008). From the outset, many thought the design was 
flawed and unlikely to be sustainable (ILO 2006; Rajkotia 2007; Agyepong and Adjei 2008). 
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This potentially flawed proposal went up for Parliamentary vote in mid-2003 after only a week of debate 
(National Health Insurance Act 2003). Voting for NHIS and the NHIA followed party lines – that is, when 
the NDC voted. Most NDC representatives walked out in protest; and NHIS (Act 650) passed (Rajkotia 
2007).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Implementation of Ghana’s “bold experiment” commenced during NPP’s second term 
(Apoya and Marriott 2011). NHIA was established, with the CEO appointed by the President. Pilot tests 
began in 2005, followed by scale-up in 2007 and continuation through the present. NHIS again arose as 
an issue in the 2008 election, just before the Ghana received the invitation to join the AMFm’s Phase I. 
 
MALARIA 
Like many malaria-endemic countries in the 2000s, Ghana, in 2005, implemented a revised national policy 
on malaria treatment that made ACTs (in particular, the Artesunate+Amodiaquine (AA) combination) the 
first-line treatment protocol (Williams, Durrheim, and Shretta 2004; R-7, n.d.). Shortly thereafter, it 
granted them OTC status for private retail (in both pharmacies and LCSs) (Pharmacy Council, Ministry of 
Health 2009; “Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009).  
 
At the same time, Ghana banned imports of CQ and SP, which seems to have spurred local production 
and not deterred use (“Ban on Chloroquine Still in Force” 2014). With these changes, Ghana paralleled 
many countries, which switched from CQ in the wake of increasing evidence of parasite resistance to it. 
This change was also spurred on by GF’s new rule that the antimalarial treatments it funded be WHO-
quality-assured ACTs (Williams, Durrheim, and Shretta 2004; Shretta, Adegoke, and Segbor 2007).  
 
The initial 2005 launch of the AA variety of ACTs in Ghana was not smooth. Some people experienced 
negative reactions to the new medicine, leading the media to ask questions in articles with headlines 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ To contextualize this move, note that in Ghana “for most of the time, each Member of Parliament (MP) 
operates with little guidance from the party Whip and an anomic party culture (with low party loyalty and low intra-
party deliberation) prevails. A hierarchical culture (with high loyalty and low deliberation) evolves in situations of 
‘crisis’ when the party reputation or status is being threatened and everyone is potentially adversely affected ” 
(Hyden 2010). 
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including “Artesunate Amodiaquine: A killer drug or a curer?” and the one in Figure 11, highlighting the 
side effects of the medication (Nketia 10).§§§§§§§§§§ This experience fostered some bias against AA, with 
amodiaquine – as AA is sometimes referenced — colloquially called “I-go-die-a-quick” (R-9, n.d.). This 
experience may have led to lingering distrust of the AA formulation and sometimes-cited reluctance to 
use it in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service , Ghana Health Service, and ICF Macro 2009; R-7, n.d.). 
 
In late 2005, amid controversy and blame about the quality of AA on the market and the resulting illnesses, 
the MoH temporarily withdrew AA and later relaunched it, amending the suggested first-line ACTs to 
include AA as well as Artemether+Lumefantrine (AL), and dihydroartemisinin+piperaquine (Ghana News 
Agency 2005; Yeboah 2005; USAID, President’s Malaria Initiative 2008; Ghana Statistical Service , Ghana 
Health Service, and ICF Macro 2009).  
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§ It is worth noting how some people responded to the negative press and experience of AA. The two drugs 
comprising AA were in separate pills – yellow and white h-- in the same foil blister pack (‘co-blistered’ rather than 
co-formulated as a single fixed dose), such that a patient had to take both a white pill and a yellow pill in one go to 
receive a combination therapy. But some patients decided the yellow pill was worryingly strong. In response, many 
just took the white (artemisinin) pill and skipped the yellow (amodiaquine) pill, rendering the treatment a 
monotherapy (i.e. artemisinin taken neat rather than as part of the intended cocktail) and less effective. 
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Figure 11: Ghana's initial launch of artesunate amodiaquine (AA, a variaty of ACT) as the first-line 
treatment for malaria was problematic 
 
The policy naming ACTs the first-line treatment, once relaunched, made these drugs more important in 
Ghana. It did not, however, automatically make them more accessible. Access continued to be constrained 
by limited availability, prescribing patterns, and prices. The limited contemporary, peer-reviewed 
evidence on aspects of access such as stocking and treatment is mixed and no data could be found on 
consumer preferences absent budget constraints.*********** Private facilities, particularly those outside 
                                                          
*********** In the follow-up PACT work (described in Chapter III and provided in full in Appendix F), a small set of 
responding retailers noted that the number of pills in an ACT treatment course was a potential deterrent, such as:  
 “some people complain that the ACT pills are just too many” and  
 “sometimes some patients fear too many pills” and  
  “they believe the pills are too many” and  
 “they do complain that the pills are many” and  
 “many clients do complain that the 4 pills at a time is many” and  
 “the 4 tablets of ACTs, most patients think is too much” and  
 “most people, especially from villages, believe that ACTs, because they have more tablets, means that they 
can just take some of the pills” and  
 “many clients do complain that the 4 pills at a time is many, so patients do not complete the dosage” and 
 asking if we could “do anything to reduce the number of pills from 4 pills to 2 pills or 1 pill? More people find 
it difficult to complete the dosage because it is 4 pills” each time. 
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Greater Accra, more often stocked monotherapies – of SP, CQ, Artesunate, or amodiaquine – reflecting 
medicines supply and/or demand (Adjei et al. 2008; Buabeng et al. 2008; USAID, President’s Malaria 
Initiative 2008; Dodoo et al. 2009; “Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): 
Ghana.” 2009; Buabeng et al. 2010). These sources suggest that between 2005 and 2009, only limited 
amounts of ACTs may have been stocked, prescribed, and used.  
 
While the treatment patterns described above may reflect adult care-seeking, parents often seek 
appropriate care for their children. In the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data collected in Ghana 
in 2008, focusing on surveyed households reporting children under the age of 5 having a fever in the 
previous two weeks (n=544, about 20% of the surveyed sample), 41% reported seeking care at a public 
facility (of any sort), 28% sought care at any private facility (of any sort), and 31% reported seeking no 
care. Of the 88 households in Northern Region reporting fever in the previous fortnight, about 26% did 
not seek treatment, while 44% sought care at a public facility and 30% sought care at a private facility. 
The type of treatment received for children under 5 reported to have a fever in the past two weeks is 
described in Table 2, reported in percentages. The ACT numbers are driven almost entirely by AA. 
 
 
Table 2: Type of antimalarial drugs, by type of residence and region 
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Ghana’s malaria supply chain and case management: public and private 
 
Supply chain 
In its AMFm application, Ghana’s CCM refers to the private sector as “vibrant” (“Application Form, 
Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). Elsewhere, it has been described as 
“fragmented, chaotic” (McCabe et al. 2011), opaque, and, more optimistically, as allowing 
“entrepreneurial freedom” (Seiter et al. 2009) (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009; McCabe et al. 2011). In 
terms of ACT supply chains, both vibrancy and chaos are reflected in the 150 wholesalers, 1,400 private 
pharmacies, and more than 10,000 LCSs spread across Ghana, about which there are limited data. In much 
of SSA, including Ghana, a single firm may fulfill one or more of the following functions: importing, 
wholesaling, distributing, and retailing. This contrasts with Francophone countries in SSA, which often 
have more tightly regulated domestic pharmaceutical sectors, with curtailed numbers of importers, 
wholesalers, and distributors greatly curtailed, each with clear, separate roles (African Union Commission 
2007; McCabe et al. 2011).  
 
In Ghana, non-pharmacists are permitted by law to own pharmaceutical importation and distribution 
companies as long as they employ pharmacists to supervise the supply of medicines. At the time of the 
AMFm application, PMAG had 38 members, six of whom had the capability to manufacture ACTs (whether 
or not they were doing so at that time). Of the 38 firms, 11 also have an importation wing, of whom 4 
could have potentially registered as FLBs to import under the AMFm (Asante 2014). 
 
Public sector procurement is the purview of MoH, which places large orders once or twice a year and ships 
these to its Central and Regional Medical Stores. However, this ordering pattern makes these inventory 
warehouses, with limited storage capacity, prone to stock-outs (“Application Form, Affordable Medicines 
Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). Due to stock-outs, public facilities procure up to 80% of their 
supplies from private-sector supply channels, which can legally and practically fill the gaps between 
ordered and needed drugs — “as long as cash is available” (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009) (Seiter and 
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Gyansa-Luerodt 2009; McCabe et al. 2011).††††††††††† However, cash is not always available given delays in 
government funding and NHIS reimbursements (Rockefeller Foundation, Results for Development Institute 
2008). 
 
Care-seeking and case management 
In this section, I briefly review research findings from studies focused on the time period relevant to the 
adoption of the AMFm. First, researchers analyzing two regions in southern Ghana in 1997 (and therefore 
prior to the NHIS) find that treatment and time-costs are major determinants of a household’s preferred 
provider (Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye 2004). Another study, with data collected in 2004 and 2005, reflects a 
similar finding: the use of private or informal care increased as the distance to the nearest public health 
facility increased (Ansah et al. 2009). Ansah et al, who aimed to simulate aspects of free health care in 
their study, found that reducing the direct costs of health care led to a “modest but significant” shift from 
private and informal sources of care to public health facilities. The authors could not attribute a change 
in health outcomes (specifically, anemia) to these shifted treatment-seeking patterns (Ansah et al. 2009).  
 
In a final study, conducted in southern Ghana and focused specifically on consumer preferences, 
researchers found that consumers felt that public sector health workers often had negative attitudes, 
though this factor was not significantly associated with the decision about whether to enroll in NHIS (Jehu-
Appiah et al. 2012). This finding echoes concerns about attitudes in the public sector from pre-NHIS 
studies; the authors note that “the increased service utilization that has accompanied the removal of the 
financial barrier by the NHIS has not been matched by a commensurate increase in already inadequate 
human resources, infrastructure, equipment and supplies” (Jehu-Appiah et al. 2012). Frequent stock-outs 
in the public sector may require patients who seek care in the public sector to still go to the private sector 
to obtain treatment and may, therefore, influence where patients decide to seek care first. 
 
                                                          
††††††††††† Public sector procurement from the private sector is allowed under the Procurement Act of 2003. 
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In Table 3, I provide existing data on a variety of public and private health and pharmaceutical facilities 
across Ghana to illustrate both the extent of the private sector’s reach and the overall paucity of health 
facilities in Northern Region. If health facilities were divided evenly by Ghana’s regions, 10% of facilities 
would be in Northern Region; if facilities were distributed by the population in each region, again, 10% of 
facilities would be in Northern Region. Thus, Northern Region seems to have more public and teaching 
hospitals than may be expected (mostly based in the capital of Tamale) but fewer private pharmacies or 
LCSs (McCabe et al. 2011; Ghana Health Service 2012). Unfortunately, Ghanaian health facility data are 
not always broken down by regions, so these comparisons cannot be made in all cases. 
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Table 3: Comparison of health and pharmaceutical facilities in Ghana and Northern Region, suggesting 
uneven coverage in Northern Region 
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SECTION IV.2:  NOVEMBER 2008  –  JUNE 2009,  GLOBAL ADOPTION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMFM ,  NATIONAL ELECTIONS AN D 
NATIONAL ADOPTION OF THE AMFM  
GLOBAL  
GLOBAL ADOPTION OF THE AMFM 
To adopt the AMFm’s technical plan — to endorse it and allow implementation to begin — the initiative 
needed an organizational host at the global level. In November 2008, at its 18th Board Meeting, GF agreed 
to play this role (Global Fund 2008a). Mindful of the strong but divergent global views in the absence of 
evidence from scaled programs, GF required the initial roll-out to be an explicitly experimental pilot 
(Global Fund 2008a).  
 
The Board further required an independent entity to evaluate the Phase I pilot. The Board planned to use 
the results from the IndE to inform the position of the AMFm in its portfolio beyond Phase I: “maintained, 
modified, scaled-up, or terminated” (Global Fund 2008a; Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ That is, 
the evaluation of Phase I would, in, turn, potentially inform GF’s (and the global) agenda on ACT access 
and malaria control (Global Fund 2008a; Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011).§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In its set-up, then, GF’s pilot- then-decide approach appeared a paragon of evidence-informed decision-
making. Note, however, with reference to theory of change (Figure 10), that the outcomes of affordability (price), 
availability, and market share fall in the middle of the hypothesized causal pathway. Yet part of the global 
controversy about the AMFm, which the pilot was mean to inform, was whether it could achieve its intended 
impacts. From the beginning, then, it was unclear that the IndE would produce all the evidence needed to show 
whether or not the AMFm “works” but it could provide a proof-of-concept. 
 
Note further that the benchmarks-of-success were set by on what was achievable in the allotted pilot period, rather 
than the pilot lasting to see effects that would address skeptics’ concerns. Thus, the benchmark price-point for 
“successfully” achieving affordability came from an assessment of feasible prices in allotted time rather than of 
willingness or ability to pay (personal conversations at (Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011; “Joint IOM/Center for Disease 
Dynamics, Economics & Policy Meeting ‘Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria Review and the Financing of Febrile 
Illness Management’” 2012)).  
 
§§§§§§§§§§§ How the Board would use the IndE results in decision-making was unclear. The invitation to countries to 
apply to join the AMFm pilot, sent in March 2009, read: “the Board has clearly stated that the AMFm will only be 
terminated if clear failures are identified during Phase 1” while the Phase I application announced on its cover that 
the results of the Phase I IndE “will be used by the Board to decide to proceed to a global roll-out of the AMFm” 
(Churchill 2009; “Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). 
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Piloting was a large undertaking.************ Participating countries had to implement the AMFm at 
national-scale, because in the initiative’s design ACTs flow through extant supply chains with minimal 
constraints. This required private sector participation as well as new public sector roles in coordination, 
monitoring, training, and marketing (Churchill 2009).  
 
At GF’s request, researchers at the Evidence to Policy Initiative (E2Pi) developed a set of access-related 
indicators to structure the IndE, which are shown in Table 4. These included three “outcome” criteria 
(availability, affordability, and market share against AMT) and one “impact” indicator (use) (Schäferhoff 
and Yamey 2011; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Further, E2Pi estimated realistic progress on key 
goals within the planned 18 to 24 pilot months, which set the benchmark levels for the IndE “criteria of 
success” (Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011). As noted earlier, in 2010 GF opted not to fund measurement of 
ACT use via a household survey (Global Fund 2010b). Other studies have subsequently worked to fill this 
gap (Morris et al. 2014). The categories of availability, affordability, and awareness structure the findings 
presented in Chapters VII and VIII. 
 
                                                          
************ Given this scale and scope of work, not all observers agreed with GF’s label of Phase I as a “pilot” (Paulson 
2012). If pilot studies are small-scale and time-delimited runs of an intervention for proof-of-concept and feasibility 
checks, it is not clear Phase I of the AMFm meets this definition (van Teijlingen and Hundley 2002). While Phase I is 
thus potentially a pilot-in-name-only, for the sake of brevity and consistency with GF terms, I refer to Phase I as a 
pilot. 
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Table 4: Benchmarks of success for Phase I  
 
GLOBAL INSTALLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMFM 
Before moving toward implementation in pilot countries, Prongs I and II — the high-level negotiations, 
subsidies, and logos— needed to be installed at the global level. Global stakeholders negotiated with pre-
qualified ACT manufacturers to sell to the private sector in the AMFm countries at the price-point at which 
they already sold to the public sector (Global Fund 2010c; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Given that 
GF hosted the AMFm and has clear rules about quality-assurance, it was requisite that included 
manufacturers have received WHO pre-qualification for the production of ACTs (Global Fund 2010d). At 
the time, all of these companies were based in Europe and Asia. Note that the decision for WHO to make 
the effort to test a manufacturing site for pre-qualification is in part linked with whether that site produces 
at sufficient scale. Therefore, while some Ghanaian stakeholders wanted AMFm funds to facilitate the 
pre-qualification process, local prequalification was not as serious a consideration as part of the AMFm 
funding or design itself, given its urgent timeframe. 
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To pay for the Prong II subsidies, funds from DFID††††††††††††, Gates‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡, and UNITAID went into an 
ear-marked (or ring-fenced) cache, from which GF applied the subsidy when pilot countries placed s-
QA.ACT orders (Frost et al. 2009). GF also arranged that financing for Prong III, the Supporting 
Interventions, would come through its existing grants. In each pilot country with in-progress GF grants 
that included ACT procurement, the savings realized through the subsidy were “re-programed” to fund 
the AMFm’s Supporting Interventions (represented by the ovals in Figure 10) (“Application Form, 
Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). Note that this has implications for how 
much new money a participating country would receive for piloting the AMFm§§§§§§§§§§§§, as discussed 
below in the subsection on putting together the proposal. 
 
In February 2009, the RBM convened eleven potential invitees for a “consultative workshop” to discuss 
the Phase I application process with potential applicants and to “enable all countries to make an informed, 
evidence-based country decision on whether to apply to the AMFm” (Global Fund 2009a). The head of 
Ghana’s NMCP went to this meeting to air her reservations about the AMFm (R-1, n.d.).  
 
With these details of the AMFm in place, in March 2009 GF invited CCMs of ten selected SSA countries to 
apply for Phase I (Churchill 2009; Global Fund 2012a). The application required three main tasks: (1) 
describing national pharmaceutical regulations, tariffs, and quality monitoring systems; (2) calculating 
how much grant money could be saved through ACT subsidies and thus re-programed; and (3) detailing 
the planned Supporting Interventions (Global Fund 2008a; Global Fund 2009b). 
 
                                                          
†††††††††††† The United Kingdom’s bilateral aid agency, Department for International Development 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§ In reflecting on the grant-writing process, members of NMCP note: “The AMFm grant was not entirely 
new, but part of an already existing grant — Ghana’s Global Fund Malaria Grant Round 4. The new element of the 
grant was intended to reduce the unit cost of ACTs and to re-program the savings to undertake interventions 
including training, behavior change communications, monitoring, and regulatory activities in the country” (K. L. 
Malm et al. 2013). 
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In mid-June 2009, RBM and GF convened a workshop on the AMFm monitoring and evaluation to address 
country questions, supported by global policy entrepreneurs including CHAI and Dr. Olusoji Adeyi who 
had also helped bring the AMFm idea onto the global agenda (Adeyi and Atun 2009; Frost et al. 2009; O. 
J. Sabot et al. 2009; Adeyi and Atun 2010). These included how the public sector could oversee private, 
for-profit entities and whether “weak AMFm implementation and progress [could] impact negatively 
upon” renewal of on-going GF grants (Roll Back Malaria Partnership 2009b). GF assured attendees that 
everyone understood Phase I “is a learning phase” and that the AMFm “will be globally rolled out unless 
serious design failures are identified during Phase I” (Roll Back Malaria Partnership 2009b). Potential 
failures, or red flags, corresponded to the AMFm’s IndE benchmarks (i.e. serious price violations, serious 
lack of availability, or limited crowding out of AMTs) (Roll Back Malaria Partnership 2009b).  
 
Given GF’s discretion in inviting countries to apply and guidance as countries prepared applications, a CCM 
that submitted an application to Geneva had taken the critical step in joining Phase I.************* That is, a 
submitted application had a good chance of gaining approval from GF. But not all formally invited SSA 
countries, including Ghana, immediately decided to take the step of applying. Of the ten invitees, nine 
applied. Rwanda opted not to apply, citing budgetary shortfall (Rwanda CCM 2010).††††††††††††† Seven 
joined Phase I, while two (Benin and Senegal) were not selected. In SSA, these seven selected countries 
formed regional clusters: Kenya, Tanzania (mainland and Zanzibar), and Uganda in the east; Ghana, Niger, 
and Nigeria in the west; and Madagascar in the south (see Figure 12).  
                                                          
************* The process of selecting invitees remains opaque. Considerations included, but probably were not 
limited to, the burden of malaria and the functionality or readiness of the country’s malaria program (Independent 
Evaluation Team 2012). Even the letter inviting countries to apply to the AMFm only states, “the Global Fund Board 
agreed that countries eligible to apply for the AMFm Phase 1 would be selected based on a set of criteria developed 
in partnership with WHO. I am very pleased to advise you that CCM Ghana was found eligible to apply” with no 
further elaboration (Churchill 2009). 
 
††††††††††††† The Global Fund did not make publicly accessible any information about the decision of Rwanda not to 
participate or why GF did not choose Benin or Senegal for the pilot. I am appreciative to Rwanda’s CCM for supplying 
this information. Though beyond the scope of the present work, it would be interesting to explore whether Rwanda’s 
decision is in line with its ‘development patrimonalist’ stance, as has been contrasted with neopatrimonialism and 
‘competitive clientelism’ in Ghana (Booth 2012b). 
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Figure 12: Map of global endemicity of P. falciparum malaria, with countries selected for Phase I of the AMFm marked with its green-leaf logo  
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GHANA  
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
The end of 2008 in Ghana marked a heated national election between the incumbent NPP (under Akufo-
Addo), the NDC (under former Vice-President Atta-Mills), and smaller parties. Neither NPP nor NDC 
crossed 50% in the 8 December election, requiring a run-off on 28 December. NDC won by a thin margin. 
 
NHIS featured in election debates, as both parties tried to claim credit for its intellectual and ideological 
origins. Alongside other social protection programs implemented under NPP (National Youth Employment 
Program, School Feeding Program), NHIS represented both the work each party had done and what they 
might do in the future (Gyimah-Boadi 2009). 
 
Many news items mentioning NHIS during this period reported on party efforts to either soothe or stoke 
concerns that voting NPP out of office would be the end of NHIS (Gyimah-Boadi 2009). Leading to the 
election, I considered nearly 60% of the mentions of NHIS by Ghana News Agency as political (refer to 
Chapter III for information on coding).  
 
NPP trumpeted the scheme as a “feather in their cap” (as per 27% of coded newspaper mentions, 
including (Ghana News Agency 2008c)) and explained plans to expand it further (5%). Meanwhile, 
opposition parties, especially NDC, claimed that NHIS was not NPP’s idea (5%), that NPP had implemented 
NHIS poorly or corruptly (8%), and promised that, under their rule, the scheme would be maintained, 
expanded, and improved (13%) (NDC 2008; Ghana News Agency 2008b). These promises were echoed in 
NDC’s manifesto.  
 
Although one respondent said that NHIS was the “only politically sexy topic in health” (R-7, n.d.) in Ghana, 
both parties focused (in speeches and manifestoes) on prevention, environmental cleanliness, food and 
water safety, and personal responsibility for health (NPP 2008; NDC 2008; Ghana News Agency 2009i). 
Atta-Mills (and by extension the NDC) focused keenly on filth. He noted in his foreword to the NDC 
manifesto that Ghana had recently been declared the “fourth filthiest” country in Africa; he promised 
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“bold and comprehensive measures to deal with the appalling filth in our communities” as a key goal for 
his first 100 days in office (NDC 2008).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  
 
In their manifestos, both parties expressly linked the health of the populace and its productivity and 
strength to Ghana’s ability to reach middle income status by 2020 (NDC 2008; Ghana News Agency 2008a; 
NPP 2008). In turn, they linked health to personal and community responsibility for taking preventative 
measures. Political leaders noted that if citizens undertook preventative measures, addressing many of 
the common diseases in Ghana, it would free funds for other development work, including education and 
employment (e.g. (Ghana News Agency 2009n; Ghana News Agency 2009d)). Political leaders also noted 
the idea of technology transfer and the need for Ghana to produce its own larvicides and treatments. 
 
In line with this, NDC brushed up its business bona fides by declaring in its manifesto an intent to forge 
partnerships between government and the private sector, attending to pharmaceutical 
manufacturing§§§§§§§§§§§§§ as a key industrial sector for investment and growth (NDC 2008). It cited the 
pharmaceutical sector as a key supporter of NDC during the election; however, through the member-
checking process described in Chapter III, a PMAG representative notes it is inaccurate to say the 
organization has an association with politicians that helps them gain some form of favors from 
government (Asante 2014; R-15, n.d.).************** 
 
Following the NDC’s victory in the run-off election, malaria and the NHIS maintained places in speeches 
and news reports. In January and February, reports recounted clean-up initiatives around Ghana as part 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ A commitment to environmental sanitation also allowed NDC to counter claims that it intended to 
dissolve its partnership with the waste management company ZoomLion©, a public-private partnership established 
by the NPP that the latter alleged would be dissolved if they were not re-elected (Ghana News Agency 2008d). 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Along with agro-processing, textiles, minerals, petro-chemicals, timber, and construction materials (NDC 
2008). 
 
************** To my knowledge, there is no way of verifying lobbying activities or campaign contributions in Ghana. 
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of Atta-Mill’s promise to address filth. The President reiterated commitments to NHIS and to 
environmental cleanliness in his State of the Nation Address in February 2009 (Atta-Mills 2009). 
 
Also in February 2009, President Atta-Mills appointed George Sipa-Yankey as the new Minister of Health. 
At his confirmation hearing, reported under the headline Govt determined to eradicate malaria, he 
explained it was his “dream to eliminate malaria” from Ghana (Ghana News Agency 2009b). He laid out a 
prevention-focused program of “environmental cleanliness” and insecticidal spraying (Ghana News 
Agency 2009b; Ghana News Agency 2009c).†††††††††††††† Besides recognizing malaria as a leading cause of 
Ghana’s morbidity, out-patient visits, and mortality, the new Minister said his motivation was the cost of 
malaria treatment to the Ghanaian economy — he cites these costs at US$ 760m — noting that this money 
could be better spent on other development efforts; he echoed this sentiment on other occasions (Ghana 
News Agency 2009b; Ghana News Agency 2009d; Ghana News Agency 2009f).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
Minister Sipa-Yankey was outspoken about eliminating malaria from Ghana and West Africa, citing a goal 
of “zero cases” (GNAh) by 2010, the intention to form an “antimalaria brigade (GNA 2009l).” He also 
planned to encourage other West African nations to take up Ghana’s Malaria Vector Control Plan, a 
preventative initiative that formally launched in mid-June 2009 (Ghana News Agency 2009b; Ghana News 
Agency 2009g; Ghana News Agency 2009j; Ghana News Agency 2009l; Ghana News Agency 2009n; Ghana 
News Agency 2009o; K. Malm 2014).  
 
                                                          
†††††††††††††† Of the 320 news and opinion items between 1 November 2009 and 30 June 2009, one-quarter related 
to calls for prevention, with 60% of these noting the importance of maintaining a clean environment to prevent 
malaria and another quarter noting the importance of focusing on prevention rather than treatment of malaria. 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ On occasion, health officials used these and similar moments to point out the importance of treating 
malaria with ACTs. In June 2009, for example, a key speaker is reported as noting, “Artesunate Amodiaquine is still 
the best drug for the treatment of malaria. He said the drug was recommended by the United Nations and the World 
Health Organization and there are no records that the drug has caused deaths anywhere in the country” (Ghana 
News Agency 2009m). In another news item, a health official reassured listeners that ACTs did not cause abortions, 
“as it was often speculated” (Ghana News Agency 2009k).  
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Both Ghana’s 2005 – 2009 Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as the RBM country strategy for 2000 – 
2010 focused on malaria interventions, including improving prevention, case management (recognition 
of symptoms, appropriate and timely treatment), partnership, and focused research (“Ghana: Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper” 2006). The Ghanaian MoH released its seven-year strategic plan for malaria 
control in early 2009, addressing increased use of ACTs but making no mention of drug costs (“Strategic 
Plan for Malaria Control in Ghana 2008 - 2015” 2009). In 2008, roughly 4% of funding went to antimalarial 
medication, with a similar percentage going to bednets (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2008). In 
contrast, in 2012, half of malaria funding in Ghana went to preventative and diagnostic efforts (Global 
Malaria Programme, WHO 2012). This reflects the heavy emphasis Ghana’s NMCP placed on preventative 
measures (USAID, President’s Malaria Initiative 2012).  
 
NMCP focused on achieving universal access to prevention and treatment by 2015, with “considerable 
emphasis on LLIN coverage” (USAID, President’s Malaria Initiative 2008; “Strategic Plan for Malaria 
Control in Ghana 2008 - 2015” 2009). In 2009, NMCP also started planning for a bednet “hang-up” 
campaign to reach universal coverage of bednets and encourage their use (Paintain et al. 2014). This drive 
ran from 2010 to 2012, followed by a plan for a Continuous Distribution Strategy for Long Lasting 
Insecticide Treated Nets (“Celebrating the U.S.-Ghana Partnership to Fight Malaria” 2013). 
 
Malaria treatment, beyond its cost to the economy as a whole, received limited mention in speeches and 
news items. These costs were linked to the need to engage in preventative measures, to practice good 
environmental hygiene and sanitation, and to embark on a vector control and elimination strategy.  
 
The only mention of drug subsidies from Sipa-Yankey — or from anyone else recorded by GNA between 
1 January and 30 June 2009 — came on World Malaria Day in April. He noted, “in 2007, malaria deprived 
the economy of US$ 730m… [He] thanked the development [partners] for their support and appealed to 
84 
them to help subsidize prices of malaria drugs and to also help the local pharmaceutical industry to 
produce quality but cheaper drugs” (Ghana News Agency 2009h).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
Also on World Malaria Day, NMCP’s Program Manager (PM) urged prevention and for “carpenters in the 
country to manufacture beds that were insecticide-treated net friendly (Ghana News Agency 2009h).” 
Perhaps oddly, then, at the April 2009 Health Summit*************** between the Ministry of Health and key 
development partners, neither malaria prevention nor treatment received a reported mention (“Joint 
Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health Summit” 2009).  
 
At this Summit, however, development partners did note the need to “think about ways of improving 
health within the limits of existing resources” (“Joint Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health 
Summit” 2008; “Joint Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health Summit” 2009). The 
development partners note that NHIS was not “maintaining the actuarial balance between expenditure 
flows (Health Summit),” referring to what a Rockefeller Foundation report more boldly labeled “crippling 
levels of indebtedness (Rockefeller)” (Rockefeller Foundation, Results for Development Institute 2008; 
“Joint Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health Summit” 2009).  
 
The sustainability or financial troubles of NHIS do not appear in the news in the two months leading to 
the run-off election. The NPP likely did not want commentary on its performance problems relating to 
their “success” (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009). Given their need to show that they would maintain and 
expand NHIS, it probably was not in NDC’s interest, either, to highlight NHIS’s sustainability problems.  
 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Other mentions of treatment by Minister Sipa-Yankey related to measures on un-approved and 
counterfeit drugs and the need for timely diagnosis and treatment. 
 
*************** More specifically, the 20-24 April 2009 “Joint Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health 
Summit, Accra.” In addition to Minister Sipa-Yankey, signatory attendees included the US, Dutch, Japanese, and 
British ambassadors, the Charge d’Affairs from the European Commission and representatives from the World Bank, 
UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (“Joint Ministry of Health and Development Partners’ Health Summit” 
2009). 
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Rumors about NDC’s intentions toward NHIS continued after the election; about 20% of all reports on 
NHIS relate to the NDC’s repetition that it would not scrap NHIS or “sack” NHIS workers hired under NPP 
(Ghana News Agency 2009b). Some concerns about financial management are reflected in 16% of 
comments, which relate to either appeals for claims to be paid to facilities on time or promises that claims 
would be paid on time in the future. Another 12% relate to the need for more human resources for health, 
staffing shortages in light of NHIS-driven attendance increases, and that staff salaries and quality of care 
suffered when payments did not come on time. However, all of these and the responses to them are 
generally framed as a concern about the financial situation of a given facility or as a technology problem 
with claims and reimbursements, rather than the lack of funds within the scheme itself. 
 
Precise retail figures for ACT prices during 2008 and 2009 are not available but based on reporting from 
that time period, US$ 3.50 is a reasonable estimate.††††††††††††††† While Ghana received ACTs at a reduced 
rate or for free, through pooled procurement (such as through PMI) or through donations (such as a 3-
part donation from China),‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ NHIS reimbursement rates were pegged to the private-sector retail 
price of the drug (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009). To reiterate this important point: NHIS looked to 
private sector retail prices to set its reimbursement rates. 
 
The incentives of double-dipping hindered the potential for donations to lower prices to consumers, as 
many public sector facilities made extra profit by receiving ACTs for free or at a lower rate but continuing 
to retail at the US$ 3.00 – US$ 4.00 price (though enrolling in NHIS allows the patient to receive 
antimalarial medication for free), plus the NHIS reimbursement based on the retail price (Seiter and 
                                                          
††††††††††††††† In its the AMFm application, Ghana reports retail prices of ACTs ranging from US$ 3.00 to US$ 9.00, as 
reported in the AMFm application (“Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 
2009). A study on Ghana’s pharmaceutical sector compiled at the end of 2008 stated that NHIS reimbursed facilities 
for ACTs at between US$ 3.00 and US$ 4.00, which reflected NHIA’s study of “median retail price as observed in the 
country” (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009). ACTs are free to NHIS-enrolled patients. 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ While the Government of Ghana contributed little or no funds to the procurement of ACTs in 2007, 
2008, or 2009, it was responsible for reimbursing ACTs dispensed at accredited health facilities to patients registered 
with the NHIS. 
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Gyansa-Luerodt 2009). As an extra obstacle in setting NHIA reimbursement rates, “cutting back 
reimbursement rates [would have priced] domestic suppliers out of the market” (Seiter 2014).  
 
On malaria, Ghanaian political leaders seemed focused on prevention and eradication. Concern about the 
cost of ACTs to consumers was virtually absent in public comments. The precise reason for this is unclear, 
though cost coverage under NHIS is one obvious potential reason. Covering the costs of malaria 
medication for patients burdened an already constrained NHIS budget. This was particularly true in the 
context of NDC promises to simultaneously maintain and even expand NHIS while also limiting the 
premium to a one-time payment from patients, thereby reducing funds coming to the NHIA.  
 
One respondent noted NHIS as a key “selling point” for the AMFm, as a means of beginning to address its 
funding gaps and constraints (R-7, n.d.). However, NHIA did not actively lobby for the AMFm. While a 
respondent noted that NHIA would always "welcome anything that can be done — legally — to reduce 
the price of medicines," he also noted that NHIA realized prices could be still lower if the drugs could be 
made locally, eliminating expenses from importation tariffs (Acheampong 2014). They did not want to 
openly support a program that did not lower prices as much as possible, which they believed assisting 
Ghanaian companies to become pre-qualified to manufacture ACTs could achieve (Acheampong 2014). 
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AMFM 
Introduction to key, active stakeholders  
I summarize the key, active national stakeholders in adopting the Phase I pilot in Ghana in Table 5. Besides 
the Ghanaian CCM (1), the active stakeholders identified as key in the adoption process through 
interviews, meeting minutes, and news reports included: (2) the National Malaria Control Program 
(NMCP), (3) the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ghana Health Service (GHS), (4) the Pharmaceutical Society 
of Ghana (PSGH), and (5) the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Ghana (PMAG).  
 
The Ministry of Health is the lead health agency in Ghana, promoting a “healthy population for national 
development,” as per MoH’s five-year program laid out in early 2008, Creating Wealth Through Health 
(“Republic of Ghana Ministry of Health: Role and Functions” 2014). NMCP is a disease-specific program 
operating under GHS§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, responsible for implementing Ghana’s strategy for malaria control. 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ In Ghana, the MoH is the policy-making and regulatory body while GHS is the implementing body, with 
control over most government health facilities (except teaching hospitals). 
Table 5: Summary of characteristics and roles of identified key stakeholders in the AMFm 
adoption in Ghana 
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Relative to other SSA NMCPs, Ghana’s Program is noted as acting independently of MoH (R-6, n.d.; R-8, 
n.d.).**************** Career bureaucrats staff NMCP, remaining despite shifts in national political power; for 
example, the Program Manager (PM) had been in place for over 10 years when GF sent the pilot invitation.  
 
MoH oversees the entire health system in Ghana, including GHS, Teaching Hospitals, the NHIA, the Food 
and Drugs Board (FDB) and the Pharmacy Council. While MoH is the policy-making and regulatory body, 
GHS is the implementing body, charged with ensuring health delivery in the public sector – except at 
teaching hospitals. Overall, the public sector provides about 40% of the health services of Ghana, with the 
mission sector and the private, for-profit sector each serving 30%. 
 
All registered pharmacists must join PSGH, which is the professional association of practicing pharmacists. 
PMAG’s membership is optional and includes pharmacists as well as non-pharmacists who own 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industries. PSGH aims to promote adherence to professional standards; 
the mission of PMAG is to “improve business perspectives of local manufacturers” (Seiter and Gyansa-
Luerodt 2009).  
 
The AMFm invitation and CCM 
In March 2009, when GF sent out invitations to country CCMs to join the pilot (Churchill 2009) , the make-
up of Ghana’s CCMs included representatives of 16 organizations spanning bi- and multi-lateral 
agencies††††††††††††††††, relevant government bureaucracies‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡, business interests§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, 
and non-governmental organizations***************** (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). A 
                                                          
 
**************** Note, for example, that NMCP, and not MoH, is the Principal Recipient for GF malaria grants. 
 
†††††††††††††††† WHO, UNAIDS, UNFPA, DfID, GIZ, USAID 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Ghana AIDS Commission 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Ghanaian Chamber of Mines and the Ghana Business Coalition Against AIDS 
 
***************** Including GHANET, Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health, Nap+ Ghana, “professional associations,” Rural 
Watch, West African AIDS Foundation  
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consideration of this list and the active stakeholders outlined in Table 5 suggests limited overlap between 
CCM membership and the active stakeholders during the AMFm adoption. Figure 13 also reflects this, 
characterizing two sets of groups and showing their overlap. The first group is those actors who were 
members of CCM or visitors during the emergency meetings at the CCM on the AMFm (Country 
Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). The former are shown in the central square and the latter in 
the shaded surround. The second group is identified key stakeholders in the AMFm adoption decision in 
Ghana. These appear in the two triangles, with government stakeholders shown in the left triangle and 
business stakeholders in the right triangle. Members are those expected to be in attendance at all 
meetings and allowed to vote on CCM issues. 
 
Figure 13: Members and non-members in Ghana’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), indicating 
also which stakeholders are in the government or the business sector 
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In early 2009, the chair of Ghana’s CCM was a pharmacist, private pharmacy owner, and previous PSGH 
President. Shortly after the invitation arrived, the CCM Chairman called an “emergency meeting” on the 
AMFm (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). The make-up of CCM and other invited 
officials at this and a second emergency meeting are illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
This meeting highlighted many aspects of stakeholder responses to the AMFm in Ghana. First, one 
prominent civil servant, NMCP’s Program Manager (PM, the lead position), requested that “sector 
representatives [in CCM] give [written] assurance that [she] would not be held personally responsible for 
any fallout of the AMFm,” recalling her “bitter experience” of introducing ACTs as first-line antimalarials 
in 2005 (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009).  
 
In addition to the PM’s personal reputation, NMCP worried that their reputation as a GF “star performer” 
would be at risk (R-6, n.d.). Implementation of the AMFm plan presented “big professional challenges” (R-
5), including the volume and “rigidity of reporting" (R-5) requirements (R-1, n.d.; R-2, n.d.; R-4, n.d.; R-5, 
n.d.; R-11, n.d.; R-14, n.d.). The AMFm required working across sectors — but NMCP were uncertain that 
they could control businesses’ compliance with s-QA.ACT pricing. They felt "blame and... reputation [for 
not achieving affordability] will come back to NMCP,” diminishing donors’ or development partners’ 
perceptions of it as a capable implementer (R-14, n.d.). They also worried that supporting the AMFm 
would lead to “accus[ations] of letting foreigners take over the [pharmaceutical] market” (R-13, n.d.). 
 
Then, near the session’s close, PMAG leadership, who had not been invited, “stormed the meeting” to 
argue against the application (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). They articulated that 
the initiative was a “short-term measure with no long-term plan” (R-11), which neither fit Ghana’s politics 
nor addressed the problems it was meant to solve, dooming it to fail to save lives (R-1, n.d.; R-11, n.d.). 
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Instead, it would undermine local manufacturing capacity††††††††††††††††† and, by extension, Ghana’s 
economic growth and move towards aid independence (R-9, n.d.; R-10, n.d.; Dodoo 2011).  
 
Further, PMAG argued on this occasion and others, retailers, for whom antimalarials “represented a big 
part of business” (R-5), would suffer (R-1, n.d.; R-5, n.d.). Manufacturers would lose “brand awareness 
and goodwill” (R-11) once the AMFm green-leaf logo became “stuck in the minds of people” (R-12) as a 
marker of quality (R-11, n.d.; R-12, n.d.). Also, registering as a FLB required importers to agree to audits 
by GF, exposing them to possible threats to their business reputations (Global Fund, n.d.). 
 
This intrusion into the CCM meeting “seemed to confuse the discussion since morning” (Country 
Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). After “calm was restored” and visitors (non-members, outside 
the central box in Figure 13) left, CCM members agreed “conditionally… to participate in [AMFm] provided 
the government gave its unambiguous support and approval” (emphasis added) (Country Coordinating 
Mechanism Secretariat 2009). They wanted this approval in the form of the Minister of Health’s signature 
on the application. Such endorsement was not a measure Ghana’s CCM had ever taken before. Between 
this request for the Minister to formally endorse, and PMAG’s move to lobby at the MoH against the 
AMFm, much of the active debate over the AMFm shifted to the “corridors of power” (R-15, n.d.). 
 
Putting together the proposal 
In the meantime, a “writing team with diverse experience,” under CCM, began the technical work of 
drafting a proposal, including details of Ghana’s supply and monitoring systems, its available budget, and 
its planned Supporting Interventions (K. L. Malm et al. 2013). Preparation included attending workshops 
and meetings, such as the mid-June meeting organized by RBM in Nairobi (Roll Back Malaria Partnership 
2009a). During a CCM meeting, the application team encouraged members to “further critic [sic] the 
proposal… [including] relevant organizations such as PMI” (“CCM Meeting 28 May 2009” 2009).  
                                                          
††††††††††††††††† At no point do I claim whether it makes economic sense for Ghana to pursue a local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry (as is difficult to assess given the lack of openness around private sector financies and 
production); I only note that various stakeholders saw this as a desireable goal. 
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As its first application task, CCM laid out details of Ghana’s distribution channels and retail sector for ACTs. 
For distribution, CCM’s application noted that “while Ghana has secured funding to procure a sufficient 
quantity of ACTs to meet the estimated need in the public sector, significant challenges with the public 
sector supply chain prevent these drugs from being efficiently distributed” (“Application Form, Affordable 
Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009).  
 
On monitoring quality, the application’s drafters note that “the private sector is assumed to have a good 
system of quality assurance, but this has not been well-evaluated” (“Application Form, Affordable 
Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). Ghana’s regulatory authorities imposed minimal price 
regulation on the pharmaceutical sector. The FDB did not have a system or budget for regulating 
pharmaceutical distribution. In addition, importers and others were able to ‘dash off’ (bribe, colloquially) 
FDB officials, a point echoed in Chapters VII and VIII (McCabe et al. 2011). The Pharmacy Council had 32 
inspectors to cover private pharmacies and LCSs nationwide (McCabe et al. 2011).  
 
After laying out the details of Ghana’s drug distribution chains, CCM’s second application task was to 
address the budget. The team estimated that switching to s-QA.ACTs in on-going grants would save US$ 
25.4m given the lower cost of procuring subsidized QA.ACTs. They estimated their proposed Supporting 
Interventions at US$ 22.0m.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This left an unclaimed US$ 3.1m of identified re-programmable 
grant money in the budget, which they planned to use for home-based care activities among underserved 
populations (“Application Form, Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). Of course, 
much more money would be mobilized for Ghana under the AMFm if selected as a pilot country but the 
funds would go directly from GF’s gated cache for the subsidy. As such, the AMFm represented about US$ 
3.0 million of ‘new’ money for Ghana’s NMCP that it could spend as it best saw fit. 
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The amount Ghana ultimately spent on the Supporting Interventions was the highest per capita of all 
the AMFm pilot countries, at US$ 0.42 per capita; the next highest were Kenya and Uganda, spending about US$ 
0.18 per capita and the lowest was Tanzania, at US$ 0.03 (Willey et al. 2014).  
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As the third application task, CCM described their proposed Supporting Interventions, budgeted at US$ 
22.0m. Supporting Intervention activities included behavioral change campaigns, training and supervising 
public and private providers on malaria case management, strengthening surveillance of ACT quality, and 
increasing and strengthening monitoring of the private sector (“Application Form, Affordable Medicines 
Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). The later three components, especially interaction with the for-
profit sector, were a new range of activities for NMCP.  
 
Throughout this application drafting process, CCM’s membership “vacillated in its support” on 
participating in the pilot, as indicated in interviews and through lack of members’ opinions expressed in 
meeting minutes (R-5, n.d.) (see Figure 13 for a depiction of CCM membership present at the Emergency 
Meetings regarding the AMFm). With the exception of the CCM Chairman, it is groups without 
membership in CCM voicing strong opinions throughout the adoption process.  
 
In addition to preparing the technical application, stakeholders (CCM members and non-members) 
supportive of the AMFm also worked to explain and sensitize the uninformed, uncertain, and sometimes 
hostile private sector on the AMFm and its potential to yield profit (R-5, n.d.). These efforts gained some 
acceptance “on the quiet” (R-1, n.d.). In its vocal resistance of the AMFm, PMAG’s leadership did not speak 
for all pharmacists or manufacturers. Rather, there was “suspicion amongst the manufacturers because… 
individual companies have different facilities, merits, and capabilities” (R-15), with some “want[ing] to 
produce to global standards and [others wanting] to maintain local standards” (R-7) (R-7, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). 
Nevertheless, PMAG’s leadership spoke loudly against the AMFm. 
 
Outside PMAG, some respondents, including CCM members, viewed the private sector as motivated by 
narrow, profit-based self-interest, engaged in “a ploy to maintain prices” (R-15, n.d.). But others, even 
strong AMFm supporters, felt that “everyone was concerned about the issues raised by the 
manufacturers” (R-14) and, ideally, everyone “would have preferred to have local, quality drugs” used for 
the AMFm (R-13) (R-7, n.d.; R-13, n.d.; R-14, n.d.; R-15, n.d.).  
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As an additional concern, many national stakeholders keenly wanted assurance about the AMFm’s 
continuation before they would agree to apply, setting up a point of opposing objectives about the 
ordering between gathering evidence and making decisions (R-14, n.d.). That is, GF wanted evidence 
before committing to continue beyond Phase I, while many stakeholders in Ghana wanted commitment 
on continuation before participating in this pilot to produce this evidence. 
 
A variety of interviewed stakeholders (refer to Figure 5), including those beyond PMAG, called for Ghana 
to become more “nationalistic” (R-11) and “futuristic” in its malaria policies (R-11), rather than remain 
“dependent on Global Fund” (R-9) and, so, “vulnerable to global economies” (R-11) and “donor fatigue” 
(R-9) to treat such an important disease (R-9, n.d.; R-11). “There is more malaria in Africa,” a respondent 
noted, so “the cure should be in Africa,” where there is “moral stake” in addressing the disease (R-11, 
n.d.). These reflect dissatisfaction with the AMFm mechanism as it was designed – that is, without the 
involvement of local manufacturing. As previously mentioned, all GF money for health product 
procurement can only be applied to manufacturers pre-qualified for the production of those products. At 
the time of the decision to participate in Phase I, no Ghanaian manufacturers met this criterion. 
 
In closing the meeting, CCM members took a unique step in their history: they decided they would submit 
the AMFm application only if the Minister of Health signed-off on it. This step is analyzed in Chapter VI. 
 
The “corridors of power” (R-15) 
Following the eventful March 2009 emergency CCM meeting, PMAG “sent strong representation” — from 
an already “strong lobby” — to the Minister (R-5, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). The CCM Chairman also went to the 
Minister to clarify how government would support the AMFm while also “mitigat[ing] local industry 
concerns” (R-5, n.d.). As the Chairman left CCM to meet the Minister, a member called on him — and the 
CCM — “not to meddle in politics” while another remarked that things were already “political” (Country 
Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). Later, the Chairman reflected that one of the most important 
lessons from the AMFm adoption experience was how much politics mattered (R-5, n.d.). 
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With appeals to the Minister from both sides, “the application became a fight” (R-15), involving arguments 
that can be labeled as symbolic, economic, and political (Reich 1995a; R-7, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). In later 
meetings, the Chairman was joined by GHS and PSGH representatives, who felt they risked “vilification” 
(R-7), “chastisement” (R-5), and being branded as a “sell-out” (R-14) for openly supporting the AMFm (R-
5, n.d.; R-7, n.d.; R-14, n.d.).  
 
The Minister found himself “in a corner,” “need[ing the] policy to go through without his confirmation” 
(R-5, n.d.; R-7, n.d.). For example, if GF did not continue the AMFm after Phase I, “the public will blame 
termination on the government of the day… with electoral ramifications” (Dodoo 2011). No party-
affiliated government stakeholders made public statements about the AMFm in 2008 or early 2009 (or 
until the early-2011 the AMFm launch). Instead, the Minister put off becoming responsible or visible vis-
à-vis the AMFm, “drag[ging] his feet” and complaining to both sides about the other side’s lobbying efforts 
(R-5, n.d.; R-6, n.d.; R-7, n.d.).  
 
On one side, the leaders of PMAG, representing Ghana’s pharmaceutical production firms, threatened to 
strike, arguing that the AMFm would undermine their local manufacturing sector and Ghana’s broader 
economic development. On the other, the CCM Chairman, joined by leaders from PSGH and the 
Department of Public Health in GHS, argued in favor of the AMFm, as described below.  
 
Both sides offered contrasting symbolic arguments over the consequences of the AMFm for Ghana. Those 
actively in favor of the AMFM argued that it would save lives among the poor by assuring the availability 
and affordability of quality medicine; those actively against believed subsidized imports would force 
industry lay-offs, leading to poverty, disease, and death among those same poor (R-1, n.d.; R-11, n.d.; R-
13, n.d.). With this argument, one respondent suggested that PMAG also reminded the Minister of NDC’s 
campaign promises and PMAG’s support for them during the election (R-1, n.d.). As one respondent 
noted, PMAG was a strong interest group and it “would [have been] political suicide to openly support 
the AMFm” and “anger constituents,” especially as “a new[ly elected] government” (R-5, n.d.). Some 
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respondents stated that if the government had been in office longer, they may not have felt such pressure 
from the pharmaceutical manufacturers (R-5, n.d.; R-14, n.d.). 
 
In response to PMAG’s dire predictions, the pro-AMFm lobby (with CCM, PSGH, and GHS representation) 
invited PMAG to quantify the volume of antimalarials they provided Ghana and their expected losses 
under the AMFm. The firms were unwilling or unable to offer hard numbers. In return, the PSGH President 
produced a number, using a back-of-the-envelope estimate to argue that the domestic industry was, at 
most, producing 10% of Ghana’s ACT supply and, thus, that imports were necessary to meet Ghana’s ACT 
needs (R-7, n.d.).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This knocked some of the wind out of PMAG’s argument. 
 
In turn, PMAG reached out to a higher level of power, sending a letter of opposition to Vice-President 
Mahama. On the other side, President Atta-Mills received a phone call from President Bill Clinton, 
highlighting the importance of Ghana joining the AMFm (R-6, n.d.; R-7, n.d.).****************** The motivation 
for this call was Ghana’s malaria burden, its wide use of the private sector in treating malaria, and the 
sense that NMCP might need a nudge in accepting the AMFm given agency risk-aversion and concerns 
about critiques from the private sector (O. Sabot 2015). Neither reaching out to the vice president or the 
president led to a public statement (R-7, n.d.).  
 
Back in the CCM Secretariat, on 25 June 2009, CCM’s members officially endorsed, by consensus, the 
AMFm proposal, as marked on the electronic application form pictured in Figure 14 (Norgbedzie 2014).  
 
The Minister never did. Instead, just before the deadline of 1 July, he “went into hiding” (R-1, n.d.).  
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Few data are available about the value of the pharmaceutical sector. The total market value of the 
pharmaceutical sector is estimated at US$ 300m, growing at 6-8% per year. Ghana’s manufacturing sector has about 
40 companies, with about 28% of these actively manufacturing and half of these at a nationally significant scale. 
Their products account for about 30% of the pharmaceutical products retailed in Ghana (Seiter and Gyansa-
Luerodt 2009).  
 
****************** This call has not been confirmed with the former president himself but the majority of sources 
confirm it. 
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CCM submitted the application on 30 June, citing the assumption that a lack of Ministerial response meant 
that CCM “had [the Minister’s] approval” (R-5, n.d.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION IV.3:  SUMMARY  
I began this descriptive chapter with a global turning point in Ghana’s democracy and in global and 
national antimalarial treatment protocols, echoed also in Figure 3. 
 
In 2001, NPP won Ghana’s national election, marking the first transition of power in Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic. Among other initiatives, the NPP enacted NHIS. NHIS was an issue in the 2008 election: NPP 
threatened that NDC would end NHIS and NDC countered that they would not only maintain but expand 
the program. NDC won the 2008 election and took power in early 2009. President Atta-Mills appointed 
Sipa-Yankey as Minister of Health. Dr. Sipa-Yankey had a stated commitment to eradicate malaria from 
Ghana, reducing its economic burden.  
 
Also in 2001, WHO named ACTs as the first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria; Ghana revised their 
treatment policy to reflect this in 2005. The initial launch of AA in Ghana proved problematic. Globally, a 
key concern was that ACTs were more expensive to consumers than previous treatment options. In 
response, IOM convened a group of experts, who, in SLBT, outlined a plan for a high-level subsidy for ACTs. 
This plan, elaborated with drug price negotiation and Supporting Interventions, became the AMFm. GF 
agreed to host the AMFm on the condition that there be a Phase I experimental period, which would later 
inform their decision to maintain, scale-up, modify, or terminate the AMFm in their portfolio. 
Figure 14: Ghanaian CCM’s endorsement of the electronic AMFm Phase I application to GF 
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GF invited Ghana to be an AMFm pilot country in March 2009. CCM coordinated the application process 
amid disagreement about joining. More stakeholders than CCM members entered this debate. In 
response to disagreement, CCM made submitting the application contingent on endorsement by Minister 
Sipa-Yankey. This began a process of lobbying the Minister, Vice President Mahama, and President Atta-
Mills. None of these three took a public stand; CCM submitted the application without their endorsement. 
 
Building on this description of the adoption process, in Chapter V, I review the stakeholders’ stands toward 
the AMFm and analyze factors influencing those stands, focusing on stakeholder perceptions. In Chapter 
VI, I turn to the actions taken by different stakeholder during the national-level adoption process.  
CHAPTER V: CASE ANALYSIS - PILOTING THE AMFM IN GHANA: A  
QUALITATIVE CASE ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL 
STAKEHOLDER RECEPTIV ITY &  RESISTANCE  
 
SECTION V.1:  INTRODUCTION  
After receiving the AMFm invitation from GF in March 2009, many stakeholders in Ghana hesitated to 
accept, as detailed in the previous chapter. On first consideration, this hesitancy may seem misaligned 
with the Ghana’s malaria burden, which exacts a heavy human and economic toll. For what reasons, then, 
did Ghanaian stakeholders question and resist participating in the pilot? Why did others in Ghana support 
participation in Phase I of the AMFm?  
 
RESE ARCH  MOTIV ATION  AND  QUE ST IONS  
The mixed and conflicted views among Ghanaian stakeholders presented a puzzle: why would national 
stakeholders question — and even forgo — piloting a program intended to deliver high-quality treatment 
for a prevalent, expensive disease? The process of answering this question involved an initial analysis by 
me, complemented by independent coding and consensus-building with two reviewers, Ashley M. Fox 
and Jesse B. Bump. Therefore, the pronoun “we” is used for analysis throughout this chapter, in contrast 
to the rest of the dissertation. 
99 
 
In solving this puzzle, we aim to highlight the interests of national stakeholders as critical to global policy 
decision-making and governance (Allison and Halperin 1972; Putnam 1988; Dodgson, Lee, and Drager 
2002). A central contention of this thesis is that these national-level viewpoints are not always analyzed 
in relation to globally led policy (with key exceptions such as (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995)). 
 
With this aim in mind, we approach the puzzle in two stages, focusing on the time period before Ghana 
decided to participate in the Phase I pilot. Our first research question is: which Ghanaian stakeholders 
responded to the invitation to join the AMFm and how did they respond? To answer, we conduct two 
analyses. The first is a descriptive stakeholder analysis, identifying and categorizing relevant stakeholders 
based on CCM meeting minutes and in-depth interviews. The second is a grounded thematic analysis of 
content.  
 
To preview the results, in the first analysis, we reveal diversity, rather than similarity, of views (stands) 
within stakeholder organizations and decision-making roles. That is, our stakeholder categorizations lack 
explanatory power, including categorizing people by the organizations in which they “sit” (Allison 1969). 
Given this lack of systematic association between stakeholder characteristics and stands, as elaborated in 
Section V.2, for the second research question, we use an iterative, grounded and thematic qualitative 
analysis to ask: how can we explain stakeholders’ stands — both resistant and receptive — toward joining 
Phase I? Through this process, we identify three thematic interests that encapsulate stakeholder reasons 
to support and resist the AMFm. To be clear from the outset, these themes draw on the range of reasons 
provided by respondents and therefore may only go part way towards explaining the full motivations that 
led stakeholders to take different stands. However, using the data and methods at hand, the findings 
represent a best-effort at explaining motivations. At best, we achieve a useful, partial explanation. At 
work, we offer a more grounded, nuanced way of categorizing of motivations. 
 
First, in these categories of reasons, stakeholders considered the direct goals of the policy, in this case, 
those related to improving access to malaria treatment, and whether they believe these proposed policies 
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can further those goals. Second, stakeholders also considered how the policy in question may affect other 
policy or business goals of interest to them. In this case, stakeholders particularly considered how the 
AMFm might further or hinder policy goals related to national capacity to deliver on national health 
insurance promises as well as the capacity for domestic pharmaceutical production. The latter had 
implications for the economic goals of private sector firms. Third and finally, stakeholders considered how 
AMFm might boost or hurt their individual, their organizational, and/or Ghana’s reputation or recognition.  
 
From these analyses, we reach four key conclusions on drivers of stakeholders’ views. First, stakeholders 
can occupy and move between several organizations, making the categorization of where they sit 
conceptually challenging. Second, the design and planned evaluation of the AMFm itself fostered both 
support and resistance. Third, stakeholders considered goals beyond the AMFm’s direct, malaria-related 
objectives – specifically, those linked to other policies of interest and those linked to reputations. Fourth, 
GF’s experimental pilot approach led to many national-level stakeholders resisting, attempting to ignore, 
or only passively supporting the AMFm. The donor’s need for evidence to commit further to the AMFm, 
juxtaposed with the implementers’ need for certainty about programmatic longevity before committing 
to generating evidence, created points of opposing objectives.  
 
We believe our insights on explanatory themes and reactions to the experimental piloting approach can 
inform future theoretical and design work on global programs to be transferred to the national level for 
adoption and implementation. However, we do not offer a precise calculus about how these three factors 
interact in this case or how each stakeholder internally considered each in deciding what stand to take on 
the AMFm. Rather, these three themes are explanatory in that they encapsulate the reasons and 
motivations respondents gave for their own stand and the stands taken by others. They provide specific 
lines of inquiry that future program designers can follow to assist in laying out the smoothest path to 
adoption and implementation. 
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CHAPTER  OVERVIEW  
In Section 2 of this chapter, we introduce the approach of stakeholder analysis and outline the relevant 
concepts in such analysis used in this chapter. In Section 3, we address the first research question with a 
descriptive stakeholder analysis. In Section 4, we address the second research question with a thematic 
qualitative analysis. Section 5 concludes, drawing implications from these findings for future program 
design as well as analysis. 
 
SECTION V.2:  INTRODUCING STAKEHOLD ER ANALYSIS AND ANALYTIC 
CONCEPTS  
Stakeholders — their perceptions, conversations, and negotiations — are critical to decisions at different 
policy stages. Given stakeholder centrality in policy-making, analyses of their interests and actions have 
become more common among global health policy researchers. As a brief illustration of the rising 
frequency of stakeholder considerations, a keyword-search for “stakeholder*” in health policy 
journals†††††††††††††††††† revealed increases of articles from 3- to 18-fold across journals, from 1993-2002 to 
2003–2012.  
 
Given that stakeholders play an important role in policy decision-making, it is useful to analyze the ways 
in which they make these decisions. Such analyses assist in tracing past — and shaping future — policy 
decisions (for one discussion of stakeholder analyses in global health policy, see (Gilson et al. 2012)). 
Tracing policy processes involves tracking a technical, “first-best” (Rodrik 2008) policy idea as it is 
transformed (or not) into a “feasible” (Reich and Fox 2013), “best-fit” (Booth 2014), or “good-enough” 
(Grindle 2007) form to endorse and roll-out in a given context (Grindle 2007; Rodrik 2008; Copesteak and 
Williams 2012; Fox and Reich 2013; Booth 2014). This happens amidst ongoing interpersonal, 
organizational, and national political-economic conversations (Walt and Gilson 1994; Reich 1995b; Oliver 
2006; Corduneanu-Huci, Hamilton, and Ferrer 2012). Analyzing such contexts, and stakeholders within 
them, can inform achievable policy design (Rodrik 2010). 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††† Health Affairs; Health Policy; Health Policy and Planning; Health Politics, Policy and Law; Social Science 
and Medicine 
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Despite their public policy currency, stakeholder analyses are rooted in business and managerial theory. 
There, a re-focus on stakeholders represents a reconceptualization and expansion of a firm’s obligations. 
In particular, it expands the firm’s accountability beyond its stockholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995; 
Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000; Freeman 2010). In this widened view, a firm’s obligations encompass the 
heterogeneous interests of all actors affecting and affected by the firm’s decisions (Freeman 2010). 
Analyzing stakeholders is a political-economic activity, which, by some accounts, is defined by the 
existence of a heterogeneity of interests (Drazen 2001). 
 
Stakeholder analysis is an umbrella term covering a range of approaches to organizing and understanding 
heterogeneous interests. These interests represent stake: the possible gains and losses from a decision. 
Given the stakes faced by an actor, s/he takes a stand — a supportive, neutral, or resistant orientation — 
on a given decision-point. Stands are influenced by personal values and interests; by personal and 
professional relationships; and by the predicted losses or pay-offs from a decision (Allison and Halperin 
1972; Glassman et al. 1999; Polski and Ostrom 1999; Ganghof 2003; Corduneanu-Huci, Hamilton, and 
Ferrer 2012). In the present analysis, stands are the key outcome of interest.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
Stakeholders in similar categories might systematically take similar stands. Thus, a first cut at stakeholder 
analysis is to map key actors into defined categories. If stakeholders in similar categories take similar 
stands, categories can be taken to explain (though not cause) those viewpoints.  
 
The criteria by which an analyst categorizes stakeholders affects the range of relationships that can be 
examined. In the next section, we review three possible sets of categorizing criteria that may have 
explanatory power for the stands taken by stakeholders. We review the potential justification and 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ While power is often an element of stakeholder analyses, in this case, we focus on the perceptions of 
different stakeholders, rather than their power to act on those perceptions. Action is the subject of the next chapter. 
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theoretical inputs for each criteria-set below. These sets divide stakeholders by (1) their decision-making 
role, (2) their organizational home, and (3) their station.  
 
CRITERIA  FO R C ATEGOR IZI NG  ST AKEHOL DER S  
INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN DECISION-MAKING 
Stakeholders from different organizations meet in decision-making arenas to consider, debate, and 
endorse ideas (Ostrom et al. 2001). Arenas have formal and normative rules and operating procedures — 
altogether, institutions — for who participates and how (Immergut 1992; Ostrom et al. 2001). Given these 
institutions, not all players with stake in a decision are automatically in the relevant arena. Institutional 
stakeholders must take part in a decision as per the arena’s rules and norms – for instance, the US 
Congress or UK Parliament. In contrast, circumstantial stakeholders are invited, or invite themselves, into 
the arena for specific decisions (Immergut 1992; Tsebelis 1995; Polski and Ostrom 1999; Ganghof 2003). 
This can include lobbyists and activists. The categorization of specific stakeholders relevant to the case of 
adoption the AMFm in Ghana are shown in Table 6. 
 
Stakeholders across these two categories may view and react in different ways to the same decision-point. 
For example, institutional stakeholders might be similarly driven to enact good policies. Circumstantial 
stakeholders may, instead, advocate for what Allison and Halperin call “messy” concerns — motives 
related to politicking, relationships, and experiences that some view as “gossip for journalists rather than 
a subject for serious investigation” (Allison and Halperin 1972; Ferguson 1990). Or, institutional 
stakeholders might take stands to protect and enhance their decision-making powers while specific policy 
causes drive circumstantial stakeholders. Thus, it is not clear from the outset what types of stakeholders 
will act in what ways. 
 
104 
ORGANIZATIONAL HOMES 
Another way of categorizing stakeholders and possibly predicting their stands is by where they sit — that 
is, their organizational homes (Allison 1969).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This follows the reasoning of bureaucratic 
politics. Members of CCM and MoH are both required, institutional stakeholders for the AMFm; but they 
may have different organizational goals toward the program. Stakeholders employed in the same agency, 
business, or ministry may hold similar norms and views, leading to similar stands. This similarity may stem 
from ex ante attracting members with similar views or because, once joining, organizational precedence, 
culture, and strategy influence members’ views ex post (Steinmo 2008). Members may also take similar 
stands if the organizational leadership constrains their choices (Allison and Halperin 1972).  
 
STATIONS 
Stakeholders with similar functions and sources of authority – stations – may work within the same 
organization. The term station separates bureaucrats from elected officials from businesspeople, even if 
they all work for the same organization. A government ministry, for example, may employ elected and 
appointed officials as well as career bureaucrats. Bureaucrats across ministries may act like one another, 
while leaders and members in the same ministry, additionally, may face different incentives and so take 
different stands. 
 
Stations draw together several rational-actor models focused on different goals that stakeholders may 
(rationally) pursue. Individual models may focus on individual job titles, the holders of which face different 
incentive structures and so, different utility-functions. Rational actor models focused on elected officials, 
for example, consider re-electability, fundraising, and maintaining party discipline (Mueller 1976; Strom 
1990; López 2002). Bureaucrats might focus on maintaining agency autonomy, avoiding blame, and 
ensuring job security (Allison and Halperin 1972; Hammond 1986; Weaver 1987; Strom 1990; Grindle and 
Thomas 1991). Businesspeople might concentrate on profits, building public and brand recognition, and 
strengthening political influence. Bringing these ideas together: to the extent that stakeholders in a single 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The precise quote from Allison, in turn based on Miles’s Law, is that “where you stand depends on 
where you sit” (Allison 1969). 
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station (with a single job title) face similar incentive structures, one may expect them to behave alike and 
take similar stands.  
 
Below, we consider and analyze whether each of the categories outlined above meaningfully correlate 
with stands taken. 
 
SECTION V.3:  ANALYTIC METHODS AND RESULTS I-  POSITIONING 
STAKEHOLDERS AND  THEIR STANDS  
DATA ANALYSI S  I  
To begin, we identified important stakeholding organizations in the decision to pilot the AMFm in Ghana, 
as introduced in Chapter IV. To each, we assigned one of five stands: actively resistant, passively resistant, 
passively receptive, actively receptive, or mixed/unstated. The ideas of supportive (or receptive) and 
resistant stands to different policy ideas have featured in the literature (as one example, see (Gómez 
2009)). We drew the nuance of considering active and passive forms of these stands from the key 
informant interviews done for this project, in which some interviewees identified themselves or others as 
having “passive” stands (R-2) (R-1, n.d.; R-2, n.d.; R-6, n.d.).  
 
For this analysis, we based assignment on key informant responses to a direct interview question — “What 
were the different positions that players took toward the AMFm?” — as well as unprompted but relevant 
statements about their own and others’ positions. We considered both what respondents said about 
themselves as well as the motivations they attributed to others. While some stakeholders’ views may have 
evolved over the course of adoption, we report here on the stand most associated with a stakeholder in 
interviews and documents. That is, each stakeholder was given only one stand in this analysis. 
 
The assignment of stands is complex and contestable (Ganghof 2003). To counter this threat-to-
validity*******************, we triangulate in several ways. First, we consider statements from key informants 
                                                          
******************* Specifically, construct validity, or the “fit between the construct supposedly measured [by an 
instrument] and the actual observations measured” (Bernard 2006). 
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in light of related, contemporary statements in the data. We use the respondents’ own words when 
possible, in pursuit of authenticity (Baker and Edwards 2012). Second, two analysts and I assigned stands 
independently before comparing notes and finding consensus (Miles and Huberman 1994). Finally, we 
shared a draft manuscript with key informants, as described in Section III.2 (Lincoln and Guba 1994). Their 
feedback guided adjustments to stands as well as fixing factual errors. We report the results in Table 6, 
which is described in more detail in the next sub-section. The right-most column of the table shows the 
stand assigned to each stakeholder. 
 
STAKEHOL DER S  AND THE  ARENA  
When GF agreed to host the AMFm, each invited country’s CCM became the national decision-making 
arena. In Ghana, CCM members became involved in the debate about whether to apply to join the pilot, 
such that CCM was both a forum and an active stakeholder. Compared to CCMs in other countries, 
Ghana’s CCM during the period of this study is cited as relatively independent from MoH, though this has 
not always been the case (Jansegers 2003; Global Fund 2008b; R-6, n.d.; R-8, n.d.).  
 
As introduced in Chapter IV, besides the Ghanaian CCM (1), stakeholders included: (2) the National 
Malaria Control Program (NMCP), (3) the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ghana Health Service (GHS), (4) 
the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana (PSGH), and (5) the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
Ghana (PMAG) (as shown in the left-most columns in Table 6).  
 
In trying to assign single stands to organizations, we find a variety of views within an organization, as 
mirrors the literature on bureaucratic politics (Allison and Halperin 1972). To accommodate this diversity, 
we expand our focus to both organizations and key individuals within them. In Table 6, we label each 
stakeholder with his or her organizational home, station, and relationship to the decision-arena. Below, 
we describe the evidence that guided our assignment of stands (refer back to Figure 13 for a review of 
stakeholders).  
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STAND S  
Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM): strongly supportive and mixed. As a whole, the heterogeneous 
membership of CCM “vacillate[d] in its support of the AMFm” (R-5, n.d.). However, the CCM Chairman — 
also a retail pharmacist and former president of PSGH — actively supported the AMFm, acting as its “real 
champion” (R-2, n.d.).  
 
National Malaria Control Program (NMCP): mixed (passively supportive and passively resistant). In the 
view of several informants, NMCP’s PM exemplified a passively resistant stand, “distanc[ing] herself from 
the AMFm” (R-1) (R-1, n.d.; R-2, n.d.; R-6, n.d.). She wanted limited association with the AMFm decision 
but told her subordinates they could work on it. In turn, they passively supported the idea, deciding “there 
wasn’t much to lose by going for it” (R-1) and helped draft the proposal (R-1, n.d.; R-2, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). At 
the time of adoption, NMCP was most keen on pursuing universal bednet coverage (Malm 2014). 
 
Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ghana Health Service (GHS): strongly supportive and unstated. Under the 
AMFm, MoH procured and distributed s-QA.ACTs through the public health care system. A high-level GHS 
bureaucrat, connected with Roll Back Malaria since the early global AMFm discussions, actively supported 
the program. In contrast, the appointed Minister Sipa-Yankey refused to reveal his stand.  
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Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana (PSGH) and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of Ghana 
(PMAG): mixed (strongly supportive, strongly resistant, mixed). Under the AMFm, pharmaceutical 
companies owned by pharmacists and non-pharmacists could import and distribute s-QA.ACTs. Thus, 
members of PSGH, PMAG, as well as any registered pharmaceutical importer or distributer, could apply 
to import and distribute under the AMFm. Pharmacists and LCSs dispensed the s-QA.ACTs to patients.  
 
According to different respondents, between two and six Ghanaian manufacturers could — and were — 
actively making ACTs prior to the AMFm (R-5, n.d.; R-9, n.d.). Within private business interests, “how 
people reacted to the AMFm depended on [their location in] the value-chain and supply-chain” (R-10, 
n.d.). One company could be at many locations in the supply chain – such as, manufacturers that also 
import or distributors that also retail – which meant their stands might be informed by several business 
perspectives.  
 
Table 6: Summary of stakeholders and their stands, showing no clear relationship between stands 
and stakeholder characteristics 
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The leadership of PGSH, representing all registered pharmacists, strongly and visibly supported the 
AMFm; but the membership held mixed opinions (R-1, n.d.). PSGH leadership also “play[ed] on the global 
[health] stage,” active in global organizations including GF (R-6, n.d.). In contrast, the leadership of PMAG, 
representing businesspeople and pharmacists involved in pharmaceutical manufacturing, strongly 
resisted the AMFm while its membership, too, held mixed opinions (R-1, n.d.). In part, resistance at the 
member level may have stemmed from lack of information, despite some CCM attempts at outreach and 
sensitization. As noted below in Chapter VIII, after adoption, the limits of street-level understanding of 
the AMFm became more clear, necessitating one-on-one sensitization (R-4, n.d.). 
 
Our analysis of stands, summarized in Table 6, reveals no clear pattern associating stands with stakeholder 
categories, as discussed further below.  
 
The two key institutional stakeholders — CCM leadership and membership — took differing stands on the 
AMFm while circumstantial stakeholder views ranged from actively supportive to actively resistant. The 
three active supporters included players from CCM, PSGH, and GHS; the latter two also had ties with 
global-level health organizations. Across national organizations and agencies, leaders took differing stands 
from one another and from their respective memberships. Businesspeople ranged from actively 
supportive to actively resistant while bureaucrats stood passively (in both directions) or remained neutral. 
Resistance came both from bureaucrats and businesspeople. In sum, we do not find a clear pattern of 
stands according to our stakeholder categorization scheme. 
 
Before moving on, I briefly note that there is some friction between institutional stakeholders — who 
seemed to have limited and vacillating opinions on the AMFM — and circumstantial stakeholders — who 
entered the arena with much at stake (see also Figure 13). Nevertheless, this thesis is not an exploration 
of the composition of the Ghanaian CCM at the time of the AMFm adoption decision, nor is it a critique 
of CCMs more generally. Rather, the CCM is a focal point for this study because when GF agreed to house 
the AMFm, the CCM became the decision-making arena.  
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REMAI NI NG P UZ ZLES  A N D L IMITAT IONS  O F THE  DE SC RIPT IVE  ST AKEHOL DER  ANALYS IS  
Given the independent coding and consensus-building around stands, as well as the member-checking 
with key informants (many of whom are also stakeholders represented in this analysis), we believe the 
above analysis provides an accurate representation of the relevant, active stakeholders and their stands 
on the AMFm. But the lack of associative pattern between categories of stakeholders and their stands 
leaves unsolved why different stakeholders held different views. This indicates two limitations of this 
analysis. These, in turn, may reflect general limitations of a descriptive, category-based approach to 
studying and explaining stakeholders. 
 
First, though our stakeholder categories do not associate with stands, this is not necessarily a limitation 
of the general approach. Other researchers could develop differing categorization criteria and these may 
perform better than the ones employed here. Second, category-based analysis does not allow 
stakeholders to have agency or voice in taking a stand, nor allow them to grapple with complex and 
conflicting motivations and interests. Given the limitation of this first analysis, we decided to conduct an 
additional qualitative analysis that focuses more on themes revealed in the data on how stakeholders 
explained the process of adopting the AMFm, rather than using stakeholder types. That is, we try to 
categorize the reasons behind stakeholders’ stands from their own perspectives, even when these 
perspectives internally conflict, as many informants noted that most stakeholders had reasons both to 
support and resist the decision to pilot the AMFm. Explicitly explaining the underlying motivations is 
beyond the scope of this thesis; rather, we try to make sense of the reasons provided to us during the 
interviews and through document and newspaper reviews. 
 
SECTION V.4:  ANALYTIC METHODS AND RESULTS II-  CATEGORIZING 
REASONS FOR STANDS  
DATA ANALYSI S  I I  
In this analysis, we aim to explore the reasoning behind stands, using informants’ reasoning for why 
certain stakeholders (including themselves) took certain stands. Further, we aim to distil these reasons 
into a concise set of explanatory themes. To analyze the narrative data, one of us (HEL) first generated a 
set of open codes on views towards the AMFm. The “openness” of the codes indicates that they did not 
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come from a list set by existing theory or from prior empirical work. Instead, they emerged from the data 
as part of the analysis. This grounded (or open) qualitative analytic approach reflects that we did not have 
a clear theoretical frame when approaching these data but rather expected the key themes to emerge 
from them. 
 
In practice, generating open codes to analyze data means reading the narrative several times and noting 
key phrases, words, topics, attitudes, or references to program components or specific events, then later 
consolidating repeated ideas. For example, “uncertainty” and “no clarity” around the AMFm refer to a 
similar underlying idea and so become combined as “uncertainty.” The consolidated list contained 30 
codes, shown in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9. 
  
Some sentences and thoughts, of course, refer to more than one topic or event. Specifically, a statement 
reflecting concern about the distribution of responsibility for the 2004 launch of Ghana’s new ACT policy 
reflects both “responsibility” and “ACT policy.” To account for this, HEL applied up to three codes to any 
unit of text. JBB and AMF, using the list of 30 codes, independently did the same. We then compared 
coding, adjusting and iterating until we reached consensus. 
 
Although not central to the analysis, Figure 15 provides a descriptive sense of the data by displaying the 
codes, using font sizes proportionate to how often each code applied to the data (using Wordle©). This is 
only suggestive of respondents’ full views, given that semi-structured interviews generated the data, 
which we then coded subjectively (Anfara, Brown, and Mangione 2002).  
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We combined and distilled the 30 codes into three encapsulating themes that, when linked with theory, 
have explanatory power. These themes represent the categories of reasons stakeholders provided for 
what they and others considered when taking a stand. Theory did not guide the creation of these themes: 
they were simply the neatest distillation of the codes that we agreed on. After pinpointing themes based 
on our empirical data, we linked them with existing theory, as shown in the next section. We show the 
open codes that fed each of these themes in the second column of each of the tables below (Table 7, 
Table 8, and Table 9). We show the linked theories in the third column of each of these three tables. 
 
The themes are: (1) direct policy goals (related to the explicit goals of the AMFm (boxed-in, Figure 15), (2) 
indirect policy goals related to state and productive capacity (plain, Figure 15), and (3) reputational goals 
(underlined, Figure 15). Below, we relate each theme to relevant theoretical and empirical literature, and 
then present how each theme drove both receptive and resistant stands in this case (as narrated in 
Chapter IV).  
 
Figure 15: Open-codes applied key informant interviews, displayed in font sizes proportionate to their 
relative frequency 
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THEME #1:  D IRECT  POL I C Y  SEEKI NG -  RED UCI NG TH E  BURDE N O F M ALAR IA  
EXISTING THEORY 
For many decision-makers, enacting policy to increase social welfare is a key goal (Strom 1990). Often, of 
course, such policies address market (or government) failures in distributing public goods. To assess a 
policy option, decision-makers may consider the severity or salience of the identified failure as well as 
whether the proposed policy option can, indeed, correct it (Grindle and Thomas 1991).  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Many respondents acknowledged the severe burden malaria imposes on Ghana, making its alleviation an 
important social goal. Moreover, many felt expanded access to high-quality ACTs could lessen this burden, 
improving public and, especially, private welfare. No respondent contradicted that the AMFm had 
admirable goals and addressed a serious problem. Rather, contestation centered on the framing of those 
goals as well as the technical viability of the AMFm as a potential way of achieving them. Said another 
way, all stakeholders seemed to agree that malaria is a problem; disagreement is around whether the 
AMFm presented the best solution. 
 
Receptive 
Receptive stakeholders believed the AMFm will widely distribute the high-quality ACTs at low 
retail prices, which they emphasized as a public good. These stakeholders were also confident 
that GF will continue the AMFm beyond Phase I. As indicated in Table 7, references to “saving 
lives,” “access,” and “public goods” are, relatively, infrequent. We interpret this apparent 
omission further in the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
Resistant 
First, some resistant stakeholders did not think the AMFm’s mechanism would increase ACT 
access, particularly because importers, distributors, and retailers might capture the subsidy in the 
supply chain. This mirrors aspects of the global debate that led GF to pilot the AMFm in the first 
place. Second, some stakeholders worried that even if the AMFm works in Phase I, if discontinued 
thereafter, it might hinder long-term ACT access. The AMFm’s marketing distorts public 
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expectations about ACT prices. But AMFm-level prices cannot hold absent the AMFm or another 
subsidization plan, of which Ghana did not have one planned at the time (R-7, n.d.). Whether GF 
maintained the AMFm hinged on the pilot. To some stakeholders, this signaled a lack of 
commitment — and even a threat — to the initiative’s stated goals. One summarized this as 
meaning that the AMFm was a “short-term measure with no long-term plan” (R-11, n.d.).  
 
In sum, the technical aspects of the AMFm itself caused debate on whether s-QA.ACTs would arrive in the 
needed places and at the intended price. The possible discontinuation of the AMFm after Phase I created 
additional concerns related to health outcomes and also GF’s commitment to those outcomes. 
 
 
Table 7: Direct policy goals in relation to open codes, theory and case evidence, showing national-level 
reasons for support and resistance for joining the AMFm pilot 
 
THEME #2:  IND IRECT  POL I CY  SEE KI NG –  GO ALS  ARO UND STATE  AND  PROD UCTI VE  CAP AC ITY  
EXISTING THEORY 
Stakeholders deciding on particular policies and programs may also attend to other policy goals, such as 
bolstering the state’s capacity (see, e.g. (Booth 2014)). Any given policy or program will have explicit goals. 
These are the direct policy goals (in this case, relating to malaria medicines access and the burden of 
disease caused by malaria). However, stakeholders may also see how pursuing a given policy may threaten 
or allow them to make gains on goals not explicitly stated in the policy – that is, indirect policy goals. Here, 
I take state and productive capacity as a key indirect goal considered by stakeholders. 
 
This capacity refers to a government’s ability to do the work expected of a nation-state. Such work 
includes financing programs, enforcing laws, spurring economic growth, protecting welfare, and delivering 
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public goods (Evans 1995; Besley and Persson 2009). An expanded view of state “developmental” capacity 
includes work in synergistically engaging the private sector to build a productive domestic manufacturing 
and industrial base (Evans 1995). These efforts can bring direct economic benefit and self-sufficiency to 
the country. They can also enhance a nation’s legitimacy and reputation, as viewed by global entities, as 
an economic power with a functional government (Chirot and Hall 1982; Gereffi 1983; Toye and Toye 
2003; Weyland 2005; Gómez 2009). 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the past two decades, Ghana has achieved important progress in economic growth, democratization, 
and global prestige (as noted above in Section III.2) (Gyimah-Boadi 2009). This progress raises new 
expectations for the state – from within and outside Ghana – to move towards firm (meaning upper, 
rather than lower) middle-income status, continuing economic growth and diversification. The state also 
needs to address heightened expectations for the delivery of public goods and social protection (Weyland 
2005; Gyimah-Boadi 2009). 
 
Receptive 
Some supporters felt the AMFm may help Ghana deliver on its social protection promises and 
noted NHIS as a “selling point” (R-7, n.d.). They believed that immediately lessening budgetary 
pressures on NHIS through the AMFm would enhance the scheme’s financial viability and, in turn, 
capacity to deliver universal health insurance.†††††††††††††††††††  
 
Resistant 
In contrast, resisters saw threats from the AMFm to Ghana’s economic growth and national self-
sufficiency. The AMFm would squeeze national pharmaceutical manufacturers out of the market 
                                                          
††††††††††††††††††† It was not possible to get financial evidence on the projected (in 2009) impact of the AMFm on the 
NHIS’s budget and sustainability. For the present analysis, the main point is that some stakeholders felt that it would 
be helpful to NHIS to have the retail price of ACTs lowered, as was expected to happen under the AMFm. In 2010, 
NHIA’s Annual Report notes that savings that came from the AMFm but does not relate this finding to the overall 
financial situation of NHIA (National Health Insurance Authority 2010). 
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as they could not compete with the price of s-QA.ACTs (R-1, n.d.; R-5, n.d.). These local 
manufacturers would lose money sunk into manufacturing equipment, which they had done in 
response to Ghana’s 2004 change in antimalarial policy.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ There was not an explicit 
plan, directly through the AMFm or GF, to financially support the inclusion of local manufacturers 
in the long-run. UNIDO started working — once the AMFm was adopted — on the task of pursuing 
a longer-term plan to make the Ghanaian pharmaceutical manufacturing industry more 
competitive.  
 
Stakeholders questioned whether the AMFm undercut national —even continental — 
manufacturing capacity (R-9, n.d.; R-14, n.d.). As noted in Chapter IV, a variety of stakeholders 
called for Ghana to become “more nationalistic and futuristic in [its] policies” (R-11), focusing on 
addressing malaria in Africa with African-made technologies (R-9, n.d.; R-11, n.d.). Concerns about 
manufacturing and state capacity thus extended beyond firm profits and to nationalism and a 
quest for self-sufficiency. 
 
In sum, considerations of state developmental capacity and self-sufficiency influenced 
stakeholders’ stands. For supporters, the AMFm might help NHIS increase financial viability, 
furthering an important government commitment to its citizens. Among resisters, the AMFm’s 
potential to cut profits and manufacturing capacity represented a large concern in the contexts 
of a country trying to fight malaria and to grow its economy. 
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Unfortunately for this analysis, because the majority of pharmaceutical manufacturers in Ghana are 
privately owned rather than publicly traded, financial information about how much they stood to lose or gain from 
the AMFm is unclear. 
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Table 8: State capacity as an indirect policy goal in relation to open codes, theory and case evidence, 
showing organizational- and national-level reasons for support and resistance to joining the AMFm pilot 
 
THEME #3:  REPUT ATIO N AND I NCENTIVE S  
EXISTING THEORY  
Decision-makers and stakeholders consider how a decision enhances or puts at risk individual or national 
reputations. Professional reputation is often associated with maintaining or excelling in one’s station, 
given its particular incentive structures (Strom 1990; Ostrom 2007). Station, as a category, did not have 
explanatory power. But the incentives set up by different stations might drive decision-making.  
 
In addition, recent theoretical and empirical arguments have highlighted the importance of a nation’s 
internal assessment of its reputation and prestige (Aronow, Carnegie, and Samii 2014). Conforming to 
globally set norms and reforms can enhance the international reputation, and in turn, the domestic 
legitimacy, of countries and the leaders that adopt them. This reputation can be deeply embedded in 
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national identity — and whether a nation is viewed from within (and without) as achieving developing or 
developed country status (Levi 2003). 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
What it means to perform well in a given station, and to pursue that goal, requires understanding how 
different types of jobs structure the distribution of reward and blame. A stakeholder trying to perform 
well in her position will work to maximize rewards and credit and/or to minimize blame (Weaver 1987). 
For some stations, performing well also benefits from certainty — that is, sticking to business as usual. 
 
Receptive 
AMFm offered stakeholders a chance to champion and successfully implement an innovative 
program. For NMCP and CCM stakeholders, joining the AMFm and executing it well could further 
their organizational reputation as a GF “star performer” (R-6) (R-6, n.d., USAID, President’s 
Malaria Initiative 2012). For individual champions, supporting the AMFm’s adoption could earn 
them national and global status. For businesspeople, the AMFm represented a chance to build 
public goodwill towards the sector, improving the image of pharmacists.  
 
Resistant 
Concerns about the AMFm stemmed from: deviations from business-as-usual, the need to forge 
new and cross-sector relationships, and uncertain distributions of accountability. All represented 
potential risks to reputation. Also, the future of the AMFm hinged on the pilot’s outcomes, which 
were uncertain. If the AMFm did not continue in the long-run, this could pose risks to its 
champions, who might be blamed for its market-distorting effects. 
 
For NMCP, the AMFm brought “big professional challenges” (R-2), with implementation 
requirements exceeding NMCP’s regular processes and proven capacity (R-2, n.d.; R-5, n.d.). In 
addition, implementation required untested partnerships across sectors — most worryingly, with 
private businesses (R-5, n.d.; R-6, n.d.).  
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NMCP was also concerned about how GF would interpret the pilot results: as proof of concept or 
as proof of NMCP’s implementation capabilities. There was a decided lack of clarity on how GF or 
the government would distribute responsibility for the pilot’s outcomes. In addition, a variety of 
public officials worried that supporting the AMFm would lead to “accus[ations] of letting 
foreigners take over the [pharmaceutical] market” and thereby undermine local capacity (R-2, 
n.d.; R-5, n.d.; R-7, n.d.; R-14, n.d.), while manufacturers worried about losing their “local brand 
identities” (R-12, n.d.). 
 
Overall, uncertainty about the accountability for and longevity of the AMFm presented major 
concerns – despite assurances provided at the stakeholder meeting in Dar es Salaam in 2009 (Roll 
Back Malaria Partnership 2009b). For practical planning as well as reputational reasons, many felt 
that “AMFm should have been an experiment for the next phase, not on whether to stop or 
continue the program” (R-14, n.d.).  
 
The Minister of Health was in a difficult position. On one hand, the AMFm would quickly bring an 
important treatment into the country, facilitating access (Arrow, Panosian, and Gelband 2004). 
On the other, PMAG leadership opposed piloting the AMFm and threatened to strike or 
demonstrate against it. PMAG had supported the Minister’s party in the recent election. 
Respondents acknowledged that the Minister would have risked “political suicide” (R-5) by openly 
supporting the AMFm (R-1, n.d.; R-5, n.d.; R-7, n.d.).  
 
Individuals also felt threats to their personal reputations. For example, NMCP’s Program Manager 
revealed her concern about avoiding blame if the AMFm did not achieve its targeted outcomes 
(Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009; R-14, n.d.). Businesspeople who championed 
the AMFm, coaxing their professional allies to accept the program, faced risks of “vilification” if 
industry lost profits or if GF revoked the program after diminishing local manufacturing capacity 
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(R-4, n.d.). Note the distinction between the undermining of local manufacturing (an issue of 
national capacity) and being personally vilified for the same issue (a reputational issue). 
 
 
Table 9: Reputation in relation to open codes, theory and case evidence, showing individual-, 
organizational- and national-level reasons for support and resistance for joining the AMFm pilot 
 
SECTION V.5:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLU SION  
For Phase I of the AMFm, global donors mobilized funds to pilot a mechanism intended to improve access 
to high-quality malaria treatment and, ultimately, lower malaria mortality. Using in-depth interviews and 
relevant meeting minutes, we ask: why would national stakeholders question — and even forgo — piloting 
a program intended to deliver high-quality treatment for a prevalent and expensive disease?  
 
These interviews took place once national implementation of the AMFm had begun but GF Board decision 
on the AMFm’s future beyond Phase I was still a year away. To explain positions and stands, we focused 
first on categories of key stakeholders. Second, we used stakeholder perspectives to distil key themes of 
interest, on which stakeholders drew both to support and to resist piloting the AMFm in Ghana.  
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Although our categorization scheme cannot explain stakeholder stands, we consolidated their 
heterogeneous reasons for support and resistance into three main themes: direct policy support, indirect 
policy support, and reputation. These have reassuring overlap with other researchers’ categories, such as 
policy, ideological, and instrumental goals that drive support for a policy (Blanchet and Fox 2013). Our 
findings also align with Grindle and Thomas’s assertion that “decision-makers act in a context of great 
uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability” (Grindle and Thomas 1991).  
 
D I SC USSIO N  
From our analysis, we reach four key takeaways, which may have broader implications for the analysis of 
why stakeholders in LMICs may resist aid in its varied forms. 
 
TAKEAWAY 1: STAKEHOLDERS OCCUPY MORE THAN ONE SEAT 
In our first analysis, we reveal that organizational home – or where a stakeholder “sits” – has no clear 
relationship with the stand s/he takes (Allison 1969). But it is also worth noting that stakeholders, formally 
or informally, often sit in more than one place. For example, the CCM Chairman is also a businessperson 
and an ACT manufacturer can also be a pharmaceutical importer. The PSGH president also has 
professional consulting links to GF. A leading advocate from in MoH was also involved in the initial AMFm 
talks given his role in RBM. A more nuanced view of where one sits would take into account these various 
affiliations at both the national and global levels.  
 
TAKEAWAY 2: DIRECT POLICY GOALS LED TO BOTH RECEPTIVITY AND RESISTANCE 
The stated public health goal of the AMFm’s — increasing ACT access and, especially, saving lives —
resonated with all stakeholders. Those who thought the mechanism could achieve these goals tended to 
support participation; those who had persistent doubts and less faith tended to resist. In taking stands, 
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stakeholders considered the pilot’s design and whether it could bring about those goals, rather than 
considering the public health merits of the goals. 
 
TAKEAWAY 3: INDIRECT POLICY GOALS AND CONCERNS FOR REPUTATION ALSO EXPLAIN RECEPTIVE OR 
RESISTANT STANDS 
Indirect policy goals also motivated stakeholders in taking stands. Recall the records from the CCM 
Emergency Meeting Minutes in which one CCM member urged the CCM Chairman “not to meddle in 
politics” and another member retorted that the decision was already “political,” relating to issues beyond 
the immediate goals laid out for the AMFm (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). These 
issues also influenced the lenses through which different stakeholders saw the AMFm. 
 
Some considered how the AMFm might affect state developmental capacity and their ability to move 
away from donor support – a concern reflected across the Ghanaian government (for one example, see 
(Mensah 2011). Note that we do not claim that the AMFm had a goal — explicit or implicit — of 
undermining Ghanaian state capacity to deliver on health insurance or to undermine the local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. Rather, the claim we make here is that national stakeholders 
considered the ramifications of the AMFm on state productive capacity in ways that the global designers 
of the AMFm – focused on direct health goals — may not have done. This indirect policy goal influenced 
how different national stakeholders weighed the merits of the AMFm.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
Several other authors have noted the importance of pursuing economic growth and creating jobs among 
citizens and politicians among low- and middle-income countries, often in contrast to donor priorities and 
processes (Benjamin 2013; Fox 2015; Pritchett 2015). In addition, stakeholders weighed whether 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ While street-level implementers are the focus of Chapters VII and VIII, it is worth briefly noting that 
a small number of drug retailers expressed an unprompted concern for supporting local production capacity during 
the PACT retailer follow-up interviews. This points was noted again by the surveyor team when reading this material 
and reflecting on what they remembered from intervews. For example, one said: “I think the local companies, 
especially in Ghana, should be equipped with the capacity to produce more and also subsidize their ACTs -- without 
that, the local companies will perish while there are also shortages and lapses in the system. Seriously scrutinize the 
supply chain and also help local companies like Ernest Pharmacy and KinaPharma to produce affordable ACTs” (V-
176 2011). 
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supporting the AMFm and implementing the pilot posed an opportunity or a risk to their reputation (that 
is, whether it represented a “public relations concern” (Heckman and Smith 1995; King et al. 2007)) either 
personally or professionally, from an individual, organizational, or national point of view.  
 
TAKEAWAY 4: EXPERIMENTAL PILOTS CREATE UNCERTAINTY, WHICH CAN BE THREATENING AND LEAD TO 
RESISTANCE 
One key question emerging from the consideration of stakeholder stands on the AMFm Phase I pilot is 
the extent to which resistance stemmed from the idea of the AMFm itself versus the idea of piloting the 
AMFm. Some issues, such as threats to both direct and indirect policy goals related to the AMFm 
mechanism itself, including the focus on malaria prevention rather than treatment as well as broader 
goals related to national pride and the support of local businesses. The idea of the AMFm, as an immediate 
idea as well as it a harbinger of future approaches to global health, provoked both support and resistance. 
 
But some sources of resistance stemmed more directly from the decision to pilot the AMFm. While many 
donor-driven projects have uncertain durations and commitments to long-term support, the approach to 
piloting the AMFm was exceptional in being explicitly experimental and non-committal. When agreeing 
to host the program, GF set-up a model of evidence-informed decision-making at the global level. By 
design, GF gave “no assurance to continue [AMFm] in the long-term,” so that the evaluation of the pilot 
could inform their decision (R-1, n.d.). This presented limited risks to those in Geneva.********************  
 
However, at the national level, this uncertainty proved troubling, as many Ghanaian stakeholders felt it 
posed national, organizational, and personal risks for policy goals and reputations. In a point of opposing 
objectives, some stakeholders may have supported the pilot if they felt they had a credible commitment 
that the program would not be terminated, while GF wanted the pilot to see if the evidence suggested 
the program should be terminated.  
 
                                                          
******************** Note that a recent tongue-in-cheek definition of “donors” was “those most insulated from the 
consequences of their actions” (Kleinman 2016).  
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Pilot-specific concerns arose from uncertainties on the investment of time in setting up the needed 
systems and relationships as well as the uncertainty of returns on investments in reputation for supporting 
the AMFm. The reasons for which Ghanaian stakeholders support participation – such as saving lives and 
alleviating NHIS budgetary pressures — will only come to fruition if the AMFm continues beyond the Phase 
I pilot. Potential boosts to reputations from supporting the AMFm may also only come about if GF’s Board 
decides to continue the AMFm after Phase I. 
 
An additional set of stakeholder concerns relates to the consequences of initiating, and then terminating, 
an intervention like the AMFm. As a large-scale intervention, as well as an experiment, the AMFm could 
affect Ghana’s malaria medicine production capacity, prices, and access expectations in ways that might 
be unpredictable and possibly negative – the kinds of changes that led Norman Daniels to suggest that 
health reforms and interventions themselves, not just research on them, should be subject to ethical 
review (Daniels 2008). National stakeholders worried about the AMFm’s potential market distortions if 
the initiative was not continued – which led some of them to not want to start the pilot at all. National 
manufacturing capacity would attenuate, procurement patterns shift, and public expectations about 
QA.ACT availability and prices heighten.  
 
A final key set of concerns about the pilot was what, precisely, would drive the decision to continue. 
National stakeholders lacked clarity on whether GF would interpret disappointing pilot results as a failure 
of the global community’s idea, a failure of the global community’s implementation ability, a failure of 
national implementation and managerial efforts and capacity, or a failure of individual efforts in Ghana. 
Some evidence from the distribution of political accountability for random shocks, including aid programs, 
suggests that absent other information, voters will tend to attribute the effects of these shocks to their 
political leaders (Guiteras and Mobarak 2014). 
 
Uncertainty about the distribution of accountability and blame — professionally and politically — led 
stakeholders to resist or, at most, offer passive support to the pilot. To again paraphrase one respondent’s 
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articulation of a common view, Phase I of the AMFm should have been an experiment on how to continue, 
not whether to continue, the initiative (R-14, n.d.).  
 
L IMITAT IONS O F THE  ST UD Y  AND MIT I G ATING STR AT EGIE S  
Our approach to the analysis of stakeholders’ stands entails two key constraints on making generalizable 
conclusions. First, the semi-structured interviews gravitated toward what was unusual and controversial 
about the AMFm compared to other health programming and, therefore, often concentrated on 
resistance rather than the obvious public health benefits.  
 
One interpretation of the data is that some issues – like public health – are simply less important to 
stakeholders. Another, though not mutually exclusive, interpretation, is that the interview structure did 
not elicit positive statements about the AMFm’s goals or design. Absent a direct question on malaria’s 
burden, for example, some respondents may have felt the importance of lessening it was too obvious to 
mention, as indicated by its absence in the word cloud (Figure 15). Additionally, most interviews drifted 
to the differences between the AMFm and other GF processes, as well as towards uncertainties about the 
AMFm design and adoption process. Put more simply, “the normal does not make news” and may not 
always make conversation either (Tuchman 1979). 
 
In addition, although I talked with many of the stakeholders identified as key for adoption, others were 
unreachable or unwilling to converse. Our analysis may, then, exclude some viewpoints. However, we do 
try to find other ways of representing these voices, including drawing on meeting minutes and 
contemporary news items. This helps to a certain extent. However, for those in attendance at CCM 
meetings that neither speak during those meetings nor come up in conversations about the AMFm 
adoption decision with key informants, it is unclear what motivated their silence and whether, in some 
cases, their silence actually spoke loudly. 
 
A second constraint is that all single-setting, single-episode case studies present challenges to external 
validity, given the idiosyncrasies of the context and program under investigation (as discussed in Chapter 
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II). For example, Ghana has unique features such as a competitive, multi-party democracy with 
commitments to growing its economy, in part through expanding private-sector manufacturing, as well 
as commitments to social protection, such as the NHIS. Aspects of this setting overlapped with aspects of 
the AMFm, including its incorporation of some private sector entities.  
 
We address and mitigate these two concerns in several ways. First, we acknowledge that, in analyzing a 
single case study, we generate rather than test hypotheses (Bennett and George 1997; Strauss and Corbin 
1997). The explanatory power of the proposed themes — the role of seeking direct policy goals, of seeking 
indirect policy goals, and seeking to build or shield one’s reputation — needs to be tested in other cases 
to see if they have merit outside piloting AMFm in Ghana. For now, they represent a potential useful set 
of constructs for future stakeholder analyses.  
 
Second, we link our findings with existing theory, which may support future testing of the ideas we 
propose in other contexts (Gerring 2004). Third, we use independent coding and consensus as a check on 
idiosyncratic readings and interpretations of the data. Fourth, we attempt to transparently narrate our 
analytic process, moving from collected data to coded data to our consolidated results and 
interpretations. Fifth, we use respondents’ own words as much as possible to describe their ideas. Finally, 
as described in Chapter III, we engage in member-checking or validation, allowing respondents to read 
the manuscript and suggest alternative interpretations (Lincoln and Guba 1986). Overall, respondents 
agreed with the themes presented in this analysis and agreed to have their names included in the 
acknowledgements section as contributors. A few factual tweaks were made, which I include in in this 
thesis. 
 
An additional, potential critique of this analysis is the assumption that Ghana could have opted out of 
submitting to join the pilot. Different stakeholders made differing claims, ranging from the “definite” 
potential of Ghana to have turned down Phase I to a sense the initiative was never likely to be blocked (R-
13; O. Sabot 2015). If the premise of opting out does not hold, the reader may question the value of the 
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analysis, especially if aware that Ghana adopted the AMFm, implemented the pilot, and will continue to 
pursue an AMFm-like mechanism in the future (as narrated in Chapter IV and analyzed in Chapter VI).  
 
We cannot construct a counterfactual to say whether Ghana may have decided against piloting the AMFm; 
interview respondents had different opinions on the likelihood of this outcome.†††††††††††††††††††† However, 
we argue that studying the process of adopting the AMFm is important regardless of whether Ghana could 
have said ‘no,’ precisely because some stakeholders would have liked to do so or would have liked to have 
proceeded under different terms. By revealing points of contention, confusion, hesitation, and resistance, 
we highlight issues that may hinder policy transfer between the global and national level. It is important 
to note, however, that we have only explored these issues in relation to the AMFm in Ghana and have not 
cross-checked whether the same stakeholders hold consistent views towards other health products, 
including bednets and rapid diagnostic test kits for malaria. 
 
These results align with studies of other health and development-related policy decisions, which find that 
stakeholders are motivated by issues outside direct policy goals — and outside policy goals altogether 
(e.g. (Ferguson 1990; Onoka et al. 2013; Booth 2014)). Motivations can be much more personal. This is 
not a new finding but it warrants repeated emphasis (Reich 1996). 
 
MOVING  FORW AR D  
In this chapter, we highlighted that national stakeholders held diverse opinions about the AMFm. Through 
a grounded qualitative analysis, using an iterative process of open-coding and consolidation, we put 
forward three key themes that explain the underpinnings of these diverse opinions in an effort to solve 
the puzzle central to this chapter: why would national stakeholders question — and even forgo — piloting 
a program intended to deliver high-quality treatment for a prevalent, expensive disease? Thematic 
interests include direct policy goals but also the desire to use policies to enhance state capacity as well as 
to enhance (or maintain) individual, organizational, and national reputations.  
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††††† Rwanda is suggestive that “no” was an option. However, both time and limited similarities prevent 
us from examining Rwanda as a comparator case. 
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This analysis has described how different stakeholders viewed the AMFm proposal and has offered an 
explanation of the complex of reasons underlying these stands. Sending off an application, not having 
been formally vetoed by the Minister, indicates that joining the AMFm had sufficient support to outweigh 
concerns within CCM. However, it is clear there was not a consensus opinion and joining the AMFm 
involved significant risks to political, governmental, business, and personal reputations. 
 
The next step is to understand what they did in response. In the next chapter, I consider the actions of 
various stakeholders in Accra, using a common conceptual framework for considering policy decisions. 
While obvious, it still bears mentioning that stakeholders did indeed act, both to support and block the 
proposal to transfer the AMFm to Ghana. National stakeholders are active agents in prioritizing, adopting, 
and implementing global health initiatives and in achieving global health goals. As the preceding narrative 
shows — and the following analysis explores — individual national stakeholders are critical to the 
governance and practice of global health (Buse and Walt 2002).  
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CHAPTER VI:  CASE ANALYSIS - ADOPTING THE AMFM IN GHANA: 
APPLICATION OF A MULTIPLE-STREAMS 
APPROACH TO A CASE OF  POLICY TRANSFER  
 
SECTION VI.1:  INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the range of reasons why different stakeholders took particular stands 
on adopting the pilot of the AMFm. Three themes helped to explain what stakeholders considered in 
taking their stands, laying out the state of play for adoption. In the present chapter, I examine the play 
itself and how stakeholder actions facilitated the outcome of policy adoption. 
 
This play included two events that interviewed stakeholders marked as unusual: the effort to involve a 
major politician in CCM decision-making and the subsequent refusal of that politician to announce a 
decision. By the modifier “major,” I indicate past and present nationally-elected officials and their party-
affiliated appointments, such as the Minister of Health. The effort to involve a major national political 
leader warrants further analysis. In this chapter, I aim to understand how — through which actions and 
actors — adoption of the AMFm pilot happened in the context of these events. 
 
I consider the AMFm adoption decision within two broad conceptual frames, not intended to be mutually 
exclusive. The first is the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) to understanding policy outcomes (Kingdon 
1995; Zahariadis 2007). This commonly used policy framework posits a set of criteria that increase the 
likelihood of a policy phase being completed. The second is that of a vertical policy transfer: globally 
defined problems catalyzed and shaped the AMFm; policies were prioritized and formulated above the 
national-level. Then the initiative was introduced for national adoption. Part of my broad goal of this 
chapter is to understand the usefulness and limitations of MSA in cases of adopting a vertically transferred 
policy proposal. I also aim to understand what is missed when vertical origin of a policy is not considered 
in analyzing its adoption. That is, in this chapter, I both seek to test a framework (MSA) and then to 
propose a way to modify the framework, in seeking to explain specific aspects of the case of adopting the 
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AMFm pilot in Ghana. To begin, I justify my use of MSA as a guiding conceptual frame and then provide 
an overview of its key components. 
 
MULTIPLE-STREAMS APPROACH (MSA) 
 
Justification for using MSA 
Studying US Congressional policy-making processes and drawing on the Cohen, March, and Olsen’s 
garbage can model of organizational choice, John Kingdon delineated MSA to explain how certain issues 
are chosen for political attention (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). His 
work on policy decisions focused on pre-adoption processes: prioritizing problems (agenda-setting) and 
specifying policy design options (Durant and Diehl 1989).  
 
Kingdon thought extant literature explained subsequent policy stages — adoption and implementation 
(Kingdon 1995). But later researchers found existing approaches wanting. They suggested that the 
multiple-streams metaphor is useful for studying and interpreting these later processes and outcomes 
(Lemieux 2002; Zahariadis 2007; Ridde 2009). I follow their lead for this analysis. 
 
MSA presents an appropriate framework for analyzing this case of adoption for six main reasons. First, 
researchers apply the framework across a wide range of policy sectors, with over 10,000 citations for 
Kingdon’s book alone, linking this analysis with a broad public policy literature (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 
2007; Greer 2015). This popularity and potential to link with the public policy and global health literature 
is appealing, though not sufficient justification in itself. 
 
Second, decisions, often examined in retrospect, are the key unit of analysis, as is true in this chapter 
(Zahariadis 2014). MSA also offers flexibility about the time period over which a particular decision is 
studied. Other frameworks are less flexible, focusing only on long-run stakeholder actions, which does not 
apply in this delimited case of decision-making (Sabatier 2007).  
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Third, MSA incorporates the many moving parts of a policy narrative. Rather than focusing on a single 
explanatory variable, it requires interactions to explain a policy decision or non-decision (Shroff, Roberts, 
and Reich 2015). 
 
Fourth, the framework has proved cosmopolitan, with researchers applying it outside the United States 
in supra-national (global), national, and sub-national contexts (Exworthy, Berney, and Powell 2002; 
Zahariadis 2005; DeJaeghere, Chapman, and Mulkeen 2006; Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson 2008).  
 
Fifth, global health researchers have used MSA to study and affect priority-setting, adoption, and 
implementation and is the main framework used to look specifically at global health policy transfer 
(Gordenker et al. 1995; Reich 1995a; Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003; Lush, Walt, and Ogden 2003; Ridde 
2009; Gagnon 2012). Researchers have used MSA to examine priority-setting, adoption, and 
implementation at sub-national (Atkins et al. 2012; Jat et al. 2013), national (Daniels and Lewin 2008; Ha 
et al. 2010; Burris et al. 2011; Shroff, Roberts, and Reich 2015; Kusi-Ampofo et al. 2015), and global levels 
(Reich 1995a; Hafner and Shiffman 2013; Gagnon and Labonté 2013; Allutis, Kraft, and Brand 2014). 
 
Sixth, the framework stems from empirical observations of decision-making under conditions of time-
limitations, ambiguity, and unclear policy preferences (Zahariadis 2007; Gagnon 2012). These conditions 
do not appear in all decision-making models but hold in the case of piloting the AMFm in Ghana. For 
example, rational actor models (neorealism and neoinstitutionalism at the state level) presume near-
perfect information and time to come to a clear decision – but this was not true of the AMFm adoption 
decision in Ghana. Similarly, two-table games include one government decision-maker simultaneously 
playing to domestic and international audiences, such “that domestic tactics clearly have foreign 
audiences in mind to explicitly pursue the extractions of concessions from the other side” (Putnam 1988) 
— but this was not true of the AMFm adoption decision in Ghana (Putnam 1988; Zahariadis 2005).  
 
132 
Basic framework 
MSA proposes that the likelihood of an issue receiving attention as a defined, prioritized public problem 
increases when elements in three “largely unrelated” activity streams interact (Zahariadis 2007). These 
three streams include the activities and actors that (1) define, spotlight, and construct problems (the 
problem stream); (2) design and promote technical policies (the policy stream); and (3) inform and make 
political decisions (the politics stream) (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). Each stream flows according to 
its own institutional currents and historical course, carrying its own stakeholders and ideas (Zahariadis 
2007). However, elements in a stream can become — or make themselves become — buoyant, rising to 
the surface of the activity. When surfaced, these elements are more visible to the media and public and 
more available to interact with surfaced elements in other streams.  
 
MSA’s set-up of surfacing and subsequent interaction indicates that events must occur with a particular 
timing and sequence to achieve policy outcomes. When elements in all three streams surface at the same 
time, meaningful interaction can occur – coupling, in MSA parlance (Kingdon 1995). Such interaction 
occurs when political actors are willing and able to consider a particular problem, linked with and framed 
by a particular solution.  
 
These moments for possible linking interaction — and, so, policy action — are windows of opportunity. 
Surfacing elements in either the problem or politics streams can open these windows at unpredictable 
moments (e.g. at a crisis) as well as predictable events (e.g. at an election). Within these windows, it 
becomes easier for related elements in each stream to surface, available for interaction. Even with 
surfaced elements, coupling of streams still requires active manipulation by policy entrepreneurs, who 
work to link a proposed solution to a surfaced problem and to critical surfaced decision-makers (Price 
1971; Weissert 1991; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2014). In Figure 16, I provide a schematic how the 
probability of coupling increases, showing the three streams, the windows of opportunity and timing of 
action by policy entrepreneurs.  
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MSA is, thus, premised on the intuitive — as well as empirically grounded — idea that the right people 
with the right decision-making powers need to be paying attention to a relevant problem at a time when 
a particular policy solution seems right to move forward. That is, the probability of achieving a policy 
outcome (coupling) increases when several independent variables co-occur: (1) an open opportunity 
window and (2) action by a policy entrepreneur, and (3) surfacing of elements in at least two activity 
streams. Without one of these, policy progress becomes less likely. 
 
 
Policy outcomes of interest: coupling as completion of policy stages 
While coupling appears as the dependent variable in MSA literature, it is often defined only loosely, 
through synonyms (e.g. linking). However, researchers often (implicitly) equate coupling with progression 
in the policy process, such as setting the agenda or adopting a proposal (deLeon 1999). This suggests a 
way towards sharper definitions of coupling as the policy outcome of interest: specifying it as the 
completion of a policy stage. As well as being sharper, this definitional approach highlights the linkages 
between heuristic policy stages, as a series of couplings as a policy moves from an identified social 
problem to the adoption of a policy to implementation of its solution (Matland 1995; Ridde 2009). I define 
adoption, the key policy outcome in this analysis, below.  
 
Figure 16: Representation of the Multiple-Streams Approach (MSA), with independent problem, 
politics, and policy streams 
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VERTICAL POLICY TRANSFER 
In this chapter, I use MSA to examine a case of vertical policy transfer, in which a policy idea – with or 
without a fully articulated agenda – moved from one level to another. I consider the AMFm to be a policy 
transferred, vertically, from Geneva to the capitals of pilot countries, including Accra in 
Ghana.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The idea of vertical policy transfer recognizes that policy operates on various 
levels: at the global level (above the state), at the level of the nation-state, and sub-national levels below 
the state (Reich 2002). One conceptual interpretation of vertical policy transfer (Stone 1999; Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000) is that once the idea is transferred, adoption and implementation processes occur at the 
national level, without global input. Whether there is or is not actually significant global input in a case of 
vertical policy transfer is an empirical question.  
 
The conceptual possibility of a transfer from global to national level with no post-transfer input from the 
global level is illustrated in Figure 17. In this visualization, I show global implementation as preceding 
national adoption. Recall from Chapter IV that global implementation involved price negotiations, funding 
the ring-fenced cache, and only then inviting candidate countries to apply to join the pilot phase. Thus, 
the sequencing depicted in Figure 17 matches the present case but may need to be modified in other 
scenarios. Also, given the explicit intention to use the results of national implementation to inform global 
decision-making, I include a feedback loop that may not exist in all cases of vertical policy transfer. 
 
Figure 17: Visualization of a possible policy trajectory in a vertical policy transfer 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This is in contrast with horizontal policy transfer – or policy diffusion – when one country notices 
and takes up a policy idea tried in another country (Rogers 1995; Stone 1999; Weyland 2005). 
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This schematic makes vertical policy transfer look straightforward. Global health researchers suggest 
otherwise. As Ogden et al note, “how policies are transferred is important for [many] reasons, not least 
because transfer without ‘ownership’ might lead to deficits or failures in implementation” (emphasis 
added) (Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003). To structure this examination of “how,” I use a common public 
policy framework: MSA (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007).  
 
Researchers who have used MSA to analyze policies transferred from the global level note linkages 
between (1) global agenda-setting and choosing policies to address prioritized problems and (2) the 
national adoption and implementation of these policies (Lush, Walt, and Ogden 2003; Ogden, Walt, and 
Lush 2003; Ridde 2008). They offer a picture of global solutions adopted in national capitals of low- and 
middle-income countries, sometimes with global agencies substituting for elected, national political 
actors – a concept I discuss further, below (Ridde 2009).  
 
These researchers generally depict transfer either in the discussion of an analysis of global-level agenda-
setting or in the introduction to an analysis of national implementation (Lush, Walt, and Ogden 2003; 
Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003; Ridde 2009). That is, they do not apply MSA to analyze policy transfer and 
national adoption or whether we should expect national adoption to follow from policy transfer. Explicit 
analysis of policy transfer from the global level toward national-level adoption is important to 
understanding the adoption of the AMFm pilot. 
 
RESEARCH GOALS AND OUTLINE 
This chapter is driven by the specific, unusual events in the case of adopting the AMFm in Ghana. First, an 
institutional stakeholder (CCM) was uncertain how to proceed with the AMFm decision and, second, the 
same stakeholder tried to give its decision-making power to a circumstantial stakeholder (the Minister of 
Health). Third, Minister Sipa-Yankey did not take a stand on piloting the AMFm. These events lead to two 
questions, one conceptual and one theoretical. Why did national stakeholders respond in this way to the 
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vertically transferred AMFm? And, to what extent can a multiple-streams approach to policy adoption help 
to explain these events and Ghana’s decision to join the AMFm pilot?  
 
In comparing the MSA framework to the empirical data presented in Chapter IV, the answer at first 
appears to be no. Many elements of MSA cannot be found among national stakeholders and processes: 
there are voids where the framework predicts there should not be. Some of the actions of national 
stakeholders – such as the effort by CCM to pass decision-making power to a major political leader – could 
be interpreted as (failed) efforts to fill some of those voids. 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, I pause to note that readers of early drafts of this chapter felt my 
aim was to salvage MSA when it did not explain all aspects of the case. In fact, this is opposite to my line 
of thinking. My initial hunch in considering this case was that the logic underlying the MSA framework — 
and therefore what is required to move the policy process forward — provided an important intuition to 
explain CCM’s decision to require approval from the Minister. Bringing in a political actor when this had 
not been done before required examination.  
 
Further, that a policy window had opened, but not in the way predicted by MSA, warranted further 
research. If a policy idea transferred from the global level can itself open an opportunity window, this may 
provide a useful way of visualizing the opportunities and hazards of vertical policy transfers. This analysis 
emerged from an initial sense that, first, MSA makes sense and that, second, where the actual events of 
the policy process deviated from MSA, important global health governance lessons could be learned.  
 
Ultimately, I argue in this chapter that MSA can make sense of the adoption events and outcome of the 
AMFm in Ghana. I also contend that MSA can be applied to a wider range of policy decisions that affect 
priority-setting. To proceed, I first describe the analytic methods of process-tracing and define the 
research hypotheses, considering the extent to which national policy and political processes can explain 
Ghana’s adoption of the AMFm. This includes an effort to carefully operationalize the MSA constructs. I 
use MSA to analyze the actions of national stakeholders, then expand the analysis to include global 
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stakeholders and processes. I conclude with implications for vertical policy transfer in global health as well 
as the use of MSA in analyzing these transfers. 
 
SECTION VI.2: ANALYTIC METHODS  
To examine the extent to which MSA provides a suitable explanation of whether and how policy outcomes 
of interest are realized, I define and operationalize each of the key constructs in MSA. Then, in the analysis, 
I consider whether each of those needed constructs appears in the data on the AMFm in Ghana. 
 
VARI ABLE  DE FI NIT IO NS  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Adoption (coupling) 
Description: Adoption§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ formalizes or endorses a “capacity to act” (Stehr 1992) — 
implement — through two sequential decision steps or actions: presenting an idea for decision-
making and then taking an authoritative decision in its favor (Stehr 1992; Kingdon 1995). In 
political settings, these are (1) deciding to bring a plan forward for endorsement, either as a bill 
on the floor of the legislature for a vote or a proposal on the desk of an executive for sign-off 
(getting something on the agenda) and, then, (2) the legislature or executive giving an 
authoritative endorsement (Haskins and Margolis 2014). Though it is a two-step process, adoption 
is often portrayed as the single binary outcome of the second decision step (Berry and Berry 1990). 
This can obscure the activity involved in achieving the first. For clarity, I present it as two steps. 
 
Operationalization: CCM sits outside the legislative and executive processes described above. The 
relevant steps to consider for this case are: (1) a CCM decision to send a proposal to GF in Geneva 
and (2) the endorsement of the proposal as a funded, implementable design. The first of these 
steps receives more emphasis in this analysis. This is because, as noted in the case narrative 
(Chapter IV), once a country submitted an AMFm Phase I application to GF, that proposal had a 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Also termed endorsement, legislation, or legitimation in the policy literature. 
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good chance of approval. This may have been especially true for Ghana given its past performance 
on GF malaria grants. 
 
IN D E P E N D E N T V ARIAB LE S  
Independent variable: Surfaced issue in the policy stream 
Description: Proposed policy solutions exist in what Kingdon calls the “primal soup” of the policy 
stream (Kingdon 1995).********************* Proposed policy solutions are the product of policy 
actors’ ideas and debates within think tanks, governmental, parastatal, and non-governmental 
bureaucracies, and academic and non-profit institutes (Zahariadis 2007). Policy proposals can 
come about in several ways, including reformulations of ideas already in the soup. As indicated 
by vertical policy transfer, policy ideas may also be dropped by global organizations into the 
national policy context. 
 
Proposals-in-waiting sink or surface subject to context-specific selection processes (Kingdon 
1995). Kingdon identifies proposal characteristics that assist an idea in staying afloat or re-
surfacing — that is, that add buoyancy: technical feasibility, ideological value acceptability, and 
value-for-effort (Kingdon 1995). Buoyancy and surfacing are my terms, which, I believe, cogently 
describe what Kingdon lays out. Surfaced elements are those available for coupling; buoyancy 
makes surfacing more likely. 
 
Operationalization: Evidence that a policy proposal had surfaced in Ghana would be that policy 
actors were engaged in assembling a proposal that they felt had the buoyant qualities of technical 
feasibility, ideological acceptability to elites, and public palatability.  
 
                                                          
********************* This part of Kingdon’s framework relies heavily on an analogy to natural selection, evolution, and 
the primordial origins of life (Kingdon 1995). 
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Independent variable: Surfaced issue in the problem stream 
Description: Problems are surfaced issues that attract decision-makers’ attention as problems 
requiring policy redress. Ridde suggests surfaced problems will tend to be (framed as) new and 
be public in nature, “recognized both by officials and the wider public as something governments 
should legitimately” address (Ridde 2009). Surfacing can be catalyzed by actors in the problem 
stream, such as the media, advocates and activists, moral authorities, watchdogs and whistle-
blowers, as well as policy-makers and civil servants.  
 
Operationalization: To identify whether the AMFm was framed in Ghana using the same problems 
that globally motivated the initiative, I look for discussions of the following as new (or re-framed) 
and public: (1) malaria drugs are too expensive or otherwise inaccessible to patients and 
consumers, leading to both (2) unacceptably high malaria mortality and (3) the potential for 
parasites to develop resistance to artemisinin, especially absent an effective alternative 
treatment.  
 
Independent variable: Surfaced actors in the politics stream 
Description: the politics stream contains political decision-making bodies and institutions, along 
with the actors (major party politicians, pressure groups) wielding decision-making power in and 
on them. Kingdon explicitly focused on the major political actors of Washington, D.C., who 
contend with electoral concerns, political party concerns, and concerns about campaign support 
(Kingdon 1995). In applying MSA to the global level, researchers broadened this definition, relying 
on the politician and financial connections of aid agencies to national governments as well as the 
pressure groups effectively formed by global non-governmental agencies that have the authority 
(and budget) to influence who gets what and when (Lasswell 1958; Kingdon 
1995).†††††††††††††††††††††  
                                                          
††††††††††††††††††††† “In the international setting, [the politics stream is composed of] officials of international 
organizations; politicians responsible for national aid agencies, and their officials; pressure groups; and 
international non-government organizations” (Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003).  
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Operationalization: Given the national level of the present analysis, I take the narrower definition 
of national, major political actors put forward by Kingdon, to see if these actors were paying 
attention to the problems the AMFm was designed to address. I examine the actions of the 
President and his health-related appointees in the Ministry of Health and the National Health 
Insurance Authority as key political players. I exclude Ghana’s Parliament, which is considered 
weak in comparison to the executive (Whitfield 2011). I look for evidence that these political 
figures had surfaced as paying attention to the problems the AMFm set out to address globally 
and open to the solution it proposed.  
 
Independent variable: Opportunity windows 
Description: Opportunity windows are specific, time-delimited (“fleeting” (Kingdon 1995)) periods 
that create a sense that decision-making and policy action are important — even urgent — and 
feasible (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2005). Windows are opened by change, whether as 
“compelling problems” or political events – that is, surfacing in those streams (Zahariadis 2007).  
 
In the problem stream, changes in feedback and information, whether routinely monitored or 
dramatic and unexpected, can cause perceptions of an issue to change. Such changes can raise 
                                                          
Similarly, as Ridde hypothesizes, “when agenda-setting and [policy design] are international in origin, international 
organizations play an essential role in the political stream of public policies” (Ridde 2009). The budgets wielded by 
these “policy-makers in international organizations and donors” may have political endorsement via receipt of 
governmental money (directly, through bilateral transfers or, indirectly, funneled through multilateral 
organizations) (Ridde 2009). They may further reflect more direct verbal endorsement from a global political leader. 
This conceptualization from Ridde and from Lush, Ogden, and Walt opens the door that CCM could be viewed as a 
political actor in Ghana in the present case. However, I keep this door closed. 
 
CCM also kept this door closed. When faced with dissent, CCM sought “government[‘s] unambiguous support and 
approval,” in the form of a signature from the Minister of Health (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 
2009). When the CCM Chairman went to meet the Minister, a member called on him -- and the CCM -- “not to 
meddle in politics” (Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). When Ghana was mid-way through 
implementing Phase I, the Chairman reflected to me that an key lesson from adoption was that politics and political 
lobbying [are] important” (R-5, n.d.). This would not have been a new lesson to someone who spent time navigating 
political currents. Taking these together, it seems that CCM sits parallel to or ‘below’ the state, not in the political 
stream (Booth 2010; Reich 2002). I analyze it accordingly.  
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certain issues to the surface as newly compelling problems, and, therefore, as available for 
coupling with solutions and politicians (Kingdon 1995; Ridde 2008).  
 
In the politics stream, important changes can include shifts in legislative or executive power and 
mandate, heightened pressure group campaigns, and a politician’s sense that the public’s mood 
and attention has drifted (Allison and Halperin 1972; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). Note that 
the public mood, as Kingdon describes it, reflects politicians’ sense of public opinion, rather than 
a direct measure of public opinion through polling or other means of assessing the pulse of the 
citizenry. Further, Kingdon considers one potential major conduit of public opinion, the media, to 
reflect politician priorities rather than public opinion (Kingdon 1995). 
 
Operationalization: An opportunity window has two defining features. First, a window links with 
a change in either the problem stream and/or the politics stream that make an issue seem newly 
(or more) problematic and/or more feasible to address, logistically and politically. Second, it only 
opens for a short period.  
 
Independent variable: Policy entrepreneur(s)  
Description: Policy entrepreneurs are necessary but not sufficient agents who help usher a 
proposal through one or more policy stages by facilitating coupling between a policy, a problem, 
and political actors. They advocate and broker, soften-up and lobby, and reframe and manipulate 
information and symbols (Price 1971; N. C. Roberts and King 1991; Weissert 1991; Kingdon 1995; 
Zahariadis 2005; Zahariadis 2007). 
 
These agents can swim in any stream but in all cases require (1) authority and reputation that give 
them “claim to a hearing” (Kingdon 1995), combined with (2) connections, access, and the skill to 
manipulate symbols and information (such as scientific or economic data) to bring people 
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together. In addition, an entrepreneur must have (3) persistence‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ and willingness 
to invest and risk their time, energy, and reputation for a proposal in which they believe (Kingdon 
1995; Reich 1995a; Zahariadis 2005). Bridging interests and assuming risk is constitutive of the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition of entrepreneurship, for policy as well as business (Stevenson 
2010).  
 
Operationalization: I looked for evidence of actors with the characteristics of an entrepreneur and 
who took the actions associated with this role, as laid out by Kingdon and Zahariadis (Kingdon 
1995; Zahariadis 2005).  
 
RESE ARCH  HYPOTHE SE S  
With these definitions in place, I propose five specific research hypotheses for analysis. If each MSA 
component is identified in the data from the period preceding Ghana’s adoption of the AMFm’s Phase I, 
MSA is a good fit for explaining the case of adoption at hand.  
1. Ghanaian policy actors (1) deemed the AMFm proposal viable (technically feasible, ideologically 
acceptable, and publically palatable) and (2) prepared it to submit it to GF for decision-making. 
2. The three global issues addressed by the AMFm were considered new and public problems in the 
Ghanaian discourse. These three global issues were: patient access to ACTs, malaria mortality, 
and staving off the development of parasite resistance to ACTs. 
3. Political actors in Ghana acknowledged the problems addressed by the AMFm and were receptive 
to the AMFm as the proposed solution.  
4. Events or changes in the problem and/or political stream created an opportunity window — a 
time delimited space created by a change — in which policy action become possible. 
5. One or more actors with the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs did entrepreneurial work to 
promote adoption of the AMFm proposal in Ghana.  
 
Before examining each hypothesis in relation to the empirical data, I lay out my analytic approach. 
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ For Kingdon, entrepreneurs also have longevity, preparing and building support for pet proposals 
over long periods, waiting for an opportunity window to open. However, Weissert also identifies actors who play 
the role of entrepreneur only a window seems likely to open as “policy opportunists” (Weissert 1991). I subsume 
such opportunists under the more common term of entrepreneur.  
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ANALYT IC  APPRO ACH  
Process-tracing is a qualitative technique to test hypotheses within a single case (Bennett and George 
1997; Mahoney 2010; Collier 2011). Using careful, triangulated description of events and their sequence 
of unfolding, the process-tracing analyst makes a “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected 
and analyzed in light of research questions posed by the investigator… to draw descriptive and causal 
inference” (Collier 2011).  
 
Collier likens process-tracing to the deductive work of Sherlock Holmes (Collier 2011). In a detective 
plotline, the outcome is already clear — a crime has been committed — and the research questions are 
straightforward — who did it and how? The task becomes unraveling these causes of the known outcome. 
Process-tracing can be either forward- or backward-looking. Here, I use backwards process-tracing to 
examine the causes of known effects. The outcome of interest — adoption of the AMFm in Ghana — has 
already been completed/committed. 
 
When solving a crime, the detective uses clear categories of diagnostic evidence to work backwards from 
the outcome: a perpetrator with means, motive, and opportunity. Like standard detective clues, the 
constructs of MSA may provide the categories of diagnostic evidence to look for in the data, if MSA does 
indeed explain policy adoption (Collier 2011). To investigate, the first task is to see if evidence of each 
MSA component is present prior to adoption and second, if so, consider whether MSA is a useful guide to 
understanding how adoption happened. Investigating in this way this amounts to closed-coding of the 
case data, with MSA providing the codes (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
There are at least two potential pitfalls with such analyses. First, the interview data used here may be 
subject to recall and self-importance biases (for one discussion of such biases, see (White and Phillips 
2012)). Second, where constructs are not found in the data, I must try to show that this represents 
evidence of an absence — an event actually did not happen — rather than an absence of evidence.  
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I address both problems in similar ways, with triangulation as the central counter-balance. Where 
possible, contemporary evidence – in the form of meeting minutes, technical documents, and media 
statements – is marshaled to complement and buttress interview claims. Second, as described in Chapter 
III, I rely on member-checking, with different stakeholders reviewing and confirming statements made by 
others (as well as my interpretation of them). 
 
To illustrate: identifying policy entrepreneurs may be subject to biases. To begin identifying 
entrepreneurs, I consider those stakeholders cited by informants as playing entrepreneurial roles, for 
example, as champions of the policy. But these informants have the advantage of hindsight and, 
therefore, this strategy runs the risk of ex post credit-claiming or blame-avoidance. To guard against this 
risk, I use meeting minutes and cross-checking across different respondent perspectives about who played 
active and entrepreneurial roles.  
 
In addition, although adoption and early implementation had passed at the time of my interviews, it was 
not yet clear if the AMFm would be considered an overall success in Ghana or globally. This decision was 
still one year into the future (see Figure 3 for timeline). Therefore, at the time of the interviews, it was 
unclear to any given respondent whether claiming credit or avoiding blame would be the wiser strategy.  
 
SECTION VI.3:  ANALYTIC RESULTS  
In the previous section, I laid out definitions of MSA components and the hypotheses stemming from their 
operationalization in the case of adopting the AMFm pilot in Ghana. Now, I examine whether empirical 
evidence of national-level processes and stakeholders fulfills each hypothesis. The details of this empirical 
evidence form the substance of Chapter IV. Overall, I find that the definitions of the policy stream and 
policy entrepreneurs are fulfilled while those relating to the problem stream, the politics stream, and 
opportunity windows are not. 
 
145 
HYPOTHESI S  1:  ADOPTIO N  AND  THE  POL ICY  STRE AM   
Policy actors (1) deemed the AMFm proposal viable (technically feasible, ideologically acceptable, and 
publically palatable) and (2) had prepared it to submit it to GF for decision-making. 
 
In this case, the evidence for part (2) is clearer than part (1). A proposal was prepared by policy actors and 
submitted to Geneva, despite uncertainties in and outside CCM of its technical feasibility and ideological 
appropriateness. On balance, then, this component (a surfaced, viable proposal) of MSA was present. 
 
Preparation for submission and adoption: GF asked CCM to draft its plan for implementing the AMFm 
(particularly those components relating to the Supporting Interventions in Prong III (refer back to Table 4 
for an overview of the AMFm components).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This made CCM the deciding policy actor. 
CCM led the proposal preparation process and submitted a completed proposal to Geneva on 30 June 
2009, having internally endorsed it as ready-to-send by consensus on 25 June 2009 (“Application Form, 
Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009; Norgbedzie 2014). GF sent an approval 
letter to CCM dated 23 November 2009, completing Ghana’s two-step adoption of the AMFm pilot 
(Norgbedzie 2014). 
 
It is clear that CCM prepared a proposal for submission. What is less clear is whether relevant Ghanaian 
stakeholders — both policy actors and political actors — felt the proposal had the characteristics that 
enhance an idea’s buoyancy, namely, technical feasibility and ideological acceptability. Public palatability 
seems to have been assumed in so far as people would prefer to pay less for a treatment for which they 
have relatively inelastic demand (Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye 2004). 
 
Technical feasibility: From the narrative and analysis in Chapters IV and V, we know that several national 
policy stakeholders, including those in CCM and NMCP, were uncertain that the AMFm could meet its 
stated (direct) goals related to public health and pricing. While GF endorsed Ghana’s proposed design as 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Though national actors assembled the proposal, global actors defined both the problem and 
solution, which largely structured Prongs I and II (Matowe and K’omolo 2011).  
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implementable, NMCP and others involved in the submission worried about their own ability to undertake 
the requisite tasks. The sustainability of the program, in the context of the Phase I experiment, was — by 
design — unknown. Moreover, Ghana had no back-up “sustainability program” (R-7, n.d.). 
 
Ideological acceptability: One key ideological concern at the global level — using the private sector as a 
means to distribute antimalarial treatments — does not show up in Ghanaian conversations. ACTs are 
legally available over-the-counter and the private sector played an important role in keeping public health 
facilities stocked. However, favoring treatment over prevention and elimination may not have resonated 
with all political and policy elites, as indicated by NMCP’s heavy focus on bednet coverage (Malm 2014). 
Further, to the extent that the AMFm’s mechanisms put at risk other (indirect) policy goals, such as 
national pharmaceutical self-sufficiency, there were ideological qualms with the AMFm, as directly 
expressed by interviewees and as indirectly expressed through conversations about malaria in the media.  
 
HYPOTHESI S  2:  PROBLE M STREAM   
The three global issues addressed by the AMFm were considered new and public problems in the Ghanaian 
discourse. 
 
At the global level, the three motivating problems for the AMFm were: (1) malaria drugs are too expensive 
or otherwise inaccessible to patients, leading to both (2) unacceptably high malaria mortality and (3) the 
potential for parasites to develop resistance to artemisinin (especially in the absence of an effective 
alternative treatment). These problems do not seem to have surfaced in a meaningful way in the Ghanaian 
discourse about the AMFm.**********************  
 
                                                          
********************** It is interesting is that both global and national policy entrepreneurs reported privately 
advocating for the policy in this case – using the language of public goods, inaccessibility, and malaria mortality. 
Even anti-AMFm lobbyists in Ghana formed a large part of their arguments around the burden of malaria, while 
also trying to support the domestic manufacturing industry. On both sides, this seems odd, as the AMFm offered 
partial, if temporary, relief to a surfaced national political problem: financing the NHIS. Without drawing on this, for 
the most part, the ‘problem’ was framed in the terms borrowed from the global level. 
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Drug prices and drug resistance: Points (1) and (3) enter the Ghanaian discourse in only a very limited way 
– mainly in elite conversations led by policy entrepreneurs. In the public media, reflecting political 
priorities, there is no mention of either prices-to-patients or drug resistance prior to adoption. These 
concerns are not reflected in political manifestoes. Moreover, there is no indication of the FDB or another 
agency cracking down on artemisinin monotherapies (AMTs) in Ghana. Local manufacturers continued 
producing SP, CQ, and AMT and the public continued to use them. The issues of the need for diagnosis 
and completion of treatment courses did not come up during adoption and, indeed, did not play a role in 
later implementation of the AMFm in Ghana (as detailed in Chapter VII). 
 
Burden of malaria: As to point (2), malaria mortality had fallen in Ghana in the years prior to the AMFm 
decision. Though the disease remained the top cause of child and adult deaths, this was not a new 
problem, nor did it receive much media attention. Health facility directors sometimes provide statistics 
on malaria cases as key drivers of outpatient visits, which are then picked up in news reports. But malaria 
itself is rarely discussed in the media. Again, however, malaria mortality is used by policy entrepreneurs 
in elite policy conversations, as discussed below. 
 
On balance, it is not apparent that the three problems motivating the AMFm at the global level were 
viewed as either new or public problems in Ghana (though certainly, epidemiologically, they were extant 
issues). Therefore, according to this analysis, relevant issues did not surface in the national problem 
stream. 
 
HYPOTHESI S  3:  POLIT I CS  STREAM   
Political actors in Ghana acknowledged the problems addressed by the AMFm and were receptive to the 
AMFm as the proposed solution.  
 
There is no evidence that key political figures in Ghana (visibly) paid attention to the problems motivating 
the AMFm at the global-level, or that they contemplated the AMFm as a proposed solution. We do not 
see political actors attending to the AMFm proposal itself. They also did not make more general public 
statements about the costs of malaria treatment to patients, the potential for drug resistance, or, even, 
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malaria mortality. The main malaria-related focus of the Minister of Health seems to have been the cost 
of treatment reimbursements to the NHIS and wanting to lower this cost by focusing on environmental 
measures. 
 
During the adoption period, neither the Minister of Health nor the President mentioned the AMFm by 
name, as per my analysis of media content (see Appendix B) as well as the review report written on the 
AMFm Phase I process in Ghana (Dodoo 2011). Minister Sipa-Yankey refers to malaria medicine subsidies 
once between his confirmation in early 2009 and the AMFm adoption deadline at the end of June 2009; 
while calling for donor support for subsidies, he also calls for support of the local manufacturing industry 
(Ghana News Agency 2009h). Even in the more secluded setting of the health development partners’ 
summit in April 2009, malaria, its treatment, and the AMFm, were not mentioned (“Joint Ministry of 
Health and Development Partners’ Health Summit” 2009).  
 
The Minister refused to take an explicit stand in either direction on the AMFm, suggestive of the political 
pressure accompanying the issue. Pressure on the vice-president and president from policy entrepreneurs 
and from PMAG also did not give rise to public statements about the AMFm. These are explicit refusals to 
engage by high-level politicians, even when asked to take a stand. Here again, then, at the national level, 
a primary component of MSA was not found. 
 
HYPOTHESI S  4:  AN OPPOR TUNITY  W INDOW  OPE NED   
Events or changes in the problem and/or political stream created an opportunity window — a time 
delimited space created by a change — in which policy action become possible. 
 
There is very limited evidence that surfaced issues in either the problem stream or the political stream in 
Ghana, such as focusing events or changes from the status quo, opened a policy window of opportunity 
to allow adoption of a policy like the AMFm. 
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Problem stream: At the global-level, the problems of prices to patients, malaria mortality, and drug 
resistance served as the motivators for the AMFm. In Ghana, there is no evidence of a focusing event or 
dramatic change related to any of these problems. As for prices, in the 2 to 3 years leading to the AMFm, 
the cost of an ACT to consumers was steady or falling in both the private and the public sectors. In the 
private sector, Chinese and Indian branded generics flooded the market. Moreover, as NHIS scaled-up, 
covering 100% of malaria treatment costs for enrolled patients, the cost of medicine to patients (as an 
out-of-pocket payment) in the public sector (and accredited private sector) fell to zero. 
 
Regarding malaria mortality, no malaria outbreak occurred, nor was there a record of a well-publicized 
malaria death in the relevant period. Rather, most indicators related to malaria mortality were steady or 
improving. As noted when discussing the problem stream above, parasite resistance to artemisinin also 
does not receive action or mention during this time frame by key stakeholders (Ghana News Agency 
2009e). 
 
Politics stream: Given the context and timing of the AMFm adoption decision, it seems plausible at first 
glance that the political stream could have opened an opportunity window. Indeed, there was a change 
in political power in January 2009. However, there is no evidence that this provided an opening for 
Ghanaian stakeholders to push for the adoption of Phase I of the AMFm. Rather, given the image NPP had 
painted of them, NDC came into power needing to prove themselves as friendly to local businesses and 
as committed and able to maintain and improve NHIS. Beyond concerns about supporting local industry, 
the Minister and the President focused on the problem of environmental hygiene as a cause of high rates 
of malaria cases needing treatment, rather than the costs of treating a case of malaria. 
 
In sum, neither the problem stream nor politics stream in Ghana opened a window of opportunity as 
defined in MSA. 
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HYPOTHESI S  5:  POLI CY  ENTREPRENEUR S   
One or more actors with the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs worked to promote adoption of the 
AMFm proposal in Ghana. 
 
We have clear evidence of Ghanaian stakeholders with the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs and 
doing entrepreneurial work in promoting the AMFm and supporting the proposal’s submission.  
 
Characteristics: Most respondents identified three key actors playing entrepreneurial roles in favor of the 
AMFm during the adoption phase and all meet the criteria of a policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995). All 
three actors (CCM Chairman, GHS official, PSGH President) were in high-level positions in their respective 
organizations, giving them a “claim to a hearing” not only in these organizations but externally, with other 
high-level officials (Kingdon 1995). Their high-level roles and connections in several communities allowed 
them to them to bridge several perspectives. 
 
Two of the policy entrepreneurs were private pharmacists who also had public health positions; two also 
had links with the global health community involved in the AMFm (such as GF and RBM). The CCM 
Chairman — as a pharmacist, private pharmacy owner, and former president of PSGH — was particularly 
well-suited to an entrepreneurial role, communicating both the public health and business potential of 
the AMFm to his business peers. 
 
Entrepreneurial activities: Besides having the right characteristics, these stakeholders did entrepreneurial 
work. For example, in trying to meet with the Minister, they drew on and manipulated symbolic and 
economic arguments, highlighting malaria mortality — preventing a death — and undercutting PMAG’s 
claims about how much of Ghana’s ACT supply they could contribute and how much their businesses 
would suffer from the AMFm. Several stakeholders saw this back-of-the-envelope economic argument as 
being important in the process (R-5, n.d.; R-7, n.d.; R-13, n.d.).  
 
All three invested resources, such as time and reputation, in promoting the AMFm. The GHS official and 
the PSGH President were not directly involved in the decision-making, and therefore were largely working 
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on their own time. Moreover, the two private sector entrepreneurs, in particular, were seen by informants 
as taking risks with their reputations in order to support the AMFm, as shown in Chapter V. 
 
IN SUM  
While MSA does not say all components must be in place for a coupling, the probability of successful 
adoption falls when pieces are missing (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). Several of the MSA hypotheses 
tested above do not bear out. Hypotheses 1 and 5 were met: there was a viable policy proposal and there 
were policy entrepreneurs supporting it. However, Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were not. The globally 
motivating problems did not surface in the Ghanaian problem stream and major Ghanaian politicians were 
not paying attention to those problems or to the AMFm proposal (Hypothesis 2). Those actors in the 
political stream who were paying particular attention to the AMFm proposal – namely, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers’ Association of Ghana (PMAG, refer back to Table 5) – were against rather than for the 
proposal (Hypothesis 3). Finally, there is no evidence of an opportunity window opening from either the 
Ghanaian problem or politics streams (Hypothesis 4). 
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And yet, adoption occurred. These happened, not as shown in Figure 16 but more as depicted in Figure 
18. In this scenario, the policy stream (a plausibly viable policy idea assembled by a local policy 
community) ran directly into the increased probability of adoption occurring, with some support from 
policy entrepreneurs. Actors and events in the politics and the problem streams did not acknowledge or 
raise relevant problems; no political actors showed interest in the AMFm or its motivations. As a result, 
these two streams did not offer a means of opening a policy window, nor do they align with each other 
and couple. Rather, the adoption of the policy, it seems, followed directly from the existence of the policy 
and the efforts of policy entrepreneurs. 
 
What should we make of this? In the next section, I consider the implications, both for the framework and 
for the case in Ghana. Rather than rejecting the framework, or immediately concluding that the 
Figure 18: Depiction of MSA if the problem and politics streams continue to flow independently of the 
policy stream 
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framework fails to explain this case, I work through why the framework does not fit. I argue that the 
framework is tailored to single-level settings but this does not mean it cannot accommodate instances of 
vertical policy transfer, which inherently involves two levels. Rather, the framework can be expanded to 
consider two levels at the same time, that is, the global and national levels. I offer evidence that this 
extension is consistent with previous applications of MSA to global public health and conclude that with 
this modified framework, the basic premise of MSA – that policy change requires interaction between 
problems, policies, and politics in specific moments with help from specific actors – bears out. 
 
SECTION VI.4:  DISCUSSION AND EXTENS ION  
As noted in Section VI.1, global health researchers have used MSA to examine instances involving vertically 
transferred policies. However, in these cases, the transfer itself usually falls at the beginning or end of the 
analyzed example. When the transfer comes at the end of the analysis, the main action takes place almost 
entirely at the global level, to prioritize a problem and propose a solution that could then be transferred 
to the country level (Lush, Walt, and Ogden 2003; Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003). When the transfer occurs 
at the beginning of the case, the analysis focuses on the national-level implementation of a policy received 
from the global-level (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995; Ridde 2009). In both instances, given the levels at which 
they apply MSA, these researchers implicitly accept that streams flow, windows open, and entrepreneurs 
work at several levels. That is, there is a global problem stream as well as a national one, global politics as 
well as national, and so on. This is intuitive, so it is not surprising MSA has been applied in this way. 
Whether ones believes that global health and development are or should be top-down or bottom-up, it is 
clear that it is a tiered enterprise, with actors above and below the state (Reich 2002). 
 
Looking at national-level adoption of a global policy puts the analytic focus more squarely on the transfer 
itself. I suggest two specific modifications that can allow MSA to better serve as a framework for making 
sense of vertical policy transfer, such as the case of adopting the AMFm in Ghana. 
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A  PROPO SED FR AMEWO RK  MODI FI C ATION  
First, I include the global and national levels simultaneously. An overall strength of the MSA framework is 
that it “constantly forces us to return to… the big policy picture” (Béland 2015). I propose a slightly bigger 
one. Just as the problem, policy, and politics streams flow at one level with relative independence from 
one another, so too do the counterpart streams at different levels. A problem becoming salient at the 
global level, for instance, does not automatically alter the course of the national problem stream or make 
a globally buoyant problem rise to the surface of the national stream.  
 
Second, I suggest that coupling be re-conceptualized in the context of several levels, between which actors 
and ideas can move. In most uses of MSA, which examine a single-level landscape (global, national, or 
sub-national), descriptions of coupling are horizontal: global entrepreneurs help bring together a global 
problem with global policy and global politics. 
 
By considering more than one level at the same time, vertical coupling becomes a theoretical possibility. 
For example, the global political stream may couple with a national policy and national problem to move 
a policy idea forward at the national level. Gaps left by national stakeholders and processes are filled in 
by global-level processes and stakeholders (such as the “transnational managerial class” (Lee and 
Goodman 2002) and “epistemic communities” (Adler and Haas 1992) discussed in the global health and 
development literature (Adler and Haas 1992; Lee and Goodman 2002)). I refer to this filling-in as 
substitution.††††††††††††††††††††††  
 
Why might this substitution occur? Perhaps because one level is keen to see particular policy outcome 
come about quickly. Policy processes often take time, with actors waiting to seize windows of opportunity 
or engaging in drawn-out entrepreneurial work. Rather than allowing national-level processes to take 
their course, a global organization on a deadline has two main means of trying to bring about a policy 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††††††† In this case, I do not observe instances of displacement but clearly one level could displace even 
surfaced elements at another level, rather than just filling a gap left by a lack of surfaced elements in the counterpart 
stream.  
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outcome quickly. One is to force the movement of the stubborn national stream, for example, through 
conditionality. The other is to substitute a global MSA component for a national one to adopt without 
elements of national streams gaining buoyancy, aligning, and finally coupling (Drazen 2001; Booth 2012a). 
I explore the latter option below.  
 
To be clear, I do not make the case that vertical policy transfer pre-sets the national agenda but rather 
that it ignores it. It does, however, restrict the room to maneuver that national actors have for adapting 
and amending policy they may adopt. It also restricts their ability to not adopt the policy. On the former 
point, in different cases of vertical policy transfer, the global agenda-setters, policy formulators, and policy 
entrepreneurs may allow more scope for national actors to adapt the policy proposal they hand down 
before adopting it nationally. On the latter point, the scope for non-adoption is inversely proportional to 
the strength of the global actors. 
 
In this particular case, the scope was quite restricted, allowing national tailoring only within the 
Supporting Interventions. The strength of the global actors, and therefore the legitimate possibility of 
Ghana not joining Phase I of the AMFm is open to speculation. 
 
SECTION VI.5:  RE-EXAMINING THE CASE  
This exploration maintains that MSA provides an accurate description of the categories of factors that 
need to be in place for adoption but broadens — or rather, heightens — the landscape in which we look 
for the relevant evidence and action. I depict this in Figure 19 and describe it in this section. 
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In Section VI.3, above, I argued that the presence of a viable policy and active policy entrepreneurs at the 
national-level were both in place. In this section, I address the elements that could not easily be accounted 
for at the national level: an opportunity window, the politics stream, and, finally, the politics stream. 
 
 
REVISIT I NG THE  HYPOTHE SE S  
I begin by revisiting Hypothesis 4: that a window of opportunity opened. In the standard MSA framework, 
a change in the political or problem stream opens one of these time-delimited spaces in which policy 
action becomes possible. In this case, it seems that such a limited space was opened from the policy 
stream at the global level. The invitation to transfer the new policy, with its offer of money and strict 
submission deadline (four months after the receipt of the invitation), not only made a policy decision 
possible, it made it mandatory. PMAG recognized that GF invitation opened a space for action, since 
Figure 19: Depiction of MSA considering global and national levels, with the global problem and politics 
streams substituting for national-level ones and the global policy stream opening a national opportunity 
window 
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PMAG “stormed the meeting” shortly after the invitation arrived (Country Coordinating Mechanism 
Secretariat 2009).  
 
I am not making a novel argument that vying for budget allocations and funding offer an opening for 
decision-making (Allison and Halperin 1972). What may be novel is my suggestion that this moment can 
come from the policy stream rather than the politics stream. The appearance of a salient policy proposal 
can itself create a time-delimited opportunity in which action is possible and, given the money-linked-
deadline, can certainly create a sense of urgency. This is shown in the dotted line between the global 
policy stream and a national opportunity window in Figure 19. But this seeming opportunity window did 
not move the national politics or problem stream towards coupling. 
 
This leads us to reconsider Hypothesis 3: political actors acknowledged the problems addressed by the 
AMFm and were receptive to the AMFm as the proposed solution. When the interest group PMAG barged 
into CCM meeting — invited but late — this literally brought the political stream into the policy decision-
arena. Reflecting on the meeting later, my informants agreed that this was a new phenomenon in CCM’s 
history (R-5, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). Until then, CCM largely worked parallel to the government, making technical 
decisions on technical proposals. However, in this case, politics “stormed” the policy stream (Country 
Coordinating Mechanism Secretariat 2009). This was not, however, a step towards coupling the Ghanaian 
political stream with the policy idea of the AMFm.  
 
In response, CCM took an unusual step, which I posit is consistent with the MSA intuition that successful 
adoption requires coupling with the political stream. CCM tried to achieve this coupling by giving a key 
player in the national political stream the decision-making power about joining the AMFm proposal. That 
they tried to do this drawing on the national political stream rather than going “above” it, to the global 
political stream, is notable (Reich 2002). However, this move did not lead to national-level coupling, since 
the Minister did not reveal his stand. To reveal a preference — to be surfaced and available for coupling 
with an idea — is to become visible and therefore susceptible to blame (Weaver 1987).  
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Following a similar intuition PMAG tried (unsuccessfully) to bring Vice-President Mahama into the debate. 
Recall that NDC named the domestic pharmaceutical sector in its manifesto as one it wanted to develop 
and, as key informants noted, in return this sector supported NDC during the campaign. The 
pharmaceutical manufacturers depicted the AMFm as job-killing and destructive to the local industry; this 
was not an opportune moment for NDC to support a policy depicted as having such effects. Further, NDC 
was not in a position to point out NHIS’s financial troubles, as it was busy in the midst of assuring the 
public that NHIS was not going away. The budget books might have benefitted from the AMFm, at least 
in the short-term, but this was not a problem known to a public who was instead worried that NHIS might 
disappear during an election cycle. 
 
In sum, there is evidence that actors and events in the politics stream actively worked against coupling 
with the AMFm idea. In its place, there is evidence of activity from the global political stream. We can take 
this as an attempt to stand in for the non-aligning national counterpart political stream. As noted above, 
other researchers consider global organizations (such as the World Bank) as political actors, bolstered by 
bilateral funding that presumably represents the preferences of donor governments (Lush, Walt, and 
Ogden 2003; Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003; Ridde 2009). In this case, several of these policy/political actors 
involved themselves in the Ghanaian decision-making. Global political actors also put direct pressure on 
national political actors, including a high-level call to President Atta-Mills encouraging him to allow the 
AMFm decision to go through (R-6, n.d.; R-7, n.d.). The national political stream would not move towards 
coupling. In their place, global political players filled in to make sure that Ghanaian political actors did not 
block the globally desired policy outcome (R-6, n.d.; R-7, n.d.; O. Sabot 2015).  
 
If the problems addressed by the AMFm were not sufficiently salient in the national-level problem stream, 
which were? The President and Minister Sipa-Yankey considered problems related to malaria but not 
those that globally motivated the AMFm. Rather, they focused on the cost of malaria treatment to the 
economy and to NHIS (rather than to patients). In their estimation, malaria treatment cost too much to 
the Government of Ghana and the reason there was too much malaria was because there was too much 
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“filth” and inadequate attention to vector control (Ghana News Agency 2009a). The national political 
stream identified with this problem and attached themselves to this solution).  
 
I find no evidence of an effort to link the AMFm to the nationally salient problems related to malaria and 
the costs of treatment. As noted in Chapter IV, the NHIA stayed quiet about the AMFm before it was 
adopted, even though they were likely to save money (Acheampong 2014). The national-level policy 
entrepreneurs reportedly relied on the globally defined problems, not the nationally defined ones such 
as the NHIS. 
 
 
IN SUM  
In this section, consistent with accounting for the global and national levels simultaneously, I have argued 
that we see evidence that those MSA components not met at the national level – an opportunity window, 
a surfaced problem, and active and attentive actors in the political stream – are filled in from the global 
level. This includes an opportunity window not only opened from the global level but from the global 
policy stream, through the transfer and invitation itself. I consider the implications of this in the next 
section. Further, I argue that where the Ghanaian political stream was either not engaged with or against 
the AMFm proposal, the global political stream took steps to make sure the proposal moved forward, 
leading to a vertical coupling. Moreover, where the Ghanaian problem stream did not offer up salient 
problems that could be coupled with the AMFm proposal, the Ghanaian policy entrepreneurs (as well as 
visiting global policy entrepreneurs, such as those from GF and CHAI, relied on the globally motivating 
problems – again, representing a vertical coupling that helped move the proposal to join the AMFm pilot 
towards coupling and adoption. 
 
In this expanded framework, the intuition of MSA seems to bear out. If we include both the global level 
and the national level, we see the policy (national), problem (global), and politics (global) stream aligning 
in the period prior to adoption and Ghanaian policy entrepreneurs made use of the opportunity window 
opened by the transfer of a policy idea from the global policy stream. 
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In the next section, I consider some implications of this means of achieving coupling before turning to 
three key conclusions and consideration of the limitations of this analysis. 
 
SECTION VI.6:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLU SION  
As I show above, Ghana (through its CCM) was invited to apply to participate in the Phase I pilot of the 
AMFm, which allowed GF to transfer a global policy idea to the national level. In this chapter, I considered 
the actions that stakeholders took to achieve adoption of this proposal, which I defined as a two-step 
process of submitting the proposal and having it approved. I consider these actions within the MSA 
framework. The analytic work in this chapter builds on the considerations of perceptions and priorities 
among the Ghanaian stakeholders presented in Chapter V.  
 
Combining the MSA framework with in-depth interviews and relevant meeting minutes, I ask: What did 
national stakeholders do in response to this vertically transferred AMFm? To what extent did MSA help 
make sense of these events and the outcome of adoption of Phase I? In asking these questions, I was 
motivated by two particular events that my informants marked as unusual: (1) CCM’s attempt to get the 
Minister’s endorsement to submit the AMFm application and (2) Minister’s refusal to give (or not give) 
that endorsement.  
 
To analyze this set of events, I used the main components of MSA through five hypotheses. In the initial 
analysis, I found that two or three of these five components were not present at the national level. Indeed, 
it seems that policy adoption happened with only a policy proposal and policy entrepreneurs in place at 
the national level. To address this puzzle, I proposed that in cases of vertical policy transfer, it is necessary 
to consider MSA simultaneously at the global and national levels and, moreover, to allow for vertical 
couplings between these two levels as a possible explanatory factor in how a policy idea moves forward 
or fails to do so.  
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Noting that simultaneous accounting for two levels with the potential for vertical coupling between them 
can explain what happened should not be taken as an endorsement that vertical transfer as the best way 
for the policy process to move forward. Rather, I only observe that that adoption of the AMFm in Ghana 
can be described in an expanded MSA framework and, further, that this analysis fits well into processes 
being explored by numerous investigators. 
 
D I SC USSIO N  
TAKEAWAY 1: MSA CAN BE EXPANDED TO ACCOUNT FOR AND ANALYZE CASES OF VERTICAL POLICY TRANSFER  
One goal in this chapter was to assess whether MSA explains adoption of the AMFm in Ghana and the 
events leading to it. My initial hunch was that the decision to try to give decision-making power to a major 
political figure (the Minister of Health) fit with the logic of the MSA framework: the political stream plays 
an important role in achieving policy outcomes. 
 
The initial analysis, focusing only at the national-level, depicted the gaps that informed my hunch. While 
Ghana indeed adopted the AMFm, only the policy stream and policy entrepreneurs were active in this 
process. This analysis challenged either the validity of MSA or the appropriateness of applying MSA to this 
case of policy transfer. 
 
In thinking about the broader context in which the AMFm decision was made, however, it became clear 
that there were salient and surfaced problems – but they flowed from the global level. Similarly, there 
was something that looked like a policy window (the time-bound invitation) but it, too, had its source at 
the global level.  
 
When the MSA framework is expanded to account for both levels in a policy transfer, we gain a new way 
of picturing what happened in Ghana, as the model better fits the type of adoption as well as the empirical 
evidence. A policy was not moving forward at the national level, as CCM “vacillated in its support,” but 
was ultimately moved forward through a vertical coupling between global problems and politics and the 
national policy stream (R-5, n.d.). The window opened from the global level and was pursued by national 
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policy entrepreneurs (as well as global ones acting within Ghana). This presents a useful way of talking 
about the interaction between the global and national levels to explain what involvement helped adoption 
occur. It also indicates that MSA, revised to include formal, assertive vertical transfers, is a suitable 
framework for analyzing a wider range of policy transfers.  
 
TAKEAWAY 2: LEAVING THE NATIONAL LEVEL OUT CAN CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN THE POLICY PROCESS 
A key takeaway from this analysis should be that the national level matters in global health policy, 
including the need for national-level policy entrepreneurs to move a global program forward towards 
national adoption and implementation. The AMFm proposal decision stalled in Ghana, as CCM “vacillated” 
(R-5, n.d.). The MSA framework, by incorporating various levels of multiple streams, highlights the 
potential hurdles (here, the mismatch between the global and national problem and political issues) that 
had to be actively addressed by policy makers and entrepreneurs to try to ensure smooth transfer and 
adoption of policies. 
 
As a specific example, even when national political figures attended to the issue of malaria, they 
problematized it as a matter of incidence, rather than one of treatment. Framed this way, the issue of 
malaria was not linked to the policy solution of the AMFm; in turn, major political leaders found it difficult 
to support the AMFm. 
 
Similarly, national political priorities at the time relevant for adoption, just following the national election, 
reflected the need to take a pro-business stance, including toward the domestic manufacturing industry. 
This national-level concern only entered global design thinking about the AMFm in a curtailed way, 
especially when no Ghanaian manufacturer met the criteria for producing s-QA.ACTS. This led to a political 
mismatch between the globally designed policy and a policy that could be easily adopted and 
implemented at the national-level. 
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L IM ITATIO NS O F THE  ST UD Y AND MI T I G ATING STR AT EGIE S  
Some of the key methodological limitations of the analysis in this chapter echo those faced in Chapter V: 
parts of the underlying data are generated from semi-structured interviews with many, but not all, of the 
identified key national stakeholders. As before, in this chapter I triangulate responses, including absent 
voices, by drawing on meeting minutes and contemporary news items. Also, as described in Chapter III, 
this chapter was subject to member-checking, allowing respondents to read the manuscript to correct 
factual errors and suggest alternative interpretations (Lincoln and Guba 1986). These interpretations are 
represented in the analysis and discussion above and help to mitigate some concerns associated with 
using interview data. 
 
In this chapter, I faced additional challenges as I applied a framework that is commonly used, though not 
always used with its component parts clearly defined. Researchers sometimes use MSA to structure 
narratives about the policy process, in which case precise definitions are less important; when researchers 
use MSA for analysis of the policy process, they may use more precise definitions but these are not always 
consistent across studies. The fact that (to my knowledge) MSA has not been used to explicitly look at 
national adoption of a globally designed policy offered limited precedent on which to draw. I have offered 
definitions in this analysis and proposed modifications to MSA based on empirical evidence — but cannot 
test these in a single case study (Bennett and George 1997; Strauss and Corbin 1997). 
 
Another concern about the MSA conceptual framework is the extent to which it provides a falsifiable 
model with clear hypotheses that can, in turn, be tested. I set up the hypotheses to examine the presence 
or absence of each MSA component. However, MSA is a probabilistic rather than a deterministic 
framework: having all components in place increases the likelihood that a stage in the policy process is 
completed but does not guarantee this. I can claim that, given the expanded framework, all the 
components are in place, yet I have no grounds to claim that absent one national component, or without 
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global substitution, adoption could not have occurred. Future investigators may be able to evaluate 
couplings across many policy adoptions to determine whether a more quantitative model can be 
formulated. 
 
MOVING  FORW AR D  
As in Chapter V, in this chapter I offer a framework that helps to make sense of the case of adopting 
AMFm’s Phase I in Ghana and may be useful in future cases. In this chapter, I employed a widely used 
framework, after comparing the framework with the empirical data, and then suggested modifications to 
the framework to better accommodate and understand policy adoption outcomes in vertical policy 
transfer. 
 
In this chapter (VI), I showed that national stakeholders, both through their action and inaction, shape the 
way and circumstances under which transferred policies are adopted at the national level. Chapter X 
includes a further discussion of national stakeholder ownership of global health policy ideas transferred 
from the global level.  
 
From the present analysis, it seems clear that much of adoption, and whether adoption translates to 
implementation, depends heavily on the work of policy entrepreneurs and managers (Matland 1995; 
Zahariadis 2015). Indeed, those within a decision-arena could plausibly adopt a policy that they do not 
think will actually be implemented. This could have possible implications for whether, how, and with what 
enthusiasm an adopted policy is implemented. In the case of adopting the AMFm in Ghana, the outcome 
of adopting the policy well was somewhat unknown: it may lead to the enhancement of personal 
reputations but whether it would lead to a continuation of the program was unclear, as discussed in 
Chapter V.  
 
To consider implementation descriptively, I now turn to the process and outcomes of implementing the 
transferred initiative. In the next chapter, I resume the narrative from just after Ghana submitted its 
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application (30 June 2009) to the end of Phase I and the endline data collection of IndE (December 2011). 
This begins with installing the necessary architecture for implementation and ends with the pricing of s-
QA.ACTs among private-sector retailers.
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PART 3:  HIGH-LEVEL INSTALLATION AND STREET-LEVEL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Figure 20: Licensed Chemical Seller in Tamale, Ghana with shipments of Malafan© (SP) and s-QA.ACT 
[own image, taken with explicit permission for re-use] 
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CHAPTER VII:  CASE NARRATIVE -  HIGH-LEVEL INSTALLATION &  
STREET-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION  
 
In this chapter, I review the descriptive case evidence spanning the period from Ghana’s adoption of the 
AMFm pilot at the end of June 2009 through late Phase I implementation at the end of 2012. As I have 
noted throughout this thesis, global and national stakeholders were uncertain whether the AMFm idea 
could work in practice. Global debates led GF to decide to pilot the AMFm, as Phase I, before deciding to 
implement the AMFm worldwide or in the long-term. In Chapters VII and VIII, I describe, then analyze how 
the AMFm rubber hit the (sometimes dirt) road: national-level implementation.  
 
I have two objectives in this chapter. First, it serves to link the discussion of adoption with the tasks of 
implementation at the high-level and street-level, including relevant global and national events that 
influenced this process. The data for this comes primarily from the in-depth interviews conducted with 
national stakeholders as well as associated literature.  
 
Second, I introduce the retail sector in Tamale in detail, drawing on the published literature and my own 
descriptive data. I also draw on the IndE findings for the AMFm outcomes in Ghana as a whole, to set the 
broader implementation context. Then, I turn to the quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered in 
Tamale, including the retailer questionnaires, the PACT household survey, and the PACT retailer follow-
up interviews (introduced in Chapter III).  
 
Like Chapter IV, Chapter VII is descriptive rather than analytic, detailing how implementation moved 
forward and how a specific component of Ghana’s plan to enact the AMFm – setting and communicating 
an RRP – was executed. Moreover, as with the relationship between the narrative in Chapter IV and the 
analyses in Chapter V and VI, I aim to include in this chapter all the relevant descriptive data and then 
provide a more detailed analysis in Chapter VIII. In Chapter VIII, I introduce a model of influences on retail 
prices and analyze compliance with the RRP specifically in Tamale over five months at the end of 2011.  
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To begin, I review the events and actions from mid-2009 to August 2010 at the high-level in Accra that 
moved the AMFm forward from adoption to implementation: setting up a managing body, the AMFm 
Coordinating Committee (AMFm-CC), and enrolling public and private FLBs to import s-QA.ACTs. 
 
In the second section, I consider events relating to implementation. The focus here, and in Chapter VIII, is 
on Tamale in Ghana’s Northern Region. However, I also consider events at the global level that influenced 
implementation in Ghana, particularly GF’s restricted approval of s-QA.ACTs orders. I also encourage the 
reader to revisit the timeline Figure 3 to track these events in relation to the thesis. 
 
SECTION VII.1:  JULY 2009  –  AUGUST 2010,  NATIONAL INSTALLATION  
On 23 November 2009, Ghana received GF’s conditional approval of its application to pilot the AMFm 
(Norgbedzie 2014). Final technical approval came in June 2010. In the interim, a lot of work was required 
by national stakeholders to implement the AMFm in Ghana. This hinged on efforts by NMCP — the grant’s 
Principal Recipient — as well as the for-profit sector. Lack of full engagement from either could have 
impeded progress, as implementation required a high level of responsibility from both; both also 
expressed misgivings before  
 
Yet, after the initiative was adopted, stakeholders moved beyond “decid[ing] if [they] were for or against 
it” and onto determining “how to live with it” (R-1) and even “how to exploit it” (R-8) (R-1, n.d.; R-8, n.d.). 
Living with the AMFm required two key actions to bridge the “big gap between policy[-design] and 
implementation,” which would pave the way for national roll-out and, ideally, improve national access to 
s-QA.ACTs (R-1, n.d.). These were: establishing a body to coordinate in-country implementation activities 
and having importers register as FLBs under the AMFm. 
 
GHANA :  MAL ARI A AND TH E  AMFM  
Following provisional approval by GF, Ghana formally had the “capacity to act” on implementing the 
AMFm (Stehr 1992). I term the first set of actions installation, in which stakeholders undertake requisite 
tasks “to do the work ahead” (Fixsen et al. 2005). Implementation is not a process that can be clearly 
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labeled complete or not, the way that, for example, a legislative vote can. However, to aid planning, 
monitoring, and analysis, it can be broken down into the components of exploration, installation, initial 
implementation, and full implementation. Installation is the stage during which stakeholders “acquire or 
repurpose the resources needed to move forward with implementation (Fixsen et al. 2005). 
 
In Ghana, “the work ahead” to run the AMFm nationwide required two clear tasks. First, Ghana needed 
to establish a means of leading, launching, and coordinating national activities, including the Supporting 
Interventions (the third and national prong of the AMFm design, see Figure 9). Second, subsidized 
QA.ACTs needed to flow into the country, requiring the private sector to sign-up as importers and for both 
the public (MoH) and private sectors to place orders (Global Fund).  
 
COORDINATING THE AMFM ACTIVITIES: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING SUPPORTING INTERVENTIONS 
All pilot countries needed to design and launch the activities under the umbrella of Supporting 
Interventions (Global Fund 2009b). This included training public and private street-level workers, planning 
a monitoring strategy, agreeing on an RRP (all pilot countries except Madagascar set an RRP (Willey et al. 
2014)), and designing a marketing campaign that would advertise the green-leaf logo, indicating to the 
public its high quality and price (the RRP). 
 
Because of its oversight mandate, Ghana’s CCM could not orchestrate the Supporting Interventions, as it 
had done while assembling the application. Instead, CCM and NMCP led the creation of an entirely new 
body, the AMFm Coordinating Committee (AMFm-CC). The AMFm-CC worked “through NMCP by 
providing the advice needed to make sure the strategies driven by the implementing partners across 
sectors [were] optimal” (Ghana Country Coordinating Mechanism 2010). NMCP’s PM demanded the 
AMFm-CC not be a “talking show forum” but rather that it “be prepared to work” as “an important 
implementing wing and partner to the success of the AMFm in Ghana” (AMFm-CC 2010). As one 
respondent noted, even though the PM had passively resisted adopting the AMFm, once it was adopted, 
she “did her duty” (R-6, n.d.). This switch between adoption and implementation was reflected 
throughout NMCP; the USAID-PMI advisor at the time of adoption noted: “ironically, Ghana's NMCP 
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leadership was not enthusiastic about the AMFm approach, but they implemented with their usual 
energy; and the AMFm pilot in Ghana wound up being one of the more successful in meeting its 
milestones” (Psychas 2015). 
 
AMFm-CC leaders wanted wide government and private sector representation to tackle the AMFm’s 
technical complexity, heavy and new work requirements without using additional human resources, and 
unclear distribution of responsibility and resources (AMFm-CC 2010). Among its many constituents, 
AMFm-CC included members from the Ministry of Health, governmental regulatory agencies, multi- and 
bi-lateral partners, research institutions, private FLBs, NGOs, civil society organizations, and pharmacist 
associations (Dodoo 2011; Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
AMFm-CC had three chairpersons, reflecting the partnerships required for the AMFm: one from an NGO, 
one from MoH, and one from the private, for-profit pharmacy sector (specifically, pharmaceutical 
manufacturing but not PMAG) (AMFm Coordinating Committee 2010). Note that none of these actors had 
been part of the formal decision-making process for adoption. 
 
Those involved are proud of the AMFm-CC, viewing it as a “well-functioning national public-private 
partnership” providing an “open forum” for “positive engagement,” with “equalize[d] power” that 
enhances transparency through “communication and shared accountability” (AMFm-CC 2010; Dodoo 
2011). The AMFm-CC “improved… and increased internal communication and collaboration between 
MoH’s agencies as well as NMCP’s relationship with the private sector,” which it had earlier regarded with 
suspicion (Matowe and K’omolo 2011; R-5, n.d.; R-14, n.d.).  
 
As one of their first activities, in January 2010, the AMFm-CC organized a large private-sector stakeholders 
meeting, also including NHIA and other government agencies (Acheampong 2014). Key topics included 
setting up the Supporting Interventions, among them determining the “best channels for private 
distribution channels, marketing initiatives, and regulatory systems” for s-QA.ACTs (Country Coordinating 
Mechanism Secretariat 2010).  
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Ghanaian stakeholders determined that enacting up the Supporting Interventions in Ghana required 
setting a national RRP. They, including those from the private sector, set the RRP at a level to allow each 
link in the supply chain to earn profits deemed reasonable while still achieving a price no more than three-
fold higher than the most popular antimalarial medication, as per the AMFm benchmarks (Schäferhoff 
and Yamey 2011; K. L. Malm et al. 2013). With these parameters in mind, Ghanaian stakeholders set the 
RRP per package at US$ 0.90 (a package contains a six-dose adult treatment course totaling between 6 
and 24 pills, depending on the patient’s weight or, as a proxy, age).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ All prices in this thesis 
are presented in US$. An exchange rate of GH₵ 1.67 to US$ 1.00 is used throughout. US$ 0.90 is 1.50 
Ghanaian cedi (GH₵), or, colloquially, one-point-five Ghana.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
To reiterate what is an important point regarding the RRP: while the global-level designers of the AMFm 
envisioned that the private sector would earn a profit on s-QA.ACTs and thus be induced to make it widely 
available and affordable, it was the country-level stakeholders who determined the specific Ghanaian RRP 
of US$ 0.90 (GH₵ 1.67, adjusted using a conversation rate of GH₵ 1.67 to US$ 1.00, as used consistently 
throughout this thesis). NMCP members, reflecting on the implementation process, write about meetings 
organized by the AMFm-CC with FLBs on s-QA.ACT pricing: “during [the consultative] meeting… the 
technical committee [of the AMFm-CC] demonstrated to FLBs and pharmaceutical retailers, with support 
from CHAI, that profit can be built into the pricing of s-QA.ACTs without the wholesaler or the retailer 
necessarily losing revenue” (K. L. Malm et al. 2013).  
 
I show the relation between the RRP and the AMFm mechanism in Figure 21. The initial import price for 
a QA.ACT such as Coartem© in the private sector was about GH₵ 2.04 (US$ 3.40). Through Prong I of the 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Given the data used in this thesis, like the IndE, I focus on prices of the Adult Equivalent Treatment 
Dose (AETD) for full packages of malaria medications, rather than following the more nuanced approach taken by 
Fink et al, who have data on the precise number of tablets purchased for cases in which packages were split (Fink et 
al. 2014). 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The Ghanaian cedi was named for the cowry shells that were formerly used for trading in the area. 
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AMFm, participating pharmaceutical manufacturers agreed to sell to the private sector in the AMFm 
Phase I countries at the same price at which they already sold to the public sector in a given country 
(Global Fund 2010c). From this price, GF applied the subsidy from its AMFm-earmarked (ring-fenced) 
cache to further lower the price at which FLBs would import s-QA.ACTs: around US$ 0.17 (GH₵ 0.28). 
Several stakeholders note that through that pilot phase, a key struggle in Ghana was the application of 
the import tariff; and many maintain that without it, the RRP (as well as the NHIA reimbursement) could 
have been lower (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; R-8, n.d.; Acheampong 2014). 
 
 
Figure 21: Estimate of QA.ACT prices along the Ghanaian pharmaceutical importation and distribution 
chain, including the montary influence of different prongs of the AMFm intervention 
 
As per its 2009 application description of planned Supporting Interventions , Ghana budgeted US$ 6.7m 
for communication and marketing activities and US$5.0m for professional trainings (“Application Form, 
Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria (AMFm): Ghana.” 2009). For communication and marketing 
activities, AMFm-CC hired an advertising firm to design a campaign to introduce the new drugs and their 
AMFm green leaf logo, indicating a quality-assured ACT. The adverts, featured on TV and radio, 
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emphasized that Ghanaians should act fast when fever strikes but pay no more than US$ 0.90 (GH₵ 1.50) 
— that is, the agreed-upon RRP — for adult doses. Media communication of the price was critical to 
getting information to consumers because the (nationally chosen) RRP was not printed on the (globally 
printed) s-QA.ACT packages.*********************** In Ghana, the communication campaign ran for 9 months, 
one of the two longest campaigns among all AMFm pilot countries (Kenya also had a 9-month campaign) 
(Willey et al. 2014). 
 
Supporting Interventions also included professional trainings for both public and private sectors 
dispensers; these trainings also highlighted the RRP. In the public sector, training activities were carried 
out by NMCP; in the private pharmacy section by the PSGH; and among the LCSs by the Pharmacy Council. 
According to the results gathered for the IndE, ~45% of the interviewed providers received training on the 
AMFm, the highest proportion among all the AMFm pilots except for Zanzibar (Willey et al. 2014).  
 
SIGNING-UP PRIVATE-SECTOR FIRST LINE BUYERS (FLBS) 
Each of the 200-plus registered domestic importers in Ghana had the potential to serve as an FLB, 
connecting with global s-QA.ACT manufacturers (Global Fund, n.d.). An FLB was an importer specifically 
approved by GF to bring s-QA.ACTs into the country. To be eligible, candidates registered both with 
national authorities — and in a separate, non-negotiable agreement with GF — on purchase terms and 
obligation to pass on the subsidy to retailers (Global Fund, n.d.). Importers were the only national supply 
chains elements subject to such an agreement, a point about which they voiced frustration at early 
implementation meetings (Global Fund 2010e; R-13, n.d.). 
 
Initial sign-up to be an FLB in the private, for-profit sector in Ghana was slow (Matowe and K’omolo 2011; 
R-14, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). This signing-up meant registering with GF to be eligible to import the s-QA.ACTs at 
the subsidized price from the global manufacturers. No additional reimbursement would flow to national-
level importers or to any other link in the national supply-chain. As noted in Chapter IV, the price 
                                                          
*********************** This was a global-level decision, so participating global pharmaceutical manufacturers did not 
have to print different packaging with different pricing information for each pilot country. 
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negotiations and the subsidy application happened at the global rather than the national level under the 
AMFm (see Figure 21 and also refer back to Figure 9). 
 
To increase participation, the CCM Chairman, PSGH leadership, and a CHAI consultant engaged one-on-
one with businesspeople, including potential FLBs as well as retailers. In their pitch, they highlighted the 
public good and public image benefits of the AMFm, and helped importers understand how the AMFm 
might affect their profit (R-2, n.d.; R-5, n.d.; R-6, n.d.).  
 
While the AMFm-CC set the RRP such that all participants in the supply chain could make a profit on each 
unit sold, no one knew ex ante what the market demand would be for ACTs (quality-assured or not) at 
this new price-point; and, therefore, what kinds of volumes an importer, wholesaler, or retailer could 
hope to move. If sales volumes were not high enough, FLBs could potentially lose money.  
 
While this concern was real, there was also incomplete or incorrect understanding of the AMFm among 
the private sector following the adoption of the AMFm pilot. One stakeholder involved in these post-
adoption pitches noted that the “one-on-one meetings played a big role because things were abstract to 
[the private sector]” (R-4) and that, for them, “this was not business as usual” (R-13) (R-4, n.d.; R-13, n.d.).  
These meetings first targeted importers with established links to global, pre-qualified manufacturers, as 
well as those with wide national distribution networks (R-4, n.d.; R-5, n.d.; R-8, n.d.; R-13, n.d.). The CCM 
chairman, PGSH leadership, and the CHAI consultant emphasized that “getting on board [would be] good 
for the image of pharmacists, showing that they are not only money conscious but also public health 
conscious” (R-7, n.d.). 
 
Among potential FLBs, there was not “peer pressure [or a] ring leader” promoting signing-up (R-7, n.d.). 
Rather, once they understood the AMFm better through the one-on-one consultations, they — “including 
the ones who had been making noise” (R-15) during adoption — “fought with each other to get on board” 
(R-7) (R-7, n.d.; R-15, n.d.). Eventually, through their efforts, 32 private importers registered as FLBs and 
14 ultimately placed orders (R-15, n.d.; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). For importers that also 
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manufactured, participation as an FLB — “their second choice, not their first” — could off-set lost 
manufacturing profits (R-13, n.d.). The Ghanaian manufacturers equipped to produce ACTs — between 4 
and 6, as discussed in Chapter IV — ceased production as the AMFm imports came in (R-5, n.d.; R-9, n.d.; 
R-11, n.d.; R-13, n.d.).  
 
Through regular monitoring, registration, and regulatory data, information does exist to help identify 
importers and, for the most part, retailers. But how drugs move from the former to the latter is less 
transparent. However, we do know that pharmaceutical distribution systems have less reach into Ghana’s 
three Northern regions than the rest of the country, a fact reiterated in the IndE, whose authors 
specifically cite poor infrastructure and resultant elevated costs for transportation (Rockefeller 
Foundation, Results for Development Institute 2008; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Below and in 
Figure 22, drawing on other sources studying pharmaceutical distribution in Ghana, I roughly illustrate 
how these distribution systems work (Rockefeller Foundation, Results for Development Institute 2008; 
McCabe et al. 2011). Later in the chapter, I flesh out this picture with descriptive data from Tamale. 
 
Such distribution systems broadly worked in the following manner: to begin, an importer must bring in 
pharmaceutical products, almost always through Accra. Then, in the private sector, an importer-
wholesaler (who may also be a national manufacturer) may sell to retailers or to individual salespeople, 
who may have motos or vans, or to distribution teams with vans. Individual salespeople may “buy enough 
products to fill their vans and travel around the countryside selling their products to rural pharmacists” 
and LCSs (McCabe et al. 2011). Teams, by comparison, have a driver and wholesaler-representative who 
sells various brands on credit or, colloquially, on a cash-and-carry basis (McCabe et al. 2011). These 
smaller, as-needed amounts, rather than bulk orders, often better matching the cash flow patterns and 
storage capacity of small retailers (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009).  
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Figure 22: Flows of pharmaceutical products within Ghana 
 
In August 2010, ready to make their way into the distribution system described above, the first doses of 
s-QA.ACTs arrived in Ghana via private FLBs (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
SECTION VII.2:  SEPTEMBER 2010  –  DECEMBER 2011,  NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION  
GLOBAL  
Through July 2011, implementation from the global level, especially in Anglophone SSA countries, 
proceeded as planned, with s-QA.ACT orders made to GF, approved by GF, and delivered by global 
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manufacturers. Shipments included six brands of s-QA.ACT: two AA (Arsuamoon© and Winthrop©) and 
four AL (Ipca©, Artefan©, Coartem©, and Lumartem©). There was an average delay of two to three months 
between approving and delivering the order.  
 
In July 2011, GF became alarmed that pilot countries’ demand for s-QA.ACTs — particularly in Nigeria 
(accounting for ~30% of all AMFm orders) as well as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania-mainland, and Uganda — 
would deplete the Phase I cache funding the subsidy for all pilot countries before the end of the Phase I. 
These concerns came from several sources, including that demand for s-QA.ACT was high relative to the 
AMFm funding cache, that there may be global artemisinin shortages, and that AMFm was making it 
difficult for other programs relying on QA.ACTs, such as PMI (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; 
Maxmen 2012). 
 
In August 2011, GF’s AMFm Secretariat began implementing a series of criteria††††††††††††††††††††††† 
collectively called “demand-shaping levers,” which were used to determine how the approval rate for s-
QA.QCT orders in pilot countries would be rationed (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). It has not been 
made public exactly how the criteria were applied but Ghana (as well as Nigeria) was substantially 
affected, with only a quarter of its overall orders approved after July 2011 (Global Fund 2010e; 
Independent Evaluation Team 2012). In a report from an implementation forum convened in December 
2010, Ghanaian and other national FLBs complained about troubles doing business with the global 
manufacturers, including the partial-approval or non-approval of orders (Global Fund 2010e). Possible 
implications appear in the Tamale data, collected between August and December 2011. As discussed 
below and in Chapter VIII, retailers refer to supply chain issues, included shortages and the pricing 
reactions.  
 
                                                          
††††††††††††††††††††††† The IndE reads: “Since August 2011, each request for copayment received was evaluated on the 
basis of several criteria (for example, the ratio of cumulative approved orders to estimated demand, relative 
proportion of pediatric formulations/pack sizes, and sector) and approved within the constraint of US$ 8-10m per 
month” (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
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GHANA  
With the first arrival of s-QA.ACTs in Ghana in August 2010, distribution began at the national level. At 
this point, as per the IndE, about 7.5% of surveyed ACT outlets were familiar with the AMFm logo 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
Between August 2010 and December 2012, Ghana received 24.7m s-QA.ACT doses, 94% of them through 
the private, for-profit sector (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Public sector orders did not arrive until 
October 2011 due to delays in the national procurement process; in the interim, the government 
purchased from the private sector (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
On 14 February 2011, with President Atta-Mills and his new Minister of Health (Chireh) in attendance, 
Ghana held the formal launch ceremony for the AMFm — though s-QA.ACTs had been flowing into Ghana 
for five months (“Stakeholders Introduce New Mechanism for Malaria Treatment in Ghana” 2014). 
Ghana’s communication campaign about the use of ACTs and advertising the RRP ran from the formal 
February launch through December 2011; overall, researchers estimate that Ghana had the highest 
“intensity” (Willey 2014) of implementation of the AMFm Supporting Interventions among all the pilot 
countries (see Willey 2014 for the definition of intensity used) (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; Willey 
et al. 2014). 
 
When GF applied the demand-shaping levers in August 2011, its approval rate of private sector orders 
from Ghana dropped from 100% to 27% for the duration of the pilot, covering the period described below 
and analyzed in Chapter VIII (refer back to Figure 3 to place this within the context of this thesis) 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012). The fact that only one-quarter of Ghana’s overall orders were 
approved needs closer examination to understand what occurred at this time as well as its implications 
on supply. First, the public sector in Ghana only placed orders beginning in August 2011 (1.4m in that 
month) and all public sector orders were approved for the duration of Phase I. That is, only private-sector 
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orders were rationed — subject to rejection — after July 2011. But, second, private sector orders also 
spike up dramatically at this time, so that the rationing is applied to elevated numbers. From July 2010 to 
June 2011, the private sector in Ghana placed an average of 1.9m orders each month. The private sector 
did not place any orders in July 2011. Then, between August 2011 and March 2012, the private sector 
placed an average of 25.8m orders each month and an average of 1.3m were approved by GF for each of 
these seven months. 
 
Shifting from orders and approvals to reported deliveries, I show in Figure 23 the monthly pattern of all 
orders delivered to Ghanaian importers — whether via procurement by the MoH or by the private, for-
profit FLBs — between August 2011 and December 2011 (as recorded by GF). This is the period of data 
collection among pharmacies and LCSs in Tamale. Overall supply to Ghanaian ports increased slightly over 
this time but with a drop in deliveries to private-sector importers. The actual size of the supply shortfall 
depends on the extent to which the volume of orders placed by the FLBs reflected true demand (separate 
from number of actual malaria cases). 
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The changing retail price of ACTs under the AMFm had implications for NHIS reimbursements. After the 
RRP was set in January 2010, NHIA planned to lower its reimbursement rates from US$ 3.00 to US$ 0.90, 
the same as the RRP, when s-QA.ACTs arrived in Ghana (Acheampong 2014). Although the first s-QA.ACTs 
arrived in August 2010, the reimbursement rate was not lowered until November 2010, when an NHIA 
market survey found the new antimalarials to be widely available (Acheampong 2014). In its 2010 annual 
report, the insurance body noted that the AMFm had allowed NHIS to save up to 50% on antimalarials; in 
2009, antimalarials represented one of the most expensive medicines on the reimbursement list and 
accounted for a quarter of the NHIS medicines budget, which in turn had accounted for about half of the 
NHIS budget in 2008 (Blanchet and Roberts 2009; National Health Insurance Authority 2010). In turn, the 
NHIS accounted for about 10% of overall government expenditure in 2010 (Blanchet and Roberts 2009). 
 
Figure 23: s-QA.ACT orders delivered to Ghana in 2011 through the Ministry of Health (public) or 
for-profit First-Line Buyers (private), August to December 
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Unfortunately, the necessary information to analyze the effect of the AMFm on the pharmaceutical sector 
in Ghana is not publicly accessible and, without a mandate to do so, private firms are not willing to provide 
it. Details on how much of the ACT market-share came from local manufacturers prior to the AMFm are 
not available. As Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt state in their policy note on Ghana’s pharmaceutical sector, 
“there are no good statistics on Ghana’s pharmaceutical market” (Seiter and Gyansa-Luerodt 2009). While 
the AMFm likely had some effect on the market and composition of overall supply, it is not clear precisely 
how it affected Ghanaian manufacturers or altered the whole ACT market in Ghana. 
 
ANTIMALARIALS AND THE AMFM IN TAMALE, NORTHERN REGION 
Overall, Ghana achieved a high level of availability in the private sector by the final data collection for the 
IndE in November 2011, with s-QA.ACTs available in 90% of formal private clinics and pharmacies and just 
under 80% of LCSs (in urban areas, stocking was 89.1% for private facilities and pharmacies and 82.1% for 
LCSs; in rural areas, stocking rises in pharmacies to 97% but fell in LCSs to 73%) (Independent Evaluation 
Team 2012). This accords with my findings in Tamale, where 98% of retailers – both LCSs and pharmacies 
– reporting having ever stocked s-QA.ACT. 
 
Across the country, Ghana just met the goal of reducing the private sector retail price to less than three-
fold the price of the next most popular antimalarial on the market. While in rural areas, the median price 
reported was the RRP, US$ 0.90, in urban areas and in Ghana overall, the median price crept up to US$ 
1.20 in private clinics and pharmacies; LCSs reported selling at the RRP (Independent Evaluation Team 
2012). This was similar to the results in my data from Tamale, where the median reported retail price in 
Tamale was US$ 0.90 for both pharmacies and LCSs. 
 
In the IndE, both urban and rural pharmacies and LCSs had median mark-ups of 50%, with the exception 
of rural pharmacies, which added a median 33% mark-up to the terminal supply price. Specifically the data 
I collected in Tamale showed an overall median mark-up of 50% on the terminal supplier price — that is, 
whichever type of supplier sells to a retailer (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010). I provide more 
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detailed tables of the IndE results as relevant for Ghana and converted to the currency exchange rate used 
in this thesis in Appendix I.  
 
In Chapter VIII, I consider the non-compliance with the RRP that is behind the median price of US$ 0.90. 
To situate this analysis, in the remainder of this chapter, I take a granular look at retailers’ specific 
experiences with the AMFm and their more general attributes and business practices: stocking and supply 
patterns, views on competition and collusion, and perceptions of regulatory agencies. I do this using the 
in-depth interviews with retailers between August and December 2011, supplementing them with the 
PACT follow-up interviews with retailers conducted in October 2011 (please refer back to Figure 3 for a 
complete timeline to situate this data collection and to Chapter III for details on data collection). 
Throughout, echoing the IndE, I compare pharmacies to LCSs. So the reader can better envision these 
retailers, in Figure 24, I present images of private providers, intended to depict the variety of private sector 
retailers in and around Tamale, including a private registered pharmacist, two LCSs, and one nurse who 
also sells medication out of her home during off-hours. 
 
183 
 
Figure 24: Examples of private-sector implementers at street-level in and around Tamale, Ghana: 
Selected pharmacists and Licensed Chemical Sellers 
 
 
Retailer experiences with the AMFm in Tamale 
Awareness of the initiative 
When asked about the goals of the AMFm, 69% of retailers (of n=226) included a goal of reducing or 
eliminating malaria, 33% of making (quality) malaria drugs available (to everyone or specifically to the 
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poor), and 12% to “promote the new drug.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Overall, retailers felt positively about the 
program.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Many expressed sentiments that “the program is good because the drug they 
produce is good and affordable and the drug is helping cure malaria” and “it is good because the drug 
cures malaria, just like they said” (V-1 2011; V-31 2011). About fifty respondents (20%) specifically noted 
that the program should be maintained and that the price should not be increased. 
 
Retailers learned about the program in various ways.************************ About half (49.4% of n=247) 
reported first hearing about the program and drug from their supplier and another third (33.2%) from the 
media. Ten percent reported learning in a workshop and 5% from other retailers and providers (including 
health professional colleagues for retailers who also worked in public health facilities).†††††††††††††††††††††††† 
 
From the overall IndE findings, “AMFm-related training appeared to be linked to knowledge and 
awareness outcomes, with the two settings with the highest training coverage (Ghana and Zanzibar) 
performing best at endline [final data collection] on knowledge of the logo and RRP, and being in the top 
three for knowledge of the which antimalarial treatments are recommended as first-line therapy. 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Only one respondent was recorded as specifically attributing goals beyond reducing malaria and 
promoting the drug: “to make malaria drugs affordable so that the government can be more popular” (V-180 2011). 
Three respondents said they didn’t know the goals. 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The specific question asked was: “overall, what do you think of the green leaf program?” 
 
************************ The specific question asked was: “how did you first hear about the green leaf program?” 
 
†††††††††††††††††††††††† Surveyors further asked whether respondents felt “this was the proper way for you to learn 
about it.” Fewer respondents answer this question (n=107) but on the whole (85%) were satisfied with how they 
heard about it. For example, echoing a common sentiment, a respondent who learned from his/her supplier said 
“my supplier normally informs me about new development” (V-187 2011). Similarly, many who heard through the 
media acknowledged something like “it was the faster and cheaper means of spreading information” (V-167 2011). 
 
Though the minority, some respondents specifically voiced that they should have heard through a government 
agency or professional association, including a “workshop to educate us more” (V-1 2011; V-7 2011; V-67 2011; V-
124 2011; V-133 2011; V-188 2011; V-196 2011; V-511 2011; V-517 2011; V-537 2011; V-542 2011). Two specifically 
raised the issue of being stakeholders. One, who heard from his/her supplier, said “I think it wasn’t fair because as 
major stakeholders, we should have been briefed before” (V-507 2011). Another, who heard first from the media, 
said “I felt this was wrong since we are a major stakeholder. We should have met as partners and been educated on 
the drug” (V-535 2011).  
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However, high levels of knowledge in some settings with relatively low training coverage indicate that 
providers also obtain information through other sources, such as communications targeted at the general 
public or through wholesale providers” (Willey et al. 2014). Unfortunately, in the present study, few 
respondents clearly answered the questions on general malaria and AMFm-specific training, so it is not 
possible to distinguish how many retailers attended an AMFm training, regardless of whether it was how 
they first learned of the program. 
 
 
Stocking, suppliers, and pricing for s-QA.ACTs 
s-QA.ACT stocking 
Retailers reported stocking, on average, 1.36 brands of s-QA.ACT on the day(s) of the interview, with 
pharmacies stocking significantly more brands than LCSs, as shown in Table 10. Overall, 92% report 
stocking any s-QA.ACT of the AL formulation (Ipca©, Artefan©, Coartem©, Lumartem©), with no significant 
differences between retailers and with Lumartem© as the most commonly stocked brand. Thirteen 
percent of retailers reported stocking s-QA.ACT of the AA formulation (Arsuamoon© or Winthrop©), which 
does not differ significantly by retailer type.  
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Table 10: Stocking of s-QA.ACT in Tamale, Ghana, stratified by retailer type 
 
Eighty-seven of retailers (of n=251) reported that s-QA.ACTs ranked among their three “most requested” 
antimalarial medications, with significantly more LCSs than pharmacies reporting this (89% versus 60%, 
significant at p=0.02 in a two-sided t-test, analysis not shown). Eighty-three percent of retailers (n=251) 
also place s-QA.ACT as their “fastest moving” antimalarial, again with significantly more LCSs than 
pharmacies reporting this (84% versus 65%, significant at p=0.10 in a two-sided t-test, analysis not shown). 
 
At the time of the interview, 65% of respondents reported “yes,” they had “as much stock with the green 
leaf on the packets as [they] would like to have.” Pharmacies were more likely to report having sufficient 
stock than LCSs, as shown in Table 10. Not all retailers expanded on why they perceived their stock as 
inadequate but those that did gave two primary reasons: insufficient funds to replenish and difficulty 
finding supply. A small number also mentioned supply prices being a reason for depleted stock, which I 
return to under the “s-QA.ACT pricing” sub-section. 
 
To explain insufficient stock, several retailers reported sentiments like, “financial constraints have limited 
my ability to obtain the drug the way I wished,” speaking both s-QA.ACT stock and stock of specific brands 
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(V-81 2011; V-123 2011; V-124 2011; V-138 2011; V-212 2011; V-507 2011; V-532 2011; V-534 2011; V-
537 2011). A small number pointed out the problem that “I currently do not have enough funds to buy it 
and I cannot buy it on credit” because suppliers were not offering credit (V-114 2011). A few received 
stock but not as much as desired, such as, “it is difficult because any time we request it, we are only given 
a small quantity” (V-106 2011). 
 
Discussing the problem of finding adequately stocked suppliers, one retailer noted, “there are times that 
I request for the drug from my supplier and he tells me that it is finished and I should wait until he goes 
to Accra to bring back some supplies. We usually have to wait for them” (V-135 2011). In cases of such 
shortages, retailers may turn to fellow retailers in Tamale: “When I do not get it from [Supplier 3003], I 
will try [popular retailer in Tamale]. I also have an arrangement with [another retailer in Tamale who 
sources from Accra], who supplies me” (V-153 2011). This does not always work: “I buy [s-QA.ACT] from 
colleague retailers and when they do not have stock, I have few options” (V-554 2011). Others turned to 
the individual suppliers on moto bikes, even though it appears they do pay more in doing so, such as, 
“there are times when we resort to buying from the mobile suppliers, who sell at a higher price” (V-101 
2011). These issues of alternative sources of — and constrained — supply are the subject of the next sub-
section; please also refer back to Figure 22 for a depiction of the pharmaceutical supply chains in Ghana. 
 
s-QA.ACT suppliers 
Overall, compared to the access of regular antimalarials, the main supply sources for s-QA.ACTs shifted 
somewhat. In Table 11, I detail these differences, showing significant changes for four suppliers (coded as 
3003, 3008, 3013, and 3014). Suppliers listed by only a few retailers, who registered as 0.00 percent of 
main suppliers, are excluded from the table.  
 
Overall, just under a quarter (23%) of retailers reported having difficulties finding s-QA.ACT supply, with 
no significant difference between pharmacies and LCSs. Because difficulties with supply and pricing are 
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linked, I discuss them together in a sub-section, below. For now, note that a retailer’s listing of “main” 
suppliers belies a slightly more complicated story about actual sources of supply. 
 
 
Table 11: Comparison of main antimalarial and s-QA.ACT suppliers in Tamale, Ghana 
 
s-QA.ACT pricing 
As noted, and accordant with the IndE findings, the median retail price of s-QA.ACT in Tamale during the 
study period is US$ 0.90. The median covers an overall (across facility types) mean retail price of US$ 0.97 
with a bimodal distribution, as shown in the (green) histogram in Figure 25. Largely, retailers either 
charged US$ 0.90 (1.50 Ghana) or they charged US$ 1.20 (2.00 Ghana).  
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Figure 25: Distribution of reported retail prices with associated supply prices and absolute mark-ups: 
 
Pharmacies more frequently charged US$ 1.20; as shown in Table 12, pharmacies also reported paying 
higher terminal supply prices for s-QA.ACTs than LCSs.  
 
 
Table 12: Retail prices, terminal supply prices, and retailer mark-ups on s-QA.ACT in Tamale Ghana, 
stratified by retailer type 
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One reason retailers might (report) selling at US$ 0.90 is if they thought there would be negative 
consequences to setting a price above the RRP.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ However, 90% (of n=138) reported that 
nothing would happen, including citing their own higher retail prices or those of other retailers, for 
example, “I presently sell my drugs above US$ 0.90 and my customers do not complain much” (V-39 2011). 
One retailer explained that these higher terminal supply prices did not present a major problem because 
“even though sometimes the price is quite high but you can buy and also raise the [retail] price and people 
will buy” (V-188 2011). Of that small percentage who thought “something” negative might happen if they 
were to charge above the RRP, they either state that customers would complain or that the retailer “will 
lose market since many people are aware of the price and would not buy from such a person” (V-167 
2011).  
 
Another reason retailers might not charge the RRP was if they thought it was an unreasonable price-point. 
Three-quarters of respondents (73%) thought the RRP price was “good,” “OK,” or “affordable,” reflected 
in statements like: “I think it is OK because more customers can afford it and the profit is good” (V-180 
2011)). A few highlighted that the price point was a “driving force of demand” (V-12 2011; V-37 2011; V-
99 2011; V-110 2011; V-154 2011; V-503 2011).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Another 12% thought the price was 
good but unprofitable or infeasible given prevailing terminal supply prices: “I think the US$ 0.90 price is 
good for both business and many customers but the recent supply price is making it unattractive for 
business” (V-515 2011). A small number expressed “discomfort” that the retail price was advertised in the 
media, such as “I think the US$ 0.90 is OK. My problem is with the adverts on the price, which puts the 
retailers in a dilemma” (V-24 2011; V-33 2011). Two percent thought the RRP should be raised, generally 
to US$ 1.20. 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The specific question asked was: “what, if anything, would happen if someone priced their leaf 
drugs higher than US$ 0.90?” Only half (55%) respondents answered this question, partly because it was added to 
the questionnaire midway through the survey process. Accordingly, the answers should be interpreted with caution.  
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The specific question asked was: “what do you think of the suggested retail price (US$ 
0.90) of the malaria drugs with the green leaf on the packet?” I coded the responses (n=235, 94% of those 
surveyed) such that each response only received one code.  
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And yet 12% thought the price should be lowered, usually to US$ 0.60 (1.0 Ghana), citing that this could 
stimulate further demand and/or that their clientele was predominantly rural and/or poor and could not 
afford the RRP.************************* To illustrate: “If the price is reduced to US$ 0.60, it will be affordable 
to many more people. Most of the people still prefer [SP] because of the low price” (V-129 2011). The 
specific comparison with SP pricing (usually US$ 0.30 or US$ 0.36), to highlight that s-QA.ACT pricing was 
still unaffordable was echoed by seven others (V-4 2011; V-79 2011; V-83 2011; V-155 2011; V-519 2011; 
V-523 2011; V-553 2011). I provide the full responses with coding in Appendix E. 
 
A third reason retailers might not charge the RRP is if they thought the market was trending in a different 
direction.††††††††††††††††††††††††† Overall, 65% felt the price could settle at US$ 0.90. Another 17% thought 
the price might settle at US$ 0.90 and that the situation depended on whether the supply price could be 
controlled. The final 18% thought the price would settle at US$ 1.20 (2.0 Ghana) or higher. 
 
Among those who thought the price would settle at US$ 0.90, their views are largely represented in the 
following: “it [the US$ 0.90 price] will come to stay because the drug is good and the clients see the price 
as affordable and we still sell at a profit” (V-8 2011); or, “I think the price will settle [at US$ 0.90] because 
customers are aware of the US$ 0.90 price and know when a retailer is selling at an abnormal price” (V-
28 2011). Most who reported this view noted that they made a profit. A small number reported not 
                                                          
************************* Later in the survey cycle, we added a specific question on “what would you think if the suggested 
retail price was lowered to US$ 0.60?” at the suggestion of a CHAI representative. Of those who answered (n=167, 
or 67% of the sample), nearly three-quarters indicated that as long as they still made a profit – that is, as long as the 
terminal supply price was also adjusted – that they would accept this change. Most of those who said they did not 
want to see the retail price lowered expressed concern about their ability to make a profit. Two respondents said 
that at a lower price, clients may not take the drug “seriously” or think it was of good quality (V-54 2011; V-124 
2011). 
 
††††††††††††††††††††††††† The specific question asked was: “the green leaf (AMFm / ACTm) program was tested in regions 
of some other countries, including Angola, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In these countries, the retail price settled 
around the equivalent of US$ 0.90 and sometimes even lower. Do you think this will happen in Tamale? Across 
Ghana? Why or why not?” Eighty-six percent (n=215) of respondents provided an answer to this question, which I 
then coded in mutually exclusive categories, so that each answer code only received one code. Full responses and 
coding are provided in Appendix E.  
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making a profit yet still thought the price would settle at the RRP: “the price will settle at US$ 0.90 because 
though the margin is not great, customer satisfaction also matters to us” (V-526; V-526 2011). I consider 
the views of those who thought the price would not settle or that supply prices and distribution needed 
to be controlled in the sub-section on “challenges,” below.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
Recall that the above data collection and statements were collected in Tamale while, in the background, 
GF was applying the demand levers to Ghana’s orders. Do we actually see suggestive time trends among 
retail prices, supply prices, and mark-ups over the last months of 2011? The values presented below, 
including in Figure 26, should be taken with caution, since they were not collected to create a time series 
and since the supply price a retailer reported on a given date reflects the price at which s/he bought it, 
not the market supply price on that date. With this large caveat in mind, there do appear to be significant 
differences across months of data collection. An ANOVA (not shown) reveals no significant differences in 
either retail or supply price across months but the absolute retailer mark-up is significant at p=0.02. If 
supply price is considered as a binary – US$ 0.60 and below versus US$ 0.61 and above – then it differs 
significantly over the five months of the study, at p < 0.00.  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ With further understanding about how retailers experienced the RRP, we reacted to passing 
comments from retailers and added the question: “some retailers have suggested that some of their customers 
suspect that that low price of the drugs with the green leaf on the packet means that the drugs are low-quality or 
even counterfeit. Have you heard anything like this? What do you think about this?” About 66% of retailers received 
and responded to this question (n=166). Of these, only about 7% had heard this concern and none seemed to hold 
this view themselves. For instance, one relayed a story that reflected the explanation that some “big men” and “big 
women” have this idea: “I have experienced this on several occasions but I usually try to explain to them and some 
take my education and some do not. There are some who even come for Coartem© and when you give them the one 
with the green leaf, they won’t take it, they want the one that costs US$ 7.20 (V-170 2011)” (V-131 2011; V-141 
2011; V-509 2011; V-524 2011). The rest attributed the idea to “ignorance” and noted that they tried to explain it to 
them, for instance “I have heard this but I think it is ignorance and I try to explain to them that it is a government 
subsidy that has made it cheap (V-510 2011)” (V-54 2011; V-63 2011; V-84 2011; V-87 2011; V-114 2011; V-149 2011; 
V-188 2011; V-198 2011; V-510 2011; V-527 2011; V-531 2011; V-533 2011; V-570 2011). 
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Figure 26: Retail prices, terminal supply prices, and absolute mark-ups on s-QA.ACTs, stratified by 
month of interview 
 
Challenges of s-QA.ACT supply and pricing 
As outlined above and illustrated in Figure 26, the median retail price of s-QA.ACT remained at US$ 0.90 
(that is, the RRP) throughout the study period, the median supply price hovered between US$ 0.60 and 
US$ 0.67; three-quarters of respondents reported no difficulty finding s-QA.ACT supply. While noting this 
overall positive picture of the program, it is hard not to also infer, based on open-ended responses, that 
retailers faced difficulties locating a supply at a price they felt allowed them to sell the s-QA.ACTs at US$ 
0.90. I cover these views in this section. Note that not all respondents answered all questions; the 
information presented below should be weighed accordingly.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Several different questions in the retailer interviews yielded the information presented below, 
including:  
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Supply: challenges and strategies 
Retailers revealed a number of challenges obtaining s-QA.QCT stock — which “runs out easily 
because of the high demand” — as well as mitigating strategies (V-65 2011). Some mentioned 
minor inconveniences, such as receiving stock two to three days after making a request or getting 
a different brand of s-QA.ACT each time they purchased stock (V-49 2011; V-547 2011). Some 
retailers were only familiar with Supplier 3003, so if stock was out there, “there is nowhere else 
for me to look,” and “I will have to come back and wait about a week before he goes to bring 
[more s-QA.ACT supply]” (V-76 2011; V-212 2011; V-529 2011; V-552 2011). Sometimes a retailer 
can switch to another major supplier but this may means using one that does not make deliveries 
(V-14 2011; V-121 2011). 
 
Another challenge for some retailers is that Supplier 3003, the dominant supplier in of s-QA.ACT 
in Tamale (see Table 11), as well as other major suppliers, do not sell drugs on credit, limiting the 
ability of some retailers to replenish stock (V-502 2011; V-506 2011; V-507 2011; V-517 2011). 
Some retailers overcame this by purchasing from mobile suppliers, who often had “flexible 
payment” so that a retailer could “take the drug now and pay later” (V-180 2011; V-517 2011). 
                                                          
 “Is it more difficult to find a supplier for malaria drugs with the green leaf on the packet than for 
other antimalarial drugs? Explain;”  
 “Some retailers have said that suppliers do not always have enough of the drugs with the green 
leaf on the packet. Have you had this experience? What happened?”  
 “Some retailers are reporting that suppliers are raising their prices on the drugs with the green 
leaf on the packet. Have you heard and/or experienced this? What happened?;” and  
 “The green leaf program was tested in regions of some other countries, including Angola, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. In these countries, the retail price settled around the equivalent of US$ 
0.90 and sometimes even lower. Do you think this will happen in Tamale? Across Ghana? Why or 
why not?” 
I also include relevant insights retailers gave in response to other questions; the full set of responses from the retailer 
in-depth interviews is available in Appendix E. In addition, the views of retailers who spontaneously raised issues of 
supply during the PACT retailer follow-up interviews in October 2011 (which did not include specific questions about 
the AMFm) are included below; the full responses are available in Appendix F.  
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Credit or no, the mobile suppliers almost always sold at higher prices (V-84 2011; V-138 2011; V-
537 2011).  
 
As noted before, an alternative strategy was to try “other retailers in Tamale if my major suppliers 
don’t have it” (V-570) (V-65 2011; V-153 2011; V-162 2011; V-534 2011; V-570 2011). However, 
for those who “prefer to buy it from the major wholesalers,” there were limited alternatives for 
finding stock when the major suppliers were out (V-54 2011). 
 
Troubles with supply prices: charging more or getting squeezed 
Several retailers detailed rising supply prices, generally reflecting a change from US$ 0.60 to either 
US$ 0.67 or US$ 0.72 per package, with the result that, for some, “the pricing makes it difficult to 
purchase” (V-61 2011) (V-16 2011; V-61 2011; V-73 2011; V-87 2011; V-93 2011; V-98 2011; V-
101 2011; V-109 2011; V-114 2011; V-119 2011; V-149 2011; V-155 2011; V-209 2011; V-211 2011; 
V-509 2011; V-512 2011; V-518 2011; V-524 2011; V-532 2011; V-535 2011; V-538 2011; V-542 
2011; V-545 2011; V-547 2011; V-548 2011; V-549 2011; V-550 2011; V-551 2011; V-552 2011; V-
553 2011; V-554 2011; V-556 2011; V-566 2011; V-570 2011). As one retailer explained, “the price 
of the [s-QA.ACT] depends largely on the price for which you obtain it, which also largely depends 
on where you get it” (V-506 2011). The importance of supply price variations in determining retail 
price is in line with the cross-country finding from Palafox et al (Palafox et al. 2015).  
 
An increase in the retail price above the RRP generally meant charging US$ 1.20 (2.00 Ghana) (see 
Figure 25 for the distribution of reported retail prices). For instance, one explained, “I sometimes 
sell [s-QA.ACT] at US$ 0.90 and sometimes at US$ 1.20, depending on the cost price” (V-83 2011). 
Several retailers echoed similar sentiments about their decision, including the implication that a 
US$ 0.07 or US$ 0.14 (10 or 20 Ghanaian pesewa; there are 100 pesewa in 1 Ghanaian cedi) 
increase in supply prices would — if they decided or were “compelled” or “forced” to increase 
their prices — raise them from US$ 0.90 to US$ 1.20 (50 pesewa) rather than an intermediate 
price. A recurrent explanation is summarized as: “we used to buy at US$ 0.67 and sell at US$ 0.90 
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but the current stock I bought at US$ 0.72. So I sell at US$ 1.20” (V-153 2011) (V-4 2011; V-8 2011; 
V-17 2011; V-65 2011; V-73 2011; V-84 2011; V-123 2011; V-124 2011; V-134 2011; V-138 2011; 
V-209 2011; V-514 2011; V-545 2011; V-549 2011; V-550 2011; V-553 2011; V-554 2011).  
 
When supply prices went up, some retailers reported that it was “impossible to sell at the 
regulated price” (V-155 2011) even if they “would want to reduce the price” (V-7 2011) (V-7 2011; 
V-155 2011). One lamented, “the US$ 0.90 is giving us problems because we buy at a price that 
does not allow us to sell at US$ 0.90. So we have a lot of challenges with clients because they do 
not understand why we sell at US$ 1.20. And we cannot sell at US$ 0.90” (V-517 2011). Another 
explained that “once the wholesale price is less than US$ 0.60, it [the retail price of US$ 0.90] is 
good for business” (V-98 2011) but otherwise the retail price of US$ 0.90 is “unattractive for 
business” (V-515 2011) (V-98 2011; V-515 2011). 
 
A small number of retailers explicitly discussed getting squeezed between the advertised RRP and 
the terminal supply price they paid: “sometimes we buy at US$ 0.78 and have to sell at US$ 0.90” 
(V-14 2011) and “suppliers raised their prices and are now making it difficult for we retailers to 
sell at US$ 0.90 but it is on ads everywhere that we can only sell at US$ 0.90 and that affects our 
business” (V-24 2011) (V-14 2011; V-24 2011). Others noted that the terminal supply price and 
the advertised retail price did not allow a sufficient profit (V-63 2011; V-65 2011; V-206 2011; V-
211 2011; V-515 2011). One said, “the [retail] price was given but when they recently increased 
the buying price, they failed to increase the retail price and they keep telling the public in the 
media that the price is US$ 0.90, which is not fair” (V-510 2011). Another added, “I do not know 
how much I should pay for it but I pay US$ 0.72 and sometimes US$ 0.84.... They tell the retail 
price in the advert but fail to tell the supply price” (V-517 2011). 
 
Two retailers reported ceasing selling s-QA.ACTs because they could not make a profit: “we buy 
from [Supplier 3003] and others who sell to us at a near-retail price, which makes it hard for us to 
sell it. Because of those challenges, we have stopped selling it” (V-530 2011) (V-519 2011; V-530 
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2011). This mirrors a sentiment from one of the suppliers (3004) interviewed in mid-December: 
“currently we do not have any [s-QA.ACT] stock. I think basically it is a result of the price increases, 
so I think for now the company is not buying because our clients complain that they do not make 
profits and we have to sell to them at more than the suggested price and no one knows what will 
happen yet… We have not been selling [s-QA.ACT] for slightly over a month now” (S-3004 2011). 
 
Suggestions for improving supply and controlling supply and retail prices 
Increase supply 
Some retailers expressed concerns about inconsistent s-QA.ACT supply: “the supply chain is not 
going down well with the [s-QA.ACTs]. More effort should be made to make them available at all 
times and with regular supply” (V-102 2011). They encouraged ways of introducing “more and 
more of the [s-QA.ACTs] into the system” (V-144 2011) either by importing more s-QA.ACT, 
producing more s-QA.ACT, or otherwise making efforts “to make sure there are always [s-
QA.ACTs] available without shortages and also [that it is] easy to find and purchase” (V-95 2011) 
and is “sufficient and stable” (V-16 2011) (V-5 2011; V-16 2011; V-24 2011, -24; V-63 2011; V-66 
2011; V-69 2011; V-92 2011; V-95 2011; V-107 2011; V-110 2011; V-121 2011; V-131 2011; V-144 
2011; V-145 2011; V-155 2011; V-166 2011; V-202 2011; V-206 2011; V-570 2011; V-571 2011). 
Others thought that “if they can increase the supply in the system so that the supply will force 
down the price, then the US$ 0.90 can be easily achieved” (V-13 2011). This aligns with the finding 
by Palafox et al that antimalarial retailers in low-income countries sometimes attribute rising 
supply prices to supply shortages, whether real or artificial (Palafox et al. 2015). 
 
Ensure distribution, supply prices, and retail prices 
Retailers offered different ideas about ensuring supply and prices but many focused on the idea 
that both supplier and retailer prices needed better monitoring and regulation, with “strong 
regulation,” enforced – often explicitly at US$ 0.60 (V-114 2011). Several retailers agreed with the 
idea that “suppliers should be controlled so that they do not raise their prices” (V-107 2011) or 
that “the agencies responsible should try to maintain the buying prices so that everyone can sell 
198 
at the suggested US$ 0.90” (V-63 2011) (V-15 2011; V-35 2011; V-61 2011; V-63 2011; V-93 2011; 
V-107 2011; V-118 2011; V-132 2011; V-134 2011; V-166 2011; V-188 2011; V-519 2011; V-523 
2011; V-525 2011; V-547 2011; V-550 2011; V-566 2011). One reflected another theme: the retail 
price of US$ 0.90 “could only come to stay if the supplier prices are controlled” (V-551 2011).  
 
One retailer summed up “a big challenge in the supply” as: “there is no one supplier who is 
charged with the distribution of the drug, so many companies and individuals provide the drug on 
a piecemeal basis” (V-84 2011). Another added, “the fact that private individuals [mobile 
suppliers] go to Kumasi to bring it to Tamale to supply it does not help the program. A company 
should be charged with the responsibility of distributing the drugs” (V-517 2011).  
 
A small number of respondents reiterated the (unprompted) idea that a central company or 
agency should be put in charge of distributing s-QA.ACTs and monitoring this distribution: “an 
agency should be tasked to regulate the distribution of the drug so that the price is not influenced 
by distribution chain complexities” (V-506 2011) or “if we can have a central agency tasked with 
the job of distributing the drug nationwide, this will limit the supply chain difficulties” (V-138 
2011) (V-16 2011; V-101 2011; V-138 2011; V-506 2011; V-517 2011; V-529 2011; V-566 2011).  
 
Rather than supply, some respondents focused on retail prices, suggesting that someone should 
“monitor the retail prices and try to enforce it. If this is not done, it will soon be out of reach of a 
lot of people since the price is steadily going up” (V-114 2011). Again, a few called for stronger 
regulation or government statements about retail prices, including “the program could be 
improved if regulatory bodies put policies to control the prices” (V-209 2011) (V-31 2011; V-61 
2011; V-202 2011; V-209 2011; V-508 2011; V-566 2011). One made the strong recommendation 
that “the government [should] send out a task force to arrest and punish retailers that sell at high 
prices” (V-107 2011). Another thought the retail price was the purview of professional bodies, 
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saying “the US$ 0.90 price can only be sustained if the chemical sellers’ association agrees for all 
its members to stay at the recommended retail price” (V-15 2011).************************** 
 
Basic attributes 
Who are these retailers who, aware or not, served as the street-level implementers of the AMFm? As 
O’Meara and colleagues state in their analysis of antimalarial medicine markets in Kenya, “the retail 
market of antimalarials is a complicated landscape consisting of many different wholesale-to-retail 
pathways with varying numbers of links; different types of outlets, ranging from registered pharmacies to 
general stores; dozens of different types and brands of antimalarials; and widely varying prices” (O’Meara 
et al. 2013). This complicated landscape exists in Ghana, as shown in Figure 22. The behaviors and 
perceptions of the private-sector retailers within this landscape are generally interesting, given academic 
and programmatic attention to small- and medium-size firms as well as the role of the private sector in 
delivering health products, but also specifically interesting because of how they might shape firm behavior 
in response to the RRP. 
 
A census of antimalarial retailers in and around Tamale located 21 private, for-profit pharmacies and 236 
LCSs (as described in Chapter III). Nearly half (43%) of the pharmacies were NHIS-accredited for NHIS 
reimbursement, such that patients could receive listed medications for free. One LCS was listed as NHIS-
accredited. 
                                                          
************************** For other suggestions to improve the AMFm, a small number of respondents (n= 7) called for 
the media campaign and education to be intensified, with some specifically calling for more detailed descriptions of 
the drugs, the efficacy, the limited side effects, and the subsidy behind their price point, for instance: “I think more 
education should be done to make people realize that the effectiveness of the expensive drug and the green leaf are 
the same” (V-49 2011; V-65 2011; V-201 2011; V-506 2011; V-535 2011; V-545 2011; V-550 2011). Two respondents 
called for more workshops to be organized for retailers for further “education” and “motivation” about s-QA.ACT 
(V-102 2011; V-535 2011). 
 
Several (n=11) respondents also said that the program — and specifically the s-QA.ACT pills — could be improved by 
making the drug more “user-friendly (V-542 2011),” reducing the number of pills a patient had to take each time and 
possibly the length of the treatment course, such as “making the doses 2 or even 1 would be very good for the 
program since a lot of people are complaining about the quantity (V-13 2011)” (V-17 2011; V-129 2011; V-135 2011; 
V-138 2011; V-503 2011; V-508 2011; V-510 2011; V-536 2011; V-570 2011). Two also called for s-QA.ACTs to be 
made available in suspension or syrup form (V-167 2011; V-556 2011). 
 
200 
 
In Figure 27, I map all of the censused retailers, along with major markets, government health facilities, 
and private hospitals located in Tamale. The center of Tamale is at the intersection of the five intersecting 
roads. 
 
 
Figure 27: Map of antimalarial retailers and other key landmarks in and around Tamale, Ghana 
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How do retailers choose locations for their businesses?†††††††††††††††††††††††††† Thirty-seven percent 
described their location as being where there were no other retailers at the time and 14% pointed out 
that the location was convenient to (or actually in) their home. Others noted that the location was in some 
way accessible to customers (whether near to a road (34%), a market (11%), or to hospitals or clinics in 
hopes of gaining customers with prescriptions (2%)). When retailers were asked to list up to five other 
retailers – be they pharmacies, LCSs, clinics, or maternity homes – in this community or area, they list, on 
average, 1.72 other retailers. This is shown in Table 13. 
 
One way retailers might choose their locations is through siting guidelines. According to a Pharmacy 
Council Guidelines and Applications for establishing a new LCS, LCSs are supposed to establish themselves 
at least 1 kilometer from another pharmacy or LCS (Pharmacy Council, n.d.; Pharmacy Council 1994). 
Figure 27 shows that this is not the case. Indeed, the number of other retailers within a 1-kilometer radius 
of any shop ranges from 0 to 49, with a mean of 14 and a median of 8 (shown for each shop type in Table 
13; pharmacies have significantly more other shops within a 1-kilometer radius than do LCSs).  
 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††††††††††† The surveyors asked retailers to describe how they selected the site for their business – an 
open-ended question that was then coded such that respondents provided up to two reasons for their location 
(n=159 retailers provided responses). 
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Table 13: Basic characteristics of antimalarial retailers in Tamale, Ghana, stratified by retailer type 
 
The retailers had been in operation between 8 months and 35 years with an average of 8.5 years, as shown 
in Table 13. They ranged from having 0 to 7 employees (additional to the owner/manager), with an 
average of 1.4 employees; pharmacies had significantly more employees than LCSs.  
 
Forty-six percent reported keeping some form of record of their stock and/or sales (see Table 13), though 
two specifically noted that these records were not accurate or consistent. The overall average is accordant 
with the survey of good business practices among small- and medium-sized firms in LMICs conducted by 
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McKenzie and Woodruff, who find that 49% of these businesses keep any written records (McKenzie and 
Woodruff 2015). Pharmacies were significantly more likely to keep records than LCSs.  
 
Ninety-one percent of retailers answered “yes,” their revenues exceeded their costs most months. One 
noted, “I have never taken the time to work that out; but since we are still in business, we are doing well” 
(V-123 2011).  
 
Researchers of private pharmaceutical manufacturers have suggested that researchers of retailer 
performance consider more seriously the forces that shape pricing decisions, including social and 
professional obligations in addition to profit motives (Van der Geest 1987; Kamat and Nichter 1998; Cross 
and MacGregor 2010; Kamat and Nyato 2010; Russo and McPake 2010). These align with scholars’ work 
— as compiled by Tripp — on localized and often small-scale economies in SSA, where markets are 
embedded in social life and where cooperation and neighborliness are valued equally with competition 
(Tripp 2001). Competition may be minimized or even avoided (Tripp 2001).  
 
Considering the above, the survey team investigated how retailers viewed their customers. About 60% of 
retailers reported that the owner/manager lived in the same community as the shop, which was 
significantly more the case for LCSs owners than for pharmacy owners. Retailers were split on whether 
they viewed their patrons as clients or neighbors and how this changed their business practice. Eighty 
percent mostly viewed them as clients; 20% said “both,” or as “neighbors,” “friends,” “relatives,” “ family,” 
or, in one effusive case, “not just as my neighbors but as my people” (V-101 2011). There is no significant 
difference between pharmacies and LCSs on their views of patrons as clients or neighbors.  
 
Most retailers (82% of the n=200 answering this question) did not think their view changed their business 
practice. For those who did think their views influenced practice, the key difference was summed up by 
one retailer, who viewed “some as neighbors and some as clients. I usually give credit to neighbors; but 
in the case of clients, you deal strictly with clients” (V-517 2011). Twenty retailers agreed that considering 
patrons as neighbors often meant offering drugs on credit or for free, which could complicate pursuing a 
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profit or “business principles” (V-547 2011). One respondent specifically noted “as a member of the 
community, sometimes the retailers will sell drugs on a credit basis as his way of a social response to the 
community” (V-121 2011).  
 
This aligns with findings from Palafox et al across six countries, in which “retailers in most countries 
reported considering a consumer’s ability to pay when deciding on a price. Several retail respondents even 
described giving antimalarials away for free of charge when they felt a patient could not afford to purchase 
treatment” (Palafox et al. 2015). A few expressed that this created acute business hardships: one 
respondent viewed customers “mostly as neighbors, since it was persistent pressure from the 
neighborhood that necessitated the establishment. I also treat people on credit and this has even 
accumulated to the tune of US$ 240.00. I usually treat customers on credit and some others don't pay; I 
currently have 30 people owing me” (V-535 2011).  
 
But three others indicated that viewing patrons as neighbors could have positive business effects, some 
of them being: I view my patrons as being “mostly neighbors. Because of this customers prefer to buy 
from us and sometimes they leave the more renowned shops in town to buy our drugs due to the personal 
relations between us and customers” (V-180 2011). There are thus both benefits and drawbacks to 
viewing customers as clients or neighbors, and some retailers suggest that they view different clients in 
different ways, with possible implications for selling at different prices to different customers. 
Nevertheless, since retailers always reported a single price for any given antimalarial in stock, as shown 
below, it seems that they have a general price in mind, from which they might deviate in some cases. 
 
Stocking and mark-ups on antimalarial medication 
Antimalarial stock 
Almost all the retailers interviewed (99%) considered antimalarial medications important to their 
business, noting that, for example, “malaria drugs represent 30% to 40% of my distribution. It is a very 
important part of the drugs I dispense and the most moving drugs among my stock” (V-158 2011). Some 
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retailers clarified that it was especially important during the rainy season, which overlapped with the data 
collection period for this study. 
 
 
Table 14: Antimalarial retailer stocking, prices, and mark-ups in Tamale, stratified by retailer type 
 
I summarize the stocking and mark-up behavior of pharmacies and LCSs in Table 14. Excluding s-QA.ACTs 
(considered above), respondents reported stocking between zero and thirteen types of antimalarials, with 
an average of five types in stock. Pharmacies stocked significantly more types of antimalarials than LCSs, 
significantly more types of ACTs, and significantly less types of SP. Retailers’ antimalarial stock included 
between zero and nine types of ACTs and between zero and eight types of SP, with an average of two 
types of each. Other types of drugs stocked and recorded as antimalarials included CQ and quinine, 
Artesunate-monotherapies (AMTs), monotherapies of ACT partner ingredients (such as amodiaquine or 
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lumefantrine), and herbal preparations. Painkillers and antibiotics were included in the antimalarial audit 
in a few instances. These data are available on request. 
 
Prices and mark-ups 
Prices for ACTs (excluding s-QA.ACTs) in LCSs ranged from an extremely low reported US$ 0.30 up to US$ 
4.20; in pharmacies prices ranged from US$ 0.90 to US$ 10.20.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The average price 
charged for ACTs differs significantly across LCSs and pharmacies, with respective mean prices of US$ 2.17 
and US$ 3.25. The average price charged for SP also differs significantly across LCSs and pharmacies, 
though the median prices are the same, at US$ 0.30. The median price for SP aligns with the findings of 
the IndE for Ghana, which their research team identifies as the “next most popular” antimalarial product 
on the market (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
Overall absolute mark-ups on all drugs ranged from US$ 0.03 to US$ 1.20, with percentage mark-ups from 
10% to 100%. The average absolute mark-up is US$ 0.33 and the average percentage mark-up is 49%. 
Percentage mark-ups are calculated as: [retail price / supply price] – 100%. That is, a drug retailed for 
exactly its terminal supply price — the price at which the last supplier sold to a retailer — would have a 
0% mark-up (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010). Note that average absolute mark-ups are higher 
and percentage mark-ups lower for ACT as compared to SP in both LCSs and pharmacies, with no 
significant differences across the two retailer types. The finding of differential mark-ups on ACTs versus 
SP is in line with findings across low-income countries, including in SSA (Palafox et al. 2015). 
 
Customer demand 
Surveyors asked retailers to list (up to) three drugs they considered to be their “most requested.” This 
reflects the importance of consumer demand and expectations found by other researchers in retailer 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ All instances of ACTs prices above US$ 4.50 are unsubsidized Coartem©. 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ All instances of SP priced above US$ 0.60 are the branded and imported Fansidar© or 
Metakelfin©. These are identified as “innovator brands” by Goodman et al, who finds this to be a significant predictor 
of price in rural Tanzania (Goodman et al. 2009). The authors of a study of consumer preferences in Tanzania (albeit 
a decade old) suggest that consumers view these brands as different in some way from other SP (Tarimo and 
Manyilizu 2006).  
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stocking and dispensing medication (Okeke, Uzochukwu, and Okafor 2006). Retailers provided n=644 total 
responses, which are dominated by ACTs (59.5%, inclusive of s-QA.ACTs) and SP (35.4%). The latter are 
sometimes referred to as the “three-in-one,” “the one with the single dose,” or “the one with three 
tablets” (e.g. see (V-18 2011; V-107 2011)). A small number (2.8%) reported AMTs requested.  
 
Respondents also named their “fastest moving” antimalarial and explained why they thought it sold well. 
Eighty-eight percent reported an ACT (including s-QA.ACT), with the remainder naming an SP. Those listing 
an SP attributed its popularity to its low cost (76%), effectiveness (52%), and simple dosing (16%) (this was 
an open-ended question; respondents’ answers could be coded for more than one 
explanation).*************************** Having explored what retailers stocked and some indications of why, I 
now turn to the factors they considered in making themselves competitive (or not) with other retailers. 
 
Competition, collusion, and pricing strategies 
Competition 
Overall, retailers perceived very few competitors near to them, with a mean of 0.64 other retailers named 
as competitors.††††††††††††††††††††††††††† Adding in those government facilities considered as 
competitors‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ raises the mean number of nearby competitors to 0.68, which differs 
significantly between pharmacies and LCSs (see Table 15). These findings are lower than in other contexts; 
in Tanzania, “89% of shops identified at least one competitor. 67% reported as least 2; 44% reported 
three” (Larson et al. 2013). 
 
                                                          
*************************** Of those listing an ACT that was not an s-QA.ACT (n=8), they attributed its popularity to its 
effectiveness (n=7) as well as its familiarity (n=2) and lack of side effects (n=2). 
 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††† To arrive at this number, surveyors first asked retailers to name the other shops that are 
“nearby or in this area” and then for each to state whether it was a competitor. Of those retailers stating that are 
any shops nearby (n=201), they named 42% of their neighbors as competitors. 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The survey team asked retailers whether they considered a government health facility to be 
“in this area,” and, if so, if they considered it a competitor. 
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To understand price and non-price competitive strategies of retailers, the survey team asked “Do you do 
anything to make yourself competitive with other retailers in this area? What things? Describe in detail.” 
Overall, 30% mentioned offering “low,” “affordable,” or “moderate” prices as one of their strategies, with 
no significant differences between pharmacies and LCSs. Three LCSs specifically said that this strategy 
involved matching the prices in the center of town – in “Tamale Central” or selling at “Tamale prices” – 
such as, “I sell at the price sold in town so that clients don't have to go there to buy and rather buy from 
me” (V-81 2011; V-106 2011; V-162 2011). 
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Table 15: Reported competitors, competition strategies, and pricing strategies by retailers in Tamale, 
Ghana, stratified by retailer type 
 
In terms of non-price competition, respondents most commonly (44%) cited “good customer relations.” 
This strategy included “being polite” and “welcoming,” having “respect for customers,” giving “time” to 
customers, “listening,” “having empathy,” putting clients “at ease,” and “greeting with a smile” or 
“friendly faces.” One respondent reported, “I am very nice to my clients and try to listen to them while 
giving them good reasons why they should stick to some drugs. I handle them extremely nicely and believe 
me, we get customers by that!” (V-119 2011). Another elaborated, “I interact with my clients and 
empathize with them so they get to trust me and always want to buy from me” (V-532 2011). 
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Forty-four percent of respondents also cited having “good,” “quality” or “effective” drugs as a key 
business strategy. Very few elaborated on this strategy; two noted specifically that it meant, to them, not 
having expired drugs in stock (V-101 2011; V-121 2011).  
 
Sixteen percent of respondents reported providing “professional” or “technical” advice; about half of 
those noted that they were (active or retired) health professionals who worked in at retail shops or 
dispensed drugs out of their home more informally (V-9 2011; V-54 2011; V-93 2011; V-110 2011; V-145 
2011; V-162 2011; V-210 2011; V-529 2011; V-530 2011; V-531 2011; V-535 2011; V-550 2011; V-556 
2011; V-565 2011). There is no significant difference between whether pharmacies or LCSs reported giving 
such advice, as shown in Table 15. For other “professional” practices, one mentioned, “we sometimes 
follow-up with our customers and we also have a medical doctor that we consult to give technical advice. 
This makes clients have confidence in our drugs” (V-507 2011). Another expanded that, “we take the time 
to investigate into the cause of the symptoms for dispensing, thereby ensuring that the patient attains 
recovery with a short time. This attracts more clients to us” (V-209 2011).  
 
Other than these features, nearly 10% of respondents pointed out that they kept a large or wide stock of 
antimalarial drugs that met the demands and needs of clients. For instance, one stated “we try to meet 
their [client] demands by having much drugs in stock” (V-74 2011). Attentiveness to consumer demand is 
in line with other research on antimalarial medicine markets and practices that find that customer 
requests are a determinant of which drugs are dispensed (Rusk et al. 2012; Wafula, Miriti, and Goodman 
2012). 
 
About 7% said they did “nothing” to compete and some noted that they had no need to do anything 
because they were the only shop in the area. Another ~3% each noted that they kept the shop and 
environment neat (“I keep my shop clean, like not letting dust settle on the drugs” (V-521 2011)); that 
they built good rapport with the wider community (“I attend all the social functions in the community and 
try to integrate with people, which makes it easier for them to do business with me”(V-14 2011)); that 
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they offered extra services such as home visits and follow-ups, taking blood pressure readings or other 
vital statistics, performing malaria tests, or administering minor stitches: “most customers know I am a 
professional. This usually brings them. I also do free blood pressure checks for them” (V-93 2011). Others 
provide drugs at discount or on credit (“I have very good customer relations and sometimes I give 
discounts to regular customers” (V-537 2011)). This last point recalls the findings from Palafox et al., which 
included retailer “willingness to reduce mark-ups in order to offer discounts as a customer retention 
strategy” (Palafox et al. 2015). 
 
Possible price setting 
Beyond considering the above factors that retailers may use to be competitive, including in determining 
their prices, we investigated whether any collusion existed. In work on antimalarial medicine markets in 
rural Tanzania, Goodman and colleagues note that collusion may occur in the pricing strategies they see 
and that sub-markets displayed “several characteristics conducive to the maintenance of cartels” 
(Goodman et al. 2009). For the present study, surveyors asked retailers, “are you aware of any agreements 
among local retailers about pricing levels? For example, an agreement in which some retailers agree to 
set the price of a certain drug at a certain level?”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
 
Overall, 9% of retailers reported being aware of such an agreement or discussions; this level does not vary 
significantly by retailer type, as shown in Table 15. A small number of retailers that expanded beyond a 
“no” answer suggested that such agreements would not exist because of the independence of businesses, 
such as, “I don’t know of any such agreement. Everyone price his or her goods by his own formula” (V-
132 2011). Others said, “all retailers are very independent when it comes to pricing” (V-198 2011) and “a 
colleague of mine spoke to me about fixing prices in the area, but I rejected the idea” (V-537 2011) (V-198 
2011; V-537 2011). 
 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The responses to this question were mixed, which may hint that the wording of the question 
was off, focusing on “agreements” rather than “discussions” or “deliberations.” The question may have also been 
too vague about the meaning of “local.” 
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A different subset of respondents noted that such discussions and agreements did not happen in their 
community but “in town,” while a few others pointed to quite localized agreements. As an example of the 
former, one noted, “I do know some retailers in Tamale Town meet to agree on common prices. 
However… it [is not] practiced in this community” (V-145 2011). On the latter, others noted, “yes, we are 
four retailers who come together to fix prices; we meet twice a month” (V-14 2011), that “retailers usually 
meet other retailers in the community to deliberate on prices” (V-110 2011) and that “sometimes we 
move to each other’s stores to have informal discussions about setting the prices” (V-502 2011). 
 
Ten respondents pointed out that the local association of chemical sellers play a role in discussing or 
setting prices: “as members of the Chemical Sellers’ Association in Tamale, we sometimes agree on 
common prices at our meetings” (V-154 2011) or “I am not aware of any agreements but prices are 
commonly deliberated during meetings of chemical sellers” (V-173 2011). When asked about other 
retailers changing prices, one respondent said, “we have an association with executives so any time such 
a thing happens, we will complain and disciplinary action can be taken or precautions can be applied. So 
far people have been persuaded” (V-167 2011).****************************  
 
Pricing strategies 
Eighty-seven percent reported basing their retail price on the supply price and, sometimes, their own 
particular mark-up formula, including “I add up some little coins on the wholesale price” (V-4 
2011).†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† Further pricing cues included other retailers and competitors, town prices, 
the association, or the general market rate: “we generally know that a product is sold around that price 
                                                          
**************************** Because questions around licensing and group membership were sensitive, we do not have 
data specifically on which retailers are members of these local associations. 
 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† The question was: “how do you determine the prices for which you sell your antimalarial 
drugs? For example, you might look at the prices used by nearby retailers or the distributor might suggest prices to 
you.” 
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in the market” (V-525 2011) or “we mostly consider the price of the drug in town” (V-81 
2011).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
Most retailers (97%) reported learning about changes in retail prices in the market from their clients. 
Illustrating a frequent point, one noted, “most of this information is gotten from the clients. When you 
mention your price to them, they will draw some comparison” (V-158 2011). Few reported visiting other 
retailers or “pick[ing] our price changes from one another” (V-211 2011). This reliance on clients is 
different from the McKenzie and Woodruff finding (from surveys of good business practices firms in 
LMICs, including Ghana) that 41% of respondents “visited competitor’s business to see prices” (McKenzie 
and Woodruff 2015). It also differs from findings among antimalarial retailers across the six countries 
considered by Palafox et al, including Benin and Nigeria in West Africa: “in most countries, competition 
was perceived to be intense… Respondents in several countries said they regularly surveyed competitors’ 
prices by visiting other businesses and asking customers what competitors were charging for similar 
products” (Palafox et al. 2015). 
 
One reason that retailers may not survey the market is that, in this sample, most seemed unconcerned 
about changing their own prices in response to another retailer.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Only 11% said they 
would change their prices in response — since “price is very crucial in determining demand” — with some 
distinguishing that they would act differently depending if others’ prices increased or decreased (V-529 
2011). Among those who would maintain their prices and expanded on their reasoning, many would do 
“nothing; I don't know how much he buys for so I do not complain” or “I would not change my price 
because we may buy it at different prices from different suppliers” (V-132 2011; V-547 2011). One 
respondent stated this more extremely: “we don't care if these prices change, only if our suppliers’ 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Surveyors also asked whether suppliers gave instructions or advice about retail pricing. 
Almost all (96%) respondents said they did not. Only a small number reported that they did, specifically stating, “yes 
and I take them and it helps” (V-95 2011), “yes, and I go strictly according to these prices” (V-51 2011), or that “it is 
usually a suggestion and applies to new drugs that are introduced into the market” (V-114 2011). 
 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The question was: “in terms of your prices, what do you do if a neighbor or competitor changes 
his/her price?” 
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change” (V-61 2011). Another retailer, expressing a less common sentiment, noted that s/he would not 
do anything because “we consider the purchasing power of our clients, not other retailers” (V-91 2011). 
Two reported they would report the price change to the association; one said s/he would speak to the 
other retailer and ask her/him to avoid price changes (V-49 2011; V-83 2011; V-85 2011; V-167 2011). 
 
Mirroring the findings above, 91% said others retailers would not respond or that they did not know if 
retailers would respond.***************************** Some cited different sources of supply as a reason not to 
be concerned about the retail prices in other shops changing, saying “we all have our own source of supply 
and means of doing business” (V-534 2011). Those who said retailers might react noted that they might 
review their own prices, come and complain, or ask about source of supply. A small number said others 
might be angry because “it is a price we all agreed on” (V-85 2011) or that the issue was raised at an 
association meeting (V-13 2011; V-14 2011; V-49 2011; V-56 2011; V-85 2011, -85; V-95 2011; V-167 2011; 
V-536 2011). 
 
Having considered how retailers think about pricing and competition — including an important role for 
terminal supply prices — I turn to the terminal sources of supply. 
 
Getting supply 
Retailers named up to three of their main suppliers of antimalarial medication; refer back to Figure 22 for 
the variety of supply options available in Ghana. On average, retailers listed 2.03 suppliers, with 
pharmacies citing significantly more suppliers than LCSs (Table 16). Almost all retailers (95.1%) included 
at least one supplier with an operation or outpost in Tamale. Another 9.3% reported also using a supplier 
or retailer based in Kumasi or Accra. Six percent include another retailer in Tamale as a main supplier, as 
did 1.6% for a “mobile” or “moto” supplier. Between pharmacies and LCSs, there are significant 
differences between all of these except for those receiving supply from Accra or Kumasi.  
 
                                                          
***************************** The question was: “if you lowered your prices, would any nearby retailers respond or be angry 
with you? What would they do?” 
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Table 16: Antimalarial supply sources among retailers in Tamale, Ghana, stratified by retailer type 
 
On average, 62% of suppliers named as “main” delivered to retailers, with no significant differences 
between pharmacies and LCSs. Different retailers reported that suppliers came around daily, weekly, once 
in two weeks, or monthly and would also respond to specific calls. For instance, with regard to one supplier 
in Tamale, the retailer reports that they deliver “the very day you call on them or whenever they come on 
their usual rounds” while another says their supplier makes “right on time” delivery “any time I need 
supply” (V-144 2011; V-15 2011). This delivery and re-stocking was more frequent than reported in other 
locations, such as rural Tanzania (Larson et al. 2013). 
 
Retailers can order before a supplier delivers, or on-demand at time of delivery. One retailer who bought 
from a Tamale-based supplier said, “I usually make my orders on demand. They come around once a day 
and each time they come I buy the drugs I require” (V-14 2011). Another, who bought from a supplier that 
delivers from Kumasi, noted, “they come every month to supply drugs and come back later the next month 
to take their money, so I usually make a list of the drugs I need before they come” (V-506 2011). A single 
supplier may deliver to only a subset of the retailers that makes up its customer base. 
 
Retailers might go to suppliers to pick-up stock for several reasons. First, they might not order enough 
stock: “I do not have enough money so I only buy a small quantities of drugs” (V-83 2011)). Second, they 
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might purchase irregularly, such as when they have constrained capital to replenish their stock: “we make 
orders on demand because we don’t have enough capital so we need to see in order to go back and buy” 
(V-215 2011). Or, third, they might be off the supply vans’ regular routes (V-145 2011).  
 
Some retailers bought from mobile suppliers or “moto sellers” – the individual salespeople without 
stationary shops shown in Figure 22 – who often delivered stock from the larger cities of Kumasi or Accra 
and might allow the retailer to take stock on credit and pay for it after s/he sold it. One retailer noted, 
“there are some people who move around [on motos] and supply the malaria drugs. I sometimes buy 
from them depending on the prices at which they are selling" (V-138 2011).  
 
Another justified buying from these sellers saying, that the mobile seller “is easily accessible and does not 
have a lot of dogmatic procedures. That is why we prefer to take drugs from them. They also have flexible 
payment” (V-13 2011). “Flexible payment” implies allowing the retailer to take the drugs on credit and 
then repay the supplier after sales. Taking drugs on credit can be important to small retailers. One retailer 
noted, “I mostly make my orders on demand because they come around every month to make deliveries 
and take their money; with me, they usually give me drugs on credit” (V-517 2011). As already highlighted, 
credit also matters in stocking s-QA.ACTs. I now turn to retailer perceptions of monitoring and regulation 
of their businesses. 
 
Regulation 
Most retailers in and around Tamale reported that the Food and Drug Board and/or the Pharmacy Council 
monitored them (61% and 49%, respectively).††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† A small number mentioned PSGH or 
the Ghana Licensed Chemical Sellers Association; 3% said no agency checked them.  
 
Retailers provided the following categories on which they were monitored (open-ended answers were 
coded for up to three categories, with 220 retailers providing at least one response for a total of n=417 
                                                          
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† The question was: “if any, which agency (agencies) is in charge of monitoring or regulating 
this vendor?” 
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responses): “cleanliness,” “neatness,” or “hygiene” of the shop and its surroundings (24%); whether any 
of the drugs in stock were expired (23%); whether the drugs in stock were authorized for sale in Ghana by 
the specific type of outlet (particularly whether LCSs were selling antibiotics or other prescription-only 
medications) (18%); the “quality of the drugs” (18%); the presence and validity of the shop’s license (10%); 
the method of storing drugs (4%); and whether any of the drugs in stock were counterfeit or fake (3%). 
 
Regardless of what a retailer said a monitoring agency looked for, s/he was asked to describe what would 
happen if a firm did not comply with these standards. Of respondents answering this question (n=214, for 
a total of n=295 coded responses), 64% felt the shop would be “shut down” or “locked” for “some time.” 
A few elaborated that “some time” ranged from one week to several months, depending on the nature of 
the offense or how long it took for the retailer to “agree to comply,” to “commit to standards,” or 
“convince the council that it has corrected its mistakes and won't repeat them” (V-28 2011; V-208 2011; 
V-523 2011; V-547 2011; V-549 2011). Three more cynical respondents said the duration depended on 
“connections” or “the ability of the owner to negotiate” (V-56 2011; V-180 2011; V-552 2011). One noted, 
“they [monitoring agencies] go off their regulation to take bribes” (V-79 2011). 
 
In addition, 12% said offending drugs (whether expired, fake, “unwholesome,” or not licensed) would be 
seized and destroyed; 9% thought the shop’s license would be suspended. Another 6% said there would 
be a fine or penalty and 5% mentioned that the agency might issue a warning. Three percent thought legal 
action, prosecution, and even jail time may ensue. Whatever penalty/ies the respondent mentioned, one-
quarter reported that s/he had seen it applied (including a few who admitted it had happened to them: “I 
have been a victim of their operation before” (V-12 2011)).  
 
Respondents varied in how often, if at all, regulatory agents visited them and whether these visits were 
frequent enough. One respondent said a way to avoid inspection was to close on the day the agencies 
were in town and that word travelled quickly when they were (although several respondents pointed out 
that agencies made “unannounced” or “spontaneous” visits). This retailer lamented, “they are effective 
because they come twice yearly. Honestly, I wish they did never come around. Any time you see a lot of 
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drug stores closed for the day, then probably the Pharmacy Council is monitoring” (V-517 2011). Another 
said “when Pharmacy Council is conducting a routine monitoring exercise, word gets around and those 
who think they have fallen foul will lock their shop and vacate” (V-527 2011). 
  
SECTION VII.3: SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I reviewed the descriptive case evidence from Ghana’s adoption of the AMFm pilot at the 
end of June 2009 to the end of Phase I at the end of 2011. Following provisional approval by GF in 2009, 
Ghana needed to design and launch the activities under the umbrella of Supporting Interventions (Global 
Fund 2009b). Ghana established the AMFm-CC to carry out these activities, incorporating the many high-
level stakeholders involved in implementing the AMFm (Ghana Country Coordinating Mechanism 2010). 
One of AMFm-CC’s key achievements was to set an RRP for s-QA.ACTs (US$ 0.90 / GH₵ 1.50), which was 
communicated through media campaigns and training workshops.  
 
With the first arrival of s-QA.ACTs in Ghana in August 2010, distribution began through FLBs and then 
across the country, including Northern Region. One year later, GF’s AMFm Secretariat began using the 
demand-shaping levers, cutting the approval of Ghana’s orders while the demand (number of orders 
placed) sky-rocketed (Independent Evaluation Team 2012).  
 
Overall, private-sector retailers in and around Tamale considered antimalarials as key to their business. 
They widely participated in the AMFm — by stocking and selling s-QA.ACTs — and thought highly of the 
goals of the AMFm. They reported that s-QA.ACTs were in “high demand” and often their “fastest moving” 
antimalarial. About three-quarters of retailers reported pricing their s-QA.ACTs at (or, in a few cases, 
below) the RRP. The next chapter, in which I focus on retailer compliance with the RRP, is set against the 
background of complicated local distribution systems and pricing cues described in this chapter, including 
shifting sources of supply and fluctuating terminal supplier prices.   
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CHAPTER VIII: CASE ANALYSIS - PRIVATE RETAILER COMPLIANCE 
WITH A RECOMMENDED RETAIL PRICE (RRP) 
IN GHANA’S NORTHERN REGION 
 
SECTION VIII.1:  INTRODUCTION  
The AMFm in Ghana serves as a case to examine whether and under what conditions an advertised RRP 
leads to the targeted pricing of health products in the private sector. In this chapter, I assess retailer-
reported prices on specific s-QA.ACTs – their performance in complying with the RRP – in relation to the 
operations and structure of retailers, suppliers, and the context in which both are embedded. This context 
ranges from local neighborhoods to the existing national-level access architecture as experienced in 
Tamale in late 2011. While earlier work, including the IndE, has focused on the median price levels for s-
QA.ACTs achieved in each pilot country, less work has been done relating these specifically to the 
nationally decided RRP or examining deviations from it (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
As described in Chapter VII, in Phase I of the AMFm in Ghana, the RRP was communicated through mass 
media and provider trainings but was not printed on s-QA.ACT packages (Independent Evaluation Team 
2012; Willey et al. 2014). Among the AMFm pilot sites in SSA, Ghana and Zanzibar performed the best in 
terms of private-sector awareness of the RRP, reaching 80% at endline (Willey et al. 2014). According to 
the IndE, the median sales price achieved by the endline in Ghana was US$ 0.90, with a median of US$ 
0.90 in LCSs and US$ 1.20 in registered pharmacies (adjusted as per the conversation rate of GH₵ 1.67 to 
US$ 1.00 used in this thesis) (Independent Evaluation Team 2012; Tougher et al. 2012). This achievement 
was just above the benchmark of success for affordability, broadly reflecting compliance with the RRP 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012). As I described in Chapter VII, the outcomes in Tamale broadly reflect 
these patterns, with median retail prices at US$ 0.90 but average retail prices creeping towards US$ 1.00 
and a subset of retailers (23% of adult-dose s-QA.ACT observations) selling higher than the RRP, usually 
at US$ 1.20. While this does not represent the massive price gouging that some feared from using the 
private sector to distribute s-QA.ACT, a US$ 0.30 increase might be a meaningful amount in this context 
given the retail prices of other antimalarials as well as household purchasing power (see Chapter II). 
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In this chapter, I use the cross-sectional dataset described in Chapter III, collected from retailers in and 
around Tamale. This follows on contextual details presented in Chapter VII, drawn from the same dataset. 
Here, using bivariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses, I explore the factors that correlated 
with RRP compliance in implementing the AMFm in Tamale, Ghana in late 2011. To begin, I provide a 
rationale for using RRPs as a way of influencing retail prices in low- and middle income settings. I then 
motivate this particular analysis and provide a framework to organize the analysis of those factors that 
may be associated with compliance with the RRP. 
 
RATIO NALE  FOR  THE  ANAL YSI S :  RRP S AND THE  AMFM  
RATIONALE FOR RRPS 
Different approaches exist for shaping and restraining market prices for public health products in the 
private sector to facilitate patient access.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ For example, governments can intervene 
into markets with regulatory measures, using price controls and resale-price maintenance contracts (e.g., 
maximum retail prices), which are, de jure, binding. However, many factors influence whether such 
government regulation actually binds, such as government failures around policy goals, policy design, and 
policy implementation (Roberts and Reich 2011). The latter can include such issues as whether regulatory 
legislation is usefully written and whether regulatory agencies have the authority and capacity to do 
enforce this legislation, insulated from lobbying and bribery while doing so (Kumaranayake et al. 2003).  
 
Scholars have shown that regulatory infringements among antimalarial retails in SSA are common, 
including on the types of medicine stocked and the qualifications of staff (Goodman, Kachur, et al. 2007). 
Where enforcement capacity is weak or not enforced, price regulations may not lead to target retail 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ International organizations and NGOs that consider the private sector to be important in 
delivering health products and pursuing public health goals have tested an additional suite of tools. On the supply 
side, these include social franchising models, supply-chain partnerships with multinational corporations, improved 
contracting capacity, and scheduled delivery; on the demand side, private sector efforts focus on social marketing 
and social norming (Rockefeller Foundation, Results for Development Institute 2008; McCabe et al. 2011).  
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prices, as shown explicitly regarding health and pharmaceutical markets in SSA (Russo and McPake 2010; 
Palafox et al. 2015).  
 
As a supplement or complement to government price regulations, researchers have posited that giving 
consumers information on provider pricing can help to overcome regulatory failures (Kumaranayake et 
al. 2003). RRPs provide a non-binding, public recommendation on sales price, which partially corrects 
information asymmetry that exists when a retailer knows the true price and a patient/consumer does not 
(Lubensky 2011). RRPs can enable consumer and social oversight at the retailer level by providing true 
prices; RRPs were suggested early on as one way forward for the AMFm (Goodman et al. 2009; Patouillard, 
Hanson, and Goodman 2010). For RRPs to be most effective, both retailers and consumers must be aware 
of the price and consumers must be able to use either “voice” or “exit” to challenge non-compliant 
retailers (Hirschman 1970).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Exit requires the availability of reasonable alternative 
sources of antimalarial medication, which may not exist if a retailer wields monopolistic or oligopolistic 
power.  
 
RATIONALE FOR THE ANALYSIS AND KEY HYPOTHESES 
In this analysis, I focus on compliance with the RRP and the factors that predict it.****************************** 
The preliminary evidence from the AMFm is broadly positive as to whether the combination of lowered 
prices and Supporting Interventions increased use (Cohen et al. 2013; Fink et al. 2014; Morris et al. 2014; 
Thomson et al. 2014). This is encouraging but still requires exploration of why retailers may opt not to 
comply. The broad retailer awareness of the RRP in Ghana suggests that pricing at US$ 0.90 or US$ 1.20 
is indeed an explicit decision by retailers. A decision in response to what is the subject of this chapter. 
 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ RRPs may also inadvertently set a price floor above the one that market forces alone may 
have determined (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010). 
 
****************************** This sets aside the important questions of whether the RRP reflects a price-point that is 
affordable in the applied context and whether it stimulates broad, equitable, and appropriate use of ACTs. 
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To date, the existing evidence on more general compliance with RRPs for health products is limited and 
mixed, with variations across products and context. This has been the case with the social marketing work 
of the large international health NGO PSI, which uses RRPs (set by PSI in consultation with Ministries of 
Health) in efforts to increase access to health products such as condoms and soap in the private sector 
(PSI 2008; PSI 2010b; PSI 2010a; PSI 2010c; Piot 2015). In addition, researchers used RRPs in the small 
operational pilot programs of ACT subsidies in Senegal, Tanzania and Cambodia, again with varied 
compliance outcomes (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 2010).  
 
Given the potential, but also possible problems, of the private sector in delivering public health products, 
including the possibility for an RRP to shape market prices, it is important to explore whether and how 
the private sector complies with such recommendations and, more generally, achieve social welfare 
outcomes (Conteh and Hanson 2003). Understanding retailer compliance with the AMFm RRP is 
specifically important because of repeated concerns from global stakeholders that subsidies would be 
captured in the supply chain (as additional profit) rather than passed on to patient-consumers as lowered 
prices (Tougher et al. 2014). Such reasons were a key point of opposition to implementing the AMFm or 
using the private sector to deliver a public good, as described in Chapter IV. While pricing benchmarks 
were met in most Phase I countries, including Ghana, there is some evidence of subsidy capture 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012; Tougher et al. 2014).  
 
Beyond broadly trying to understand the factors associated with non-compliance given a well-advertised 
RRP, I explore two specific ex ante hypotheses, set prior to data collection. The first, related to horizontal 
competition, follows on the work by Catherine Goodman and colleagues on the effect of market structure 
on antimalarial medicine stocking and pricing outcomes in rural Tanzania (Goodman 2004; Goodman et 
al. 2009). Where retailers are distant from other drug sellers, researchers predict they have higher power 
to set their own prices and, therefore, are less likely to comply with the RRP. In this case, I focus on the 
number of perceived nearby competitors. 
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The second hypothesis relates to whether retailers react to their sense of regulatory enforcement, even 
though an RRP is, by definition, not enforced. One of the innovations of the AMFm mechanism was the 
“hands-off” approach taken supply, with no additional intervention into distribution, stocking, and pricing 
with existing public and private sector retail supply chains (Fink et al. 2014). There were not official 
sanctions if a retailer opted to sell above the RRP. Nevertheless, with plans for increased (quarterly) retail 
monitoring by the Pharmacy Council (contracted with NMCP to do this work) to provide data for the Global 
Fund on the AMFm, retailers might believe that retail prices were being watched more strictly than they 
actually were (K. L. Malm et al. 2013). If so, and if retailers have witnessed or experienced regulatory 
action in general, they may be more likely to comply with the RRP for the AMFm.  
 
Considered in hindsight, this hypothesis could also go the other way: having seen regulation enforced, 
agents may decide the penalties are bearable (as in, e.g., (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000)) or they may be 
aware of how to game the system. In both cases, retailers that had witnessed regulatory action may be 
more likely to price above the RRP. Also, recall from Chapter VII that no retailers reported thinking that 
regulatory sanctions could result from charging above the RRP. Nevertheless, my early expectation was 
— in line with a broad deterrence hypothesis about the influence of witnessing negative sanctions on 
subsequent behavior — that retailers reporting having seen regulation enforced would be more likely to 
comply with the RRP (Bandura 1969; Tittle and Logan 1973).  
 
In the next section, I lay out an organizing framework for thinking about the effect of RRPs on retail prices, 
which guides the selection of variables for inclusion in the analysis. In Section VIII.3 I provide the analytic 
methods, including the coding of key variables. In Section VIII.4, I present the findings. In Section VIII.5, I 
discuss the findings and the limitations of the study and offer conclusions that may be relevant for future 
research and practice on achieving access for public health products. 
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SECTION VIII.2:  ORGANIZING FRAMEWOR K,  EXISTING EVIDENCE ,  AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION  
 
The basic research question addressed in this paper is: what factors correlate with retailer non-compliance 
with the AMFm’s RRP for a specific s-QA.ACT in Northern Region, Ghana? I take compliance — the key 
outcome of interest in this analysis — to be any retail price equal to or below the RRP, that is, US$ 0.90 or 
GH₵ 1.50. The RRP is an absolute number set by Ghana’s AMFm-CC.; the GF’s success benchmarks used a 
relative value for the affordability target, with success defined as s-QA.ACTs retailing for a price equal to 
or less than three times the median price of the next-most popular antimalarial on the market; in Ghana’s 
case, this is SP (Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011; Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Given that the reported 
median retail price of SP in Ghana was US$ 0.30 in both the IndE and in these Tamale data, the RRP of US$ 
0.90 and the upper bound of success for affordability (three times US$ 0.30) are equal. GF did not have 
set target prices (relative or absolute) at any other points along the supply chain. 
 
I draw specific explanatory and control factors I consider from an existing organizing framework that 
explains market performance outcomes — such as retail prices and, in this case, whether these prices 
match the RRP — using the structure of supplier and retailer markets as well as the conduct of retailers, 
suppliers, and consumers within their economic, regulatory (de jure and perceived), and social 
environments (Goodman 2004; Frost and Reich 2008; Patouillard 2012).  
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Figure 28: Structure and conduct factors shaping retailer performance with regard to health product 
access in the for-profit sector 
 
A basic structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework, as shown in Table 25, is derived from the 
industrial organization literature regarding how sector outcomes, such as price, are influenced by the 
structure of market power of that sector and the conduct of firms within the sector (Tirole 1988). The 
version used here suggests that structure and conduct mutually affect each other (Scherer and Ross 1990). 
A series of scholars have tailored an SCP framework to analyze the achievement of private-sector access 
for public health products, including for pharmaceuticals, in low- and middle-income countries (Conteh 
and Hanson 2003; Goodman 2004; Russo and McPake 2010; Patouillard 2012; Palafox et al. 2015). I build 
on this work and make two additional changes to the framework. First, I interpret structure more broadly 
than only market structure, accounting for epidemiological and social structures to better account for the 
social and public health context. Second, I give perceptions a role in conduct.  
 
I provide, in Figure 29, a more detailed version of the framework, including the key constructs used in this 
analysis. Many of the key performance outcomes in the SCP framework, as the scholars mentioned above 
have shown, correspond with the success benchmarks designed for the AMFm; this analysis focuses on 
price, as considered in relation to the RRP (Schäferhoff and Yamey 2011). The two key explanatory 
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constructs are both underlined and in bold in Figure 29: perceived horizontal competition and seen 
enforcement. Constructs that are considered in the analysis as control variables are bolded, including the 
shop’s license type and shop size, its location, the stock breadth and specific products type available, and 
the mark-up behavior of the retailer. Later in the analysis, I consider the terminal supply price (a supplier 
conduct variable as a stratifying variable, motivated by the framework and by the descriptive results from 
the data presented in Chapter VII. I operationalize these variables in the next section, on methods. 
 
 
Figure 29: Expanded structure-conduct-performance framework, with specific regard to AMFm 
 
This framework overlaps with a basic depiction of the relevant private-sector supply chain, shown in 
Figure 30. This is a simplified version of Figure 22 (in Chapter VII). Because the functions of importing, 
distributing, and retailing are not always separated into discrete businesses, the intermediate suppliers 
are depicted as sometimes overlapping with both First-Line Buyers and sometimes with terminal 
suppliers. They may overlap with retailers as well; this is not shown for the sake of the image’s clarity. 
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Figure 30: Simplified private-sector supply chain for the AMFm in Ghana 
 
SECTION VIII.3:  ANALYTIC METHODS  
In this section, I outline the variables included in the analysis. I present the descriptive statistics for each 
of these in Table 17, explain their construction, and justify their inclusion below. The questionnaire that 
generated these data appears in Appendix D. 
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics of key shop- and drug-level variables used in the main analysis 
 
DEPENDE NT  VARIABLE  
RRP non-compliance is measured as a self-reported retail price above the AMFm RRP in Ghana. The 
dependent variable is, therefore, a drug-level variable and different s-QA.ACTs within a single shop may 
be coded as compliant or non-compliant. For a specific s-QA.ACT in a specific shop, coding compliance is 
recorded as “0” and non-compliance as “1.” For any given s-QA.ACT brand in stock, the retailer reported 
a single price, which is what is coded for this analysis. Limitations of this approach are considered at the 
end of the chapter.  
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The analysis is restricted to median reported retail prices of the upper two weight bands available for each 
brand of s-QA.ACT. Each brand included four different weight — meaning a strength depending on the 
weight of the patient — bands, except Arsuamoon© (an AA formulation), which had three. The decision 
to only examine the upper weight bands reflects both limited stocking of the lower two weight bands as 
well as surveyor uncertainty that all retailers clearly understood the differences between the different 
strengths of s-QA.ACTs available. Overall, only eleven s-QA.ACT observations for which retailers provided 
prices were strictly of the lower two weight bands and are, therefore, not included in the analysis. 
 
KEY  INDEPENDENT  VAR IAB LES  
Both of the key independent variables in this analysis are shop-level variables. The analytic sample is 
restricted so that there are no missing values for these variables, nor for the dependent variable. For 
control variables, I impute missing values using the mean value for the variable in the analytic sample. 
Logistic regression is used for all analyses; therefore, the key outcome of interest is an odds ratio 
associating the key explanatory variables with non-compliance with the RRP. 
 
RETAILER STRUCTURE: PERCEIVED HORIZONTAL COMPETITION†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† 
For this analysis, perceived competition is operationalized as the number of competitors a retailer 
reported as being “nearby” or “in this area.” I constructed this variable from a two-part questionnaire 
item (also described in Table 13 and Table 15), which first asked retailers to list all the retailers they 
considered to be in the area and then, for each identified retailer, to clarify whether they were a 
competitor, another branch of the same shop, or not a competitor. I took the count of those named as 
competitors as the measure for this analysis. 
 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† As I was unable to carry out full retail audits and calculate sales volumes and market shares 
for this project, I refer to horizontal competition as the closeness or density of retailers within a market, rather than 
reflecting on the concentration of market power within a market, as has been done in other work (Goodman et al. 
2009). 
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Broadly, the more retailers — or the number of competitors — in a given market, the lower and more 
consistent their prices for a given product should be equal. In this case, the hypothesis is that the greater 
the number of nearby competitors a retailer perceives him- or herself to have, the more likely that retailer 
will be to comply with the RRP. That is, with non-compliance coded as “1” and compliance as “0,” the 
expected direction of the sign on the coefficient is negative. 
 
RETAILER CONDUCT: SEEN REGULATION ENFORCEMENT 
The survey team asked retailers a series of questions about monitoring and regulation, as also described 
in the sub-section of Chapter VII on “Regulation.” This series of questions culminates in the binary variable 
used to operationalize seen regulation enforcement for this analysis. First, retailers identified the major 
agencies they felt monitored or regulated their business. Second, when retailers identified any agency, 
surveyors asked for a description of what the agency monitored and what penalty would be exacted if a 
retailer was found to have deviated from mandated practice. Finally, surveyors asked retailers whether 
or not they had ever seen their stated penalty enforced. This answer, having ever seen regulation 
enforced, is coded as a binary for this analysis, with “never seen” coded as “0” and “seen” coded as “1.”  
 
We expected that those who have seen enforcement exacted would have a higher sense of the 
consequences of enforcement and, as a result, be more likely to comply with the RRP. That is, given the 
coding of non-compliance, we expected the sign on the coefficient to be negative. 
 
ADD IT IONAL  CONTROL  V ARIABLE S  
RETAILER STRUCTURE 
Seven structure variables are included in the analysis as basic controls (these are also shown in Table 17). 
To capture license type I include variables on, first, whether the shop is a pharmacy or an LCS and, second, 
whether the shop (a pharmacy in all cases but one) has NHIS accreditation to dispense medication and be 
reimbursed. Both of these variables were generated from the interviewer’s assessment of the shop, 
including asking whether the shop was a pharmacy and looking for an identifying insignia or sign of NHIS 
accreditation. (Recall that in Ghana, both pharmacies and LCSs have legal permission to sell ACTs and, 
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therefore, s-QA.ACTs.) Because of some sensitivities around asking to see a license, it is likely that the 
“LCS” category in this analysis also contains some unlicensed chemical sellers, often — though not always 
— health professionals such as nurses who have a small shop or distribute medicines out of their home. 
In rural Tanzania, type of retail shop significantly predicted retail prices (Goodman et al. 2009). 
 
Third, to capture a dimension of shop size, I include a count of the number of employees, as also used by 
O’Meara and colleagues to study predictors of stocking s-QA.ACTs in western Kenya (O’Meara et al. 2013). 
Fourth, to capture the duration of firm of a retailer, possibly linked to elements of reputation, I include 
the number of years that the shop has been in operation. Fifth, as an additional variable to capture 
dimensions of reputation, I include a dummy for referrals, representing whether or not five or more other 
retailers say that they would refer a customer to that retailer if they did not have the medicine the 
customer wanted. 
 
Sixth, I include the distance to town (in kilometers) of a retailer from the Tamale main market, itself is at 
the center of the city. An on-going concern with the AMFm mechanism is that more remote shops — 
because of high transport costs, limited information access, limited competition, or limited oversight — 
are less likely to comply with an RRP. Though different measures of remoteness have not been shown to 
be associated with s-QA.ACT pricing in Ghana or other countries, the variable is included for thoroughness 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012; Yadav et al. 2012; Ye et al. 2015).  
 
Finally, seventh, as a drug-level control reflecting product type, I include a dummy for whether the s-
QA.ACT in question is an AA (of which two brands were available) or AL (of which there four brands were 
available) formulation. Overall, AA s-QA.ACTs were less common on the market in Tamale — making up 
13% of total s-QA.ACT market observations (see Table 14) — and some retailers expressed difficulty in 
finding them to sell (V-114 2011; V-155 2011; V-531 2011). In addition to this differential supply, there is 
suggestive evidence of differential demand, perhaps reflecting the initial early launch of AA as the first-
line antimalarial treatment in Ghana, described in Chapter IV. For example, one retailer reported “clients 
do not like AA” while another called for “sensitization on the AA brands of [s-QA.ACT] because the 
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perception of side effects makes a lot of clients refuse to take it” (V-73 2011; V-506 2011). A preference 
for AL over AA is also reflected in other studies in SSA (Sears et al. 2013; Ezenduka et al. 2014).  
 
RETAIL CONDUCT 
Five conduct variables are also included as controls for this analysis; all are shop-level variables. First, as 
a reflection of basic good business practice, I include a binary variable for whether or not the retailer 
reports keeping written records of stock and/or sales (McKenzie and Woodruff 2015). Second, and again 
to capture basic business conduct, I include a binary variable on cover expenses, which reflects the answer 
to the questionnaire item “is your revenue usually enough to cover your expenses?” 
 
Third, I construct a low prices variable reflecting “price and non-price competitive strategies” from the 
open-ended question “what, if anything, do you do to make yourself competitive with other retailers in 
this area? What things? Describe in detail,” also described in Table 15. For this analysis, I use a binary 
variable created to represent price competitive strategies strategy, coding as “1” if the retailer included a 
statement about “low” or “affordable” prices and “0” otherwise. Note that this reflects a retailer’s overall 
stated strategies and does not adjust for how a retailer might respond to any individual client. 
 
The final two conduct variables relate to stocking. Fourth, I include a variable that reflects antimalarial 
stock: the number of different types of antimalarials a retailer had in stock in at the time of the interview 
– in addition to stocking behavior, this could also be taken a rough proxy of shop size. In the count used 
to construct the variable, different “types” reflects both brand and formulation such that, for example, 
the ACT Lonart© is represented twice if the retailer stocks both Lonart Forte© and Lonart DS©. The 
maximum number stocked by any retailer by this measure is thirteen. Fifth, to capture specific s-QA.ACT 
stock, I include a count of the number of the six possible brands of s-QA.ACT a retailer has at the time of 
the interview. This only reflects a count of brand, not of the different weight bands of each, and so ranges 
from one to six. 
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BASIC CONTROLS 
In the analysis, I include an interviewer dummy to represent one of the five interviewers that could have 
conducted a given survey. Different surveyors may have inspired different amounts of rapport and trust 
in eliciting answers about regulation and about pricing. In addition, given the background trends of 
“demand-shaping levers” and potential time patterns described in Chapter VII, a month dummy is 
included for each month of the interview in the analysis. 
 
MAIN  EQU ATIO N  
The main estimating equation is a logistic regression to predict the binary outcome of non-compliance 
with the RRP, which is specific to the particular s-QA.ACT (d) price reported for a given shop (s) in a given 
month (m) in a specific interaction with an interviewer (i). The key independent variables are the number 
of perceived competitors for a retailer and whether that retailer reports ever seeing regulation enforced 
— that is, they are shop-level variables while the dependent variable is reported at the drug-level. The 
controls include a vector of variables related to retailer structure and another related to retailer conduct, 
as described above; for retailer structure, some variables are shop-level and some are drug-level. 
Dummies for both the month of the interview and the interviewer are also included. Standard errors are 
clustered at the shop level, as there can multiple s-QA.ACT-price observations per retail shop. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑚𝑖  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑺(𝑑)(𝑠) +
 𝑪((𝑠) + 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑚 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑑𝑠𝑚𝑖 
 
 
SECTION VIII.4:  ANALYTIC FINDINGS  
RESULTS: BASIC 
A central finding of this analysis is the low level of RRP non-compliance —about 16% — the course of the 
study in this analytic sample, at about overall, ranging from a high of 24% non-compliance in August to a 
low of 8% non-compliance in November, shown on the secondary vertical axis in Figure 31. As in the IndE, 
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the median price stays steady at the RRP, US$ 0.90 (shown in large, stand-alone diamonds on the primary 
vertical access in Figure 31; means of the analytic sample are shown with shaded standard deviations).  
 
 
Figure 31: s.QA.ACTs price levels and non-compliance with RRP, by month of study (n=242) 
 
RESULTS: BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
In the basic bivariate relationships, shown in Table 18, there is no statistically significant association 
between perceived number of competitors and retailer non-compliance. There is a significant association 
between seen enforcement and retailer non-compliance, such that a retailer who has seen some 
regulation enforced has two times lower odds of complying than a retailer who does not report seeing 
such enforcement. This significant relationship holds in the full model; the dummies for December and 
one interviewer drop for collinearity. 
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Table 18: Association of retailer structure and conduct features with non-compliance with Ghana's RRP 
for s-QA.ACTs 
 
RESULTS: CONSIDERATIONS BY TERMINAL SUPPLIER PRICE 
Given the importance retailers themselves placed on terminal supply prices (as detailed in Chapter VII), 
and to further explore how we might explain retailer non-compliance, I repeat the above analysis, dividing 
the sample based on terminal supply price (US$ 0.60 and below, US$ 0.61 and above) and then by the 
calculated absolute mark-up (US$ 0.30 and below, US$ 0.31 and above).  
  
When the terminal supply price is reported as US$ 0.60 or less (n=158), non-compliance with the RRP 
drops to 5%. At a terminal supply price of US$ 0.61 or above (n=84), non-compliance is 36%. In a t-test of 
means, these differences are significant at p<0.000. 
 
In the multivariate model for terminal supply prices ≤ US$ 0.60, to retain observations and because of 
variables dropped due to collinearity, only the following controls are used: years of shop operation, 
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whether five or more other retailers refer to this shop, the number of employees, distance to Tamale 
town center, whether the drug is AA, and the count of both all antimalarial and s-QA.ACT stock. I present 
these results in Table 19. In the multivariate model for US$ > 0.60, the dummies for December and one of 
the interviewers are dropped for collinearity (see Table 19 below). 
 
 
Table 19: Association of retailer structure and conduct features with non-compliance with Ghana's RRP 
for s-QA.ACTs, split by terminal supply price 
 
SECTION VIII.5:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLU SION  
This analysis contributes to the small but growing literature rigorously relating features of retail market 
structure and conduct in poor countries to retailer decisions about stocking, pricing, mark-ups and, in this 
case, compliance with an RRP (Goodman et al. 2009; Patouillard 2012). This represents the first such study 
in Ghana (or in West Africa) and supplements s-QA.ACT availability and price findings from the AMFm IndE 
(Independent Evaluation Team 2012). 
 
D I SC USSIO N  
KEY TAKEAWAY I 
Overall, compliance with the RRP is reasonably high – 16% in this analytic sample and 23% in the larger 
sample of shops stocking s-QA.ACTs and prices on them (the latter is reported in Chapter VII). This 
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confirms, in a localized census sample, the findings from the representative IndE across Ghana, given that 
the RRP also represented the retail price-point targeted by GF under its benchmarks of success. 
 
KEY TAKEAWAY II 
Retailers fail to comply with the RRP in a specific way: by charging US$ 1.20 rather than US$ 0.90. One the 
one hand, this is good news, as a US$ 0.30 increase does not represent the massive price gouging 
predicted for utilizing the private sector as a delivery mechanism. Nevertheless, US$ 0.30 is a meaningful 
amount in a low-income context like northern Ghana and represents a price that is four times, rather than 
three times, the price of commonly available SP formulations. In this sample, as in Chapter VII, retailers 
were largely aware of the RRP and had to make a conscious decision about their price-point knowing that 
consumers also knew the RRP. When they charged above the RRP, they usually jumped to a retail price of 
US$ 1.20 (2.0 Ghana) in response to a US$ 0.07 or US$ 0.14 increase in the terminal supply price. This 
lumpy pricing may be unsurprising intuitively to anyone faced with making change in Ghana — but it is 
also not fully predicted by retailers’ pricing strategies for other antimalarials, as reported in Chapter VII 
(see Table 14 and the sub-section on prices and mark-ups). For example, retailers reported selling SP for 
both US$ 0.30 and US$ 0.36. 
 
KEY TAKEAWAY III 
When an RRP is in place and supply prices rise, it is the street-level implementers – the retailers – who 
have to decide to forfeit profit (get squeezed) or to fail to comply and charge above the RRP. While it is 
never made explicit in documentation, it is implied that the AMFm-CC, in setting the RRP at US$ 0.90, 
expected the terminal supply price to be US$ 0.60. It may not have been anticipated that there would be 
variation in the terminal supply price, to which retailers would have to respond.  
 
KEY TAKEAWAY IV 
Perceived competition does not influence compliance in this context of a widely advertised RRP. If 
anything, the result is not in the expected direction, with an increase in the number of listed competitors 
increasing the odds of non-compliance. This finding is robust to whether the number of perceived 
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competitors is increased to reflect whether the respondent identifies as government health facility as 
“nearby” and a competitor.  
 
The finding is also robust to spatial considerations. There is no meaningful correlation found in these data 
between the number of a retailer’s perceived competitors and the actual number of retailers within a 
given radius, including 3km (a commonly used distance in studies of antimalarial markets in SSA) and 1km 
(reflecting the Pharmacy Council’s rules about distances between LCSs). There is also no correlation 
between the number of perceived “nearby” competitors and the distance to the nearest retailer which is, 
on average, 0.43 kilometers in this sample.  
 
Moreover, there is no correlation between any of the spatial variables considered above these spatial 
variables and the outcome of non-compliance, as is also suggested by the maps in Figure 32 and Figure 
33. In other studies, sited in rural East Africa, retailer density predicted s-QA.ACT stocking practices but 
pricing was not explored (Larson et al. 2013; O’Meara et al. 2013). When markets are constructed based 
on administrative units and customer shopping patterns, rather than fixed radii, and market power is 
assessed through sales volumes, it is predictive of antimalarial pricing patterns, in rural East Africa 
(Goodman et al. 2009). 
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Figure 32: Map of retailers complying and not complying with the RRP for s-QA.ACTs in Tamale, Ghana, 
full census 
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Figure 33: Map of retailers complying and not complying with the RRP for s-QA.ACTs in Tamale, Ghana, 
town center 
 
KEY TAKEAWAY V 
The variable for “seen enforcement” remains persistently significant throughout this analysis – though in 
the unexpected direction. This suggests that, if anything, seeing enforcement of general regulation on 
retailers makes a retailer less likely to comply with the RRP. I have limited data with which to try to explain 
this outcome. However, we can speculate that seeing any regulation enforced (reflecting the construction 
of this variable) is viewed as of minimal importance or that the respondent feels confident that they know 
how to get around such enforcement. There is low correlation (0.35) between the variable of having ever 
seen regulation and reporting that “something” might happen if a retailer opts to charge above the RRP. 
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CONCL USION  
LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
The results of this analysis should be treated with some caution. First, the data analyzed are from a cross-
sectional study of only private providers, collected over five months in a bounded and small geographic 
area, with the sample size constrained by the available retailers within that area. The length of time it 
took to complete this cross-sectional data collection adds an element of confusion, as prices and mark-
ups appear to change, sometimes significantly, over time. But the interview questions address the price 
paid and charged for the current stock of medication, not the supply price of s-QA.ACT on the day of the 
interview. While the median pricing and compliance results are reassuringly similar to the national-level 
IndE, caution is still advised. In the present analysis, variations in time are accounted for using dummies 
for the month in which the interview took place in the main estimating equation. 
 
Second, as with the IndE, a cross-sectional study with no comparable group or exogenous source of 
variation in the supply of or information about s-QA.ACTs under the AMFm, only associative rather than 
causal claims can be made.  
 
Third, the pricing data presented here should be taken with several grains of salt. For one, they are 
generated via self-report by the retailer, which may be subject to reporting biases. These include those 
stemming from social desirability or from fear of oversight and regulation, despite measures taken to 
assure retailers that the interview team was not affiliated with the government or a professional body. 
They are, however, reassuringly in-line with the (also retailer self-reported) pricing data from the IndE. An 
additional bias arises if different interviewers differentially built rapport and trust; interviewer effects are 
therefore included in the analysis. Moreover, using a conversational approach to interviewing that 
allowed the interviewers the flexibility to ask questions in an order that made since for each situation 
hopefully helped to improve the accuracy of answers on potentially sensitive materials. Recall bias may 
be a final concern; relatively limited recall periods were employed related to ordering shipments and all 
other reported prices were of-the-moment. 
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For two, relating to concerns about the pricing data, pricing in this context is probably somewhat fluid. As 
in Chapter VII, retailers may adjust prices to extend concessions or credit to regular clients or those they 
know are unable to pay. An additional clue comes from a marginal comment from a surveyor who, in 
noting s-QA.ACTs prices, recorded the retailer as explaining: “a different retailer told me the prices have 
increased to US$ 1.20 but I had been selling at US$ 0.90. I haven't bought more since he told me this, so I 
raised the price on the old goods. But if you have US$ 0.90, I will sell to you at that price” (V-52 2011). In 
short, retailers may not have a single price for a dose of any given brand of s-QA.ACT and may adjust their 
price for a particular customer or by other factors, such as how long the drugs have been in stock. The 
analysis in this chapter is based strictly on the terminal supply price reported by the retailer for a particular 
in-stock s-QA.ACT brand on the date the s-QA.ACT audit was administered during the interview. 
 
For three, and finally with regards to concerns about the pricing data, the prices reported are for full adult 
doses. However, if only partial packages are sold, as considered in Fink et al, then the prices reported 
overestimate how much a client actually pays to treat malaria with a s-QA.ACT (Fink et al. 2014). Given 
this, along with the more limited availability of pediatric formulation the survey team did not record the 
price paid in specific sales of s-QA.ACTs on other antimalarials, I rely on retailer reporting for the full 
package of treatment and therefore could not pro rate prices in cases in which only partial packages were 
sold, as has been done in other work (Fink et al. 2014).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
Fourth, any of the constructs in Figure 29 but not considered in this analysis are potential limitations of 
this study and omitted variables in the analysis. Often, data related to these constructs were not collected 
due to limitations in personpower in the field. For example, we were unable to conduct full retail audits 
or to witness individual sales and sales volumes over the course of one or more days or to link sales with 
household use. Ezenduka et al do this while Fink et al could link in-store purchases from each retailer of 
interest with household characteristics and drug utilization, as did (Ezenduka et al. 2014; Fink et al. 2014). 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Surveyors did ask retailers whether, in cases when patients did not have enough money for 
a full package, partial doses were sold. Those that said that this “sometimes” happened (n=13) clarified that patients 
were always instructed to come back for the rest and almost always did so. 
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With full retail audits, researchers are able to better calculate market shares and horizontal market 
concentration – rather than proxies of horizontal competition – as measures of retail market structure, 
such as in the work of Goodman and colleagues (Goodman 2004; Goodman et al. 2009). Other 
researchers, by including data on population density and fever prevalence, have constructed variables on 
the structure of consumer need and demand but this was not possible in this analysis. Patouillard, using 
national-level data in Cambodia, find variations in transmission rates are associated with differences in 
retailer mark-up an antimalarials; however, O’Meara et al find household density and fever prevalence do 
not predict stocking AL in rural Kenya and Larson et al similarly find no relationship between household 
density and ACT stock in rural Tanzania, (Patouillard 2012; Larson et al. 2013; O’Meara et al. 2013).  
 
Fifth, because of both sensitivities and some surveyor confusion about the questions, we did not collect 
information related to retailer conduct, such as membership in professional groups – e.g. the Ghana 
Licensed Chemical Sellers Association (GLCSA) – though this may have influenced staff quality and opened 
additional avenues for research about products and processes. Indeed, some respondents reported 
holding leadership roles in this organization. Others noted that GLCSA sometimes met to discuss prices. 
For this analysis, I could not assess the degree to which a particular retailer discussed and agreed on prices 
informally or through a formal association. This is a clear path for future research. 
 
For similar reasons of sensitivity, we did not ask questions about the educational, professional, or training 
qualifications or experience of owners and attendants, though this would have enhanced our 
understanding of staff quality. While no studies could be found relating staff qualifications (separate from 
type of retailer) to pricing decisions, improved qualifications and experience have predicted the stocking, 
recommendation, and sale of ACTs in other studies (Rusk et al. 2012; M. A. Briggs et al. 2014).  
 
Sixth, one interpretive problem is that, during our check-in sessions and in reviewing the analysis 
presented here, surveyors noted that many respondents did not seem to know the difference between 
green leaf ACTs (s-QA.ACTs) and other ACTs (the latter of which they generally did not refer to as ACTs 
but rather by brand name). The questionnaires were reviewed with the surveyors and the data used in 
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this analysis reflect their interpretation of whether the respondent was referring to the whole class of 
drugs or only those provided under the AMFm. 
 
Seventh and finally, with regard to external validity even within Tamale, the sample analyzed here differs 
in significant ways from the full sample of those shops stocking s-QA.ACTs and reporting on prices (n=325 
s-QA.ACT observations). The analytic sample is restricted by having observations for the two key 
explanatory variables, reporting the number of perceived competitions and reporting on whether the 
retailer had seen regulation enforced. Compliance differs significantly (p=0.02) between the two groups, 
with 23% non-compliance in the full sample and 16% in the analytic sample. Interviews in the analytic 
sample were also significantly more likely to have occurred in August (29% in restricted sample and 23% 
in the full sample, p = 0.10) and the s-QA.ACT observations more likely to be from shops that report 
keeping written records of sales and/or stock (58% in the restricted sample and 50% in the full sample, 
p=0.06). There are no significant differences on the other control variables included. Those excluded from 
the analysis include all eight shops in which the retailer cited that “no agency has come to monitor me” 
when asked to name the agency “in charge of monitoring or regulating this retailer.” 
 
SUMMATIVE COMMENTS 
Taking into account the limitations of this study and analysis, the results presented here as well as the 
description in Chapter VII provide evidence suggesting that an overwhelming majority of retail outlets 
sold s-QA.ACTs at the recommended retail price of US$ 0.90. Recall that the RRP was set by the AMFm-
CC with private sector input, reflecting a price that would allow for reasonable mark-ups along the supply 
chain. While this was done with affordability in mind, there is not a strict relationship between the RRP 
(or the benchmark for affordability) and actual consumer purchase or use. Assessing s-QA.ACT use is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Through this analysis, I provide suggestive evidence that competition – whether perceived or spatial – is 
not important in determining compliance with a well-advertised RRP. Rather, it seems more likely that 
variations in upstream mark-ups, as reflected in varied terminal supply prices, play a role in the retail 
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price, even when faced with a well-advertised price-point. This finding strengthen the call for both 
research and monitoring practice to move further up the supply chain (Patouillard, Hanson, and Goodman 
2010; Palafox et al. 2015). 
 
MOVING  FORW AR D  
A conclusion from Chapters VII and VIII is that retailers largely comply with a well-advertised RRP and that 
almost all non-compliers opt to charge the same rate when charging above the RRP. This echoes the 
findings in the IndE, that Ghana met the AMFm success benchmark for “affordability.” It also did so for 
availability and market share (Independent Evaluation Team 2012). Still, there was non-compliance, which 
measures of perceived and spatial competition do not explain. Having seen regulation enforced in the 
past is associated with non-compliance, which does not suggest that increasing regulation alongside an 
RRP — at least at the retailer level — is necessarily an effective way to improve compliance in the future. 
Though the significance of the seen enforcement variable away from compliance is unexpected, the 
general finding that current regulatory enforcement is ineffective is in line with other findings in SSA. 
Having considered the outcomes achieved by Ghana under the AMFm, I turn to the decision made by both 
the Global Fund and Ghana about the program after the data collection at the end of 2011. 
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PART 4:  AFTER THE ENDLINE- LEARNING LESSONS AND 
RE-SETTING THE GLOBAL AGENDA  
 
Figure 34: Image from rainy season in Tamale, Ghana  
[image courtesy of Rachel Strohm] 
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CHAPTER IX:  CASE NARRATIVE -  AFTER THE INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION  
SECTION IX.1:  DECEMBER 2011  –  DECEMBER 2015,  AFTER THE ENDLINE  
GLOBAL  
Preliminary IndE results were released in July 2012, followed by more complete results in November 2012 
(Global Fund 2012b). The IndE outcomes focus on availability, market share, and affordability, falling 
about two-thirds of the way down the AMFm’s theory of change (Figure 10). Many requisite steps lie 
between the Phase I benchmarks of success and the outcomes of first-order interest: appropriate sales 
and use of s-QA.ACTs and reduction of malaria morbidity and mortality. This left open room for 
interpretation about whether the AMFm truly worked. 
 
In mid-2012, both global and, to a lesser extent, national stakeholders mobilized to shape or interpret the 
findings and the debate about whether the AMFm should continue (Arrow et al. 2012; Fan 2012; Fan and 
Lanthorn 2012a; Fan and Lanthorn 2012b; Kamal-Yanni 2012; Maxmen 2012; Paulson 2012; Talisuna, 
Adibaku, et al. 2012; Tren et al. 2012). Absent evidence further down the theory of change, the 
Independent Evaluation allowed supporters to declare a successful proof-of-concept while detractors 
claimed their initial concerns had not been cleared. There was a good deal of uncertainty, anxiety, and 
advocacy as the GF Board meeting approached (Bump et al. 2012; Fan and Silverman 2014). 
 
Between 2004 and 2010, global malaria stakeholders held a variety of views on the AMFm, as described 
in Chapters IV and V. At the close of Phase I, most global malaria stakeholders maintained similar stands 
towards the AMFm (for examples, see (Arrow et al. 2012; Kamal-Yanni 2012; Tren et al. 2012)). In contrast, 
while elite stakeholders in Ghana had mixed opinions about the AMFm before it was adopted, by 2012, 
most§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ supported the AMFm’s continuation (Talisuna, Adibaku, et al. 2012). To 
reflect this continued split, at a GF update meeting in December 2015 on the next iteration of the AMFm, 
a Global Fund procurement representative likened the AMFm to “marmite” as an example of something 
that people either love or hate. However, a WHO representative in the room took stock of meeting 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The key, vocal exceptions were elites in PMAG and UNIDO. 
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participants from participating countries (national malaria programs, CCMs, and first-line buyer 
representatives in the room) and no one contested his statement that “the role and value of case 
management in the private sector [is] not contested at this meeting” (Global Fund 2015).  
 
Returning to 2012, despite calls for a transparent decision-making process, and given varying 
interpretations of the AMFm’s outcomes, it is not precisely clear how GF made its decision on the AMFm, 
nor is it clear the role the IndE findings played in the decision (Bump et al. 2012). In late November 2012, 
the GF Board voted to fold the AMFm into its regular grant-making processes and to un-gate the funds 
that could be specifically applied for private-sector activities (Hurst 2012). The Board’s decision allowed 
countries to decide whether to include private sector subsidies and mechanisms in proposals to GF to 
fund malaria work. At the time, many interpreted this as the AMFm’s death knell. They doubted national 
malaria programs would coordinate, or share funding, with the private sector absent a specific mandate. 
This has echoes in the decisions at the end of GMEP for countries to incorporate malaria activities into 
regular primary care processes and the subsequent limited priority given to malaria activities. 
 
However, an obituary was premature for the idea of the AMFm, which was partially reincarnated as the 
Global Fund’s Private Sector Co-payment Mechanism (PSCM or CPM for co-payment mechanism) in late 
2013 (Global Fund 2013). For part of 2012 and all of 2013, both the British and Canadian governments 
provided additional, transitional financing (DfID 2012; CIDA 2013). In early December 2013, 
representatives from CCM, NMCP, and private-sector FLBs of pilot countries met in Geneva to discuss 
future iterations of the AMFm. On 16 December 2013, GF approved an Operational Policy Note allowing 
countries to have GF apply a portion of their grant money directly to manufacturers to subsidize ACTs 
imported through the private (for-profit and not-for-profit) sector (Global Fund 2013). This co-payment 
money would continue to be housed at GF. The Global Fund’s decision to focus the new mechanism 
entirely on the private sector reflects their understanding that an AMFm-like mechanism did not add value 
for affordability or availability in the public sector (Global Fund 2013). Otherwise, the three prongs of the 
AMFm remained intact in PCSM. 
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Coming full circle from antagonism toward adopting Phase I of the AMFm, Ghana was among the first 
three countries to join PSCM. Ultimately, six of the seven original pilot countries joined this new effort — 
all except Niger. To begin the PSCM in early 2014, GF hosted a competitive tender for manufacturers that 
wanted to provide under this mechanism, which resulted in a further 30% decrease in manufacturer prices 
(Global Fund 2015). However, because the GF Secretariat manages the relationship with the tendered 
manufacturers, countries have trouble “putting pressure” on manufacturers to deliver supplies in a timely 
manner, resulting in issues of drug availability in all PSCM-participating countries (Global Fund 2015). 
 
In other ways, however, PSCM includes explicit efforts to enhance GF’s vision of country ownership. For 
example, it now falls to countries to determine how much priority to give to private-sector case 
management activities in their overall portfolio of malaria activities (Global Fund 2015). In addition, 
countries also choose their own “demand-shaping levers” in setting the subsidy levels for adult and 
pediatric doses and, further, setting their own schedules and targets for monitoring activities. Finally, GF 
Principal Recipients, rather than GF, would sign agreements with selected FLBs, giving countries a greater 
oversight role than the GF Secretariat (Global Fund 2015). Representatives from Ghana report that this 
has allowed them to have a more transparent process of selecting FLBs and have brought FLBs into the 
decision-making process through the AMFm-CC (Global Fund 2015). Still, all countries reported that they 
had difficulty getting FLBs and other elements in private-sector supply chains to comply with their 
reporting requirements. 
 
Concerns about the involvement of local manufacturers continue. Representatives from Nigeria 
emphasized the need to empower local manufacturers through WHO pre-qualification (Global Fund 
2015). Representatives from Kenya noted that local manufacturers are asking them why they have been 
“locked out of the market for so long” (Global Fund 2015). A Global Fund representative said that there 
has been a shift towards recognizing that manufacturing can be done locally and as CPM has become 
more mature, along a five-year timeline, it makes sense to encourage African pharmaceutical 
manufacturers (Global Fund 2015). 
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GHANA  
At the end of 2011, as I completed my interviews in Accra, elite stakeholders still had plenty to say about 
the AMFm, especially the issues of local manufacturing and self-sufficiency as well as ownership of the 
problem, aid dependence, and about the uncertainty of the AMFm’s future. Regarding self-sufficiency and 
productive capacity, one respondent asked, “What if a tsunami hits Asia and no products can be exported? 
It would negate the objectives of the AMFm” because without the delivery of malaria drugs from outside, 
Africa would remain vulnerable to malaria (R-9, n.d.; R-12, n.d.). A member of PSGH leadership and a 
hospital pharmacist noted that Africa consumed most of the world’s malaria drugs but itself had limited 
capacity to manufacture these drugs. For her, this showed that “our leaders have let us down; [they] 
haven't fought or haven’t fought well for this” (R-9, n.d.). 
 
Across sectors, respondents echoed the need for “Africans [to] solve Africa's problems” and that since 
“there is more malaria in Africa… [so] the cure should be in Africa [as] we have a moral stake in the 
disease” (R-11) (R-11, n.d.; R-12, n.d.). Regarding local ownership of the malaria problem, and therefore 
the ways of reducing the disease burden, one respondent asked that I “tell President Bill Clinton that local 
industry needs to take care of local problems” (R-12, n.d.). 
 
On the issue of uncertainty, one respondent felt the approach of piloting the AMFm would “teach us to 
swim and then leave us in the middle of the sea” if the program did not continue (R-9, n.d.). Similarly, 
another said that if the global motivation for the AMFm was truly the “love of saving lives,” GF should 
commit to “quality antimalarials tomorrow” as well as “today” (R-12) (R-11, n.d.; R-12, n.d.).  
 
Despite these misgivings, many national stakeholders, having done the hard work of implementing the 
AMFm, are pleased with their achievements and do not want to see them undone. AMFm-CC members 
view the organization and their work with pride. They see it as a well-functioning national “public-private 
partnership” providing an “open forum” with “equalize[d] power” that enhances transparency through 
“communication and shared accountability” (AMFm-CC 2010; Dodoo 2011). The AMFm-CC “improved… 
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and increased internal communication and collaboration between MoH’s agencies as well as NMCP’s 
relationship with the private sector,” which it had earlier regarded with suspicion (Matowe and K’omolo 
2011; R-5, n.d.; R-14, n.d.). In the private sector, importers and retailers felt they had engaged in “good-
quality CSR … enabl[ing] the private sector to work in public health [while] receiving little or no profit” 
(Dodoo 2011; R-12, n.d.). 
 
In September 2012, private and public members of the AMFm-CC, as well as other AMFm supporters, 
traveled to Washington, D.C. to advocate for the continuation of the AMFm, though with some 
modifications, especially regarding local manufacturing (“Joint IOM/Center for Disease Dynamics, 
Economics & Policy Meeting ‘Affordable Medicines Facility- malaria Review and the Financing of Febrile 
Illness Management’” 2012). Under PSCM, the AMFm-CC has morphed into the AMFm Taskforce, with 
similar membership to AMFm-CC. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze Ghana’s decision after the close of the Phase I pilot, 
making use of the stop-gap funds in 2013 and joining the PCSM in 2014. Nevertheless, in the remainder 
of this chapter, I provide a few relevant details on the steps Ghana has taken since the end of Phase I as 
denouement to the main analysis in this thesis and to highlight that the issues raised throughout and in 
the concluding Chapter X — specifically around ownership and risk — continue to resonate. Future work 
could explore the extent to which Ghana’s decision was motivated by: (1) the actual evaluation results or 
(2) by a process of learning-by-doing, having implemented the AMFm with “their usual energy” (Psychas 
2015), or (3) by a sunk-cost mindset that, having done so much work to set up the national-level AMFm 
architecture and relationships, it would be more difficult not to continue. 
 
As noted by GF at the meeting convened at their Secretariat in Geneva in early December 2015, no “formal 
evaluation” has been undertaken following Phase I (Global Fund 2015). A rapid assessment was 
undertaken in each of the six countries by Health Action International (HAI) to provide a rough update on 
availability and pricing of s-QA.ACTs, using their approach to assessing medicine prices (Health Action 
International 2013). Relying on measurements from sixty outlets per country per year, HAI estimates that 
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s-QA.ACT availability has fallen to between 60% and 80%, with prices between US$ 1.20 and US$ 1.50 
(Global Fund 2015). The recommended retail price as of December 2015 for s-QA.ACT is around US$ 1.12, 
reflecting a 95% subsidy. But neither this nor the green-leaf logo has been advertised while shipments of 
s-QA.ACT shipments to Ghana have been delayed by at least eight months (Global Fund 2015). This is 
despite GF’s Operational Policy Note on PSCM, which requires mass communication campaigns, provider 
trainings, monitoring, and regulatory advocacy as a minimum bundle of Supporting Interventions (Global 
Fund 2013). 
 
In this early-December meeting, Ghanaian representatives repeatedly pointed out variations on a key 
theme: the need for supplies. These included, “all we want are supplies,” “supplies influence everything 
else,” “the spine of the whole program is medicines,” and “the key objective… is for medicines to arrive 
in-country on time” (Global Fund 2015). In the absence of s-QA.ACT supplies, four Ghanaian 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have begun producing ACTs again and have worked to flood the market, 
limiting FLB and retailed demand for quality-assured ACTs (Global Fund 2015). 
 
At the same time as highlighting these concerns, the Ghanaian delegation also expressed confusion and 
frustration at having to prepare a plan for exiting from PSCM, which they were “praying” not to have to 
do (Global Fund 2015). Currently, Ghana’s grant including PSCM will end in 2017 but it is likely that their 
co-payment funds will run out in 2016. A representative from Ghana noted, “although Ghana never opted 
out of the co-payment mechanism” and “although we have not been asked to exit [from the co-payment 
mechanism], we have been asked to present an exit strategy” (Global Fund 2015). One of the Ghanaians 
present said that “we will be committing suicide by ending the co-payment in 2017” (Global Fund 2015). 
 
As a final point, at the early-December 2015 meeting on PSCM progress, the Chief Procurement Officer 
thanked countries for “showing courage” as the AMFm, and now the PSCM, have evolved (Global Fund 
2015). This recognition of the need for courage resonates with the idea of risk I raise in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER X:  CONCLUSIONS  
 
SECTION X.1:  GOALS ,  APPROACH,  AND KEY FINDINGS  
In this dissertation, I have assessed a major effort to improve access to high-quality antimalarial treatment 
through adopting and implementation a specific initiative — the AMFm Phase I pilot — in a specific 
location — Ghana — between November 2008 and December 2011. Overall, from my research as well as 
the IndE, the AMFm was a success in Ghana relative to its own goals. Yet, many of the same issues that 
generated resistance during the adoption phase remain at the end of 2015, as reviewed in Chapter IX. 
 
To consider both adoption and implementation processes, I have contextualized this thesis in global 
malaria control programs and Ghana’s political-economy and national health efforts. My overall approach 
brought together rich description with both quantitative and qualitative data sources and analytic 
strategies to shed light on how national stakeholders and processes shaped the AMFm in Ghana.  
 
This in-depth, contextualized description was a key motivator for pursing a book-length thesis and 
represents a key contribution of my work. Such “messy” process details and the cacophony of stakeholder 
voices often remain undocumented and outside the purview of academic research (Allison and Halperin 
1972; Ferguson 1990). But they are important to our collective understanding of policies and programs 
that are practical and politically palatable. I have analyzed perspectives from high-level and street-level 
stakeholders in Ghana to voice their experiences and opinions of adopting and implementing the AMFm.  
 
My approach carries the inherent limitations in valuing depth over breadth. This thesis represents a single 
case: a specific program with a particular decision-making arena in a single country at a particular political-
economic moment. In Chapters II, IV, and VII, I provided details on the demographic, epidemiologic, 
political, and economic realities of Ghana in 2011, which should temper glib generalizations of my findings. 
The lack of comparative work within this thesis to either other countries or programs is a constraint; such 
breadth would have come at the expense of depth. That said, depth and detail are also critical in a sense 
of generative rather than counterfactual causality, as is relied on in process-tracing approaches (Bennett 
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and George 1997; Pawson and Tilley 1997). As noted in the introduction, thick description is necessary to 
determining the generalizability of lessons learned (Lincoln and Guba 1994).  
 
In each analytic chapter, I reviewed specific methodological constraints related to self-reported data and 
the limitations of each theoretical framework and analytic strategy to address each research question. 
 
While this thesis represents a single case viewed from multiple angles, it employs different theoretical 
frames and empirical strategies suited to the questions asked in each analytic chapter. For this thesis, the 
case — Phase I of the AMFm in Ghana — rather than theory has provided the red thread running 
throughout. The lack of a unifying theory may be a weakness of this thesis but it is also a weakness in 
public policy theory more generally (Pritchett, Samji, and Hammer 2012; “Statement on Advancing 
Implementation Research and Delivery Science” 2014). Most theories and frameworks focus explicitly on 
adoption or, to a lesser extent, implementation processes and achievement of outcomes. Matland has 
made the main effort (of which I know) to bring these two phases together (Matland 1995). The present 
case challenges his view of the link between adoption phases with conflict or ambiguity, such as about 
responsibility or accountability, and consequent challenges with implementation. This is an interesting 
subject for future exploration using this case material but is beyond the scope of the present thesis.  
 
With these limitations in mind I review, below, the findings from each of the analytic chapters: V, VI, and 
VIII. I then turn to two undercurrents — risk and ownership — that wind throughout this thesis, though I 
have not explicitly analyzed them so far.  
 
The experience of the AMFm (re-)highlights that the views of national stakeholders matter — and may be 
divided — on global health policies to be adopted and implemented at the national level. This motivated 
the attention to national stakeholder perspectives as the main material analyzed throughout this thesis. 
For both adoption and implementation, a wider array of stakeholders may be involved, and views 
sharpened, by the following three conditions: (1) the matter of policy involves the private sector as well 
as the public, (2) the policy is to be implemented on an experimental basis, and (3) when the policy 
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transferred from the global to the national level with little scope for national tailoring. National 
stakeholders face individual, organizational, and national risks in aligning with global health policy, which 
are not always acknowledged when viewing these processes as strictly technocratic. However, the thesis 
also shows that a conflicted adoption phase can be followed by a successful implementation phase — 
defined as meeting the goals set by the intervention itself — when incentives to implement as-planned 
are in place at both the high-level and street-level. This includes a case when the key implementers are in 
the private, for-profit sector. 
 
In Chapter V, I — together with Ashley Fox and Jesse Bump — asked: why would national stakeholders 
question — and even forgo — piloting a program intended to deliver high-quality treatment for a prevalent 
and expensive disease? Although after reading Chapter IX, we know that Ghana successfully implemented 
the pilot and voluntarily continued with the GF’s Private Sector Co-Payment Mechanism and would like 
to continue to do so, it is important to remember the mixed reactions the pilot initially caused.  
 
Drawing on the grounded qualitative analysis based on high-level stakeholder interviews, meeting 
minutes and local newspaper reports, we developed three main categories to explain receptivity and 
resistance to piloting the AMFm. The direct public health goal of the AMFm – increasing ACT access and, 
especially, saving lives – resonated with all stakeholders. But even within considerations of the direct 
policy aims of the AMFm, some stakeholders questioned the pilot’s design and what it could actually 
accomplish those goals. Stakeholders also considered policy outside the direct public health goals, such 
as not directly those of the AMFm, for example, state developmental capacity to fulfill insurance promises 
as well as to enhance national manufacturing capacity. I have called these indirect policy goals. Finally, 
stakeholders considered individual, organizational, and national reputations.  
 
Relating to all of these, experimental pilots create uncertainty, which can foment resistance. Many 
Ghanaian stakeholders felt the uncertain future of the AMFm following the Phase I pilot posed risks for 
policy goals and reputations, which hinged on the GF Board’s decision. This set up opposing objectives: 
some stakeholders may have supported the pilot if they knew the program would not be terminated, 
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while GF wanted a pilot to see if the evidence suggested the program should be terminated. Also, national 
stakeholders lacked clarity on how GF would interpret disappointing pilot results. Would they regard it as 
a failure of the idea, a failure of the global community’s implementation ability, a failure of national efforts 
and capacity, or a failure due to individual efforts? Uncertainty about the distribution of accountability 
and blame led stakeholders to resist or only offer passive support to the pilot. To paraphrase one 
respondent’s articulation of a common view, Phase I of the AMFm should have been an experiment on 
how to continue, not whether to continue, the initiative (R-14, n.d.).  
 
In Chapter VI, I used the Multiple-Stream Approach (MSA) to close-code data from stakeholder interviews 
and meeting minutes to analyze the adoption of the AMFm. While MSA was developed to consider 
priority-setting, it also provides a lens through which to examine other phases of the policy process, 
including adoption (Zahariadis 2007; Ridde 2009). In my analysis, I consider the fit between the five key 
components of MSA (a policy stream, a politics stream, a problem stream, an opportunity window, and 
one or more policy entrepreneurs) and the empirical data to address the questions: What did national 
stakeholders do in response to this vertically transferred AMFm? Can MSA help to make sense of these 
events and the outcome of adoption of Phase I?  
 
I found a poor fit between the framework and the empirical data on national stakeholders and events. 
Only two of the five hypothesized necessary MSA components — a policy proposal and policy 
entrepreneurs — were present at the national level at the moment of adoption. These gaps help explain 
the difficult and stalled adoption process in Ghana. When only some MSA framework’s components are 
in place, a more contested, challenging, and circuitous process of policy change, if any, may follow. This 
aligns with the framework’s contention: that absent components will not necessarily make a policy 
outcome impossible — but it will make it less probable (Kingdon 1995). 
 
In my analysis in Chapter VI, I propose that in cases of vertical policy transfer, as occurred with the AMFm’s 
Phase I, it is necessary to consider MSA simultaneously at the global and national levels. When this is 
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done, all five important MSA components are in place, some from the national level and some from the 
global level. The revised framework better fits the type of adoption as well as the empirical evidence.  
In Chapter VIII, using data from in-depth interviews of private-sector antimalarial retailers and logistic 
regression, I assessed compliance with Ghana’s widely advertised s-QA.ACT RRP of US$ 0.90. I considered 
two hypotheses set ex ante to the study: whether (1) perceived competition or (2) having seen regulation 
enforced influenced non-compliance. Though the AMFm rests on market forces to drive availability and 
affordability, perceived competition plays a limited role in whether a retailer decides to comply with the 
RRP. This finding is robust to the inclusion of several spatial operationalizations of market density.  
 
I also did not find evidence that a retailer’s report of having seen regulation enforced previously raises 
their compliance with the RRP. In fact, seeing prior enforcement of regulation is associated with 
persistently lower odds of complying. This suggests that retailers were not too impressed by the regulation 
or enforcement they had seen and, perhaps, felt they now knew how to get around it. As part of the 
AMFm programming, Ghana had no sanction for non-compliance with the RRP. Rather, the RRP can be 
viewed, given capacity constraints, as a substitute for regulation or formal sanctions in the AMFm 
mechanism (Kumaranayake et al. 2003). In line with the lack of formal sanctions, many retailers reported 
that “nothing” would happen if they priced their s-QA.ACT stock above the RRP. Indeed, a small number 
actually called for increased enforcement of the supply price and retailer pricing.  
 
The most obvious factor associated with complying or not with the RRP seems to be the terminal supply 
price. This suggests that organizations introducing market-based mechanisms with an advertised target 
retail price should focus their monitoring and enforcement activities higher up in the supply chain, among 
intermediate and terminal suppliers. 
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SECTION X.2:  OWNERSHIP  
One undercurrent running throughout this thesis is the idea of ownership. This includes ownership over 
the definition of the problem related to ACT access, over the process of adopting the AMFm, and over the 
program details themselves and their implementation, set against a backdrop of questions about a 
developmental state’s constructive relations with its individual citizens as well as its big and small private-
sector firms (Evans 1995).  
 
In relation to the program details of the AMFm, in Chapter IV, I introduced several stakeholder suggestions 
how the pilot might have “develop[ed], not negate[d], local production capacity,” such as upgrading local 
manufacturers to meet WHO prequalification and bringing local government and industry into closer 
partnership (R-8; R-9; R-10; R-11; Matowe and K’omolo 2011). Both those ultimately receptive and 
resistant to the AMFm acknowledged that all national stakeholders “would have preferred to have had 
quality, local drugs” (R-13). The very strength of the AMFm design — high-level negotiations and 
subsidization — precluded local, structural changes. 
 
In Chapter V, I highlighted that several key stakeholders refused to take — that is, to own — a visible stand 
on whether Ghana should apply to Phase I. Moreover, the key, institutional decision-makers in the CCM 
vacillated on whether to send the application while a variety of circumstantial stakeholders felt they had 
stake in the decision and worked to influence the process. In Chapter VI, I analyze how global ideas and 
actors played a role in Ghana’s adoption of Phase I. In Chapter VII, I describe the way the AMFm-CC was 
set up which, in composition and process, differs from the CCM (AMFm-CC 2010).  
 
These examples relate to a broader concept of country ownership of development initiatives, as 
advocated in the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005). In particular, in Chapter VI, I demonstrated the absence 
of an aligned national politics stream and national problem stream during adoption. The MSA lens — and 
the failure to align national streams in this case — neatly dovetails with David Booth’s efforts to clarify 
what should be meant by country ownership (Booth 2012a). He proposes that ownership includes an end 
to conditionality to “buy reform” and, more relevant here, an end to channeling aid funding through 
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“projects” as a way of by-passing country decision-making bodies, processes, and institutions (Booth 
2010). A multi-level approach to MSA offers a way to analyze the idea of country ownership in the future.* 
MSA allows interest groups to enter the politics stream, which matches the high-level and street-level 
push for inclusion of local business, another facet of ownership to consider. 
 
With this in mind, the CCM represents an interesting example with which to consider country ownership. 
The CCM’s explicit raison d’ětre is to foster ownership and they do indeed bring together representatives 
of government bureaucracy, business, and civil society, “representing the views and interests of grant 
recipient countries” (Nfor 2014) (Global Fund, n.d.; Nfor 2014). Yet, in the specific case analyzed in this 
thesis, the CCM structure allowed for vacillation within and strong views without and, ultimately, an 
attempt to pass on responsibility for — and therefore ownership over — the decision about whether to 
adopt. We must at least question whether the CCM’s composition when adopting Phase I allowed for 
sufficient ownership. Given the effort of CCM members to yield decision-making power to the Minister, it 
seems that CCM members did not feel so. This conclusion is further supported in juxtaposing the CCM 
with the AMFm-CC in terms of stakeholders represented, the capacity and legitimacy to make relevant 
decisions, and a sense of ownership of the work ahead. If the AMFm-CC represents a more locally owned 
body and therefore more locally owned programmatic decisions, what can we determine about whether 
the CCM served the purpose of fostering ownership? 
 
However, it must be noted that the AMFm process was an inversion (or perversion) of the usual 
functioning of the CCM, which is to design proposals, not fill in details for a globally designed plan. 
Moreover, it is not fair to simply critique apparent limited ownership without three additional questions:  
 Would Ghana have tried out the AMFm if political or bureaucratic actors had to take initial 
responsibility for the design?  
 Did limited national ownership of the design and adoption decision allow national stakeholders 
to better, “energ[etically] (Psychas)” implement the initiative, maximizing credit-seeking after 
minimizing risk for blame during adoption (while recognizing that policy entrepreneurs and others 
still felt this risk keenly) (Weaver 1987; Kang and Reich 2014; Psychas 2015)?  
                                                          
* Including, perhaps, analyses of how GF decided on continuing, modifying, scaling-up, or terminating. 
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 How should we interpret Ghana’s decision to continue with GF’s PSCM, despite their original 
hesitancy or opposition?  
 
These questions suggest important avenues for future analysis of ownership, given roles and relationships 
between donors and the state as well as the between the state, street-level workers, and the public.  
 
Indeed, ownership is not only an issue for capital-based elites; Fox recently highlighted that “the current 
aid architecture deprives both African governments and African publics of agency” (Fox 2015). In Chapter 
VII, I introduced views of the citizens and businesspeople at the street-level of implementation. About 
20%, during in-depth interviews, spontaneously said they wanted to see the AMFm continued — a view 
that seems to have had no route to enter debates about the future of the AMFm, given the limits of the 
data collected in the IndE and beyond and passed on to decision-makers at the Global Fund.  
 
Though the minority, some respondents specifically voiced that they should have learned about the 
AMFm through a government agency or professional association (V-1 2011; V-7 2011; V-67 2011; V-124 
2011; V-133 2011; V-188 2011; V-196 2011; V-511 2011; V-517 2011; V-537 2011; V-542 2011). Two raised 
their role as stakeholders. One, who heard from her supplier, said “I think it wasn’t fair because as major 
stakeholders, we should have been briefed before” (V-507 2011). Another, who heard first from the 
media, said “I felt this was wrong since we are a major stakeholder. We should have met as partners” (V-
535 2011). These concerns relate to relations between Ghana and the Global Fund as well as between 
Accra-based elites and Tamale-based retailers.  
 
The events of both adoption and implementation of the AMFm suggest that ownership is important (in 
no way a novel claim). Note, though, that there may be certain amounts of freedom to innovate accorded 
by being ‘just an implementer,’ rather than having clear ownership of a new idea, decision-making power 
over adopting and implementing that idea, and, facing risks if the idea does not pan out.  
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Also, if we accept that ownership is indeed important, which seems a plausible lesson to draw from this 
thesis, we also learn that simply giving decision-making power to some national stakeholders is 
insufficient. The right national stakeholders and their existing decision-making structures need to be in 
play. We may glean something about relevant national stakeholders in this case through the composition 
of the AMFm-CC and the committee characteristics raised as important (transparency, collaboration). But, 
given the views of some street-level implementers, ownership may require further consideration. 
 
SECTION X.3:  RISK  
A second major undercurrent running throughout this dissertation is the presence of risk, a flip side of 
innovation. Innovation is a common epithet in writing on the AMFm, but risk — especially at the national 
level — makes minimal appearance. This thesis serves as a partial counterbalance.  
 
The idea of risk is explicit in Chapter V, to explain stakeholder stands. To begin, the very term stakeholder 
implies having sense of risk. More specifically, in assessing whether to join Phase I, stakeholders saw 
possible threats to their indirect policy goals and to personal, organizational, and national reputations. 
The GF approach to piloting the AMFm was exceptional in being explicitly experimental and non-
committal, imposing risks to national — but not necessarily global — stakeholders. Businesspeople who 
championed the AMFm, coaxing professional allies to accept the program, faced risks of “vilification” if 
industry lost profits and capacity or if GF revoked the program after diminishing local manufacturing 
capacity and altering public demand for antimalarial medication (R-7, n.d.).  
 
The assumption of risk is constitutive of being an entrepreneur, including for policy ideas (Kingdon 1995). 
The extent to which the AMFm structure was fixed beyond Supporting Inventions details heightened this 
risk (and, indeed, limited African government involvement in the formative stages of the AMFm raised 
suspicions about the AMFm and, therefore, the risk of supporting the initiative) (Matowe and K’omolo 
2011). In the case of the AMFm Phase I pilot, uncertainty about the distribution of professional and 
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political accountability for achieving the benchmarks led some stakeholders to resist or, at most, offer 
passive support to the pilot. 
 
The motivation for the analysis in Chapter VI was a series of actions that can be read as a response to 
perceived personal or organizational risk: the CCM tried to shift decision-making responsibility to a 
politician (the Minister of Health). In turn, that politician refused to take a public or even private stand on 
adopting the AMFm pilot. Recall that requiring the Minister’s sign-off was an unprecedented move in the 
history of Ghana’s CCM. It can be taken positively, as an attempt to claim country-ownership by bringing 
politics into the decision-making process. Or it can be taken negatively, as an attempt to shift the decisive 
(veto) power — and therefore the risk — to a different decision-maker. These are not mutually exclusive 
motivations. In the case of the AMFm, unease about making the final decision to adopt the pilot led to 
the entry of the global politics stream to help move adoption forward. 
 
The AMFm imposed on different national stakeholders a variety of different risks. This included the 
reputational risks of both high-level decision-makers but also street-level businesspeople maintaining 
trusting relationships with their customers. In altering both prices and price expectations through a 
market-based mechanism in Ghana for antimalarial treatment, the AMFm brought business and financial 
risks as well. Private sector stakeholders had to decide to import, deliver, and stock a product with 
uncertain demand (UNITAID 2014). After they made these decisions and committed to the AMFm, GF 
intervened through its demand-shaping levers starting in August 2011, approving only a fraction of 
private-sector FLB orders. As supply fell short of demand, prices along the supply chain rose, forcing 
retailers either to charge the RRP — getting squeezed — or to charge above the RRP, risking losing 
customers. The experimental set-up of the Phase I pilot increased risks in both adoption and 
implementation, which were further compounded by no plan for scale-up or phase-out. 
 
These risks to national stakeholders — of starting and potentially stopping a wide-reaching program — 
are often not discussed in literature on policy experiments. More broadly, we often focus the risks and 
ethical considerations inherent in introducing an intervention but far less so on the risks of ending that 
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intervention, whether based on evidence or whim. As noted in Chapter V, the AMFm affected Ghana’s 
malaria medicine production capacity, prices, and access expectations. Many different players felt they 
had significant stake in decisions about adopting and implementing the AMFm yet a much smaller number 
had an active role in these decisions. Such features may suggest that health reforms and interventions 
themselves, not just research on them, should be subject to ethical review (Daniels 2008).  
 
SECTION X.4:  LOOKING BACK AND F ORWARD  
To close, I place my specific and broad findings back in context: in Ghana, malaria is the leading cause of 
under-5 child mortality, a top cause of all-age morbidity, and the top cause for out-patient visits in public 
facilities (Global Malaria Programme, WHO 2013; Ghana News Agency 2014). Limited availability and 
affordability of high-quality, first-line antimalarials at facilities where the public treats malaria partly 
perpetuates this situation. 
 
The Phase I pilot of the AMFm was simultaneously “innovative” (Adeyi and Atun 2010) — even “radical” 
(Maxmen 2012) — in mechanism, scale, and commitment to an evidence-informed approach but also 
another in a series of malaria interventions in SSA (Adeyi and Atun 2010; Maxmen 2012; J. L. A. Webb 
2014a). A lesson from Webb’s history of malaria interventions — both those that have achieved their 
goals, like the AMFm, and those that have not — is also a warning about experimentation with malaria 
and with policy intervention in general (J. L. A. Webb 2014a). 
 
Any reading of the history of malaria, of artemisinin, and of artemisinin-based treatment demand both a 
sense of history and a slight taste for irony. Malaria is one of the world’s oldest diseases, coevolved with 
humans (Packard 2010; Dalrymple 2013). We are now fighting it with both futuristic sounding weapons 
and those drawn from ancient knowledge. While I was finalizing this conclusion in late autumn of 2015, 
there were simultaneous press releases about genetically engineering mosquitoes to combat malaria and 
about Dr. Youyou Tu’s Nobel Prize in Medicine for harnessing Artemisia annua for present-day malaria 
treatment (J. Webb 2015; NobelPrize.org 2015).  
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Dr. Tu’s work, and the 1970s Chinese research program (Project 523) in which she worked, examined 
ancient medical texts to find old treatments and package them in a new way to address a problem that, 
though now largely tropical and impoverished in provenance, remains am unsolved global threat (Packard 
2010; Dalrymple 2013). By the time Dr. Tu’s findings became the WHO-recommended first-line treatment 
for uncomplicated malaria, concerns about parasite resistance to artemisinin had already emerged (Duffy 
and Sibley 2005; Vijaykadga et al. 2006). Its sustainability as an efficacious treatment was threatened, in 
part, because of its widespread accessibility and presumptive use in monotherapy-form in Southeast Asia. 
These drug-resistant strains have made their way from Asia to Africa (St. Laurent et al. 2015). 
 
The AMFm was developed precisely to make the drug more accessible in combination-forms while — 
through the use of drug combinations with artemisinin — delaying the emergence of resistance and 
sustaining its efficacy. And yet, ironically the mechanism itself seems unsustainable, either as the AMFm 
or as in its successor forms. In 2012, the AMFm technically ended as a stand-alone program but did not 
exactly end, since it was rolled into regular Global Fund granting processes. GF also launched the Private 
Sector Co-Payment Mechanism.  
 
Throughout this, there has been limited space for reflection on collective learning — operational and 
political — from the AMFm (Fan and Silverman 2014). In some “epistemic communities,” it has become 
difficult, even toxic, to discuss in a nuanced way what has been learned from Phase I, between 2010 and 
2012 (Adler and Haas 1992). This thesis represents one effort to examine, analyze, and reflect openly on 
what happened and how, taking into account multiple, national perspectives, and examining in-depth the 
political-economic and social context of adoption and implementation. A failure to do this for such a 
massive experiment like the AMFm would only add to Webb’s list of lessons ignored in malaria control. 
Despite its shortcomings, despite not being wanted by many key stakeholders at the outset, AMFm 
nevertheless succeeded in its stated goals in Ghana. The careful consideration of key stakeholder views 
points to how both the process and outcomes of a program like the AMFm can be improved in the future.
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APPENDIX A. PASTICHE OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS & MEETING 
MINUTES 
 
Table 20: Legend for key informant interviews, CCM meeting minutes, and AMFm-CC documents 
Source Font 
My questions to respondents  Bradley’s hand 
[My clarifying add-ins and de-identifiers in typing up notes]  [Bradley’s hand] 
R-1 Poor Richard 
R-2 Papyrus 
R-3 Franklin Gothic Medium 
R-4 Harrington 
R-5 Modern No.20 
R-6  Britannic Bold 
R-7 Baskerville Old Face 
R-8 Monotype Corsiva 
R-9 Rockwell 
R-10 Bauhaus 93 
R-11 Colonna MT 
R-12 Harlow Solid Italic 
R-13 Matura Script 
R-14 Tw Cent MT Con 
R-15 Informal Roman 
CCM meeting minutes Forte 
AMFm-CC technical documents Cooper Black 
 
Table 21: Pastiche from key informant interviews and meeting minutes 
Item 
The malaria control world is small and dominated by alliances and politics 
Grants and grant money cause people to form sub-groups 
Head of NMCP can be replaced when a new party comes in but that is not necessarily what 
happens 
Head NMCP has been in place for 10 years, through party transitions. NMCP is not highly 
politicized in terms of party politics 
[NMCP and PM] were star performers on Global Fund grant management until last year 
[2010], when procurement shifted from WHO to MoH 
Head NMCP has issues with other females, including the head of MoH procurement 
NMCP lacks managerial capacity; Deputy DG NMCP bullies people all the time 
Head NMCP & Deputy DG NMCP, ‘the ladies', get along 
Deputy DG Public Health MoH & Head NMCP are closely aligned  
Deputy DG Public Health MoH likes the AMFm but Head NMCP does not – this created some 
tension 
MoH is the policy-making body but has less power than GHS; limited involvement in proposal writing 
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GHS is powerful because it controls most of the health facilities 
[There seems to be some disagreement about whether NMCP is really under MoH or GHS; it is GHS] 
MoH is highly decentralized 
More so than in other countries? Yes, the agencies are stronger and have more money. Its programs are run as 
agencies. This creates boundary tensions between MoH and agencies 
NMCP in Ghana is more removed from central MoH authority than in other countries; they can 
question and challenge the minister 
The structure of MoH and its agencies is problematic 
NMCP expected MoH to be in the driver's seat for the AMFm 
NMCP expects MoH to do oversight work but gives us no money to MoH to do oversight 
Deputy DG Public Health MoH is not necessarily equal to MoH [his vision and the larger MoH vision 
are not necessarily the same] 
Ghana has a peculiar system because MoH does policy while GHS does technical and implementation work 
When GF system was set up, we did not say from the beginning that MoH- GHS was PR on GF grants 
Created a power play from the outset [confusion about who could be PR, who would spend the money] 
CCM is meant to be independent of the government but, at many times, needs the government in order to move 
It is not feasible for GF/ CCM to be independent because it has government representation 
In the case of the AMFm CCM may have already made several commitments before the government was brought 
on 
CCM put out advertisements for PRs [for the AMFm] before [talking to] the government 
It is all [the within-government maneuvering] about the money [not malaria related goals] 
For GF, MoH signs documents but GHS/NMCP spends money 
Besides money, MoH had no other clear role in the AMFm 
PC is the government association of pharmacists, involved in regulation of the practice of pharmacy 
PC cannot speak for all pharmacists 
PSGH is the private association of all pharmacists 
PSGH has a mission to ensure that members engage in good practice to provide peer review and persuasion 
Pharmacists automatically become part of PSGH 
PSGH president is a board member of PC but not vice versa 
PSGH president speaks for all pharmacists  
PMAG members are not all pharmacists 
For the AMFm PSGH train pharmacists; PC in charge of training LCS 
PSGH champion the cause of pharmacists 
Some local pharma companies have portfolios based largely on 'diseases of common occurrence' 
Per capita, Ghana has more pharma industry than any other West African country [Nigeria has more 
actual manufacturers; most other West African countries have 2, 1, or none] 
People are passionate about it [the pharmaceutical industry] 
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Registered manufacturers need a pharmacist to be able to operate. But they are not necessarily owned by 
pharmacists. Legally all you need to run a pharmaceutical company is to hire someone like a production 
pharmacists. 
Most of the manufacturers are also wholesalers, importers, and retailers. 
In French Africa they tend to have pure importers and pure retailers – I would call it a separation of 
roles. So people just are retailers or wholesalers. And there are few importers so the supply chain is much 
neater. In Ghana it is difficult to get very pure breeds; I mean the people are doing the same things. 
Across the political parties, there is support for local industry but how to do it is ambiguous. Should they 
reduce standards or raise standards? [in order to grow the industry] 
Government has never consciously tried to help the local industry 
 There hasn’t been time when government has given them tangible, measureable support. There have been a 
lot of good words spoken, but only when the government says I am going to give you 10 million and you can 
manufacture, and then you know they are serious. 
Somewhere in the early 90s – maybe late 1980s but I think early 90s - the manufacturers submitted a list 
to the government which was sent to the Minister of Finance and they were exempt first from being imported. 
You could search for “Ghana exemptions list of medicines,” they call it exempt list. They could not import 
chloroquine as a finished product. And then we added amoxicillin, paracetamol, aspirin; I mean it is a form 
of protectionism but the thing too is that it meant the country had enough natural capacity to produce it so 
there was no need to import it. What has happened is that that list has grown and there are quite a few 
products, I think twenty or so products, that you cannot import but they can be locally manufactured. So 
what has happened is some of the manufacturers have bought the finished product and then repackaged them 
locally. So if you look into it, really there are violations of that code. The finished good should not have been 
allowed into the country but I suppose if they come with - I don’t know what you call it, manufactured already 
or to be repackaged. 
This is off the record, but there has been a bit of pampering of local manufacturers so you exempt them and 
then you don’t have expectations of them, you are checking on them but not really cracking the whip, so they 
aren’t going to raise their standards and they will still be where they are. 
This is off the record, but there has been a bit of pampering of local manufacturers so you exempt them and 
then you don’t have expectations of them, you are checking on them but not really cracking the whip, so they 
aren’t going to raise their standards and they will still be where they are. 
That’s it with protectionism, if you are not going to meet quality standards. The whole problem is that people 
fall to the lowest denominator rather than right into the highest numerator.  
PMAG is privately owned [not publically traded] 
Most manufacturers are family- or privately-owned, so no capacity or information about them 
Of 35 manufacturers in Ghana, only 2 are on the stock exchange. It is easier to get information about these 
Otherwise, the ownership structure militates against outsiders gaining information 
Ownership structure: Family-owned (i.e. man, wife, and children), so very conservative in running of the 
company 
Everything [in the pharmaceutical industry] is like a family duel 
Access to finance [business loans] would entail going on the stock exchange; there is limited interest in this 
as it would limit the ownership structure and dilute control 
Current PMAG president had strategic plans to begin producing ACTs but then the AMFm came up so he never 
started  
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If you talk to the manufacturers association, there are clearly two types of manufacturers, there those...who 
want to move to the highest standard level possible...pushing for prequalification for products and...US 
FDA standards. There are those who believe that we’ve done this business all our lives, and we’ve made 
enough business, we’ve made enough money, so why change the model; leave us as we are. And they are 
unfortunately very loud. And then there are those who produce an occasional paracetamol and still call 
themselves manufacturers. So if you look at the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Ghana the 
list is about 53 or 54; only about 23 are producing and then another 23, maybe 10 or 11, are maybe more 
serious producers. So it is a gathering of different tribes, who speak in tongues. 
 There are no competition laws in Ghana 
Several Ghanaian manufacturers active in the production of antimalarials (mostly monotherapies) 
Chloroquine had [only?] been manufactured locally (SP also manufactured locally) 
Nobody barred from importing and selling antimalarials (but could not import chloroquine [because 
meant to be manufactured locally] 
You could not import chloroquine, you could not import chloroquine tablets, you could import the powder. 
Chloroquine is not banned; what has been said it is that it has been de-emphasized for the treatment of 
malaria but it can be used for other conditions. 
[Actual documentation on this is much harder to find than one would like!] 
In 2004, beginning of policy of [WHO] pre-qualification - GF funding started to seep in and GF money 
not applicable to locally manufactured drugs 
For several respondents, the AMFm story starts at least as far back as 2004, which is when the new 
national drug policy was introduced that made ACTs – and specifically AA – the first-line drug of 
choice for uncomplicated malaria  
At the time, no one was making AA locally [had local and imported artesunate monotherapy on the 
market] 
When switching first-line drugs, there were two possible products [for the government to choose 
from]: AA or AL (Coartem©). They had chosen Coartem©, but at the last meeting they saw there was a 
possibility to produce AA locally, so went with that. There were no fines or tariffs on importation and 
tariffs were removed on importing raw materials  
This national policy on moving to AA was made under the assumption it could be made locally  
But the local industry was not properly evaluated. Manufacturers started just combining many pills into 
one, which led to reactions, which then led to the public starting to make noise. Initially, there were some issues 
with AA being prescribed according to weight and without proper education. A significant proportion of the 
population could not tolerate AA [at least when given improperly?]  
Roll-out of the new malaria policy had challenges. Many stakeholders were not involved and the 
education was not too good. People were given doses stronger than their weight class [and got 
sick]. The media hyped AA as the killer drugs (people call amodiaquine ‘I-go-die-a-
quick’). Some of this is hearsay and perception; but some people genuinely cannot tolerate 
AA.  
The government had to withdraw and reintroduce AA, and the public had to be reassured. The government 
also reviewed national policy and introduced AL as an option as well as DHAP. But AA is still the most 
recommended; in order to cure and prevent subsequent attacks, serve as long term prophylaxis 
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Six years later, some pharmacists are still not aware of the policy of ACTs being first-line drugs. 
There are also some practical problems of the policy, which requires patient counseling. For 
example, AL requires a fatty meal [and complicated dosing] and ACTs cannot be given in the first 
trimester. Many pharmacists are not abreast of current treatment guidelines for simple ailments; 
they don't read and don't upgrade. 
When the first line of treatment moved from chloroquine to AA, the price went from 10p [US$ 0.05] to 
GH₵ 15 [US$ 7.85] with generics priced between GH₵ 4 and 6 [US$ ~2.10 to 3.10]). Now have a 
new product [ACT] that is too expensive. If [they] announce the [new first-line treatment] policy but 
nothing is there [no ACTs in stock], there will be a vacuum (old one is gone but new one is not there) 
In all efforts [on antimalarials to date, they have been] targeting the public sector, so could make 
it affordable there but not in the private sector. [Without the private sector] how can we win fight 
against malaria? 
In the chloroquine era, the drug was universally available -- public and private sectors, urban 
and rural areas – had a large reach. It was very cheap, even by Ghanaian standards. 30+ local 
firms were able to manufacture Chloroquine 
What happens if we try to shift this [chloroquine] model to ACTs? Why can't we return to 
the chloroquine era of pricing [and availability]?  
[Several meetings took place prior to needing to thing about the application. A 2008 meeting in Dar 
(Dakar? trouble with phone connection, so not clear where meeting held) dealt with the fact that ACTs 
were actually available] in countries but the prices were high. [They] talked about what would happen if 
they subsidized the drugs at the manufacturer level and brought the drugs in through the normal supply chains 
A meeting in Kenya in 2009 [GF workshop] covered the issue of crowding out local manufacturers. 
Local manufacturers petitioned before this meeting, raising this concern, especially as it became 
clear they would need pre-qualification [to participate] 
Several pharmaceutical manufacturing initiatives have been underway prior to and simultaneous 
with the AMFm – these were mentioned by various respondents 
WAHO (West African Health Organization), MoTI , UNDP have on-going initiatives that 
manufacturers [?] can join in order to build capacity. 
GTZ brought together pharma manufacturers in West Africa in Dakar in 2007. An issue that arose was 
upgrading the local pharma industry. GTZ involved as a "sponsor," through UNIDO (not directly involved) in 
"strengthening local production of essential generic drugs in least developed & developing countries)”  
Dakar meeting followed by a 2008 visit to Ghana by the project manager and formed a partnership between 
UNIDO, PMAG, & MoTI.  
In ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], only Ghana and Nigeria have a sizable 
number of manufacturers  
After stakeholders meeting, they formed committees and came up with 5 pillars [of action]. The UNIDO 
project is set to continue until 2013  
Development of a GMP roadmap to set timelines and minimum standards for the industry 
GMP roadmap: Post-market surveillance (PMS) 
GMP roadmap: Need to make sure demand will be there 
GMP roadmap: Need to protect the market if asking them to upgrade (not crowded out by sub-standard or 
counterfeits) 
GMP roadmap: Need to strengthen FDB  
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GMP roadmap: Access to capital  
GMP roadmap: Need to invest in HR, machinery, equipment 
GMP roadmap: Availability to get development finance; now borrowing from the commercial market at a crazy 
30%; need alignment between this rate and a long-term plan (3+ years) 
GMP roadmap: Provision of incentives [for upgrading] 
GMP roadmap: Time-limited incentives, to be undertaken by government 
GMP roadmap: HR development 
GMP roadmap: Training to manage/handle equipment, meet new standards 
GMP roadmap: Talking to tertiary training institutions 
GMP roadmap: Improve pharma technologists; take over from the Indians currently running [these firms] 
WAHO: Around 2009 WAHO decided to promote local manufacture by patronizing the purchase of local 
products and they bought ARVs from [a Ghanaian company] and a company in Nigeria 
UNIDO (MoTI): UNIDO has developed a conceptual strategy to upgrade local production to meet some of the 
international standards (i.e. pre-qualification, GMP). They also gave technical assistance to some of the local 
companies to help them map their route to attain the standards.  
UNDP: UNDP is currently involved in marshaling all UN agencies to help [one of the local companies] 
attain the PQ standards. 
Do you know what measures were taken/offered (in Ghana or elsewhere) in terms of moving the 
local manufacturers towards WHO pre-qualification (for ACTs or otherwise)? My sense was that 
something was being offered by UNDP, which maybe no local manufacturer took up. Or, is this part 
of the pursuit of [the two local manufacturers going] for pre-qualification? Is there anywhere to 
learn more about the (written) details of this effort? I am not aware of any such thing. 
Was there talk with (or any push-back from) UNCTAD or the ICTSD on issues around building up 
local manufacturing capacity? If so, is there any chance there are actually documents on the 
subject? Not aware  
Some respondents were quite in favor of the public-good goal of everyone being able to access and 
afford the good meds  
Some noted there was not much to lose much by going for it or that it could be supported by taking a 
purely experimental view 
One respondent pointed out, from the public perspective, we just want ACTs available and 
affordable everywhere, if people are making money that is a second order concern 
Another that, for each ACT that is stocked but could not be sold (because the drug was too expensive), someone 
dies 
Further, NHIS as a selling point for the AMFm; [the cheaper drugs] will save them a lot of money 
Everyone was concerned about the issues raised by the manufacturers [with regard to the AMFm] 
Everyone is asking the same questions openly, from both the public and private sectors 
Respondents were concerned about the potentially short-lived nature of the program and what would 
happen in its wake, as well as interpreting what the non-committal nature of the program meant 
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[One respondent was concerned about the] experimental nature of the program [and that the experiment 
would be carried out] at the national level. People knew the program would be 18-24 months, with no assurance 
to continue or assurance of implementation in the long-term. There was no commitment from GF on sustainability  
It was concerning to everyone to evaluate [implementation progress and results] after less than 2 
years 
Despite these concerns, no one developed a clear economic sustainability program; everyone [acted as 
if] it would continue. 
If the goal [of the AMFm] is saving lives, then it should be permanent. If GF is interested in saving lives 
and doing it for the love of people, then doing the AMFm for only 18 months is not saving lives. Therefore, 
I don't understand the objective of the program. 
[It doesn’t make sense that] GF is concerned about quality antimalarials today but not tomorrow. This is not 
sustainable. 
One concern among informants was about whether the cost-savings on antimalarials would 
artificially buoy the NHIS, which would then not put in place a back-up plan and would in the end 
bankrupt itself 
NHIS welcomed the idea of the AMFm; they thought it would save them money 
Prior to the AMFm, NHIS was paying GH₵ 3.5 or 3.6 [~US$ 1.85] to facilities and paid a lot more to teaching 
hospitals – from GH₵ 10 up to GH₵ 15 [US$ 5.25 – 7.85] -- for ACTs as well as costs like accompanying 
painkillers and vitamins 
I am not sure whether NHIS looked at the long-term and what would happen if the AMFm was withdrawn 
Savings made by the NHIA as a result of the AMFm [should] be invested to set up a fund that could 
ensure subsidization of ACTs 
PM was skeptical about sustainability; made many arguments but there were no clear answers [to her 
concerns] 
No additional money [would be given to do the AMFm]; some people thought it was unfair to take 
money from Round 4 GF grants because it had already budgeted for full-dose costs and to 
reprogram [that savings] as SIV 
Generally there is always this unhappiness about the fact that all the funds we obtained from the Global 
Fund or PMI are used for imported products rather than locally. It’s a long abiding thing that we should 
move from using those funds externally to using them internally. That’s not a Ghanaian issue but it is 
primarily an African issue. 
The whole idea was that it doesn’t make sense to spend all the grants we get from the Global Fund to import 
medicines. So by giving the local industry protection and assured the market to be able to raise again and 
meet quality standards including prequalifications, that’s the whole idea. 
 [Funds for industry were] not going to come from not from the AMFm money, it was meant to come 
from what we call the funds which we reprogrammed. So the argument was if the government is going to 
save 10 million dollars because of the AMFm, why doesn’t the government use the other monies that they 
received from the Global Fund or elsewhere to support the local industry to raise their standards.  
Some people had apprehension about Head NMCP 's own commitment 
Concerns about private sector being used for the first time for a public good 
Concerns about whether the industry would be compliant 
What was the ability to keep prices down; how would price regulation work? 
Anticipated challenges with private sector engagement 
 274 
Deputy DG NMCP does not trust the FLBs 
Many people were making a good profit on selling ACTs 
Community pharmacists make a majority of their sales from antimalarials 
For those manufacturing ACTs and other antimalarials, it represented a big part of their business. How 
would they fill in this profit if undermined? 
Many companies had just started retooling to make ACTs, so [they were not happy about the AMFm] 
Local producers lose money in machines and raw materials 
Even those not manufacturing antimalarials had concerns that the AMFm idea could spread to other diseases and 
drugs 
[The manufacturers] felt now it was starting with antimalarials, what’s next. It was about the whole global 
model that could in the future be very destructive if it applied to more and more of the market.  
[Was the AMFm sort of the first time the Ghanaians manufacturers got to vocalize that displeasure 
or have there been other incidents?] No that was the main one. 
AFMm should be used to develop, not negate, local capacity 
Local industries and manufacturers [wondered] who would buy their products [if the AMFm was in 
place] 
Highest form of employment is from industries. Only need 1 person to do importing and wholesaling; need 
many more if manufacturing (more employment) 
Local industry supports so many drugs locally but this one comes from outside; WHY? [this respondent 
is very dramatic] 
Manufacturers say this [AMFm] is an attempt to destroy their business 
AMFm has killed the initiative of the people in the local industries 
AMFm has created unemployment [they can't cite how much] 
There was genuine fear regarding a new thing coming that will upset the business environment 
Now that the prices for ACTs are down, they cannot be brought back up 
Then what [if the AMFm ends]? We would have a distorted market 
It is a problem for local manufacturers that the AMFm will run for 18 months, then could be 
renewed or not. In the meantime, the AMFm will have already taught people that ACT should 
be GHC 1.50. The Global Fund will have taught them to swim and then leave them in the 
middle of the sea 
 There was no plan for what would happen at the end of 18 months [after the pilot phase]. Would local 
manufacturers take back over? Would they extend the AMFm? 
From the AMFm, the brand name of ACT [green leaf] has stuck in the minds of people. How can we 
shift them to new brands? Now we have lost the branding, goodwill toward the local industry, lost brand 
awareness 
Manufacturers worried that the AMFm would kill the local markets; some local companies 
already had up to 2 billion [???] courses made, which would then expire 
And now [with the AMFm the] capabilities of local manufacturers are diminished, and they are not 
importing ingredients [so what would happen if the AMFm ended?] 
80% to 90% of antimalarials produced globally are consumed in Africa but [Africa has] no 
capacity to manufacture for ourselves. We haven't fought or haven’t fought well for this; 
our leaders have let us down 
There is more malaria in Africa, so the cure should be in Africa; [we] shouldn't need to rely on an 
outsider who has no moral stake in the disease 
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We are managing a local disease, so should have local drugs. Why not build local capacity? Why not foster 
international partnerships? 
As a country, we shouldn't be dependent on GF for so long without contingencies 
[contingency plans] because of the possibility of donor fatigue 
Besides Ghana and Nigeria, no one else in West Africa is producing seriously. Rather than buying from Asia, 
we should make [antimalarials] in West Africa. What if a tsunami hits Asia and no products can be 
exported? It would negate the objectives of the AMFm [because then no drugs would be available 
anyway] 
If the government thinks pharma manufacturing is a strategic industry, then physical and policy incentives 
should be given. Maybe the government should repeal the AMFm 
GF does not empower us; for how long will they give us fish before they teach us? 
AMFm is a short-term measure with no long-term plan 
Africa needs to get its house in order so that they have local capacity and are not vulnerable to 
global economies 
Politically, across the African continent, in speaking to NEPAD and African Union, local production is 
what they want to do. There is no doubt about that.  
Ultimately, the private sector proved unwilling or unable to provide numbers about their 
manufacturing capacity. Past-President PSGH estimated that they supplied about 10% of the 
country's ACTs [Past-President PSGH later pointed out that this was a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation that could not be verified with an official citation]. Therefore, one respondent suggested 
that this resistance is mostly just a ploy to maintain price. Local manufacturers were not prepared to sacrifice 
business in the interest of the nation  
If you speak to UNIDO, the more you tried to know the exact amount of business loss the more you run 
into trouble because everyone wanted to deal with facts, not figures coming from space.  
In addition, before the proposal was made, WHO offered technical support but no one [no 
manufacturer] took it. They didn't want to invest [their money in machinery, etc.] 
Even those more on ‘industry’s side’ [like UNIDO] had trouble getting figures, and were unable to 
estimate ACT needs of the country, for example the % imported verses the % manufactured 
locally 
As a group, I think PMAG officially welcome the support of UNIDO. Officially they do. 
Private businesses were cashing in on monotherapies but also on some ACTs. But, [we] don't actually 
know the ratio of manufactured to imported ACTs, relative to the national need 
Originators of the AMFm talked to MoF and told them how much they would save under the AMFm. 
MoF may have signed and committed before any other stakeholders were brought on 
Are we sure the brands within the AMFm are really the same? The certification [WHO 
prequalification] is just on paper; how do we know we are getting good drugs? 
GF looks at system-wide issues as an afterthought; funding support is linked to diseases 
Rather, GF should leverage support across all diseases 
AMFm should have been an experiment for the next phase, not on whether or not to stop or continue the 
program. 
Local manufacturers and the FLBs felt the [business model] could have been ‘mixed’ to allow participation by the 
local industry 
Everyone would have preferred to have quality, local drugs (for the AMFm) 
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AMFm [could have] become a funding source for up-grading [local manufacturers for pre-
qualification] 
AMFm should give specific support to building [local manufacturing] capacity. If Ipca© [global 
pharma manufacturer], etc., are pre-qualified, GF should try to partner them with a local manufacturer 
in order to build capacity [in Ghana] 
[AMFm should help] Ghana pharma manufacturers...forge partnerships locally and internationally 
AMFm said it was going to deal with all stakeholders, but it gave no direct support for manufacturers 
It is a major concern that no manufacturer in Ghana is WHO pre-qualified. Why [would the 
AMFm] not help us to get there? GF could identify key manufacturers to upgrade 
Why couldn't GF support the local industry with WHO pre-qualification? 
AMFm planners did not factor in that there is no substitute for local initiatives 
We suspect that GF wants to take our food from our table to give to someone else. Who? We don't know. 
Tell Mr. Gates that his money is going nowhere; it’s going to the pockets of Asia, not Africa 
[I also felt, talking particularly to manufacturers, quite a bit of anti-Asia rhetoric.] The thinking is 
that anything bought from India and China is counterfeit. You could say that there is not a lot of love lost 
between us and them. Because we feel like that a big percent of all imports are from India and China. 
Tell Bill Clinton that local industry needs to take care of local problems; Africans need to solve Africa's 
problems 
Ghanaian companies have been producing ACTs for 7 years and are not killing our people, so we only need 
a little help but the AMFm did not consider this 
The private sector resistance is based on the perceived impact of the AMFm on local 
manufacturers (those countries with a sizable manufacturing industry). They have been 
working to address this with partners: ALMA (African Leaders' Malaria Alliance) and UNIDO. 
They are working with the African Union to coordinate a response to challenges to African-
based manufacturers 
Ghana asked to apply to the call for proposals (11 countries) - like a normal GF application.  
GF (RBM) wrote to Ghana CCM about a new initiative for malaria endemic countries to reduce the 
disease effects, through access to cost-effective medicines 
Would be an opportunity for Ghana to access more funds 
Why did the Global Fund want Ghana to join? GF encouraged [NMCP] to apply based on their previous 
record of progress. 
Why did the Global Fund want Ghana to join? GF wanted Ghana because Ghana is often used 
to start things 
Why did the Global Fund want Ghana to join? Head NMCP [and NMCP] were star performers on 
Global Fund grant management until last year, when procurement shifted from WHO to MoH 
Why did the Global Fund want Ghana to join? Ghana was leading with GF for three disease areas - 
HIV, TB, malaria - and HSS, so we were receiving grants for malaria control activities 
Why did the Global Fund want Ghana to join? With another dispensation through RCC, Round IV malaria 
grant, we had done very well with innovative approaches and good implementation. 
The application would go through the CCM; CCM identified NMCP as principle recipient. The application 
written between March and June 2009 [up through September 2009] 
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The application included a plan for supporting interventions, marketing, monitoring, 
monitoring and evaluation training, and research 
Initially they [NMCP, CCM] were not in favor [to the AMFm invitation] because they thought there 
would be a lot of resistance from local industry 
CCM met to agree and respond to invitation. We indicated interest, said we would need further support 
in technical writing 
Voted at CCM to prepare application; large majority supported preparing the application. Once CCM 
asked for the votes to submit, went almost immediately [the decision to prepare the application] 
Decided it was in the public good 
Took a decision based on the best interests of the nation; we gleefully accepted challenge [of putting 
together proposal] 
In broad frame, CCM says 'let's submit,' so working on the application, but [meanwhile] other issues 
continue to drag the process 
Head NMCP distanced herself from the AMFm; NMCP delayed the application. Head NMCP thought that 
monitoring would be very stressful, beyond their capacity and capabilities. She was worried about the 
difficulties of implementation, rigidity of reporting, etc. 
Head NMCP was passively against the AMFm. She had doubts but was open and frank and 
ultimately did her duty. 
PM still had issues, so just told Deputy DG NMCP and Officer NMCP they could put in an application and 
that they would have to run it. But, PM would always have some level of responsibility. 
To submit the application, CCM put together an in-country proposal team: PC, FDB, GSMF, 
NMCP (Keziah & Officer NMCP), LCS [Informant couldn’t remember for sure], community 
practice pharmacists, and the Chair of CCM. Possibly a UNICEF consultant. MoH procurement only 
came once to the meetings. Technical assistance came from CHAI (Precious, Phillip). To write 
the application we agreed on a framework and then shared portions to write. 
The private sector was not yet involved or consulted 
By about 2009, active local manufacturing was down from 6 to 3 manufacturers still making 
ACTs 
When talks started about the AMFm, 5 local manufacturers were producing AA  
Some local manufacturers were producing ACTs, 5 were still producing at the time of the 
AMFm; now none of them are producing anymore 
A 6th had invested heavily in equipment but wasn't yet producing at the time of the AMFm 
(The local manufacturers] scheduled to tail off production as the AMFm phased in because they 
cannot compete 
Do GF proposals usually get this much attention? No! 
16 & 17 March 2009 – National Stakeholders Meeting (NSM) [supported by CHAI] took place at La 
Palm [fancy hotel in Accra] 
CCM invited private sector to NSM 
The meeting served as dissemination forum, with the AMFm and its implications brought to the fore 
Private sectors’ fears were met with good representation from GF (HQ) to answer questions 
Deputy DG Public Health MoH delivered the report from NSM and an overview of the AMFm  
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Deputy DG Public Health MoH said the CCM should ensure strong presence of the public and private 
sectors in the AMFm proposal development team, should it decide [to go] for it  
Deputy DG Public Health MoH said that despite assurances to local manufacturers of technical and 
financial support from organizations like UNIDO, WHO, and the government, the private sector was still 
not open to the concept  
Deputy DG Public Health MoH said the [private] sector feared that the cost of pre-qualification status 
would be borne solely by individual manufacturers 
Deputy DG Public Health MoH said not all the concerns of local manufacturers could be addressed in 
the [AMFm] proposal. He said some of the concerns relating to prequalification would be taken on board 
as a different package 
Motion in support of the AMFm proposal 
After exhaustive discussion of the agenda, three members took turns to call on CCM to approve 
of the AMFm proposal.  
The report of the national stakeholders’ meeting as well as the presentations and clarifications 
to the issues at the meeting showed that Ghana stands to benefit from the program.  
The report of the national stakeholders’ meeting as well as the presentations and clarifications 
to the issues at the meeting showed that Ghana stands to benefit from the program.  
They argued that a decision to reject the AMFm could not be defended anywhere because its 
benefits outweigh the cost to the country 
They advised the private sector to focus on the opportunities and challenges that the program 
offers to position itself rather than on the loss of jobs and collapse of market 
A representative of the bilateral group said the [private] sector would support the AMFm 
proposal for Ghana. He recalled that the AMFm decision was preceded by a number of well-
thought decisions 
What was required of the CCM was to decide whether Ghana joins the AMFm pilot or wait until 
the outcome of this phase before taking a decision.  
The member said there were issues about supply chain, diagnosis, and drug monitoring that must 
be critically examined in view of the fact that the NMCP had received approval for two huge 
grants to implement. He questioned the implications of going for the AMFm now or doing so after 
two or three years 
In response, Deputy DG Public Health MoH explained that the AMFm would result in the 
reprogramming of the existing grant, leading to cost-savings for the country  
In addition, it would provide an opportunity to strengthen Supporting Interventions that included 
training, supply and distribution chains, and drug monitoring. 
Responding to calls on the CCM to accept the invitation to be part of the AMFm pilot, the NMCP 
(PM) [Head NMCP] said the CCM should request for a written statement from sector 
representatives [members] on the CCM giving assurance that she personally would not be held 
responsible for any fallout of the program.  
She said her concern was borne out of the bitter experience with the change in drug policy from 
chloroquine to amodiaquin [in 2004], when the latter was perceived as dangerous and 
unacceptable by the public. 
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Submission by PMAG - the meeting took a different turn when 4 executives of PMAG came rather 
belatedly to petition the CCM on the AMFm proposal.  
Representatives of PMAG storm the meeting and strongly protested that this would destroy the local industry (at 
least for some time) 
Said the AMFm would affect profit margins and was a disincentive to industry 
PMAG said their overhead costs would not go away; how could they cover costs if prices drop? 
[The president of PMAG] said for the CCM position to be acceptable by all parties, it must be 
carefully balanced. He urged the CCM not to accept the AMFm in Ghana because it would lead 
to the collapse of the local pharmaceutical industry  
He said despite the good intention of the program, the AMFm would change the mindset of 
Ghanaian consumers through strong attachment to the international brands of ACTs, which would 
lead to the collapse of the local market and loss of jobs to its 5000 workers. PMAG said the 
country should wait for the outcome of the pilot phase 
 There were mixed reactions to the call from PMAG, which appeared to confuse the whole 
discussion since morning  
 The PM said she would repeat her call on the CCM to request for written statements from all 
sectors represented accepting responsibility for any decision of the CCM 
 There were also calls for clarification on the government as PR and calls to defer the decision of 
the CCM until further consultations are made with both government and private sectors 
At this juncture, the Chairman excused all observers for about 10 minutes to allow only voting 
members to discuss the new development and to take a common stand on the way forward with 
the discussions. 
When calm was restored the CCM took a critical view of the various statements, particularly that 
of PMAG and the PM.  
After some deliberations on the matter, the CCM conditionally agreed by consensus to participate 
in the AMFm initiative provided government/MoH gave its unambiguous support and approval 
to lead the program as PR.  
In addition, members mandated the Executive Committee to meet with the Honorable Minister of 
Health to seek this clarification and also put across some of the genuine concerns of the private 
sector. 
 The observers outside were called back and the decision was conveyed to them. A member agreed 
with the decision of the CCM…and reminded members of the 1 July 2009 deadline for submitting 
the AMFm proposal to the GF 
At the last meeting, the CCM conditionally approved the submission of the AMFm proposal to 
the GF. He said the Exec Committee was mandated to seek audience with the Hon Minister on the 
following clarifications: 
To seek further clarifications to the consent and commitment of government (MoH/PR) 
To seek clarifications on how government intends to mitigate local industry concerns of the AMFm 
initiative aimed at providing unlimited access to ACT at affordable prices 
The Chairman said the first meeting with the Minister on 6 April ended with a promise by the 
Minister to get back to the committee within three days after he had consulted His 
Excellency the Vice President.  
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He said as of the day of the meeting, the Honorable Minister [of Health] could still not be reached 
for any information as promised at the last meeting 
 The Chairman said since the AMFm proposal submission had a deadline, he could not wait but 
[needed] to call an emergency meeting of the CCM to discuss the way forward 
He said information from the Minister would have provided important feedback for the meeting 
because of the need to understand how government intends to mitigate local industry concerns 
against the background of providing access to ACT at affordable prices 
 The Chairman informed the meeting of a phone call he had received from the Hon Minister in the 
course of the meeting, requesting to meet with him at 13:00 the same day. He invited views from the 
members on whether to continue with the meeting or wait for the outcome of the meeting with the 
Minister. 
After some deliberations, the members agreed as follows: - To wait for the outcome of the meeting 
with the Minister since it was critical to any decision by the CCM and to draw up a plan based on 
two scenarios: a positive response from the Minister that the government is OK with the AMFm 
proposal and a ‘no’ response that government still needed time to take a decision. 
In the case of the first plan, it was unanimously agreed to quickly assemble the task team to 
work on the proposal should the response be positive. However, in the case of a ‘no’ response, the 
reasons cited would inform that CCM’s decision, which was likely to be a discontinuation of the 
proposal development for submission. 
A member expressed the importance of the AMFm initiative in the control of malaria in Ghana. He 
said the CCM should be guided by its own mandate in taking a decision.  
He said it was evident with the current stock of ACT in the public system that the AMFm could 
have problems with the existing distribution and supply chain management and suggested the 
identification of weaknesses [needing] to be strengthened to support the process. 
A member called on the CCM to be careful not to meddle in politics, but this was quickly rebutted 
by a member who said health issues were political 
Two persons, Dr. Henry Nagai and Marius de Jong, were nominated to accompany the Chairman 
to meet with the Minister. The outcome of the meeting was to be conveyed to members.  
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? Minister of Health 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? [PSGH President] will be vilified if it doesn't work 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? PMAG are still upset with [PSGH leadership] about 
this [supporting the AMFm] 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? [CCM Chairman] chastised by colleagues for bringing 
the AMFm in 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? [CCM Chairman] would be branded as a sell-out [by 
the private sector] 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? [CCM Chairman] did a lot of work going to talk to 
people [in the private sector] 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? NMCP and the public sector don't want to be 
accused of letting foreigners take over the market 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? [NMCP PM] thought [she] would bear the brunt 
 281 
Whose reputation is on the line with the AMFm? Reputation will come back to NMCP, even though just 
implementing for MoH 
What about [PSGH President]? He was involved in some high level meetings and made some genuine 
comments about whether the manufacturers could say that their businesses were really at stake 
What about [PSGH President]? [He] is playing on a global level 
What about [PSGH President]? Not actively part of the process but similar to [CCM Chairman]; 
on the side, was able to meet with counterparts [among pharmacists] and talk to them about the 
AMFm 
What about [PSGH President]? What did he do? I don't know what [he] did. Pushed more work onto 
[CCM Chairman's] plate? 
Who came forward as champions in this process? Deputy DG Public Health MoH [GHS] 
Who came forward as champions in this process? Deputy DG NMCP 
Who came forward as champions in this process? [CCM Chairman]- very supportive and useful 
because he is a pharmacists and a retailer 
Who came forward as champions in this process? There is no champion for malaria in Ghana. Compare 
us with Tanzania, where the president was a champion for malaria. 
Who came forward as champions in this process? In Ghana, besides the NHIS, health issues are not 
sexy for politics 
Who will be blamed or vilified if this does not work? The whole system [GF secretariat] and 
international credibility 
Who will be blamed or vilified if this does not work? The global community's reputation is at stake 
and whether countries would buy into another pilot 
CCM was the main player in moving the application forward 
CCM vacillated in its support 
[PSGH President] spoke in favor about it regarding the public health benefits; this made it look like more 
pharmacists were in support of the program than really may have been 
If PSGH goes one way, others will usually follow 
PSGH was the first 'on board' 
It was clear [to PSGH President] that local industry would not support, and PSGH was needed 
If PSGH had said ‘no’ to the AMFm, it might not have gone through  
Getting on board is good for the image of pharmacists, showing that they are not only money-
conscious but also public health conscious  
Appeal to professionalization; saying it aligns with the mission of PSGH 
In the end, the government [GHS bureaucrat] was begging PSGH for their help 
What were the different positions toward the AMFm? Manufacturers and pharmacists were 
actively against the AMFm 
What were the different positions toward the AMFm? Private sector was worried because sales could 
go from low volume/high margin to potentially high volume/low margin  
What were the different positions toward the AMFm? There was disagreement between hospital 
and community pharmacists; community pharmacists resent hospital pharmacists [think they 
take business] 
[CCM Chairman] understands the business side, which is very important; business people who really 
knew [about business] were the real champions [of the AMFm] 
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What were the different positions toward the AMFm? Some suggested that local government and NMCP 
were playing it safe and being conservative about the AMFm because of economics and politics. The 
AMFm presented big professional challenges.  
What were the different positions toward the AMFm? Local manufacturing and pharmacist industry 
could not actually say (quantify) how much they stood to lose and provided only non-scientific arguments. 
But chloroquine was cheap; was it really a big part of their business? 
The first argument the companies made was that the AMFm was going to destroy their business. So when 
I was involved with UNIDO, the question I asked was what was the size of the market which was going to 
be destroyed? So that we can make other arrangements to ensure that shortfall was met. And none of the 
manufacturers could give us a figure, whether in volume terms or in dollar terms of what the market is. 
For the size of the market that they claimed would be lost was not clear. If you don’t know what is going 
to be lost, it is hard to determine what to give and it becomes very difficult... They could not quantify what 
they had lost and what needed to be replaced.  
The problem has been that when the manufacturing sector does not know the volumes of its production; 
cannot tell you how much money is involved; cannot tell you if they their profits. With good manufacturing 
practices, good oversight, good regulatory controls then we could have said, OK, you are producing so 
much, say 20 tons or 200 million tablets or doses, now you know that it is how estimated that this is what 
we are supposed to give you. 
The manufacturers thought if you make enough noise about the AMFm the government would invest in 
us. But government was not going to invest, at least in my discussions with government, until they knew 
what was going to be lost. And government would put that amount back in.  
How people reacted to the AMFm depended on which part of the value-chain and supply-chain 
they were in. Importers are happy but manufacturers are not. Manufacturing also makes less 
profit than importing and has more problems [because more people are needed]. 
[The manufacturers] all claim it is cheaper to import than to manufacture because they don’t get the tax 
breaks they need on their equipment or raw materials and package materials, so it is much cheaper to 
import rather than produce. 
The malaria community was mostly on board and told the government that it needed to make the drugs 
affordable. 
CCM had a lot of individual chats with manufacturers/importers 
Many spoke as if they were against it but on the quiet, they were willing to go along [with the idea] but wanted 
to show solidarity in public 
Biggest distributor of ACTs is an importer, Tobinco, not a manufacturer 
Importers had no specific body but CCM had organized meetings with wholesalers, asking them to 
nominate representatives 
Distributors were also against because it would bring down business (different margin for same fixed 
costs) 
Make same public goods and CSR argument to them, saying that the AMFm is a sacrifice for everybody 
Within the manufacturing sector, there are different interests 
They tried to put out as a common goal/view that this will destroy our interests, but not all see it that way 
Even within the manufacturers, how many are actually producing ACTs? 
There is latent suspicion among the manufacturers because there is an attempt to get them all to come together as 
one unit, but the individual companies have different facilities, merits, and capacity 
Those with limited manufacturing machines are much more against the AMFm 
Diverging interests within their own fold for potential prequalification 
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How can CCM organize the different interests to achieve a common goal? There were some 
disagreements, power plays. 
Was the AMFm rushed? To the private sector, the AMFm may seem like a rush; so they wanted to buy 
time and disrupt the process 
Was the AMFm rushed? GF had made a timeline for the AMFm by accepting the intervention, CCM 
had bought into it 
Was the AMFm rushed? If had been given more time for discussion, would have missed the deadline 
Was the AMFm rushed? Took the AMFm decision based on wiping out monotherapies and price 
availability 
Was the AMFm rushed? So, why waste time with profit-driven private sector? 
Was the AMFm rushed? Overall, maybe experienced a one-month hold-up because of the manufacturers 
Getting to the application became a fight  
Opposition was toward going for the AMFm in general, not for the proposal writing 
Opponents didn't block the writing but tried to lobby and advocate [against it] 
PMAG does not completely frown on the idea of the AMFm but the process has not been rolled out well; we agree 
with idea of increasing quality and decreasing cost 
Local manufacturers are not pre-qualified; if the industry is not competitive, how could they fulfill the 
process of pre-qualification? 
PMAG presented ideas on how to partner with the project to empower the local industry to NMCP, CCM, MoH, 
MoF, MoTI, UNIDO but this was not very fruitful; GF/CCM not very interested in our ideas 
UNIDO is not much in favor of the AMFm but can't do much to stop it 
PMAG’s arguments have some merit but we were really on their side the whole time 
We tried to link them for pre-qualification, for example, with UNIDO 
We don't know what type of offer UNIDO is making  
Some manufacturers are not prepared to take the risk and make capital outlays [in order to pursue 
pre-qualification]; they can still produce non pre-qualified drugs for market 
PMAG attended a few CCM meetings and made the point that Ghana needed to be more nationalistic 
and futuristic in our policies 
For example, Sanofi and Aventis (two French companies) merged with each other rather than 
pursuing a merger with a German company 
GF wants to have high-quality drugs -WHO pre-qualified - but this is a financially-, HR-, and 
technologically-intensive task; it is a long road that takes too long 
Once have qualification, still no guarantee that people will buy your drugs 
Need to have assistance with the upgrade because otherwise, how can we sell drugs for cheap? 
Malaria will be with us for a while, we need to be futuristic in how we tackle it 
There is a lack of interest among global bodies in supporting the private sector; there was no actual 
direct dealing with the private sector except for international pharma, so how can we see this as a 
PPP? 
If we have to lay people off, it will drop them back into poverty, and their exposure to other diseases 
will increase 
Minister (not the MoH) was non-committal 
The Minister is an ass. He prolonged everything 
The Minister had it in for [NMCP PM] 
Minister delays the submission due to feet-dragging, leading us to come very close to the deadline 
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The private sector had foot soldiers hopping around the corridors of power 
Government found it difficult to quickly say "yes" because of the implications; private sector threatened to 
go on strike or demonstrate and may well have done so -- not responsive to its own national need 
Minister told manufacturers that CCM and GF "are trying to lobby me" 
All manufacturers pay politicians 
The manufacturers try to influence the government. Because they also are wholesalers and importers, they 
also participate in the tender process for almost everything. All the manufacturers have a hope that the 
government will support them more than the government does. So they try to create the enabling environment 
for government to support them. It makes a good business sense for them to be nice to all politicians because 
the government still buys, you know, whether through the hospitals, private hospitals and public hospitals, 
and public facilities, you know, you have to supply something. Maybe not ACTs, but something –like sutures, 
bandages, zinc, ORS… Most of them expect government to be giving them business loans so that they can 
move their business up. That is their eternal hope. 
Politically, we are yet to get to the state where the politicians have a commitment to anything apart from 
getting reelected. Investment in the pharmaceutical industry is going to show in two or three years, it will 
take time. 
Manufacturers have a strong lobby, so would be political suicide [for the Minister] to openly support 
the AMFm 
Minister could not come out and say 'we are for this program' 
Minister is a politician, so susceptible to lobbying 
Industry felt they had the power to influence the government 
 Minister at the time facing pressures from the local manufacturers 
PMAG has a strong lobby to vice-president 
Some attempted to derail the process through political connections because of concerns about 
employment; threatened they would have no option except to lay off employees. Made presentations to 
the highest level [doesn't know if or how high] 
The new government had just taken over in 2009 
Their [recently elected government] campaign messages had assured local industries and manufacturers they 
would be supported and bolstered 
PMAG tries to use this as trump card to oppose the AMFm 
New government facing a new program that would anger constituents 
PMAG lobbied the ministry a lot 
Minister heavily lobbied by industry; he promised PMAG not to worry 
When they left the table [from the emergency CCM meeting], PMAG sent strong representation to the 
Minister 
PMAG could have put more pressure on the government to do something to support pre-qualification 
but they did not do this 
Did they really believe that the AMFm would broaden the scope of the uses of its money or whether 
they were hoping to induce government to invest in them or if they sort of had an end game or if 
they didn’t really have an end game? There was no end game.  
The fight against the AMFm had a lot more to do with continuing the status quo rather than anything 
else. 
CCM does not require the Minister's signature for the proposal to be submitted, but needed 
representation / signature from all CCM members to endorse the submission 
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AMFm needed consent and commitment of government for application and to mitigate concerns of the 
private sector 
[CCM Chairman] needed the Minister to authorize the proposal 
Is or was the CCM a lobbying group? It is to an extent because it has a cross-section of representation; 
individual members put in a word [to government officials] but there was no formal lobby 
AMFm was political but was it party politics? Political fight had nothing to do with political parties  
AMFm was political but was it party politics? Difficult to say; indicators that some were trying to show 
political connotations 
While tendering the AMFm deal (end-2010), GHS bought 3 million doses of local ACTs; they 
paid 3 or 4 times as much for these [as they would under the AMFm] and possibly never paid 
the manufacturer 
Minister was in a corner; he needed a policy to go through without his confirmation 
[Before application due] Minister went into hiding, then told the chief director that he could write the letter 
[to CCM] when he was going out of the country 
Letter when the minister was going out of town (traveling) 
On last day to submit, CCM had to submit a letter that CCM was going ahead since the Ministry had not 
said "no" 
CCM sent letter saying "we take it we have your approval;" a passive yes 
Minister never said anything in writing about supporting the AMFm but gave a verbal commitment to 
Past-President PSGH , Deputy DG Public Health MoH  
PMAG unhappy because CCM went ahead 
Did it come close to being blocked? Unable to say 
 Did it require a call from Bill Clinton? Yes, Clinton did call the Late, Former President of Ghana 
to ask him to support the AMFm, just before the application was due 
How close was CCM to not submitting? I didn't have the impression that it would be blocked, it 
just required explanations, negotiations 
Did it require a call from Bill Clinton? Doubt that Bill Clinton called; there was not so much at 
stake to require that level of coaxing 
There was jostling and maneuvering based on access to President; either side could have won the day 
 Industry lobbied VP with a letter saying the AMFm would not take place 
VP could have changed the course, but Clinton called the Late, Former President of Ghana 
The Late, Former President of Ghana may have said something in his cabinet about supporting the 
AMFm but he never said anything in public 
NMCP had no choice when CCM said submitting 
Once the application went in, NMCP was committed fully 
 November 2009 - receive board approval of Phase I 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Cannot seriously predict outcomes 
over a short period of time 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Making room for uncertainties is 
important 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Moving along full supply chain can 
take time 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Progress requires confronting the truth 
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Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Failure to plan leads to failure 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? This was complex in terms of dealing 
with the private sector (profit-oriented); if there are delays or loopholes in the system, they may 
try to go around and create problems 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? There is a big gap between policy-making 
and implementation 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? When the government is getting involved 
in policy, need to consult all stakeholders to get a holistic picture of what getting into 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Politics are a struggle 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Had to deal with private sector 
participation 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Political lobbying very important [in 
health policy] 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Confidence and trust, and openness 
to talking facilitates the initiative 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? It is possible to have PPPs in 
developing settings; it requires trust and respect 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? The relationships and contracts between the 
Global Fund, the manufacturers, the NMCP, and the FLBs should be made clear, transparent, and consistent 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Should not roll out [something like the 
AMFm] until country on board 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? Stakeholders in Ghana are unanimous that 
the AMFm should continue post-phase I with modifications, including a key role for local manufacturers and financial 
sustainability plans from the government of Ghana 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? There was unanimous agreement that the 
AMFm should not and could not be terminated without undue and untoward consequences to all… Hence, the option 
favored in Ghana is to modify the AMFm 
Was Ghana ready for the AMFm? What were lessons learned? The political ramifications of termination 
are dire – the public will blame termination on the government of the day and this will have severe electoral 
ramifications (Ghanaians are going to the polls to elect a new President and Parliament in December 2012) 
Approved in July 2010 -- delay because of grant consolidation complications 
Once had the green light, NMCP had to also do PR work to sell the AMFm 
Between January and March 2010 starting to engage in sensitization 
At the stage which we were at, we had already moved beyond needing to decide if we were for or against it, so 
the idea was ‘how to live with it’ 
Because CCM is the oversight committee for the AMFm, it could not continue its implementation 
support. Therefore, it helped form the CC, though it continued to engage in implementation while 
this was being established. Previous GF grants have not required such an implementation 
committee.  
Deputy DG Public Health MoH made the point that… the key to success to the AMFm is the decision 
to involve the private sector. In building a PPP, there are many issues and questions. There was 
the need for the private sector to propose how it can effectively restructure to create its winning 
opportunities; the public sector will be there to support. He also emphasized that building local 
capacity is an important concern for the entire pharmaceutical sector. 
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The AMFm CC should be convened as soon as possible in order to begin coordinating important 
and time-sensitive work. The AMFm CC should: 
Have a good representation from the private sector 
Be housed under the NMCP but constituted by the CCM 
Have broad representation: NGO, government, private, etc. 
The proposed members of the AMFm CC are as follows: 
Private sector stakeholder representation: § PSGH, § LCS, § PMAG, § Society of Medical 
Practitioners, § Community Practice Pharmacists, § Pharmacy Business Executives 
 Public sector stakeholder representation: PC, FDB, NMCP PM, CCM, § Representative of the 
Policy, Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Unit, MoH, § Rep of the Coalition of NGOs in 
Malaria (local NGOs)  
 There were concerns about implementation transparency and solutions 
Only NMCP was PR for the grant; how would we get transparency? 
Form CC as the governance structure for the AMFm, to help bring transparency 
CCM shifted responsibility to the CC after application approved 
CC is representative of all stakeholders with an elected chairman 
CC has three (elected) co-chairs (SamBoateng (Director In MoH), Collins Agyarko Nti (head of 
coalition of NGOs in health), Doris Attafuah (at Vigdoris, previously vice-chair of PSGH) 
Retailers on the CC but not CCM 
[CCM Chairman] said the CC must be guided by its TOR, to ensure strong private 
sector buy-in, adopt open and transparent process for discussions, and to engage 
all relevant stakeholders for effective decision making 
Dr. Bart-Plange said the CC must not just be a talking show forum but members 
must consider themselves as an important implementing wing and partner to the 
success of the AMFm in Ghana 
Deputy DG NMCP said the purpose of the CC is to provide implementation advice 
across sectors and intends to meet regularly 
MoH representative said the representation on the committee was skewed toward the 
private sector in order to ensure effective collaboration and also to overcome 
barriers promptly 
It is expected that the committee works through NMCP by providing the advice 
needed to make sure the strategies that are being driven by the PR and other 
implementing partners across sectors are optimal 
Working out prices; working out how the pricing would work 
Retailers reluctantly agreed but manufacturers still against 
Possible strategies: Allow some manufacturers to import directly from the global manufacturers 
and renegotiate with the principle supplier. This was either Ghana-specific or at least started 
here 
Some said UNDP would help with getting local facilities up to (pre-qualification) standards; but 
most took this 'promise' with a grain of salt 
Ask potential FLBs 'if brought in a similar product, how would you price it?' 
Ghana has no price controls, so couldn't come out with a suggested price 
Supply-chain irregularities could skew price, so need a maximum retail price that would be publicly 
known (because simple monitoring) 
CHAI and AMFm CC co-Chair against having a maximum price but the rest wanted it 
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Discussed how pricing should look; make a suggested retail price (evolved as roll-out gained 
traction) 
Kenya the first country with a recommended retail price  
Ghana hesitant because no price control in the market 
This process was country-led and country-driven 
Awareness creation and marketing started late and without wide consultation  
The PM reminded members of the committee’s role, stressing that the committee 
must be prepared to really work and not become a mere talk show 
Membership of the CC: Dr. Bart-Plange called for consistent participation on the 
part of the members and suggested that all representatives should have alternates 
to stand in for them in the event of not being able to attend a meeting. She added 
that the alternates must be well-informed to keep continuity in the issues being 
discussed by the CC 
AMFm CC co-Chair raised the issue of the representation of NHIA on the CC since 
they are key buyers of drugs and service in the health sector in Ghana… the house 
agreed to invite NHIA as members of the CC 
A representative of the importers and wholesalers association was also to be 
invited once the group was properly organized 
 The house agreed that the CC should report directly to the CCM. The decision 
overturned the first decision of the committee to report through the NMCP 
AMFm CC co-Chair suggested the establishment of sub-committees to handle the 
tasks. He said this was necessary in view of the volume of tasks needing to be 
accomplished before the next meeting 
All CC members were to act as liaisons between the committee and the sectors 
that its members represent 
Administrative/Monitoring subcommittee - § Convener: Deputy DG NMCP; § 
Responsibilities: Oversee the preparations for the launch of the AMFm Phase I, 
Review reports submitted to the AMFm-CC, Provide guidance to the PR on 
implementation, Advise the PR on critical strategic and policy matters related to 
the AMFm Phase I, Provide direction on resolving any bottlenecks during 
implementation, Advise on the activities for monitoring the AMFm 
Technical subcommittee - Convener: (AMFm CC co-Chair. MoH); Responsibilities: 
Advise on strategies for key the AMFm activities such as information collection, 
drug forecasting, pricing, regulatory issues, and supply chain optimization, 
Explore and implement a range of private sector interventions to maximize reach 
of ACTs throughout Ghana 
Advocacy subcommittee - Convener: Dr. Priscilla Nortey (Academia); 
Responsibilities: IEC/BCC and advocacy, Advise on key strategies to improve 
adherence of partners to agreed-upon strategies, Provide direction on resolving 
any emerging bottlenecks during implementation of the AMFm 
The AMFm in Ghana is seen as having built strong PPPs and collaboration. It brought on board all players including 
the local pharmaceutical industry, some of whom are FLBs.  
NMCP has an improved relationship with the local private sector (importers) 
Public sector stakeholders said that the AMFm had improved not just collaboration externally with the private sector 
but has increased internal communication and collaboration between agencies of the MoH (NMCP, PC, FDB, NHIA) 
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The AMFm has built up a strong PPP between MoH, its ministries and departments, and the government of Ghana 
on one side and the pharmaceutical manufacturers, FLBs, private pharmacies, private doctors, and LCSs on the other 
side 
Not always easy to get everyone to talk together; as a PPP, CC definitely doing very well in 
providing an open forum 
CC provided an open-forum discussion, equalizing power across all stakeholders, bringing all into 
the decision-making process 
CC engagement has been positive; transparency and accountability have been achieved 
Balance of power in CC equally distributed around the table; met 'in the open' 
Openness and transparency; all peoples' views are valued, all sit together if an issue comes up 
After application, begin sensitization (explaining what the AMFm is) 
No other sensitization occurred until got final approval on application 
 Several stakeholders meetings to try to convince them to become FLBs 
CCM advertises for FLB; tries to get as many as possible by painting it as a 'public good' 
Sell to retail by 'public good argument’, and that the ACTs were highest quality (quality-
assured) 
It was hard to find a financial argument because demand depends on sickness, so there will be some 
peak to demand 
Particularly in Anglophone countries, where there are more liberal policies regarding the number of 
wholesalers, there are a lot of relationships to manage. (Francophone countries tend to have more control 
and restrict the number of wholesalers to 4 or 5) 
CCM engaged with PMAG and kept hammering the issue of CSR and public goods; gained gradual 
acceptance 
CHAI made a pricing tool meant to help build the business case for manufacturers 
Encouraged those importers with a good network to become FLBs  
[Stakeholders meeting] End January 2010 – first stakeholders meeting with the private sector; describe 
details of the application and talk about details of implementation 
[Stakeholders meeting] Objective: gather input from key private sector stakeholders 
and resolve key private sector distribution strategy issues 
[Stakeholders meeting] Overview presentation of how implementation would go – channels, pricing in the 
public and private sector 
[Stakeholders meeting] Ask the big in-country pharma distributors to propose pricing strategies, for example, 
the best channels for private distribution, and what marketing initiatives were needed, and what regulatory 
systems 
GF Secretariat on-hand to respond to concerns 
Outcomes: Sensitize participants on the AMFm 
Outcomes: Document recommended strategy for distribution of ACTs in the 
private sector 
Outcomes: Agreement on a pricing system to ensure the end user gets ACTs at an 
affordable price 
Outcomes: Agreement on the mode of ensuring information flow for the success 
of the AMFm 
Outcomes: One major concern was what will happen to the stock of antimalarials 
that retailers had with the arrival of co-paid ACTs. The potential for a buy-back 
was raised and GF indicated that if this becomes a legitimate alternative, 
countries will be notified.  
Outcomes: they should operate under the assumption that it is not an alternative 
for the time being  
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Outcomes: the President of PSGH reiterated the fact that the AMFm was coming 
and the private sector needs to position itself to determine how to respond to give 
the AMFm the greatest possible chance of success, and to give the business sector 
the greatest possible opportunity to participate 
Also one-on-one discussions with importers, led by CCM Chairman 
Tell importers and distributors if decide not to get involved, you will be priced out of the market 
CHAI and Chair of CCM engaged with the private sector, using Chair of CCM’s connections with 
importers and PMAG 
Communication to private sector took time to help them understand; this was not business as 
usual 
Late night meetings with CHAI, going around to do one-on-ones 
Assumptions about selling in volume were based on promises of publicity [for the new drugs]; 
there were questions/concerns about whether this volume would be enough to make-up for lower 
cost 
The one-on-one meetings played a big role because things were abstract to them, so had to explain 
the details to them 
In July/August, PSGH did pharmacist training on the AMFm and most of the noise died down 
 Importers/wholesalers – 200 registered in 2009 
30+ manufacturers in Ghana, though some were never making antimalarials 
200 importers dealing with cheap pharmaceuticals; all were potential the AMFm FLBs ( GF put no 
restriction on number of importers for the AMFm) 
GF was happy to let manufacturers become FLBs, (i.e. They would not have a single FLB for 
Novartis) 
CCM involved in FLB selection process, documentation 
All of them who were making noise came in to register 
If you look at the AMFm there was a lot of resistance from local manufacturers but if you look at the data 
those same local manufacturers were actually the first line buyers.  
Once the application had been approved, importers came in for form 
From all the noise, they came back to the table. They did not have genuine concerns / interests / reasons 
(only surface, not genuine, reasons to condemn the AMFm) 
Many local manufacturers agree to be importers 
They are part of the importers because it is their second choice, not the first 
Need to compromise on some issues and move forward 
Initial uptake was slow, with weeks in-between; 4 signed up in 2 months; after 3-4 months, 
10-20 signed up 
Didn't sign on all at once; one after the other 
They came in one-by-one [not in groups]; some were inquiring about who else came for the form 
CCM’s prior “engagement” with private sector was maybe not so good; it was clear the 
engagement didn’t have much meaning because the details were still vague 
Gradual sign-ups to become FLBs  
Quite a lot of FLBs came quite quickly because they had already been through all the arguments  
Within the manufacturers, there was no peer pressure, no ring leader; once it was coming, just fought with 
each other to ‘get on board’ 
Early sign-ups to serve as champion 
 291 
Limited unity among the local manufacturers; there is a gap between those that want to produce to global 
standards and those that want to maintain local standards 
Apart from having a united stand against the AMFm, the manufacturers in Africa have not presented a 
united front.  
Even as a group [manufacturers], no one wants to discuss what they import, or what they have in stock  
Manufacturers and importers don’t want to discuss business interests with each other 
 They switched from thinking about how to stop the AMFm to thinking about how to exploit it  
Started pushing for sign-ups with big suppliers that already had supply chains in place, have 
big distribution networks and already have relationships with the pre-qualified manufacturers 
Most that signed up first already had a relationship and supply chain with a pre-qualified 
manufacturer 
FLBs tried to set a maximum wholesale price; acting as a cartel and killing market forces 
One who opted out of being an importer thought he could do more on his own to seek pre-
qualification, build on his own capacity 
Local manufacturers don’t want to be pre-qualified for ACTs now but once pre-qualified for one drug, becomes 
easier to go over the bar for the others 
At the end of the day, the private sector has really lived up to and supported the program; private FLBs 
had much faster procurement than the government 
Public sector has trouble importing 
Procurement challenges, especially public sector procurement, takes longer 
Government took some time dealing with procurement, other malaria drugs in system 
Because private sector did not need to go through the public sector for procurement, get much 
faster than private sector 
Stakeholders, especially FLBs, very frustrated with stock-outs and the fact that only portions of the requested products 
were supplied 
By December 2010, held an "early lessons learned" meeting 
Some manufacturers not ready to do business with all the FLBs that had signed up 
International manufacturers wanted to select certain distributors through a 'second-stage clearance' but 
this is not what GF agreement says 
AMFm not fulfilling/honoring all orders of the FLBs [32] leading to heated meeting 
Local manufacturers realized they could get on board as FLBs; now they are angry that they are 
not getting enough drugs – some are not getting the drugs at all 
More FLBs could sign on but no one else may want to 
there should have been more rules and guidelines from GF 
It looks like we have been exonerated [for resisting the AMFm] 
GF has been cancelled because of lack of funds; they have done more harm than good 
Planning to "go public" [about failings of the AMFm]; we have been disappointed, will tell people to only 
buy local from now on 
Even now, if the local industry gets an opportunity, they will speak against the AMFm 
Local manufacturers have ceased production 
The manufacturers are businessmen and know how to compete 
Most local manufacturers have stopped producing ACTs unless they have a contract with the 
government for SP IPT 
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 If it can be manufactured in-country, this makes things easier but quality has been an issue in 
the past 
[Food and Drug Board] is a big joke 
Our regulatory process has been so politicized that the regulators are chosen not based on ability but based 
on political patronage. All the regulators in this administration and the previous one belong to the 
government of the day and they were chosen purely because of politics.  
Need systematic enforcement of regulation for what comes in and how it is treated; but at 
FDB, you can just dash off [bribe] anyone 
FDB CEO is letting it slide that monotherapies are being brought into Ghana [under the AMFm] 
Why are we seeing shortages of supply? 
Major stock-outs among FLBs, so then what happens? It has not been managed properly. 
If there are stock-outs, people are costed out of buying ACTs, so still revert to chloroquine. 
So has the purpose been achieved? 
Shortage is really about AL; many people don't like AA, some practitioners won't prescribe 
it; we have had many doses expiring in the hospital 
Even though AA is the 'drug of choice,' everyone wants AL 
AMFm is building Pharmacy Council's capacity as researchers 
MoTI may have problems because of limited guarantee of sustainability 
Needed to involve various stakeholders - MoTI and Ministry of Finance 
Did not stop import of other ACTs 
The fact that taxes and tariffs on the AMFm ACTs have not been waived is a challenge whose successful resolution 
will enhance the image of government and demonstrate high level political commitment in a tangible way 
The private sector providers and FLBs see their participation in the AMFm as CSR in view of the low prices. They, 
however, claim the fact that the AMFm ACTs are being used widely by all including the poor and vulnerable shows 
their concern for the poor since they distribute these products far and wide regardless of the transportation and logistics 
challenges 
FLBs called for mechanisms to give prominent recognition to FLBs either during (AMFm) adverts or on websites and 
prominent places 
AMFm has enabled the private sector to work in public health receiving little or no profits but receiving an opportunity 
to get involved in what they call ‘good quality CSR’ 
Ghana has a peculiar system because MoH does policy while GHS does technical and implementation 
work 
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APPENDIX B. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Table 22: News items containing reference to “malaria” 
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Table 23: News items containing reference to “national health insurance” 
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APPENDIX C. ETHICAL APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX D. RETAILER QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX E. RETAILER INTERVIEWS: FULL ANSWERS FOR SELECT 
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
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APPENDIX F. RETAILER FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS FROM PACT 
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APPENDIX G. PACT FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
  Yes No Don’t know Refuse  
U2 Is it your opinion that malaria can 
actually kill any adult? 
1 2 -888 -999 
By adult, we mean people 18 
years and older. 
U3 Is it your opinion that malaria can 
actually kill a child under 9 yrs old? 
1 2 -888 -999 
 
U4 Is it your opinion that malaria can 
actually kill a pregnant woman? 
1 2 -888 -999 
The pregnant woman can be of 
any age. 
U5 Have you heard about malaria drugs 
called ACTs? 
1 2 -888 -999 
 
U5a Have you heard any information in 
the last week about malaria or 
malaria drugs?  If so, describe. 
No (don’t  know) 
Refuse……..……. 
Yes, explain…… 
2 
-999 
1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U5b What may happen to you if you take 
non-ACT malaria drugs -- older drugs 
like chloroquine or Malafan? 
Don’t know……… 
Refuse……..…….. 
Explain: 
 
 
  
-888 
-999 
U5c What may happen to your 
community if many people take non-
ACT malaria drugs -- older drugs like 
chloroquine or Malafan? 
Don’t know…... -888    
Refuse…………… 
Explain: 
 
 
 
-999 
  
 
U5d Have you heard that malaria drugs 
other than ACTs, such as older drugs, 
might not cure you completely from 
malaria? 
1 2 -888 -999 
 
U5e Have you heard that malaria drugs 
other than ACTs, such as older drugs, 
may no longer work in your 
community? 
1 2 -888 -999 
 
U6 Have you seen this logo (show 
AMFm logo) 
Yes................................. 
No.................................. 
Don’t know.................... 
1 
2 
-888 
 
 SKIP to COMIC 
 SKIP to COMIC 
U6a What do you know about this logo? Don’t know………………… 
Refuse………………………… 
Explain: 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
-888 
 
 
  
 
U. AWARENESS OF MALARIA & AMFM  Instructions 
U1
  
Compared to all the health problems 
in this community, how common is 
malaria? 
   
Not common........................……............... 
Somewhat common.................................. 
The most common............…….................. 
Don’t know...................……….................... 
Refuse....................................................... 
1 
2 
3 
-888 
-999 
Can prompt with answer 
choices. 
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SURVEYOR NOTE: How many people are listening to this education session?  [____ | ____] 
 
ALL MESSAGES START WITH THESE POINTS… 
o When a mosquito bites a person, it can inject malaria into his or her blood 
o When malaria is inside the body, it makes you feel unwell, such as having a fever 
o When you think you have malaria, you should get a blood test. 
 
□ MESSAGE 1 – uses page 1 of the comic only 
o If you actually have malaria, take the treatment prescribed to you. 
 
□ MESSAGE 2 – uses pages 1 & 2 of the comic 
o If you actually have malaria, you will have a choice of which drugs to take. 
o Some of the older drugs – with which you may be familiar like Chloroquine – do not work as well as they used to.  Because 
these drugs have been around for some time, some of the malaria is now stronger than these drugs. 
o It may be the case that if you take one of these older drugs, it may not kill all the malaria, so you will not be completely 
cured and may not feel better 
o However, ACTs, the new combination drugs that have been available in Ghana since 2005, can kill all the malaria, even that 
stronger than the old drugs. This means it is more likely that you will be completely cured.  
o  
□ MESSAGE 3 – uses pages 1 & 2 of the comic 
o If you actually have malaria, you will have a choice of which drugs to take. 
o Some of the older drugs – with which you may be familiar like Chloroquine – do not work as well as they used to.  Because 
these drugs have been around for some time, some of the malaria is now stronger than these drugs. 
o It may be the case that if someone takes these older drugs, it may not kill all the malaria.  When another mosquito bites 
this person, it will swallow these stronger parasites, which it then will inject into the next person it bites.  This person will 
not be able to kill all the malaria with the older drugs.  When this happens, the whole community is less safe from malaria. 
o However, ACTs, the new combination drugs that have been available in Ghana since 2005, can kill all the malaria, even 
those stronger than the old drugs. This means that when a mosquito bites a person with malaria, it will not pick up any 
living parasites with which it can infect another person. 
 
□ MESSAGE 4 – uses pages 1 & 2 of the comic 
o If you actually have malaria, you will have a choice of which drugs to take. 
o Some of the older drugs – with which you may be familiar like Chloroquine – do not work as well as they used to.  Because 
these drugs have been around for some time, some of the malaria is now stronger than these drugs. 
o It may be the case that if you take these older drugs, it may not kill all the malaria.  You may not be completely cured and 
may not feel better. 
o In addition, when another mosquito bites you, it will swallow these stronger parasites, which it then will inject into the 
next person it bites.  This next person will not be able to kill all the malaria with the older drugs.  When this happens, the 
whole community is less safe from malaria. 
o However, ACTs, the new combination drugs that have been available in Ghana since 2005, can kill all the parasites, even 
those that are stronger than the old drugs. This means that when a mosquito bites a person with malaria, it will not pick up 
any living parasites with which it can infect another person. 
 
□ MESSAGE 5 – uses pages 1 & 2 of the comic 
o If you actually have malaria, you will have a choice of which drugs to take. 
o Some of the older drugs – with which you may be familiar like Chloroquine – do not work as well as they used to.  Because 
these drugs have been around for some time, some of the malaria is now stronger than these drugs. 
o It may be the case that if someone takes these older drugs, it may not kill all the malaria.  When another mosquito bites 
this person, it will swallow these stronger parasites, which it then will inject into the next person it bites.  When this 
happens, the whole community is less safe from malaria. 
o In addition, even after taking some drugs, if you are infected with the stronger parasites, you may not be completely cured 
and may not feel better. 
o However, ACTs, the new combination drugs that have been available in Ghana since 2005, can kill all the parasites, even 
those that are stronger than the old drugs. This means that when a person has malaria, even if it is the stronger parasites, 
s/he will be able to cure the malaria completely and feel better. 
 
 
 
U7 What new things, if anything, did you learn about malaria drugs from this education? 
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V. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
SURVEYOR NOTE: please make sure to find a comfortable space for the respondent before beginning this section. 
V1 Sometimes, there are issues with trust 
and communication between people 
living in the same village/community.   
 
To what extent (not very much, 
somewhat, very much) are trust and 
communication hindered in your 
village/community [BETWEEN THE 
FOLLOWING GROUPS].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEYOR NOTE:  
Circle the number that corresponds to 
the respondent’s answer 
 
 Very 
much 
Somewhat Not very 
much 
Not at 
all 
Don’t 
know 
Refuse 
a. Between differences in 
formal education 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
b. Between differences in 
wealth/ material possessions 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
c. Between differences in 
landholdings 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
d. Between differences in 
social status 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
e. Between men and women 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
f. Between younger and 
older generations 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
g. Between long- time 
inhabitants and new settlers 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
h. Between political party 
affiliations 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
i. Between religious beliefs 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
j. Between differences in 
ethnic background 
 
1 2 3 4 -888 -999 
 
V2 Please tell me whether, in general, you 
agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Agree Disagree Don’t 
know 
Refuse 
a. Most people in this village/ community are 
basically honest and can be trusted 
1 2 -888 -999 
b. People are always interested only in their own 
welfare 
 
1 2 -888 -999 
c. Members of this village/community are more 
trustworthy than others 
1 2 -888 -999 
d. In this village/ community, one has to be alert 
or someone is likely to take advantage of you 
1 2 -888 -999 
e. If I have an issue, there is always someone to 
help me 
 
1 2 -888 -999 
f. I do not pay attention to the opinions of others 
in the village/ community 
1 2 -888 -999 
g. Most people in this village/community are 
willing to help you with finances if you need it 
1 2 -888 -999 
h. Most people in this village/community are 
willing to help you with non-financial matters if 
you need it 
1 2 -888 -999 
i. This village/community has prospered in the last 
five years 
1 2 -888 -999 
j. I feel accepted as a member of this village/ 
community 
 
1 2 -888 -999 
   
SURVEYOR SAY: “Thank you very much for your time!”  Time end: [___ | ___] hours : [___ | ___] minutes 
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APPENDIX H. AMFM OUTCOMES FROM THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION 
 
 
Table 24: AMFm Indpendent Evaluation results reporting on affordability and availability indicators for 
s-QA.ACTs in Ghana at end-2012. Ghana surpassed the benchmark for availability and just met the 
benchmark for afforability. All prices in US$, at exchange rate of GH₵ 1.67 to US$ 1.00. 
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Table 25: Nov and Dec 2011 antimalarial availability, the AMFm Independent Evaluation (IndE) 
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Table 26: Nov and Dec 2011 antimalarial retail prices, the AMFm Independent Evaluation (IndE) 
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Table 27 Nov and Dec 2011 median percentage (gross) mark-ups between antimalarial supply and retail 
prices, the AMFm Independent Evaluation (IndE) 
 
 
